The African Union and the Development of African International Criminal Law by Kahombo, Balingene
                                
 
The African Union and the Development of African 








Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors des Rechts 
am Fachbereich Rechtswissenschaft  
der  















Erstgutachterin: Prof. Dr. Heike Krieger 
Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Helmut Philipp Aust 
















































I declare that the thesis titled “The African Union and the Development of African 
International Criminal Law”, which I hereby submit for the degree Doctor of Philosophy, at 
the Law Departement of Freie Universität Berlin, is my work and has not previously been 
submitted by me for a degree or examination at this or another university. Where secondary 










List of Legal Texts ..................................................................................................................... x 
List of Cases ........................................................................................................................ xxxiv 
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................... xlv 
General Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 
1. The Particular Context of the Study ............................................................................... 3 
1.1. The Regionalisation of International Criminal Law ............................................... 3 
1.1.1. The Relative Absolute Universalism ..................................................................... 4 
1.1.2. The Revival of International Legal Regionalism ................................................. 11 
1.2. The Potential Regional Fragmentation of International Criminal Law ...................... 16 
1.2.1. The Ambiguity of the Doctrinal Debate .............................................................. 17 
1.2.2. The New Perspective: Towards a New Order of International Criminal Law .... 21 
2. The Question of African International Criminal Law ................................................ 24 
2.1. The Landmarks of the Legal Development of the Concept .................................. 24 
2.1.1. The Existence of African International Law........................................................ 24 
2.1.2. The Object of African International Criminal Law ............................................. 31 
2.2. The Axes of Analysis ................................................................................................ 34 
2.2.1. The Search for a Regional Legal Regime in a System-Oriented Approach ........ 34 
2.2.2. The Influence of Pan-African and TWAIL Thoughts ......................................... 38 
3. The Structure of the Thesis ............................................................................................ 41 
Part I. The Crisis of Universal International Criminal Law .............................................. 42 
1. The Decline of State Sovereignty on Domestic Criminal Jurisdiction ....................... 44 
1.1. The Expansion of Competing Criminal Jurisdictions .......................................... 47 
1.1.1. The Scope of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction ............................................................ 47 
1.1.1.1. The Diverging Conceptions on the Sources of Extraterritoriality ................. 47 
1.1.1.2. The Extension of Heads of Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction ................ 53 
1.1.2. The Jurisdiction of the International Community ................................................ 57 
1.1.2.1. The Shift towards Global Legal Moralisation and Humanitarianism ........... 57 
1.1.2.2. The Sources of the International Criminal Jurisdiction ................................ 62 
1.2. The Duty on States to Exercise Domestic Criminal Jurisdiction ......................... 68 
1.2.1. The Result of Two Separate and Interdependent Obligations ............................. 68 
1.2.1.1. The Duty to Take National Implementation Measures ................................. 69 
1.2.1.2. The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute ............................................................... 74 
1.2.2. The Risks of a Weak Legal Flexibility for the Territorial State .......................... 81 
1.2.2.1. The Trend towards Absolute Individual Criminal Prosecutions ................... 81 
iv 
a) The Alleged Benefits of the Sentencing Goal of Criminal Prosecutions ........... 82 
b) The Potential Denial of Local Alternative Mechanisms to Criminal Prosecutions
 ................................................................................................................................ 87 
i) The Logic of Nuremberg .................................................................................. 87 
ii) The Difficult Acceptance of Local Non-Prosecution Options ........................ 90 
1.2.2.2. The Consequences of the Failure to Prosecute .............................................. 94 
a) The External Judicial Intervention ...................................................................... 94 
b) The Threat of International Sanctions ................................................................ 98 
i) The Sanctions of Collective Security................................................................ 98 
ii) The Sanction of the State Responsibility ....................................................... 103 
1°) The Case of President Hissène Habré ..................................................... 103 
2°) The State of Senegal on the Bench ........................................................... 106 
2. The Rise of Objections against the System of International Criminal Justice........ 111 
2.1. The Disapproval of the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction ......... 112 
2.1.1. The Repetition of Persistent Interstate Contestations ........................................ 114 
2.1.1.1. The Presence of the Accused in the Territory of the Prosecuting State ...... 114 
a) The Debate under International Treaty Law ..................................................... 116 
b) The Debate under Customary International Law ............................................. 118 
2.1.1.2. The Subjection of State Officials to Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction ............ 126 
a) The Perception of a Serious Danger in the Relationship between Independent 
States ..................................................................................................................... 126 
b) The Shield of the African Conception of Horizontal State Sovereignty .......... 129 
2.1.2. The Contestation of the European Judicial Interventions in Africa................... 134 
2.1.2.1. The Paradox Characterising the Dispute ..................................................... 134 
a) The Indictments of African Leaders in European States .................................. 135 
i) The Preliminary Observations ....................................................................... 135 
ii) The French Proceedings ............................................................................... 139 
iii)  The Belgian and Spanish Proceedings ....................................................... 143 
b) The Impunity of African Leaders in the African Continent ............................. 147 
i) The Relative Positive Impact of European Proceedings in African States .... 147 
ii) The Poor Performance of African Domestic Courts .................................... 152 
1°) The Limits of the Exercise of Territorial Jurisdiction ............................. 153 
2°) The Relative Default of the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction ............... 158 
iii) The Causes of the Judicial Inertia of African States ................................... 164 
2.1.2.2. The Alleged Abuse of Jurisdictional Power by European States ................ 167 
a) The Arguments in Support of the Allegation ................................................... 167 
v 
b) The Mitigation of the Disagreement with European States ............................. 170 
2.2. The Contention over the International Criminal Court ............................................ 173 
2.2.1. The Divergence of Views between States on the Court’s Establishment .......... 175 
2.2.1.1. The Unrealised Legal Expectations on the Part of African States .............. 175 
a) The Court’s Institutional Status ........................................................................ 176 
b) The Scope of the Court’s Jurisdiction .............................................................. 180 
2.2.1.2. The Crisis of Participation in the Court ...................................................... 185 
a) The Justification of Non-membership .............................................................. 186 
b) The Justification of Membership ...................................................................... 188 
i) The Free Consent of African States to the ICC Statute ................................. 189 
ii) The Context of Pressure and the International Strategy of Enticement of 
African States .................................................................................................... 192 
2.2.2. The Hostility against the Court’s Judicial Work in Africa ................................ 196 
2.2.2.1. The Radicalisation of African Criticisms .................................................... 197 
a) The Development of the Common African Position on the ICC ...................... 198 
b) The Allegations of Politics behind the Means of Law and Justice................... 199 
i) The Suspicion of Collusion between the Court and Great Powers ................ 200 
ii) The Avoidance of Positive Application of the Principle of Complementarity
 ........................................................................................................................... 204 
1°) The Situation in Kenya ............................................................................. 204 
-  The Trigger of the ICC’s Intervention .................................................... 204 
- The Denial of Kenya’s Primary Jurisdictional Right .............................. 207 
2°) The Situation in Sudan ............................................................................. 213 
2.2.2.2. The Defence of the Court ............................................................................ 217 
a) The Continuing Support for the ICC in Africa ................................................. 217 
b) The Attempt to Vindicate the Office of the Prosecutor .................................... 220 
c) The Interaction between Peace and Justice ...................................................... 225 
2.2.3. The Disagreement on the Irrelevance of State Officials’ Immunity .................. 229 
2.2.3.1. The Potential Plea for State Officials’ Immunity before International 
Tribunals ................................................................................................................... 231 
a) The Clarification of the Legal Issue at Stake.................................................... 232 
b) The Court’s Main Findings .............................................................................. 237 
i) The Recourse to the Charter of the United Nations to Reject the Plea for 
Personal Immunity ............................................................................................ 238 
ii) The Paradox of Three Contradictory Theses on Head of State’s Personal 
Immunity ............................................................................................................ 239 
vi 
2.2.3.2. The Misunderstanding of the Intent and the Power of the Security Council
 .................................................................................................................................. 244 
a) The Issue of Implicit Waiver of Immunity ....................................................... 245 
b) The Lack of Logic in the Judicial Construction of the Pre-Trial Chamber II .. 247 
c) The Power of the Security Council to Lift Applicable Personal Immunity in 
Question ................................................................................................................ 249 
2.2.3.3. The Court’s Reversal of Previous Findings on Personal Immunity ............ 250 
a) The Decision of 6 July 2017 ............................................................................. 250 
b) The Discussion of the New Finding of the Court on Personal Immunity ........ 252 
3. The Claims for Legal Reforms by Member States of the African Union ................ 254 
3.1. The Logic of International Negotiations .............................................................. 254 
3.1.1. The Mobilisation of Multilateral Forums .......................................................... 254 
3.1.1.1. The United Nations General Assembly ....................................................... 255 
3.1.1.2. The Assembly of States Parties ................................................................... 258 
3.1.2. The Proposals for Reforms Emanating from Africa .......................................... 261 
3.1.2.1. The Regulation of the Scope and Application of Universal Jurisdiction .... 261 
a) The Legal Options of the African Union .......................................................... 261 
b) The Search for Restrictions on the Use of Universal Jurisdiction.................... 265 
i) The Identification of Issues under Discussion within the Sixth Committee ... 266 
ii) The Question of Subsidiarity ........................................................................ 269 
3.1.2.2. The Proposed Reform of the ICC Justice System ....................................... 274 
a) The Earlier Initiatives of the African Union ..................................................... 274 
b) The African Proposals for Amendments to the ICC Statute ............................ 277 
i) The Submissions of South Africa and Kenya ................................................. 277 
ii) The Potential Obstacles against the Proposed African Amendments .......... 282 
3.2. The Logic of International Confrontation ........................................................... 286 
3.2.1. The Protective Measures of the African Union ................................................. 287 
3.2.1.1. The Obligation not to Cooperate ................................................................. 287 
a) The Political Context ........................................................................................ 288 
b) The Legal Context ............................................................................................ 290 
i)  The Rise of Competing Obligations .............................................................. 290 
ii) The Battle of Legal Solutions ........................................................................ 292 
3.2.1.2. The Threat of Collective Withdrawal of African States from the ICC ....... 295 
3.2.2. The International Resistance against the Claims for Legal Reforms................. 299 
4. Conclusion of Part I ...................................................................................................... 302 
  
vii 
Part II. The Pillars of African International Criminal Law ............................................ 304 
1. The Emergence of African Regional Public Order.................................................... 305 
1.1. The Definition of the Concept ............................................................................... 306 
1.1.1. The Order of Protection by Regional Rules of Fundemental Importance for 
Africa ........................................................................................................................... 307 
1.1.1.1. The Question of Regional Jus Cogens ........................................................ 307 
a) The Relationship with the Notion of Public Order ........................................... 308 
b) The Existence of a Regional Legal and Institutional Hierarchy ....................... 312 
1.1.1.2. The Specificity of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights ..... 316 
a) The Absence of Derogation from the Minimum Standards of the Charter ...... 316 
b) The Possible Consequences for the Safeguard of Regional Public Order ........ 322 
1.1.2. The Order of Defence Against Regional Security Threats ................................ 325 
1.1.2.1. The Evolution from the OAU to the African Union ................................... 325 
a) The Weaknesses of the OAU System ............................................................... 325 
b) The Advent of the Common African Defence and Security Policy ................. 328 
1.1.2.2. The Reorganisation of Institutions of Security and Defence ...................... 331 
a) The African Union as a Community of States and Peoples.............................. 332 
b) The Right of the African Union to Intervene in a Member State ..................... 336 
1.2. The Codification of Crimes against Peace and Security in Africa .................... 340 
1.2.1. The Combination of International and Transnational Crimes ........................... 341 
1.2.2. The Regionalisation of ICC Crimes................................................................... 345 
1.2.2.1 The Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes .......... 346 
a) The Failure to Expand the Ambit of the Crime of Genocide ........................... 346 
b) The Ambiguity of Crimes against Humanity ................................................... 349 
c) The Scope of War Crimes between Progress and Omissions ........................... 351 
i) The Progressive Definition of the Malabo Protocol ...................................... 352 
1°) The Criminalisation of the Use of Nuclear Weapons or Other Weapons of 
Mass Destruction ........................................................................................... 353 
2°) The Incorporation of Other Crimes ......................................................... 354 
ii) The Omissions of the Malabo Protocol ........................................................ 356 
1.2.2.2. The Specificity of the Crime of Aggression ................................................ 358 
1.2.3. The Codification of Other Crimes ..................................................................... 361 
1.2.3.1. The Crimes against the Security of the State .............................................. 361 
a) The Crime of Political Assassination and Subversion ...................................... 361 
b) The Crime of Mercenarism .............................................................................. 364 
c) The Crime of Unconstitutional Change of Government................................... 368 
viii 
i) The Passage from Prohibition to Criminalisation ......................................... 369 
ii) The Potential Perpetrators of the Crime ...................................................... 373 
1.2.3.2. The Crimes against Human Security ........................................................... 375 
a) The Crimes of Piracy and Terrorism ................................................................ 375 
i) The Definition of Piracy ................................................................................ 375 
ii) The Definition of Terrorism .......................................................................... 377 
b) The Crime of Illicit Exploitation of Natural Resources ................................... 380 
c) The Crimes of Corruption and Money Laundering .......................................... 383 
i) The Malabo Protocol against Grand Corruption .......................................... 383 
ii) The Dependency of Money Laundering on Corruption ................................ 385 
d) The Crimes of Trafficking in Persons, Drugs or Hazardous Wastes in Africa 386 
i) The Trafficking in Persons ............................................................................. 386 
ii) The Trafficking in Drugs .............................................................................. 388 
iii) The Trafficking in Hazardous Wastes in Africa .......................................... 389 
2. The Promotion of the System of African Regional Criminal Justice ....................... 392 
2.1. The Available Judicial Options to the African Union ......................................... 393 
2.1.1. The Delegation of Jurisdiction to a Member State ............................................ 393 
2.1.1.1. The Novelty of the Senegalese Precedent ................................................... 394 
2.1.1.2. The Problems of Legality and Implementation ........................................... 398 
2.1.2. The Creation of Hybrid Criminal Tribunals ...................................................... 402 
2.1.2.1. The Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalese Courts ................. 402 
a) The Process of Establishment of the Chambers ............................................... 403 
b) The Main Features of the Chambers: an Innovation? ...................................... 407 
2.1.2.2. The Call for the Creation of a Hybrid Court for Darfur .............................. 411 
2.1.3. The Establishment of the Criminal Court of the African Union........................ 415 
2.1.3.1. The Historical Evolution ............................................................................. 415 
a) From Emergence to Maturation of the Project ................................................. 415 
b) The Drafting Process of the Court’s Statute ..................................................... 420 
2.1.3.2. The Status of the Court ................................................................................ 423 
a) The Case for a Single Regional Criminal Jurisdiction for Africa .................... 424 
b) The Case for a Permanent or Non-Permanent Court ........................................ 427 
2.2. The Viability of the Criminal Court of the African Union ................................. 430 
2.2.1. The Conditions of Operationalisation ................................................................ 430 
2.2.1.1. The Ratification of the Malabo Protocol ..................................................... 430 
2.2.1.2. The Operationalisation of the Court’s Structure ......................................... 433 
ix 
2.2.1.3. The Completion of the Definition of the Court’s Applicable Law ............. 437 
2.2.2. The Ambitious Jurisdiction of he Court ............................................................ 441 
2.2.2.1. The Broad List of Crimes Covered ............................................................. 441 
2.2.2.2. The Admission of Corporate Criminal Liability ......................................... 444 
2.2.2.3. The Court’s Trigger Mechanisms ............................................................... 449 
2.2.3. The Factors Susceptible to Hamper the Court’s Jurisdiction ............................ 453 
2.2.3.1. The Expanded Immunity Provisions ........................................................... 453 
2.2.3.2. The Low Standards of the Court’s Complementary Jurisdiction ................ 457 
2.2.3.3. The Potential Non-Cooperation of African States ...................................... 461 
a) The Facets of Judicial Cooperation under the Malabo Protocol ....................... 462 
b) The Need for a Comprehensive Legal Framework on Judicial Cooperation ... 465 
2.2.3.4. The Funding of the Court in Question ........................................................ 469 
3. The Relationship with the Global System of International Criminal Justice ......... 474 
3.1. The Coordination with the Criminal Court of the African Union .................... 476 
3.1.1. The Relationship with the ICC .......................................................................... 476 
3.1.1.1. The Hierarchical Model .............................................................................. 476 
3.1.1.2. The Cooperative Approach ......................................................................... 479 
3.1.2. The Potential Role of the Security Council ....................................................... 483 
3.2. The Future of International Criminal Justice ..................................................... 487 
3.2.1. The Regionalisation of the ICC ......................................................................... 487 
3.2.1.1. The Creation of Regional Trial Chambers of the ICC ................................ 488 
3.2.1.2. The Regional Criminal Courts as Jurisdictions of First Instance ................ 492 
3.2.2. The Establishment and Application of the Principle of Regional Territoriality 497 
Conclusion of Part II ............................................................................................................ 501 
General Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 504 






List of Legal Texts 
International and Regional Treaties 
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (30 January 2007). 
African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) (1 July 1995). 
African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons 
in Africa (Kampala Convention) (22 October 2009). 
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (11 July 2003). 
African Union Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact (31 January 2005). 
Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone (with Statute) (16 January 2002).  
Agreement between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on the Establishment of a 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (2006).  
Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning 
the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea (6 June 2003). 
Agreement Establishing the CARICOM Court of Justice (14 February 2001). 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis and Charter of the International Military Tribunal (8 August 1945). 
Agreement on Non-Aggression and Defence Assistance (ANAD) between Member States of 
the Western African Economic Community (CEAO) and Togo (9 June 1977). 
Agreement on the Establishment of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the Courts of 
Senegal between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the African Union (22 
August 2012). 
Amended Protocol on Non-Aggression between Member States of the Economic Community 
of West African States (22 April 1978).  
xi 
Amendment to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the 
African Union on the Statute of Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the 
Courts of Senegal for the Prosecution of International Crimes Committed in Chad in the 
Period between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990 (24 July 2014). 
Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary 
Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa (30 January 1991). 
Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (25 May 1963). 
Charter of the Union of African States (29 April 1961).  
Constitutive Act of the African Union (11 July 2000). 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(10 December 1984). 
Convention of Gisenyi Establishing the Economic Community of Countries of the Great 
Lakes (20 September 1976). 
Convention on the Fight against Terrorism in Central Africa (27 May 2004). 
Convention on the High Seas (29 April 1958). 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
against Humanity (26 November 1968). 
Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 
1948).  
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques (18 May 1977).  
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (13 January 1993).  
Convention on the suppression and punishment of the crime of apartheid (30 November 
1973). 
Covenant of the League of Nations (28 June 1919). 
xii 
ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption (21 December 2001). 
ECOWAS Protocol A/P.1/7/91on the Community Court of Justice (6 July 1991).  
ECOWAS Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the 
Protocol Relating to the Mechanism For Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, 
Peacekeeping and Security (21 December 2001). 
ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (10 December 1999). 
European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes against 
Humanity and War Crimes (25 January 1974). 
Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (12 August 1949). 
Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (12 August 1949). 
Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (12 August 1949). 
Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 
August 1949). 
ICGLR Protocol for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War 
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination (30 November 2006). 
ICGLR Protocol on the Prevention and Suppression of Sexual Violence against Women and 
Children (30 November 2006).  
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries (4 December 1989). 
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (17 December 1979).  
International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance (20 
December 2006).  
xiii 
International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (30 
November 1973). 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (14 September 
2005). 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (12 January 1998). 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (10 January 
2000). 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966).  
Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security Between 
the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms 
of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa (2008). 
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation (23 September 1971). 
Mutual Assistance Pact between Member States of the Economic Community of Central 
African States (2000).   
Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United 
Nations (2004). 
African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact (31 January 2005). 
Non-Aggression Pact between Member States of the United Nations Standing Advisory 
Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (8 July 1996). 
OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (3 July 1977).  
OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (10 
September 1979).  
OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (14 July 1999). 
Pact on Security, Stability and Development for the Great Lakes Region (15 December 2006). 
xiv 
Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (8 June 1977). 
Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (8 June 1977). 
Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union (11 July 2003).  
Protocol on Amendments on the Constitutive Act of the African Union (11 July 2003). 
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights (27 June 2014).  
Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region (30 November 
2006). 
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union (9 July 2002).  
Protocol on Relations between the African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic 
Communities (2007). 
Protocol on Relations between the Regional Economic Communities and the African 
Economic Community (25 February 1998). 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (1 July 2008). 
Protocol Relating to the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (24 February 2000). 
Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (8 July 
2004). 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime (15 November 2000).  
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an 
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (10 June 1998). 
xv 
Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Including the 
CARICOM Single Market and Economy (5 July 2001). 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998). 
Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption (14 August 2001). 
Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 Amending the Preamble and Articles 1, 2, 9 and 30 of 
Protocol A/P.1/7/91 Relating to the Community Court of Justice and Article 4 Paragraph 1 of 
the English Version of the Said Protocol (19 January 2005).  
Treaty Establishing the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (16 March 
1994). 
Treaty Instituting the African Economic Community (3 June 1991). 
Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community (July 4 1973) 
Treaty of Port-Louis (Maurice) of 17 October 1993 Establishing the Organisation for the 
Harmonisation of Business Laws in Africa (OHADA). 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (15 November 2000).  
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982).  
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969). 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States, and International Organisations or 
between International Organisations (21 March 1986).  
Resolutions of the United Nations 
SC Res. 1593 (2005), 31 March 2005. 
SC Res. 1966, 22 December 2010. 
SC Res. 1970 (2011), 26 February 2011.  
SC Res. 4222 (2002), 12 July 2002. 
SC Res. 827 (1993), 25 May 1993.  
xvi 
SC Res. 827 (1993), 25 May 1993. 
SC Res. 883 (1993), 11 November 1993. 
SC Res. 955 (1994), 8 November 1994.  
SC Res.1291 (2000), 24 February 2000. 
SC Res.138 (1960), 23 June 1960.  
SC Res.1400 (2002), 28 March 2002. 
 SC Res.1487 (2013), 12 June 2013.   
SC Res.1503 (2003), 28 August 2003. 
SC Res.1505 (2003), 4 September 2003. 
 SC Res.1565 (2004), 1 October 2004. 
SC Res.1816 (2008), 2 June 2008.  
SC Res.1838 (2008), 7 October 2008. 
SC Res.1846 (2008), 2 December 2008. 
SC Res.1851 (2008), 16 December 2008.  
SC Res.1896 (2009), 7 December 2009. 
SC Res.731 (1992), 21 January 1992. 
SC Res.748 (1992), 31 March 1992. 
UNGA Res. 377 (V) A, 3 November 1950. 
UNGA Res. 40/34, 29 November 1985: Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims 
of Crime and Abuse of Power, 40 UNGA Official Reports, Supp. No.53 (1985).   
UNGA Res. 44/162, 15 December 1989: Principles on the Effective Prevention and 
Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, UNGA Official Reports, 
Supp. No. 49 (1990). 
xvii 
UNGA Res. 53/105, 26 January 1999.   
UNGA Res. 60/1, 16 September 2015. 
UNGA Res. 64/117, 16 December 2009. 
UNGA Res.1000 (ES-I), 5 November 1956. 
UNGA Res.2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970: Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations. 
UNGA Res.3074 (XXVIII), 30 November 1973: Principles of International Cooperation in 
the Detection, Arrest, Extradition, and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity, UNGA Official Reports Supp. No. 30 (1973). 
UNGA Res.375 (IV), 6 December 1949. 
 UNGA Res.47/133, 18 December 1992: Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance, UN Doc. A/RES/47/133. 
UNGA Res.69/124, 10 December 2014.  
UNGA Res.96 (I), 11 December 1946.  
UNGA Res.998 (S-I), 4 November 1956. 
UNGA Res.A/RES/53/105, 26 January 1999. 
UNGA Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 29 November 1974.   
UNSC Res.1457 (2003), 24 January 2003. 
UNSC Res.169 (1961), 24 November 1961. 
  
xviii 
Resolutions, Decisions, Declarations and Communiqués of the African Union and the 
Organisation of African Unity 
AHG/Dec. 142 (XXXV), Decision, 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, Alger (Algeria), 12-14 July 1999. 
AHG/Dec.1 (XXXVII), Decision on the Implementation of the Sirte Summit Decision on the 
African Union, 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of 
the Organisation of African Unity, Lusaka (Zambia), 9-11 July 2002. 
AHG/Dec.127 (XXXIV), The Crisis between the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya and the United States of America and the United Kingdom, 34th Ordinary Session 
of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, 
Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), 8-10 June. 
AHG/Dec.141 (XXXV), Decision, 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, Alger (Algeria), 12-14 July 1999. 
AHG/Decl. 1 (XXXVIII), OAU/AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic 
Elections in Africa, 38th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
of the Organisation of African Unity, Durban (South Africa), 8 July 2002. 
AHG/Decl.2 (XXX), Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations, 30th 
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of 
African Unity, Tunis (Tunisia), 13-15 June 1994.  
AHG/Decl.2 (XXXII), Declaration and Plan of Action on Drug Abuse Control and Illicit 
Drug Trafficking in Africa, 32nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the Organisation of African Unity, Yaoundé (Cameroun), 10 July 1996.  
AHG/Decl.3 (XXIX),  Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the 
Establishment within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution, 29th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the 
Organisation of African Unity, Cairo (Egypt), 28-30 June 1993.  
AHG/Decl.4 (XXXVI), Solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, 
Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA), 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly 
xix 
of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, Lomé (Togo), 10-12 
July 2000.  
AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI), Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to 
Unconstitutional Changes of Government, 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, Lomé (Togo), 10-12 July 2000.  
AHG/Res. 27 (II), Declaration on the Problem of Subversion, 2nd Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, Accra 
(Ghana), 21-26 October 1965.  
AHG/Res.16 (I), Resolution Concerning Border Disputes among African States, 1st Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African 
Unity, Cairo (Egypt), 17-21 July 1964. 
AHG/Res.213 (XXVIII), Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination 
among African States, 28th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the Organisation of African Unity, Dakar (Senegal), 29 June-1 July 1992. 
ASS/AU/Dec. 8 (I), Decision on a Common African Defence and Security, 1st Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Durban (South Africa), 9-10 July 2002. 
Assembly/ AU/DEC.112 (VII), Decision on the Moratorium on the Recognition of the 
Regional Economic Communities (REC), 7th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African 
Union, Banjul (The Gambia), 1-2 July 2006. 
Assembly/AU/ Dec.127 (VII), Decision on the Hissène Habré Case and the African Union 
(DOC. ASSEMBLY/AU/3 (VII)), 7th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African 
Union, Banjul (The Gambia), 1-2 July 2006. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.340 (XVI), Decision on the Hissene Habre Case (Doc. 
Assembly/AU/9(XVI)), 16th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis 
Ababa (Ethiopia), 30-31 January 2011. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.355 (XVI), Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction (Doc. EX.CL/640(XVIII)), 16th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African 
Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 30-31 January 2011. 
xx 
 Assembly/AU/Dec.420 (XIX), Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction (Doc. EX.CL/731(XXI)), 19th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African 
Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 15-16 July 2012.  
Assembly/AU/Dec.103 (VI), Decision on the Hissène Habré Case and the African Union 
(Doc.Assembly/AU/8 (VI)) Add.9, 6th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African 
Union, Khartoum (Sudan), 23-24 January 2006.  
Assembly/AU/Dec.127 (VII), Decision on the Hissène Habré Case and the African Union 
(Doc.Assembly/AU/3 (VII)), 7th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, 
Banjul (The Gambia), 1-2 July 2006.  
Assembly/AU/Dec.13 (II), Decision on the African Defence and Security Policy (Doc. 
Assembly/AU/6 (II)), 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Maputo 
(Mozambique), 10-12 July 2003. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.199 (XI), Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the 
Principle of Universal Jurisdiction (Doc. Assembly/AU/14 (XI)), 11th Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 30 June - 1 July, 2008.  
Assembly/AU/Dec.213 (XII), Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly Decision on 
the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction (Doc. Assembly/AU/3 (XII)), 12th 
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 1-3 
February 2009. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.220 (XII), Decision on the Resurgence of the Scourge of Coups d’état in 
Africa, 12th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 
1-3 February 2009. 
Assembly/AU/DEC.221 (XII), Decision on the Application by the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) Prosecutor for the Indictment of the President of the Republic of the Sudan, 12th 
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 1-3 
February 2009. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.243 (XIII) Rev.1, Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal 
(Doc. Assembly /AU/11 (XIII)), 13th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, 
Sirte (Libya), 1-3 July 2009. 
xxi 
Assembly/AU/Dec.243(XIII) Rev.1, Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction (Doc. Assembly /AU/11 (XIII)), 13th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the 
African Union, Sirte (Libya), 1-3 July 2009.  
Assembly/AU/Dec.245 (XIII) Rev.1, Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII)), 13th 
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Sirte (Libya), 1 – 3 July 2009. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.249 (XIII), Decision on the Report on The Election of Members of The 
African Union Commission on International Law (Doc.Ex.CL/534(XV)), 13th Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Sirte (Libya), 1-3 July 2009. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.269 (XIV), Decision on the Prevention of Unconstitutional Changes of 
Government and Strengthening the Capacities of the African Union to Manage such 
Situations (Doc.Assembly/AU/4(XIV)), 14th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African 
Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 31 January-2 February 2010. 
Assembly/AU/DEC.270 (XIV), Decision on the Report of the Second Meeting of States 
Parties to the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court (ICC) (DOC. 
Assembly/AU/8(XIV)), 14th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis 
Ababa (Ethiopia), 31 January-2 February 2010. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.292 (XV), Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction (Doc. EX.CL/606(XVII)), 15th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African 
Union, Kampala (Uganda), 25-27 July 2010.   
Assembly/AU/DEC.296 (XV), Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the 
Implementation of the Decision Assembly/AU/DEC.270 (XIV) on the Second Ministerial 
Meeting on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Doc. 
Assembly/AU/10 (XV)), 15th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, 
Kampala (Uganda), 25-27 July 2010. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.297 (XV), Decision on the Hissene Habre Case 
(Doc.Assembly/AU/11(XV)), 15th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, 
Kampala (Uganda), 25-27 July 2010. 
xxii 
Assembly/AU/Dec.334 (XVI), Decision on the Implementation of the Decisions on the 
International Criminal Court (Doc. EX.CL/639(XVIII)), 16th Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 30-31 January 2011.  
Assembly/AU/Dec.364(XVII), Decision on Alternative Sources of Financing the African 
Union – Doc. EX./CL/656(XIX), 17th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African 
Union, Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), 30 June – 1 July 2011.  
Assembly/AU/DEC.366 (XVII), Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly decisions 
on the International Criminal Court (Doc.EX.CL/670 (XIX)), 17th Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of the African Union, Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), 30 June- 1 July 2011.  
Assembly/AU/Dec.392 (XVIII), Decision on African Integration (Doc: EX.CL/693(XX)), 
18th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), 29-
30 January 2012. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.394 (XVIII), Decision on Boosting Intra-African Trade and Fast Tracking 
the Continental Free Trade Area (Doc. EX.CL/700(XX)), 18th Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of the African Union, Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), 29-30 January 2012. 
Assembly/AU/DEC.397 (XVIII), Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the 
Implementation of Assembly Decisions on the International Criminal Court (ICC), Doc. 
EX.CL/710 (XX), 18th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa 
(Ethiopia), 29-30 January 2012. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.401 (XVIII), Decision on the Hissene Habre Case (Doc. 
Assembly/AU/12(XVIII)), 18th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, 
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 29-30 January 2012. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.419 (XIX), Decision on the Implementation of the Decisions on the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) Doc. EX.CL/731(XXI), 19th Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 15 - 16 July 2012.  
Assembly/AU/Dec.427 (XIX), Decision on the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on 
the Statute of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Doc. 
Assembly/AU/13(XIX)a), 19th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis 
Ababa (Ethiopia), 15-16 July 2012. 
xxiii 
Assembly/AU/Dec.45 (III) Rev.1, Decision on the Seats of the African Union, 3rd Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 6-8 July 2004. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.458 (XX), Decision on the Establishment of an “International 
Constitutional Court” (Doc Assembly/AU/12(XX) Add.1)’, 20th Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 27-28 January 2013. 
Assembly/AU/DEC.482 (XXI), Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) (Doc. Assembly/AU/13 (XXI)), 21st Ordinary Session of 
the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 26-27 May 2013.  
Assembly/AU/Dec.493 (XXII), Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the 
Implementation of the Decisions on the International Criminal Court (Doc. 
Assembly/AU/13(XXII)), 22nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis 
Ababa (Ethiopia), 30-31 January 2014. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.529(XXIII), Decision on the Draft Legal Instruments (Doc. 
Assembly/AU/8(XXIII), 23th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Malabo 
(Equatorial Guinea), 26-27 June 2014.  
Assembly/AU/Dec.544 (XXIII), Decision on the Budget of the African Union for the 2015 
Financial Year (Doc. Assembly/AU/3(XXIII)), Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), 26-27 June 2014. 
Assembly/AU/DEC.547 (XXIV), Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the 
Implementation of Previous Decisions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Doc. 
Assembly/AU/18 (XIV)), 24th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis 
Ababa (Ethiopia), 30-31 January 2015. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.577(XXV), Decision on the Budget of the African Union for the 2016 
Financial Year (Doc. Assembly/AU/3(XXV)), 25th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the 
African Union, Johannesburg (South Africa), 14-15 June 2015. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.578 (XXV), Decision on the Scale of Assessment and Alternative Sources 
of Financing the African Union (Doc. Assembly/AU/5(XXV)), 25th Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of the African Union, Johannesburg (South Africa), 14-15 June 2015. 
xxiv 
Assembly/AU/Dec.590(XXVI), Decision on the International Criminal Court (Doc. 
EX.CL/952(XXVIII)), 26th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis 
Ababa (Ethiopia), 30-31 January 2016. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.605(XXVII), Decision on the Outcome of the Retreat of the Heads of 
States and Government, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Finance on the 
Financing of the African Union, 27th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, 
Kigali (Rwanda),17– 18 July 2016.  
Assembly/AU/Decl.1(XVIII), Declaration on Boosting Intra-African Trade and the 
Establishment of a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA), 18th Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of the African Union, Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), 29-30 January 2012. 
Assembly/AU/Decl.3/(XXI), Solemn Declaration on the 50th Anniversary of the OAU/AU, 
21st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 26-27 
May 2013, para. F (ii); PSC/PR/BR.(CDXXXII), 29 April 2014. 
Assembly/AU/Decl.5(XXV), Declaration on Self-reliance, 25th Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of the African Union, Johannesburg (South Africa), 14-15 June 2015. 
CM/Res. 245 (XVII), Resolution on the Permanent Sovereignty of African Countries over 
their Natural Resources, 17th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organisation 
of African Unity, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 15-19 June 1971.  
CM/Res. 5 (I), Regional Groupings, 1st Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the 
Organisation of the African Unity, Dakar (Senegal), 2-11 August 1963. 
CM/Res.1153 (XLVIII), Dumping of Nuclear and Industrial Wastes in Africa, 48th Ordinary 
Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity, Addis Ababa 
(Ethiopia), 19-23 May 1988.  
CM/Res.1199 (XLIX), Resolution on Global Convention for the Control of Transboundary 
Movement of Hazardous Wastes, 49th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the 
Organisation of African Unity, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 20-25 February 1989. 
xxv 
CM/Res.1389 (LVI) Rev.1, Resolution on the Right of States to Decide on their Political 
Options without Foreign Interference, 56th  Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of 
the Organisation of African Unity, Dakar (Senegal), 22- 28 June 1992. 
CONF/HRA/DECL (I), Declaration and Plan of Action, 1st OAU Ministerial Conference on 
Human Rights, Grand Bay (Mauritius), 12-16 April 1999.  
EAHG/Decl. (IV) Rev.1, Sirte Declaration, 4th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, Sirte (Libya), 8-9 
September 2009.  
EX.CL/Dec.331 (X), Decision on the Relationship Between the African Union Commission 
and the Regional Economic Communities (RECS) (DOC. EX.CL/308 (X)), 10th Ordinary 
Session of the Executive Council of the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 25-26 
January 2007. 
EX.CL/Dec.919 (XXIX), Decision on the Budget of the African Union for the 2017 Financial 
Year (Doc. EX.CL/956(XXIX)), 29th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the 
African Union, Kigali (Rwanda), 13-15 July 2016. 
Ext/Assembly/AU/1-2/(II), Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security 
Policy, 2nd Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Sirte (Libya), 27-28 
February 2004. 
Ext/Assembly/AU/DEC. 1 (Oct.2013),  Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African 
Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 12 October 2013. 
Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII), The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United 
Nations: “The Ezulwini Consensus”, 7th Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council of 
the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 7-8 March 2005. 
MIN/CONF/HRA/Decl.1(I), Kigali Declaration, The First AU Ministerial Conference on 
Human Rights in Africa, Kigali (Rwanda), 8 May 2003. 
PSC/MIN/Comm (CXLII), 21 July 2008. 
PSC/PR/COMM (DLXV), 17 December 2015.  
xxvi 
PSC/PR/COMM.(DLVII), 13 November 2015.  
Other International Legal Documents 
African Model Anti-Terrorism Law (1 July 2011) <http://caert.org.dz/official-
documents/african-model-law-en.pdf> accessed 1 February 2017. 
African Union Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes (13 
July 2012) <http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/71/universal_jurisdiction/african_union_e.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2017. 
ASP Res. ICC-ASP/12/Res.7 (27 November 2013) <https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-Res7-ENG.pdf> accessed 30 
August 2017. 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946) 
<http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-
crimes/Doc.3_1946%20Tokyo%20Charter.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017.  
CM/Res.1650 (LXIV), Resolution on Liberia, 64th Ordinary Session of the Council of 
Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity, Yaoundé (Cameroon), 1-5 July 1996 5 July 
1996. 
Dakar Declaration for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998 (6 
February 1998) <http://www.iccnow.org/documents/DakarDeclarationFeb98Eng.pdf > 
accessed 12 March 2015.   
ECOWAS, ‘Code of Conduct for the Members of the Council of State of the Republic of 
Liberia’, 22 ECOWAS Official Journal (1996).  
Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime (1935) Appendix 9 
<http://s1.downloadmienphi.net/file/downloadfile4/206/1392182.pdf> accessed 30 August 
2017. 
HRC Res. 26/9, ‘Elaboration of an International Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights’ 
(A/HRC/RES/26/9), 14 July 2014. 
xxvii 
ICC-ASP/8/Res.6 (26 November 2009) <https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-8-Res.6-ENG.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017. 
ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001). 
ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of the Mankind (1996). 
ILC Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (1994). 
Memorandum of Understanding Establishing the Framework for Cooperation and 
Collaboration between the African Union and the Pan African Lawyers Union (5 May 2006) 
<https://lawyersofafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Memorundum-of-Understanding-
between-the-AU-PALU.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017. 
Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over 
Serious Criminal Offences within the District Court in Dili in East Timor (United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor, UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (6 June 2000). 
Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the African Union (9 July 
2002)<https://www3.nd.edu/~ggoertz/rei/rei040/rei040.13tt1.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017.  
Rules of Procedure of the Executive Council of the African Union (9 July 2002) 
<http://www.euppublishing.com/doi/pdfplus/10.3366/ajicl.2005.13.1.158> accessed 30 
August 2017.  
Statute of the African Union Commission on International Law (4 February 2009). 
Statute of the Commission of the African Union (9 July 2002) 
<https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/STATCOMMISSION.PDF> accessed 30 
August 2017. 
Statute of the International Law Commission (21 November 1947). 
Terms of Reference of the ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights (2009) 
<http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Philippines/Terms%20of%20Reference%20for%20the%2
0ASEAN%20Inter-Governmental%20CHR.pdf> accessed 10 May 2017. 
xxviii 
The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) (1967) 




Law No.1/004 of 8 May 2003 laying down the Repression of the Crime of Genocide, Crime 
against Humanity and War Crime, 
<https://www.assemblee.bi/IMG/pdf/N%C2%B01_4_08%20mail_2003.pdf> accessed 30 
August 2017. 
Law No.1/011 of 30 August 2003 relating to the Ratification by the Republic of Burundi of 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
<https://www.assemblee.bi/IMG/pdf/N%C2%B01_11_30%20juillet_2003.pdf> accessed 30 
August 2017. 
Penal Code (22 April 2009) <http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/fr/bi/bi009fr.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2017. 
Central African Republic 
Law No. 10.002 of 6 January 2006 - Central African Code of Criminal Procedure (6 January 
2010) <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/SERIAL/88120/100660/F498635820/CAF-
88120.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017. 
Law No.10.001 Laying down the Central African Penal Code (6 January 2010) 
<http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/SERIAL/88116/100661/F1881819351/CAF-88116.pdf> 
accessed August 2017.  
Organic Law No.15-003 Relating to the Creation, Organisation and Functioning of the 
Special Criminal Court (3 June 2015) 
<https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/loi_organique_portant_cre_ation_organisation_et_fonctionne




Democratic Republic of Congo 
Décret-loi constitutionnel n°003 du 27 mai 1997 relatif à l’organisation et à l’exercice du 
pouvoir en République démocratique du Congo, tel que modifié et complété à ce jour (textes 
coordonnés et mis à jour au 1er juillet 2000, Official Journal of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (May 2001) 91-101. 
Decree-Law No. 0013/2002 of 30 March 2002 Authorising the Ratification of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Official Journal of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (5 December 2002).  
Law No. 002/2001 of 3 July 2001 on the Trade Tribunals, Official Journal of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (Volume 14: 42nd Year, 15 July 2001) 2-15. 
Law No. 023/2002 of 12 November 2002 on the Military Judicial Code, Official Journal of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (Special Volume: 20 March 2003) 
<http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Judiciaire/Loi.023.2002.18.11.2002.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2017. 
Law No. 024/2002 of 12 November 2002 Laying down the Military Criminal Code, Official 
Journal of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Special Volume: 20 March 2003) 
<http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Judiciaire/Loi.024.2002.18.11.2002.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2017. 
Law No.006/2002 of 7 July 2002 Authorising the Ratification of the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union, Official Journal of the Democratic Republic of Congo (First Part: 43rd Year, 
2002) 1. 
Law No.016/2002 of 16 October 2002 Relating to the Labour Tribunals, Official Journal of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (Special Volume: 25 October 2002) 81-89. 
Law No.15/022 of 31 December 2015 Modifying and Complementing the Decree of 30 
January 1940 Laying down the Penal Code, Official Journal of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (Special Volume: First Part, 57th Year, 29 February 2016) 2-17. 
Law No.15/023 of 31 December 2015 Modifying and Complementing the Law No.024-2002 
of 18 November 2002 Laying down the Military Criminal Code, Official Journal of the 
xxx 
Democratic Republic of Congo (Special Volume: First Part, 57th Year, 29 February 2016) 17-
19. 
Law No.15/024 of 31 December 2015 Modifying and Complementing the Decree of 6 August 
1959 Laying down the Code of Criminal Procedure, Official Journal of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (Special Volume: First Part, 57th Year, 29 February 2016) 19-31. 
Organic Law No.13/011-B of 11 April 2013 Laying down the Organisation, the Functioning 
and the Competences Courts of the Judicial Order, (Special Volume: First Part, 54th Year, 4 
May 2013) <http://www.droitcongolais.info/files/1.17.17.1.-Loi-organique-du-11-avril-
2013_Organisation-et-competence-judiciaire.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017. 
Penal Code (30 January 1940), Official Journal of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Special 
Volume: 45th Year, 30 November 2004) 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/fr/cd/cd004fr.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017. 
Rwanda 
Law Nº 30/2013 Relating to the Code of Criminal Procedure (24 May 2013) Official Gazette 
no.27 of 08/07/2013 <http://www.minijust.gov.rw/fileadmin/Law_and_Regulations/PPR.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2017.  
Organic Law N° 01/2012/OL Instituting the Penal Code (2 May 2012) Official Gazette 
no.Special of 14 June 2012 <https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/rwa/1999/penal-code-
of-rwanda_html/Penal_Code_of_Rwanda.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017. 
Organic Law n°40/2000 of 26/01/2000 setting up Gacaca Jurisdictions and Organising 
Prosecutions of Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide and Other Crimes against 
Humanity, Committed between October 1st, 1990 and December 31, 1994 
<http://jurisafrica.org/docs/statutes/ORGANIC%20LAW%20N0%2040.pdf> accessed 30 
August 2017. 
Organic Law No 16/2004 19/06/2004 Establishing the Organisation, Competence and 
Functioning of Gacaca Courts Charged with Prosecuting and Trying the Perpetrators of the 
Crime of Genocide and Other Crimes against Humanity, Committed between October 1st, 
1990 and December 31, 1994 
xxxi 
<https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/4582/3677.pdf?sequence=1> 
accessed 30 August 2017. 
Senegal 
Constitutional Law No. 2008-33 of 7 August 2008 Amending Articles 9 and 95 and 
Complementing Articles 62 and 92 of the Constitution, Official Journal of the Republic of 
Senegal (8 août 2008) 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/SERIAL/85291/95426/F1682183630/SEN-85291.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2017. 
Law No.2007-02 of 12 February 2007 Amending the Penal Code, Official Journal of the 
Republic of Senegal (10 March 2007) 2377-2380. 
Law No.2007-05 of 12 February 2007 Modifying the Code of Criminal Procedure Concerning 
the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, fficial Journal of 
the Republic of Senegal (10 March 2007) 2384-2386. 
Law No.2012-29 of 28 December 2012 Modifying the First Article of the Law No.84-19 of 2 
February 1984 Determining the Judicial Organisation 
<http://www.jo.gouv.sn/spip.php?article9610> accessed 30 August 2017. 
Senegalese Penal Code (21 July 1965) 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/fr/sn/sn010fr.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017.  
Other Countries 
Constitution of Kenya (2010) 
<http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/constitutions/kenya_constitution.pdf>accessed 30 June 
2017. 
Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Proclamation No.414/2004) 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/et/et011en.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017.  
Germany, Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozeßordnung) (7 April 1987) 
<https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/deu/1987/the_german_code_of_criminal_procedur
e_html/german_criminal_procedure_code_as_of_2013.pdf> accessed 30 June 2016 
xxxii 
— — Völkerstrafgesetzbuch (26 June 2002) <https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/vstgb/VStGB.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017.  
International Criminal Court Act 2010, Acts Supplement to the Ugandan Gazette No.39 
Volume CIII dated 25th June, 2010. 
Kenya Sexual Offences Act (2006) <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_protect/---protrav/---ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_127528.pdf> accessed 30 
August 2017.  
Kenya, Geneva Conventions Act (1968) <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-
nat.nsf/0/96a73f574995915a41256904003786d0/$FILE/Geneva%20Conventions%20Act.pdf
> accessed 30 August 2017. 
Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, with 
Inclusion of Amendments as Promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006). 
Nigeria, Geneva Conventions Act (1960) <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl-
nat/6fa4d35e5e3025394125673e00508143/c458f16c39f42631412565b80052809d/$FILE/Gen
eva%20Conventions%20Act,%201960.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017. 
Republic of Congo, Law No.8-98 Laying down the Definition and the Repression of 
Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (31 October 1998). 
South Africa, Implementation of the Rome Statute Act (2002) 
<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/SouthAfricaLegEng2002.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017. 
— — Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 
(2004) <https://www.saps.gov.za/resource_centre/acts/downloads/juta/terrorism_act.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2017.  
Spain, Organic Law 6/1985 on the Competence of the Courts (1 July 1985) 
<legislationline.org/download/action/.../id/.../Spain_law_juidiciary_1985_am2016_en.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2017. 
xxxiii 
Uganda Penal Code Act (1950) <http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-
force/africa/Uganda/Penal%20Code%20Act%20Uganda%201950.pdf> accessed 30 August 
2017. 
— — Geneva Conventions Act (1964) <https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ee0230/pdf/> 
accessed 30 August 2017. 
— —International Criminal Court Act (2010) 
<https://www.ulii.org/ug/legislation/act/2010/11/International%20Criminal%20Court%20Act
,%202010.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017.  
Zimbabwe Geneva Conventions Act (1981) <https://ihl-





List of Cases 
Permanent Court of International Justice and International Court of Justice 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 11 July 1996 , 
I.C.J. Reports 1996.  
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, I.C.J. 
Reports 2007. 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, I.C.J. Reports 2005.  
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of 2 February 
2006, I.C.J. Reports 2006.  
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Application 
Instituting Proceedings of 17 October 2000, I.C.J. General List, No.121, 2000. 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment 
of 14 February 2002, I.C.J. Reports 2002. 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), second phase, 
Judgment of 5 February 1970, I.C.J. Report 1970.  
Case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment of 22 
December 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1951. 
Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France), Application 
Instituting Proceedings of 9 December 2002, I.C.J. General List, No.3, 2003. 
Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France), Order of 16 
November 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010. 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory 
Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962. 
Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment 
of 4 June 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008.  
Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, Judgment of November 20th 1950, I.C. J. Reports 1950. 
Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v. Republic of Albania), Judgment of 9 April 1949, 
I.C.J. Reports 1949.  
xxxv 
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), Judgment of 16 April 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013. 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of 3 
February, I.C.J. Reports 2012.     
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion of 
21 June 1971, I.C.J. Reports 1971. 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, I.C.J. 
Reports 1996. 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986. 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of 26 November 1984, I.C.J. Reports 
1984. 
Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion of 7 February 1923, 
P.C.I.J., Series B, No.4. 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal 
Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969, I.C.J. Reports 1969.   
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from 
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), 
Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992. 
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from 
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment of 27 February 1998, I.C.J. Reports 1998. 
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from 
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), 
Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 27 February 1998, I.C.J. Reports 1998. 
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Merits, 
Judgment of 20 July 2012, I.C.J. Reports 2012. 
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), 
Provisional Measures, Order of 28 May 2009, I.C.J. Reports 2009. 
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, I.C.J. Reports 1951.  
xxxvi 
SS Wimbledon (United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan v. Germany), Judgment of 27 August 
1923, P.C.I.J., Series A. –No.1. 
The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), Judgment of 7 September 1927, P.C.I.J., 
Series A. –No.10. 
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Tehran), 
Judgment of 24 May 1980, I.C.J. Reports 1980.  
International Criminal Courts and Tribunals 
Akayesu (ICTR-96–4-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber I, 2 September 1998.  
Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. and Ibrahim Mohamed Al-Amin, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
concerning Personal Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings (STL-14-06/PT/AP/AR126.1), 
Appeals Panel, 23 January 2015.  
Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-
compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of 
Omar Al-Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 6 July 2017. 
Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, 12 July 2010. 
Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, 4 March 2009. 
Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-139), Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on 
the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by 
the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Pre-
Trial Chamber I, 12 December 2011.  
Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-140-tENG), Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome 
Statute on the Refusal of the Republic of Chad to Comply with the Cooperation Requests 
Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 13 December 2011. 
Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-195), Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo Regarding Omar al-Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, 9 April 2014.  
Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-242), Decision Following the Prosecutor’s Request for an Order 
Further Clarifying that the Republic of South Africa is under the Obligation to Immediately 
Arrest and Surrender Omar al-Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 13 June 2015.  
Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-266), Decision on the non-compliance by the Republic of 
Djibouti with the request to arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court and referring 
xxxvii 
the matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the State Parties to the 
Rome Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 11 July 2016. 
Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-267),Decision on the non-compliance by the Republic of Uganda 
with the request to arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court and referring the matter 
to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute, 
Pre-Trial Chamber II, 11 July 2016. 
Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-3), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 4 March 2009.   
Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber III, 
31 March 2016.  
Blaskic (IT-95-14-AR 108 bis), Judgement on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for 
Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997,  Appeals Chamber, 29 October 
1997.  
Furundzija (IT-95-17/1-T), Judgement, Trial Chamber II, 10 December 1998.  
Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 8 
February 2010. 
Harun and Kushayb (ICC-02/05-01/0), Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 
58(7) of the Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 27 April 2007. 
Jean Kambanda (ICTR 97-23-A), Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 19 October 2000. 
Kallon and Kamara (SCSL-2004-15-AR72 (E) and SCSL-2004-16-AR72 (E)), Decision on 
Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, Appeals Chamber, 13 March 2004. 
Kanyabashi (ICTR-96-15-T), Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Trial 
Chamber, 18 June 1997.  
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1497), Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. 
Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the 
Admissibility of the Case, Appeals Chamber, 25 September 2009. 
Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95–1-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber II, 21 May 1999.  
Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-1005), Decision on the Withdrawal of Charges against Mr. 
Kenyatta, Trial Chamber V (B), 13 March 2015. 
Lubanga ((ICC-01/04-01/06 A5), Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
against his Conviction, Appeals Chamber, 1 December 2014.   
xxxviii 
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trail 
Chamber I, 29 January 2007.  
Mbarushimana (ICC-01/04-01/10 OA 4), Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor against 
the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges", Appeals Chamber, 30 May 2012. 
Mbarushimana (ICC-01/04-01/10), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, 16 December 2011. 
Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali (ICC-01/09-02/11), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 
2012.  
Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali (ICC-01/09-02/11-01) , Decision on the Prosecutor's Application 
for Summons to Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and 
Mohammed Hussein Ali, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 8 March 2011. 
Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali (ICC-01/09-02/11-274), Judgment on the Appeal of the Republic 
of Kenya against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘Decision on 
the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case 
Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute’, Appeals Chamber, 30 August 2011. 
Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali (ICC-01/09-02/11-96), Decision on the Application by the 
Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) 
of the Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 30 May 2011. 
New TV S.A.L. and AI Khayat, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal 
Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings (STL-14-05/PT/AP/AR126.1), Appeals Panel, 23 
January 2015. 
Ntuyahaga (ICTR-98-40-T), Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion to Withdraw the 
Indictment, Trial Chamber, 18 March 1999, point 1 (On the Withdrawal of the Indictment).  
Public Prosecutor v. Hissène Habré, Judgment on Reparations, Extraordinary African 
Chambers, Trial Chamber, 29 July 2016. 
Public Prosecutor v. Hissène Habré, Judgment, Extraordinary African Chambers, Trial 
Chamber, 30 May 2016.   
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-2027), Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments of 
Acquittal, Trial Chamber V(A), 5 April 2016. 
Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 
2012. 
xxxix 
Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11), Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for 
Summons to Appear for William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap 
Sang, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 8 March 2011.  
Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-101), Decision on the Application by the 
Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) 
of the Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 30 May 2011. 
 Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-307), Judgment on the Appeal of the Republic of 
Kenya against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled 'Decision on the 
Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant 
to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute', Appeals Chamber, 30 August 2011.  
Simic and Others (IT-95-9), Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to Be Provided by 
SFOR and Others, Trial Chamber, 18 October 2000.  
Situation in Darfur, Sudan (ICC-02/05-185), Decision on Application under Rule 103, Pre-
Trial Chamber I, 4 February 2009. 
Situation in Darfur, the Sudan (ICC-02/05), Prosecutor's Application under Article 58(7), Pre-
Trial Chamber I, 27 February 2007. 
Situation in Libya in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-
Senussi  (ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 4), Judgment on the Appeal of Libya against the Decision of 
Pre-Trial Chamber I of 31 May 2013 entitled “Decision on the Admissibility of the Case 
against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi”,  Appeals Chamber, 21 May 2014.  
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Bosco 
Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06), Recommendation to the Presidency on Holding part of the Trial 
in the State Concerned, Trial Chamber IV, 19 March 2015.  
Situation in the Republic of Kenya (ICC-01/09-02/11), Decision on the Application by the 
Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) 
of the Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 30 May 2011. 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya (ICC-01/09-19), Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the 
Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 31 March 2010, para.207 and 211. 
Tadič (IT-94-1), Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Trial Chamber, 10 August 
1995.  
Tadič (IT-94-1-A), Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999. 
Tadič (IT-94-1-AR72), Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995.  
xl 
International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanism 
Guengueng et al. v. Senegal (Communication No. 181/2001), Decision of 17 May 2006 (UN 
doc. CAT/C/36/D/181/2001). 
Opinions and Declarations of Judges on International Cases 
Declaration of Judge Ranjeva, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, I.C.J. Reports 2002. 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Alvarez, Asylum Case (Colombia/Peru), Judgment of 20 
November 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950. 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita USacka, Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali (ICC-01/09-02/11-
342), Judgment on the Appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the Decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber H of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the Application by the Government of 
Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute’, 
Appeals Chamber, 20 September 2011.  
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita USacka, Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-336), 
Judgment on the Appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber 
H of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya 
Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute’, 
Appeals Chamber, 20 September 2011. 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bedjaoui, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 
1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, I.C.J. 
Reports 1992.  
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lord Finaly, The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” The Case of the S.S. 
“Lotus” (France v. Turkey), Judgment of 7 September 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A. –No.10,, 
Judgment of 7 September 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A. –No.10, at 52.  
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996.  
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, I.C.J. 
Reports 2002. 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weiss, The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), 
Judgment of 7 September 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A. –No.10.  
Individual Opinion of Judge Alvarez, Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment 
of 18 December 1951, I. C.J. Report 1951.  
xli 
Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, Arrest Warrant of 11 
April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, 
I.C.J. Reports 2002.  
Minority Opinion of Judge Marc Perrin De Brichambaut, Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), 
Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with 
the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
6 July 2017.  
Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, I.C.J. Reports 2002. 
Separate Opinion of Judge Gilbert Guillaume, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, I.C.J. Reports 2002.  
Separate Opinion of Judge Rezek, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, I.C.J. Reports 2002. 
Separate Opinion of Judge Yusuf, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), Judgment of 16 
April 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013.  
Regional Case-Law 
Austria  v. Italy, EComHR, Decision of 11 January 1961, Application No. 788/60, 4  Yearbook of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (1961).  
Carmelo Soria Espinoza v. Chile, Report No.133/99 of 19 November 1999, IACHR (Case 
11.725). 
Civil Liberties Organisation (in respect of Bar Association) v. Nigeria, ACmHPR, 
Comm.101/93, 8th Activity Report (1994-1995). 
Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v. Chad, ACmHPR, 
Comm.74/92, 9 Activity Report (1995-1996).  
Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, ACmHPR, Comm. 227/ 
1999, 20 Activity Report (2006). 
Femi Falana  v. The African Union, Judgment of 26 June 2012, AfCHPR, Application 
No.001/2011.  
Hissène Habré v. Republic of Senegal, Judgment N0: ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/10 of 18 November 
2010, ECOWAS Court of Justice. 
 Ignacio Ellacuria and others v. El Salvador, Report No.136/99 of 22 December 1999, 
IACHR (Case 10.488). 
xlii 
Institute for Human Right and Development in Africa v. The Government of Malawi, 
ACERWC Comm. No. 004/Com/001/2014, Report on Consideration of an Amicable 
Settlement under the Auspices of the Committee (27 October 2016). 
Irland v. United Kingdom, ECHR, Judgment of 18 January 1978, Application No.5310/71. 
Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire, ACmHPR, Comm.75/92, 8 Activity Report (1994-
1995). 
Loizidou c. Turkey, ECHR, Preliminary Exceptions, Judgment of du 23 mars 1995, Serie A, 
n° 310. 
Malawi African Association and others v. Mauritania, ACmHPR, Comm.54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 
164/97 to 196/97 and 210/98, 13th Activity Report (1999-2000). 
Media Rights Agenda, Constitutional Rights Project, Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional 
Rights Project v. Nigeria, ACmHPR, Comm.105/93, 128/94, 130/94 and 152/96, 12th Activity 
Report (998-1999). 
Michelot Yogogombaye v. The Republic of Senegal, Judgment of 15 December 2009, 
AfCHPR, Application No.001/2008.  
Ould Dah v. France (dec.), no. 13113/03, Decision of 17 March 2009, ECHR 2009-I. 
Sir Dawda K. Jawara v. The Gambia, ACmHPR, Comm. 147/95 and 149/96, 13th Activity 
Report (1999-2000).   
The Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the American Convention on Human 
Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, September 24, 1982, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(Ser.A) No. 2 (1982). 
Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment of 29 July 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.  
(Series C No.4).  
National Case-Law 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Public Prosecutor and 54 Civil Parties v. Émile Tabwangu Kayembe and 29 Others, 
Judgment of 20 December 2004, Military Court of Appeal of Katanga Province, RP 01/2003 
(On File with the Author). 
Public Prosecutor and Civil Parties v. Adémar Ilunga and others, Judgment of 28 June 2007, 
Military Court of Katanga, RP 010/2006 (On File with the Author). 
xliii 
Public Prosecutor and Civil Parties v. Atanaserose Nabini Bijou and Others, Judgment of 29 
October 2014, Mobile Military Court of the Noth Kivu Province, Colonel Mamadou Ndala 
case, RP n°015, 017 and 018/014 (On File with the Author). 
Public Prosecutor and Civil Parties v. Daniel Mukalay Wa Mateso and Others, Judgment of 
23 June 2011, RP N° 066/2011 - RMP N° 1046/MBJ/2010 (On File with the Author). 
Public Prosecutor and Civil Parties v. Kakwavu, Judgment of 7 November 2014, Military 
High Court, RPN n° 004/2010 (On File with the Author). 
Public Prosecutor and Civil Parties v. Kumba and Others, Judgment of 17 December 2011, 
District Court of Kalamu/Kinshasa (Tribunal de grande instance de Kalamu/Kinshasa), RP 
11.154/11.155/11.156 (On File with the Author).  
Senegal 
Avis de la Cour d’appel de Dakar sur la demande d’extradition de Hissène Habré (Extrait), 
Chambre d’accusation, 25 November 2005<http://www.trial-
ch.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/trialwatch/habre_cour_dappel.pdf> accessed 18 
April 2016. 
Public Prosecutor’s Office and Francois Diouf v. Hissène Habré, Judgment No. 135 of 4 July 
2000, Dakar Court of Appeal (Chambre d’accusation) 
<https://www.hrw.org/legacy/french/themes/habre-decision.html> accessed 18 April 2016. 
Souleymane Guengueng et al. v. Hissène Habré, Judgment No. 14 of 20 March 2001, Court 
of Cassation (Première chambre statuant en matière pénale) 
<http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/20121105T123352-
Habre,%20Cassation%20Court,%20Senegal,%2020%20March%202001.pdf> accessed 18 
April 2016. 
South Africa 
S v Okah (SS94/2011) [2013] ZAGPJHC 6; 2015 (2) SACR 561 (GJ) (21 January 2013). 
Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others 
(Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution Intervening) (83145/2016) 
[2017] ZAGPPHC 53; 2017 (3) SA 212 (GP); [2017] 2 All SA 123 (GP) (22 February 2017). 
xliv 
National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights 
Litigation Centre (485/2012) [2013] ZASCA 168; 2014 (2) SA 42 (SCA); [2014] 1 All SA 
435 (SCA) (27 November 2013). 
The Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and Others v. The President of the Republic of 
South Africa (CCT 17/96) [1996] (25 July 1996).  
National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights 
Litigation Centre and Another (CCT 02/14) [2014] ZACC 30; 2015 (1) SA 315 (CC); 2015 
(1) SACR 255 (CC); 2014 (12) BCLR 1428 (CC) (30 October 2014).  
Others Countries 
Brazzaville, Chambre Criminelle, 17 August 2005 (Republic of Congo) 
<https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/cg435f-2.pdf> accessed 20 July 2016. 
Cass. Crim. 23 October 2002, Bull. Crim. n° 195, 2002 (France) 
<https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000007070167> 
accessed 5 July 2016. 
Cass. Crim.11 April 2006, Expédition, Répertoire No. D06, 2006 (Central African Republic) 
<https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/RCA457-2006.pdf> accessed 21 July 2016. 
Decision CC n° 002/C/C/SG of 17 December 2003 (Ivorian Constitutional Council) 
<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:pRgYlysLb3kJ:www.civox.net/atta




List of Abbreviations 
ACCA : African Coalition for Corporate Accountability  
ACDEG : African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 
ACHPR : African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
ACmHPR : African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights  
ACRI : African Court Research Initiative  
ACSRT : African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism  
AEC : African Economic Community 
AfCHPR : African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
AfCJHPR : African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights 
AfCJHR : African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
AICHR : ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights 
AMU : Arab Maghreb Union 
ANAD : Agreement on Non-Aggression and Defence Assistance 
AOHR : Arab Organisation for Human Rights 
APLFT : Association for the Promotion of Fundamental Liberties in Chad 
APSA : African Peace and Security Architecture  
ASEAN : Association of South-East Asian Nations 
ASP : Assembly of States Parties 
ATS : Amphetamine Type Stimulants 
AU : African Union 
AUCIL : African Union Commission on International Law 
AUPD : African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur 
AZAPO : Azanian People’s Organisation 
BIA : Bilateral Immunities Agreements 
CAR : Central African Republic  
CARICOM : Caribbean Community 
CADSP : Common African Defence and Security Policy 
CCJ : Caribbean Court of Justice 
CEMAC : Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 
CEN-SAD : Community of Sahel-Saharan States 
CEPGL : Economic Community of Countries of the Great Lakes 
CFA : Communauté financière africaine (African Financial Community) 
xlvi 
CFTA : Continental Free Trade Area 
CICC : Coalition for the International Criminal Court  
CIPEV : Commission of Inquiry on Post-Elections Violence 
CMCA : Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration 
CNDP  : Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress for the 
People’s Defence)  
CODESRIA  : Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa 
COMESA : Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
COPAX : Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa 
CSSDCA : Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in 
Africa  
DRC : Democratic Republic of Congo 
EAC : Extraordinary African Chambers 
ECCAS : Economic Community of Central African States 
ECCC : Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia  
ECCHR : European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights 
ECHR : European Court on Human Rights   
EComHR : European Commission on Human Rights 
ECOSOCC : Economic, Social and Cultural Council 
ECOWAS : Economic Community of West African States 
ESIL  : European Society of International Law 
FATF : Financial Action Task Force 
FDLR  : Forces Démocratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for 
the Liberation of Rwanda) 
FIDH : Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme (International 
Federation of Human Rights Leagues) 
HRC : Human Rights Committee 
IACHR : Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
ICC  : International Criminal Court 
ICCLR : International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice 
Policy  
ICCPR : International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICCTAP : International Criminal Court Technical Assistance Program 
ICEM : International Commission of Enquiry on Mercenaries  
xlvii 
ICGLR : International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 
ICJ : International Court of Justice 
ICTR : International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY : International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
IDP : Internally Displaced Persons 
IGAD : Intergovernmental Authority for Development 
IIL : Institute of International Law  
ILC : International Law Commission 
IMT : International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg 
IMTFE : International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: Inter-American Court of Human Rights  
IOM : Independent Oversight mechanism 
JEM : Justice and Equality Movement  
JRRD : Justice and Reconciliation Response to Darfur 
KNDR  : Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation 
LMG : Like-Minded Group  
LTDH : Chadian League for Human Rights 
MAPROBU : African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi 
NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NGO : Non-Governmental Organisation 
OAS : Organisation of American States  
OAU : Organisation of African Unity  
OAU/AEC  : Organisation of African Unity/ African Economic Community 
OECD : Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OHADA : Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa 
OIC : Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 
OMD : Orange Democratic Movement 
ONUCI : Operation of United Nations in Côte d’Invoire  
OTP : Office of the Prosecutor 
PALU : Pan-African Lawyers Union  
PCHR : Palestinian Centre for Human Rights  
PCIJ  : Permanent Court of International Justice  
PDF : Popular Defence Force  
PGA : Parliamentarians for Global Action  
xlviii 
PNU : Party of National Unity 
PTC : Pre-Trial Chamber 
RADDHO : African Assembly for the Defence of Human Rights 
REC : Regional Economic Community  
RPF : Rwandan Patriotic Front 
RUF : Revolutionary United Front  
S/REC : Sub-Regional Economic Community 
SADC : Southern African Development Community 
SADI  : Société Africaine pour le Droit International (African Society of 
International Law)  
SADR : Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic 
SALC : Southern Africa Litigation Centre 
SAPS : South African Police Services 
SCCED : Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur  
SCSL : Special Court for Sierra Leone 
SFDI  : Société Française pour le Droit International (French Society of 
International Law) 
SLM/A : Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army 
SPLM : Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement 
STC : Specialised Technical Committee 
TFV : Trust Fund for Victims 
TJRC : Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
TWAIL : Third World Approaches to International Law  
UK : United Kingdom  
UN : United Nations 
UNCLOS : United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  
UNGA : United Nations General Assembly 
UNIDIR : United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 
UNSC : United Nations Security Council 
UNWCC : United Nations War Crimes Commission  
USA : United States of America  
VCLT : Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
WGA : Working Group on Amendments 
1 
General Introduction 
Public international law should not be or remain an order of frustrations for any part of the 
world. It is never too late to build “a workable, rational, balanced and accepted general system 
of international law”1 and thus avoid, if not eradicate, what Christian Tomuschat, probably 
inspired by Samuel Huntington,2 has called the clash of civilisations through the use of 
international law devices.3   
The need to reform international law as such is not new. It is a constant issue under discussion 
among international lawyers. On the one hand, some voices, being aware of the fact that the 
elimination of colonial administrations did not really amount to the entire decolonisation of 
the world,4 continue to claim for the decolonisation of international law.5 On the other hand, 
contrary voices have their roots in the phenomenon of what Obiora Okafor calls “newness 
claims” in international law, that is to say “a deeply political practice, a key political 
maneuver that allows proponents of radical international reforms to justify many of their 
preexisting imperial ambitions”6 in order to perpetuate “the historical and continuing 
experience of subordination at the global level”7 and serve hegemonic purposes.8  
What is new, however, is that the debate has never been made in international criminal law as 
in the present time. It is particularly Africa, as a territorial set of 55 independent countries that 
                                                 
1 S. Rosenne, ‘The Perplexities of Modern International Law. General Course on Public International Law’, 291 
Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International (2001)  9-472, at 24. 
2 S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London: Simon and Schuster, 
1996). The book was initially published in 1993 and since then several re-editions have followed. 
3 C. Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century. General 
Course on Public International Law’, 281 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International (1999) 9-438, 
at 55.  
4 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Coloniality of Power in Postcolonial Africa: Myths of Decolonization (Dakar: 
CODESRIA, 2013), at 3. 
5 S. Pahuja, Decolonizing International Law. Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
6 O. Okafor, ‘Newness, Imperialism, and International Legal Reform in our Time: a TWAIL Perspective’, 43 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal (2005)171-191, at 172 and 173. 
7 Ibid., at 174. 
8 See M. Koskeniemi, ‘What is International Law for?’, in M. D. Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 32-57, at 32, 50 and 51. 
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are members of the African Union (AU),9 which decides to make and develop African 
international criminal law in parallel with universal international criminal law. In fact, the 
Extraordinary African Chambers in charge of the trial of the former Chadian President, 
Hissene Habré, were created in 2012,10 after the AU’s attempt to establish a hybrid criminal 
tribunal for Darfur in Sudan.11 In June 2014, the AU adopted the Protocol on Amendments to 
the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (hereafter the 
Malabo Protocol on the AU Criminal Court), vested with jurisdiction to try 14 types of 
crimes.12 Therefore, African international criminal law is becoming a legal reality. At first 
sight, it presupposes a negative connotation13 because it appears to be the opposite to 
universal international criminal law of which it might reflect “a symptom of weakness”14 or 
undermine the applicability. However, to look at it in a positive way as with any regional law, 
African international criminal law may be a “laboratory of ideas and practices”15 which can, 
thanks to its “experimenal anticipation”,16 enable progress in other regions of the world and at 
the global level.17 
Accordingly, it is important to determine its foundational bases, that is, the factors which 
inform its development, to illustrate its content, and to examine its relationship with the 
                                                 
9 Morocco was not member of the African Union (AU) created in July 2000. However, it reintegrated the 
organisation in January 2017. Morocco withdrew from the AU’s predecessor, the Organisation of the African 
Unity (OAU), in 1984 after the admission of the contested state of Western Sahara, officially named the Sahrawi 
Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which Morocco considers to be part of its territory. See G. Naldi, ‘West 
Sahara: Suspended Statehood or Frustrated Self-determination”, 13 African Yearbook of International Law 
(2005) 11-41, at 16-19.  
10 Agreement on the Establishment of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the Courts of Senegal between 
the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the African Union (22 August 2012).   
11 B. Kahombo, ‘The Project for the Creation of a Pan-African Criminal Court’, 14 African Law Study Library 
(2013) 71-91, at 80-83. 
12 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (27 
June 2014).  
13 S. Doumbe-Billé, ‘Propos introductifs’, in S. Doumbe-Billé (ed.), Régionalisation du droit international 
(Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2012) 10-17, at 10. 
14 See R.P. Anand (ed.), Asian States and the Development of Universal International Law (Delhi, Bombay, 
Bangalore, Kanpur, London: Vikas Publications, 1972), at xxvi. 
15 P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, Droit international public (8e edn., Paris : LGDJ, 2009), at 86. The 




international legal system as a whole. But, with such a systemic character, the topic is not 
easy to study. Just the concept of African international criminal law may be a source of 
misunderstanding and significant controversy. Thus, this long introduction will provide 
preliminary clarifications on the concept in the particular context of this study (1), the 
problems that it raises (2) and its main structure (3). 
1. The Particular Context of the Study 
African international criminal law overlaps the notions of regionalism and universalism. Both 
notions appear to have a conflicting nature by excluding each other (regionalism v. 
universalism).18 But, it is generally admitted that they can also go together (regionalism and 
universalism) so as to reflect the legal cultural diversity of the world.19 Hence, the so-called 
“unity in diversity”.20 In this regard, universalism does not mean a uniform world.21 African 
international criminal law develops on the basis of regionalism while general or global 
international criminal law evolves on that of universalism. In the context of this study, both 
notions of regionalism and universalism raise the issue of regionalisation (1.1) and potential 
regional fragmentation of international criminal law (1.2).   
1.1. The Regionalisation of International Criminal Law 
The concept of regionalisation refers to a process which implies “no more than a 
concentration of activity at a regional level”22 and may result in “the formation or shaping of 
regions”23 or “the emergence of regional groups”24 and arrangements. This process is in 
                                                 
18 S. P. Sharma, ‘Regionalism versus Universalism: in Institutional Building’, in R.P. Anand (ed.), Asian States 
and the Development of Universal International Law (Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore, Kanpur, London: Vikas 
Publications, 1972) 130-142, at 130. 
19 Doumbe-Billé, above note 13, at 15.  
20 J. Crawford, ‘Universalism and Regionalism from the Perspective of the Work of the International Law 
Commission’, in United Nations, International Law on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century: Views from the 
International Law Commission (New York: United Nations, 1997) 99-121, at 119. 
21 M. Bennouna, ‘Droit international et diversité culturelle’, in United Nations, International Law on the Eve of 
the Twenty-first Century: Views from the International Law Commission (New York: United Nations, 1997) 79-
98, at 80. 
22 L. Fawcett, ‘Exploring Regional Domains: a Comparative History of Regionalism’, 80 (3) International 




essence a consequence of international regionalism. Regionalism can be definied as a policy 
developed by a group of states that agree, given their common history, interests, aspirations 
and objectives, to deal with their mutual affairs at the level of their limited region in exclusion 
of any external state to their group.25 In this sense, international regionalism develops not only 
on the basis of geography (the region), but also (and cumulatively) of a number of shared 
commonalities between participant states.26 But, one basis can be predominant over the other, 
depending on each specific case. In practice, international regionalism is a world-wide 
phenomenon and may include a political, legal, economic, social and cultural dimension.27  
The regionalisation of international criminal law implies the transformation of this law into a 
“regional fact”28 which is dealt with by participant states within the boundary of their region. 
This process is very problematic. It occurs in a branch of international law which is above all 
characterised by a very high degree of universality. Thus, to assume that international 
criminal law is regionalised is in fact to agree that the declaration of its absolute universality 
is in principle relative (1.1.1) given the revival of international regionalism (1.1.2). 
1.1.1. The Relative Absolute Universalism 
The universal character of international law stems from its historical roots. In fact, the 
systematisation of contemporary international law between the 15th and 19th centuries is a 
European heritage.29 Following the conclusion of the peace treaties of Westphalia (1648), 
international law was developed as a body of rules governing the relationships between the 
emerging European sovereign states from the pope’s empire. However, several authors 
                                                 
25 See M. Virally, ‘Les relations entre organisations régionales et organisations universelles’, in Société française 
pour le droit international (SFDI), Régionalisme et universalisme dans le droit international contemporain - 
Colloque de Bordeaux (1976) (Paris : Pedone, 1977)147-165, at 148.   
26 F. Borella, ‘Le régionalisme africain et l’Organisation de l’unité africaine’, 9 Annuaire français de droit 
international (1963) 838-885, at 839 ; Sharma, above note 18, at 133. 
27 Daillier, Forteau and Pellet, above note 15, at 86. 
28 J-C. Gautron, ‘Le fait régional dans la société internationale’, in Société française pour le droit international 
(SFDI), Régionalisme et universalisme dans le droit international contemporain - Colloque de Bordeaux (1976) 
(Paris : Pedone, 1977) 3-43.   
29 M. Yanagihara, ‘Significance of the History of the Law of Nations in Europe and East Asia’, 371 Recueil des 
Cours de l’Académie de Droit International (2014) 273-435, at 305. 
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suggest that it made its earliest steps in the ancient civilisations of Asia and Africa.30 In this 
regard, Sergiei Aleksandrovich Korff writes: 
As soon as there developed a cultural center of a certain level of civilization, a state of some 
prominence, there grew up simultaneously relations with the outside world that soon took the 
shape of a whole system of institutions. In other words, such a system was the necessary 
consequence of any civilization and was as old as human culture in general. One matter of 
importance must be remembered in this connection: the ancient peoples of Asia or Africa were 
well acquainted with international relations and law. Further, there is another striking 
consequence: the careful analysis of these relations of different ancient civilizations reveals a 
remarkable similarity in their lines of development. Take, for example, the history of 
ambassadorial missions, the question of extradition of fugitive criminals, the protection of 
certain classes of foreigners, and, above all, the sanctity of international contracts.31 
Among these legal developments of the ancient civilisations, one may quote the peace and 
alliance treaty (Treaty of Kadesh), which was concluded in 1259 BC between ancient Egypt 
under Pharaoh Ramsès II and the Kingdom of Hittites (former Syria) under Hattusili III.32 The 
Treaty of Kadesh is said to be one of the oldest agreements in the history of international 
law,33 although it was concluded between two political entities which were not equivalent to 
current modern sovereign states. It is also known that there was a pre-colonial African 
international law, as confirmed by keen scientific observers.34 But, when European scholars 
                                                 
30 J. I. Levitt, ‘Introduction. Africa: a Maker of International Law’, in J. I. Levitt (ed.), Africa: Mapping New 
Boundaries in International Law (Oxford and Portland/Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2008) 1-9, at 2 and 3. See also 
S. C. Neff, ‘A Short History of International Law’, in M. D. Evans (ed.), International law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 3-31, at 4. This author also confirms that earlier practices of international trade that 
could be attached to international law already happened in the 6th century before Jesus Christ in Africa. But, he 
only doubts that these practices correspond to the required elaborate conception of international law as it is 
known since the European treaties of Westphalia (1648).  
31 S. A. Korff, ‘An Introduction to the History of International Law’, 18 (2) American Journal of International 
Law (1924) 246-259, at 246-247. 
32 Yanagihara, above note 29, at 297. 
33 P.-M. Dupuy, ‘L’unité de l’ordre juridique international. Cours général de droit international public’, 297 
Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International  (2002) 9-496, at 80. It seems that this treaty is also the 
first to have contained a clause of extradition. See M. Poutiers, ‘L’extradition des auteurs d’infractions 
internationales’, in H. Ascensio, E. Decaux and A. Pellet (eds), Droit international pénal (Paris: Pedone, 2000) 
933-950, at 933.  
34 E. I. Udogu, ‘Historicizing and Contextualizing the Discourse on African International Law and a Concise 
Overview of the Pacific Settlement of the Cameroon-Nigeria Bakassi Peninsula Dispute’, 7 African and Asian 
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and diplomats began to develop and systematise practices and principles of international law, 
the contribution of the ancient civilisations was ignored. According to Masaharu Yanagihara, 
this situation was due to the lack of knowledge concerning these civilisations because of the 
scarcity of (written) documents and the invasion of the discipline by ideology which intended 
to distinguish between Europeans and non-European (barbarian) peoples.35 The universality 
of the new formulated European discipline was a result of its expansion and exportation 
everywhere around the world as a legal production of the civilised nations, so-called in the 
19th century, that is to say Christian people of Europe and those of European origin.36 
International law started being used to justify conquests and the colonisation of the rest of the 
humanity or uncivilised nations,37 who were objects and not subjects of international law.  
While colonisation was an aberration of the history, it enabled the transformation of the 
European legal product (former public European law) into universal international law 
applicable world-wide.38 This universality was consolidated after new states had emerged 
from decolonisation, partly accepted international law as valid and binding on them and 
rejected some of its rules which were supposed to compromise their hard-won independence 
and sovereignty.39     
In this context, universalism as a policy must be associated with the imposition of 
international law on all states and its application worldwide. Therefore, the concept of 
universal, global or common international law which is used as a synonym for general 
                                                                                                                                                        
Studies (2008) 77-99, at78-79; J. T. Gathii, ‘Chapter 17: Africa’, in B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds.), The 
History of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 407-428, at 410-412; M.-C. Djiena 
Wembou and D. Fall, Droit international humanitaire: Théorie générale et réalités africaines (Paris/Montréal: 
L’Harmattan, 2000), at 167-168. 
35 Yanagihara, above note 29, at 293-294. 
36 Tomuschat, above note 3, at 30. 
37 A. Anghie, ‘The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Post-colonial Realities’, 27 (5) Third World 
Quarterly (2006) 739-753, at 742 and 743-746. 
38 See J. Crawford, ‘Chance, Order, Change: the Course of International Law. General Course on Public 
International Law’, 365 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International  (2013) 9-390, at 233.  
39 Anand, above note 14, at xiii and xiv ; A. Mampuya Kanunk’a Tshiabo, Emergence des Etats nouveaux et 
droit international (Kinshasa : Presses Universitaires du Zaïre, 1984), at 166-180 ; M. Flory, ‘Décolonisation et 
succession d’Etat’, 12 Annuaire français de droit international (1966) 577-593, at 589-592 ; M. Bedjaoui, 
‘Succession of States in Respect of Matters other than Treaties’, II Yearbook of International Law Commission  
(1977) 45-117, Part I. 
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international law.40 In its origin, it looks like an imperial law. Its universality excludes the 
possibility of any retreat into legal particularism because in this sense, as Bruno Simma 
writes, “international law is all-inclusive”.41  The Hague multilateral conventions of 1899 and 
1907 as well as the Covenant of the League of Nations of 1919 were likely adopted with this 
legal spirit in mind. The original preexisting regionalism was step by step replaced by more 
and more imposing universality. 
During the 20th century, universalism became balanced by various sectors of regionalism, but 
international criminal law so far remained outside the process of regionalisation. While there 
is no allocation of functions between the world as a whole and the regions,42 international 
criminal law seems to reflect the triumph of universalism. This impression of absolute all-
inclusive universal character of international criminal law was further influenced by the 
development of a sort of “objective universality”.43 True, any system of law is objective as a 
set of abstract, impersonal, general and binding rules governing the relationships between its 
subjects and organising the society. If international law posseses the same character with 
respect to international society,44 it is also true that it relies on the will of sovereign states that 
create its rules, notably by adopting treaties (having relative effects on the parties), which at 
the same time apply to them. However, the idea of “objective universality” is based on a 
particular category of substantive rules that are permanent (applicable until abrogation) and 
binding on states without their express consent.45 These norms are obligations erga omnes, as 
proclaimed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ),46 and peremptory norms of general 
                                                 
40 Daillier, Forteau and Pellet, above note 15, at 50.  
41 B. Simma, ‘Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner’, 20 (2) European Journal 
of International Law (2009) 265-297, at 267. 
42 C. Schreuer, ‘Regionalism v. Universalism’, 6 European Journal of International Law (1995) 477-499, at 484. 
43 Crawford, above note 38, at 239. 
44 In this sense, positive international law is primarily objective law, which is different from subjective law. In 
fact, subjective law is simply a prerogative which is conferred by objective law on its subjects. For example, the 
prerogatives that are conferred on human being in international human rights law, such as the right to life, and 
the right to be free from torture.  
45 See C. Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States without or against their Will. General Course on Public 
International Law’, 241 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International  (1993) 195-374. 
46 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), second phase, Judgment of 5 
February 1970, I.C.J. Report 1970, para.33.  
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international law or jus cogens provided for in Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.47  
These categories of norms, which differ in the degree of their character,48 have given 
legitimacy to the increasing legalisation of the international system through various 
international instruments49 and the doctrinal praise of the concept of “international 
community”50 as the global protector of mankind against serious violations of international 
law. Such a conception of the “international community” is not far from the idea of “legal 
cosmopolitanism”51 defended by Danilo Zolo, which would lead to the progressive reduction 
                                                 
47 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969), Articles 53 and 64. See also Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Articles 26, 40 and 41. See also International 
Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries’, II Yearbook of International Law Commission (2001) 30-143, Part II.  
48 It can be said that obligations erga omnes are international customary rules established for the protection of the 
interest of the international community as a whole, whereas jus cogens, more than being made up of obligations 
erga omnes, consists of peremptory norms, i.e. norms from which no derogation is permitted. But, it is difficult 
to clearly distinguish between these two categories of norms in the international legal system due to the lack of a 
pre-established unequivocal criterion of identification. See D. Hahim, ‘Le concept d’indérogeabilité en droit 
international: une analyse fonctionnelle’ (PhD Thesis, Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales et du 
Développement de Genève 2012), at 148-152 ; J. Verhoeven, ‘Sur les ‘bons’ et les ‘mauvais’ emplois du jus 
cogens’, I Anuário Brasileiro de Direito Internacional (2008) 133-160, at 138-139 ; J. Brunnée, ‘International 
Law and Collective Concerns : Reflections on the Responsability to Protect’, in T.M. Ndiaye and R. Wolfrum 
(eds), The Law of the Sea, Environment Law and Settlement of Disputes -Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A. 
Mensah (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2007) 35-51, at 37-38; P.-M. Dupuy, ‘Normes internationales 
pénales et droit impératif (jus cogens)’, in H. Ascensio, E. Decaux and A. Pellet (eds), Droit international pénal 
(Paris: Pedone, 2000) 71-80, at 78-79.  
49 Apart from Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of May 1969 and the jurisprudence of 
the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction (1970) and the Genocide case (1996), it is important to quote, among other 
instruments, the preamble of the ICC Statute.  
50 B. Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law. General Course on Public 
International Law’, 250 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International (1994) 217-384; C. Tomuschat, 
‘International Law as the Constitution of Mankind’, in United Nations, International Law on the Eve of the 
Twenty-first Century: Views from the International Law Commission (New York: United Nations, 1997) 37-50; 
I.I. Lukashuk, ‘The Law of the International Community’, in United Nations, International Law on the Eve of 
the Twenty-first Century:Views from the International Law Commission (New York: United Nations, 1997) 51-
68; M. Delmas-Marty, Les forces imaginaires du droit (IV). Vers une communauté des valeurs (Paris: Seuil, 
2011), at 8-11. 
51 D. Zolo, Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), at 97. The author 
seems to have been influenced in this idea by Hans Kelsen. See D. Zolo, ‘Hans Kelsen: Peace through 
International Law’, 9 European Journal of International Law (1998) 306-324, at 319-322.   
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of the sovereignty of states, jurisdictional centralism and the development of norms and 
centralised bodies for the verification and coercive application of the law.52 On its part, the 
ICJ underlined this universality of international law in its judgment of 11 July 1996 in the 
Genocide case recalling its Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951.53 It stated that not only were 
rights and obligations enshrined in the Genocide Convention obligations erga omnes,54 but 
also that the condemnation of genocide and the required cooperation to release mankind from 
such an odious act both had a universal character.55 
It is remarkable that the institutions designed for enforcing international criminal law are 
connected with this conception of universality. At the level of the United Nations, the 
Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY)56 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)57 for the purpose of 
prosecuting international crimes committed in the territories of these two states.58 Historically, 
these tribunals were succedors to the experience of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg (IMT)59 and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) after 
World War II,60 and to the failure of prosecutions against the emperor Wilhelm II, after World 
War I, according to Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919.61 Other criminal 
jurisdictions were later established, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)62 and 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory 
Opinion of 28 May 1951, I.C.J. Reports 1951, at 23.  
54 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 11 July 1996 , I.C.J. Reports 1996, para.31.  
55 Ibid. 
56 SC Res. 827, 25 May 1993, para.2. 
57 SC Res. 955, 8 November 1994, para.1. 
58 The process to terminate their mandates was launched in 2012. See SC Res. 1966, 22 December 2010, para.1. 
In this paragraph, the UN Security Council decided ‘to establish the International Residual Mechanism for 
Criminal Tribunals (“the Mechanism”) with two branches, which shall commence functioning on 1 July 2012 
(branch for the ICTR) and 1 July 2013 (branch for the ICTY), respectively (“commencement dates”), and to this 
end decides to adopt the Statute of the Mechanism in Annex 1 to this resolution’. 
59 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis and Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal (8 August 1945). 
60 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946), Article 1.  
61 See E. David, Code de droit international pénal (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2004), at 995. 
62 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (with Statute) (16 January 2002).  
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the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,63 which involved the United Nations 
and the states in which crimes were committed.64 The summit of universalism in international 
criminal law was reached with the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC’s creation 
was applauded as “the odyssey of the 20th century”.65 The Rome Statute of 17 July 1998 also 
achieved a very long process of codification of international criminal law, following several 
efforts such as those of the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) through the 
codification of the Nuremberg Principles,66 the Draft Statute for an International Criminal 
Court67 and the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of the Mankind.68    
In the context of such universalism, a room was opened for international criminal law only at 
the national level. What could be called the third way of international criminal law which is 
found at the regional level was not foreseen. In this regard, the ICC Statute provides that the 
permanent institution is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions69 while both the 
ICTY and the ICTR are temporary tribunals with primacy over national courts of all states.70  
It follows that the emergence of African international criminal law implies that the supposed 
absolute universalism of international criminal law becomes relative. Despite the existence of 
rules binding on states without their consent and the increasing trend to enforce international 
                                                 
63 Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the Prosecution 
under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (6 June 2003), 
Article 2; Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, with Inclusion of Amendments 
as Promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006). 
64 See E. David, Principes de droit des conflits armés (Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2012), at 931-934.  
65 A.S. Cehreli, ‘L’odyssée du XXe: la naissance de la Cour pénale internationale’, 2 Synergies Turquie  (2009) 
113-122. 
66International Law Commission, ‘Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg 
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, with Commentaries’, II Yearbook of International Law 
Commission (1950) 374-378.  
67 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court with commentaries’, II 
Yearbook of International Law Commission (1994) 26-74, Part II.  
68 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with 
commentaries’, II Yearbook of International Law Commission (1996) 17-56, Part II. It is a more developed text 
than the one already elaborated in 1954. See International Law Commission, ‘Draft Code of Offences against the 
Peace and Security of the Mankind’, II Yearbook of International Law Commission (1954) 1-3.    
69 ICC Statute, Article 1.  
70 ICTY Statute, Article 9 (2); ICTR Statute, Article 8 (2). 
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criminal law at the universal level, states remain the masters of the game to structure or 
restructure the global legal system. The truth is that “international law is a process”71 subject 
to constant transformations that are dictated by sovereign states’ aspirations. It is in line with 
these aspirations that the development of African international criminal law is envisaged, in 
respect of both substantive and procedural norms.      
1.1.2. The Revival of International Legal Regionalism 
It is now possible to say that international criminal law is moving from universalism to 
regionalism. The regional level is a third way next to the universal and domestic levels.  
According to the ILC, the concept of regionalism encompasses three different meanings.72 
Firstly, it is “a set of distinct approaches and methods for examining international law”73 and 
denotes “particular orientations of legal thought or historical and cultural traditions”,74 such as 
the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL).75 Secondly, regionalism means 
“a regional approach to international law-making”.76 In this sense, regions are understood as 
“privileged forums for international law-making because of the relative homogeneity of the 
interests and actors concerned”.77 The ILC even perceives that “much of international law has 
developed in this way, as the gradual extension of originally regional rules to areas outside the 
region”.78 In this regard, the ICJ declared that the principle of uti possidetis, originally 
established by Latin-American states,79 then approved for reasons of stability in new states by 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU),80 was already a norm of general international law.81 
Lastly, in its third meaning, regionalism refers to “the pursuit of geographical exceptions to 
                                                 
71 Crawford, above note 38, at 22 and 240. 
72 International Law Commission, ‘Report of the International Law Commission. Fifty-seventh session (2 May- 
3 June and 11 July-5 August 2005)’, II Yearbook of International Law Commission (2005) 207-225, at 207. 
73 Ibid., at 207 and 208.  
74 Ibid., at 208. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., at 207 and 209. 
77 Ibid., at 209. 
78 Ibid., at 209. 
79 G. Albine, ‘Sur le nouveau principe général de droit international : l’uti possidetis’ (PhD Thesis, Université 
d’Angers 2006), at 50-96.  
80 Ibid., at 97. 
81 Case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment of 22 December 1986, 
I.C.J. Reports 1951, paras.20 and 22. 
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universal rules of international law”.82 Regionalism may then give rise either to “a rule or a 
principle with a regional sphere of validity in relation to a universal rule or principle”,83 that is 
to say “the rule in question would be binding only on the States of the particular region”,84 or 
to one which “imposes a limitation on the validity of a universal rule or principle”,85 which 
means that “states concerned would be exempted from the application of an otherwise 
universal rule or principle”.86  
It follows from this ILC definition that regional international law does exist only in the second 
and the third meaning of regionalism, the first meaning being more about the methods used to 
interprete or orientate the understanding of international law. Therefore, where there is 
regional international law, there is always regionalism, but the opposite is not true. In fact, in 
order to assume that regional international law exists, there must be a normative system which 
is put in place and can be enforced by specific regional institutions, if not a tribunal. It is 
symptomatic to observe that the process of globalisation, the strengthening of which derives 
from the end of the split of the world, during the Cold War, in three different blocs (the liberal 
West, the communist East and the non-aligned states Group), did not break down the dynamic 
of regional groupings. Rather, what may be called the “new regionalism”87 resulted in an 
extension in number of regional treaties and organisations,88 particularly in Africa.89   
                                                 
82 International Law Commission, above note 72, at 207 and 209. 
83 Ibid., at 209.  
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid.  
87 Fawcett, above note 22, at 438. See also J. M. Pureza, ‘New Regionalism and Global Constitutionalism: 
Allies, not Rivals’, ESIL Conference Paper Series No.2 (1) (2012), at 4. 
88 See M. Diez De Valasco Vallejo, Les organisations internationales (Paris : Economica, 2002), part III. 
89 See A. Tchaméni, Les évolutions du régionalisme africain : le fonctionnement des communautés économiques 
régionales (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2013), at 17 ; R. Frimpong Oppong, ‘The African Union, the African Economic 
Community and Africa’s Regional Economic Communities : Untangling a Complex Web’, 18 African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law (2010) 92-103, at 93; B. Kahombo, ‘L’encadrement conventionnel des 
relations entre la République démocratique du Congo et le Congo-Brazzaville : tendances juridiques générales et 
justifications’, 15 Librairie africaine d’études juridiques (2013) 189-212, at 190-199 ; T. Kalala, Code des 
organisations internationales (Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2008) ; A. Mahiou, ‘Le cadre juridique de la coopération 
sud-sud. Quelques expériences ou tentatives d’intégration’, 241 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit 
International (1993) 9-194. 
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Historically, regionalism was recognised at the universal level by article 21 of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations of 28 June 1919.90 Then, the Charter of the United Nations of 26 
June 1945 broadly regulates it in Chapter VIII concerning “regional arrangements”.91 
Elsewhere, the Charter relies on regionalism in order to guarantee an effective representation 
of all the regions of the world within the bodies of the organisation. It is clear, however, that 
regional agencies were expected to develop more in the field of peace and security.92 But, to 
borrow Simma’s expression, regionalism has become today all-inclusive, devoid of borders of 
competences, and deals with all possible legal issues, such as collective security, economic 
and trade law, human rights law and now relevantly international criminal law. 
In Africa, regionalism can also be connected to Pan-Africanism, which is the main political 
ideology on the basis of which the principal objective of African unity is supposed to be 
achieved.93 With this dynamic, the OAU,94 the OAU/AEC95 and the AU were created. Pan-
Africanism was initiated in the 19th and the 20th centuries in the West Indies and in America 
by the African diaspora, led by William Du Bois, Sylvester Williams, Marcus Garvey and 
George Padmore, before being introduced in Africa by African leaders (Julius Nyerere, Jomo 
Kenyata, Kwame N’krumah, Patrice-Emery Lumumba, etc.) after the Pan-African Congress 
of Manchester in October 1945.96 During the first Conference of African Independent States 
                                                 
90 This Article 21 provides: ‘Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international 
engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understanding like the Monroe Doctrine for securing the 
maintenance of peace’.  See J.R. Orue Y Arregui, ‘Le régionalisme dans l’organisation mondiale’, 53 Recueil 
des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International (1935) 1-96 ; J.M. Yepes, ‘La contribution de l’Amérique latine 
au développement du droit international public et privé’, 32 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit 
International  (1930) 691-800.    
91 UN Charter, Article 52 (1). See H. Saba, ‘Les accords régionaux dans la Charte de l’ONU’, 80 Recueil des 
Cours de l’Académie de Droit International (1952) 635-720. 
92 See J. Combacau and S. Sur, Droit international public (7e edn., Paris: Montchrestien, 2006), at 662.  
93 G. Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism? (London: Dennis Dobson, 1955); J. Woronoff, Organizing 
African Unity (the Scarecrow Press, Inc., Metuchen, N.J., 1970) ; S.C. Bitembo, ‘Questions autour de l’unité 
africaine’, 426 Congo-Afrique  (June-July 2008) 486-491, at 486-489 ; O. Ndeshyo, L’héritage de l’OUA à 
l’UA : la quête permanente de l’unité africaine (Kinshasa : Editions universitaires africaines, 2010). 
94See Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (25 May 1963). 
95 The OAU changed its nature when, in order to strengthen its institutional and legal framework, the African 
Economic Community (AEC) was established by the Treaty of Abuja of 3 June 1991 and then became, 
officially, the OAU/AEC, a continental organisation of integration for achieving African unity.  
96 See G. Padmore, Panafricanisme ou communisme? La prochaine lutte pour l’Afrique (Paris : Présence 
africaine, 1962), at 181-184. 
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held in Accra (Ghana) on 15 April 1958, the motto that “Africa must unite”,97 in which 
Cheikh Anta Diop had later seen “the condition of survival of the African peoples”98 in a 
divided world, was delivered. Beyond the objective of African unity, African regionalism 
aims to ensure that Africa carries its responsibility to bring African solutions to African 
problems. In other words, the continent claims that African problems shall be solved in 
Africa, by Africans, and within a strictly African framework.99  
In the field of international criminal law, this policy of self-reliance contrasts with the 
situation wehereby the continent appears to be a great consumer, or even a place of 
experimentation, of global international criminal justice. In essence, Africa presents itself in a 
pessimistic way before the rest of the world. The continent seems to be the sanctuary of 
crises, conflicts, crimes and criminals, with no other way than dismissing the management of 
all these problems to the international community and particularly the United Nations. 
Furthermore, the “judicial strategy of surrounding criminals”100 at the global level doesn’t 
prove to be entirely satisfactory. An international criminality, which is not specifically dealt 
with, tends to develop: unconstitutional change of government, illicit exploitation of natural 
resources, trafficking in hazardous waste in Africa, trafficking in human beings and other 
transnational crimes. The ICTR and even the ICTY are said to have produced mitigated 
results,101 while criticisms against the ICC reveal “the decline of the spirit of Rome”102 as well 
as the situation of a Court which is challenged, inefficient and in need of a reform.  
                                                 
97 K. N’krumah, L’Afrique doit s’unir (Paris et Dakar : Présence africaine, 1994). 
98 C. A. Diop, ‘L’unité africaine, condition de survie des peuples africains’, in Problèmes actuels de l’unité 
africaine (Alger : SNED, 1973) 411-417, at 411. The translation is mine.  
99 See M. Bedjaoui, ‘Le règlement pacifique des différends africains’, 18 Annuaire français de droit 
international  (1972) 85-99, at 85 ; P.-F. Gonidec, Relations internationales africaines (Paris : LGDJ, 1996), at 
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œuvre du pouvoir d’intervention de l’Union africaine dans les Etats membres’ (Unpublished Mémoire d’études 
supérieures en droit public, University of Kinshasa 2011), at 3-4.  
100 L. Katansi, Cour pénale internationale, tribunaux pénaux internationaux, tribunaux pénaux nationaux. 
Crimes, châtiments et dispositif d’encerclement des criminels de guerre dans la région des Grands Lacs 
africains (Kinshasa : Presses Universitaires du Congo, 2010).  
101 S. Sur, Le rôle des juridictions pénales internationales : premier bilan et réformes (Fribourg : Conference, 
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Under these circumstances, Africa decides to develop African international criminal law and 
to be an actor of distributing international criminal justice on the continent. This regional 
development would open the international legal system to reform. The principle of regional 
territoriality, according to which international crimes allegedly committed in the continent 
must be prosecuted and tried in Africa, by Africans and through African mechanisms of 
criminal accountability, could be adopted.  
However, such a development can also be merely a sign of rhetoric, since African enterprises 
systematically depend on foreign assistance.103 A deeper pessimistic view is the perception 
that the continent actually tends to favour the impunity of crimes that are committed by those 
who bear the greatest criminal responsibity, starting with high ranking state officials, who 
would enjoy immunities and may impede the proper functioning of the aforementioned 
African mechanisms of criminal accountability. This justifies Malick Ndiaye’s apparent 
worries in the title of his book when he asked: “Impunity: till where is Africa ready to go?”104 
However, this question cannot prevent an optimistic view of the issue because universalism 
does not necessarily amount to better justice or the end of impunity either. Moreover, the 
problem of financial constraints is not insoluble. It is mainly a matter of political will.  
Finally, it has to be noted that international law is always “the product of a process of claim 
and counterclaim, assertion and reaction by governments as representatives of states and by 
other actors at the international level”.105 Any eventual development of the international legal 
system which could stem from a regional dynamic is like a return to the roots of international 
law which are historically regional. The particularity that the dynamic comes from Africa 
could contribute to mitigate the perception of “Euro-centrism”106 according to which 
international law is originally a legal product of Europe which was expanded world-wide by 
Europeans states, the latter with their Oceanic (Australia and New Zealand) and northern 
                                                 
103 P. E. Batchom, ‘La double-présence au sein des institutions internationales’, CODESRIA Newsletter (31 
January 2014) 1-16, at 5. 
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105 Crawford, above note 38, at 21. 
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American allies (United States and Canada) keeping the monopoly, both politically, 
economically and scholarly, to dictate the future of the international legal system.107 This 
revival of regionalism poses another contextual problem: the potential fragmentation of 
international criminal law. 
1.2. The Potential Regional Fragmentation of International Criminal Law 
The issue of fragmentation of international law is not new. It was subject of much debate 
among international lawyers during the period between 1914 and 1925.108 Today, it is still an 
endless international legal debate.109 The question arises as to the relationship between 
regional international criminal law and global international criminal law. The concept of 
fragmentation comes to mind as rupture of the unity which is supposed to characterise 
international law. In this regard, the development of African international criminal law can be 
considered, prima facie, as a factor of regional fragmentation of general international criminal 
law. Still, the doctrinal debate is too ambiguous about whether or not regional law represents 
a threat to that unity (1.2.1) and so the issue of fragmentation cannot challenge the relevance 
of the African initiative which may give rise to a new order of international criminal law 
(1.2.2).   
                                                 
107 A.-M. Slaughter and W. Burke-White, ‘The Future of International Law is Domestic (or the European Way of 
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Université d’Helsinki 2014), at 14 ; A-C. Martineau, ‘La fragmentation du droit international : un 
renouvellement répété de la pensée ?’, in European Society of International Law, International Law: Do We 
Need It ? (Paris : conférence bi-annuelle, 18-20 mai 2006).  
109 See P.-M. Dupuy, ‘Fragmentation du droit international ou des perceptions qu’on en a ?’, EUI Working Paper  
Law No. 2006/14, European University Institute (2006), at 12.  
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1.2.1. The Ambiguity of the Doctrinal Debate 
The current debate on the legal fragmentation of international law started when the ICJ 
proclaimed, in the Hostages Judgment of 24 May 1980, the existence of legal “self-contained 
regimes”,110 i.e. those legal regimes consisting of “groups of rules that do not correspond to 
those of general international law and that contribute to fragmentation of international law”.111 
The diversity of branches of international law, the expansion of rules which they give rise to 
and their contradictory interpretation, as a result of the proliferation of international courts 
and tribunals, raise the question of maintenance or demise of the unity of international law. 
Several examples are given to illustrate the problem,112 among them the historic contradiction 
between the ICJ and the ICTY, respectively in the Nicaragua Judgment of 27 June 1986 and 
the Tadič case in 1999, concerning the condition of attribution to states of the conduct of non-
state actors: the ICJ decided on the basis of effective control,113 while the ICTY deliberately 
preferred to rely on the criterion of overall control.114 Two presidents of the ICJ, Stephen M. 
Schwebel in 1999 and Gilbert Guillaume in 2000, expressed their concerns over such a legal 
fragmentation before the United Nations General Assembly.115 Their voices seem to have 
                                                 
110 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Tehran), Judgment of 24 
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influenced the ILC which initiated a study of the issue to which two main reports were 
devoted, first in 2000 by Gerhard Hafner,116 and then in 2006 by a Study Group headed by 
Martti Koskenniemi.117    
The question which relates to this debate is to know whether the development of African 
international criminal law, substantive and procedural/ institutional, should be combated as a 
threat to the unity of international criminal law, or promoted as a desirable and good 
achievement of regionalism in Africa. In this regard, the sholarship is ambiguous. Firstly, the 
question as such is not examined, although an answer may be drawn from one’s 
understanding of the general debate on legal fragmentation. Secondly, the matter is very 
controversial, given the fact that the debate involves two main categories of international 
lawyers, that is to say those who hold extreme positions and the moderates. 
In the category of extreme positions, one may distinguish between two opposed groups of 
international lawyers. The first one consists of alarmist international lawyers who are pure 
advocates of universalism and for whom, when faced with the danger of legal fragmentation, 
even a regional one, it is the unity of international law which must be protected and defended 
so as to avoid what Jean Combacau has called a ‘bric-à-brac’118 to express the concern about 
the lack of order which may affect the international legal system. For Mireille Delmas-Marty, 
for example, the unity of international law would merely amount to “one world law”,119 
unified and not multiple.120 The position is apparently shared by Pierre-Marie Dupuy for his 
obsession with the unity of the international legal order.121 This group also includes those 
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lawyers who call for an institutional hierarchy to combat the danger of fragmentation, like 
Christian Leathley122 and the two former president of the ICJ (Shwebel and Guillaume), and 
the proponents of the constitutionnalisation of international law, represented by Tomuschat,123 
who merely want to transform it into the law of the (universal) international community. In 
this sense, it seems that there is no room for admitting the existence of African international 
criminal law. 
The problem with the position of this group of lawyers is that they tend to deny evidence of 
the diversity of the world, despite the fact that mankind or humanity is everywhere the same, 
as if the universality of international law would signify, by exaggeration, its uniformity or be 
tantamount to the unity of the international legal system. Moreover, in a constitutional 
perspective founded on the necessity to protect values common to mankind, it is doubtful that 
the alleged protector, the international community, only exists at the global level. Why can a 
community of states and peoples at the regional level not stand for the international 
community? After all, why can’t this regional community of states and peoples pretend at 
least to act on behalf, or even in the interest, of the international community as a whole? The 
position of this group of lawyers is thus difficult to support. To borrow Michael Walzer’s 
words, these lawyers seem to elaborate their position on universalism just on the paper.124 
Accordingly, their position is at odds with the fact that the world is currently diverse and 
heterogeneous.    
On the other hand, the second group of lawyers holding an extreme position opposes that 
perception of universality, because it reflects a totalitarian, imperial and hegemonic 
perspective of international law which is a threat to the legitimacy of the contested global 
order.125 On the contrary, these lawyers are stubborn advocates of international legal 
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pluralism which fits for the diversity of the world, politically, economically, socially and 
culturally. This is why Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Tuebner have warned against 
“the vain search for legal unity in the fragmentation of global law”.126 Okafor even argues 
that, because international law is not yet sufficiently expanded and diversified, what is 
actually needed is, not the search for that unity, but more fragmentation.127 In Okafor’s view, 
fragmentation is not a legal pathology, but a solution to the reproduction of “the problematic 
and historical subordination of the third world within the global system”.128 Thus, African 
international criminal law could be welcome.        
The main criticism against the position of this group of lawyers is that its perception of legal 
fragmentation is extremely exaggerated and tends to create more anarchy within the 
international legal system. In addition, one should not overlook that the strategy for more 
uncontrolled fragmentation may be utilised instead by powerful states against weak countries. 
As Pureza has best noted, “powerful states use a twofold strategy to foster their dominant 
position: on one side, they claim their hierarchical superiority within multilateral institutions 
and regulatory frameworks; on the other, they promote institutional and regulatory 
fragmentation whenever they serve their agendas”.129  
Between both groups of lawyers in the category of extreme positions stands the category of 
moderate international lawyers. Like alarmist lawyers, moderates are also proponents of 
universalism. However, they differ from them, like pluralists, by their acceptance of the 
unavoidable character of legal fragmentation, which they perceive as pathology of the global 
law. But, this pathology should not be overstated130 because “based on the information 
available at this time (…) a serious problem does not appear to exist”.131 International law 
could have appropriate legal devices to deal with rising threats of fragmentation. This group 
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includes lawyers such as Crawford132, Koskenniemi133, Simma134, Jonathan Charney,135 
Rosalyn Higgins136 and Tullio Treves.137 No doubt that for this group of lawyers, the 
existence of African international criminal law could be admitted beside universal 
international criminal law.  
The problem with the position of this group of lawyers is to overestimate solutions that 
general international law provides for in cases of fragmentation. Therefore, these lawyers also 
exaggerate their position by minimising the scope of the phenomenon of regionalisation. It 
must be observed that the problem of coordination between the universal and the regional 
levels is still not a matter of evidence. The ILC, with its Study Group on the fragmentation of 
international law, has only issued some classical solutions, dealing with regional international 
law generally as lex specialis.138 As some ILC members have noted, this is not all that can be 
said on regionalism.139 As a result, the ILC’s work could simply serve as a basis for analysis 
from which new perspectives can be drawn. This conclusion particularly applies to the 
relationship between general international criminal law and African international criminal law 
in view of the need to establish a new order of international criminal law. 
1.2.2. The New Perspective: Towards a New Order of International Criminal Law 
The diversity of doctrinal perceptions on the fragmentation of international law is 
symptomatic of the complexity of the issue. As Georges Abi-Saab writes, everything depends 
upon the “level of analysis”140 that each author actually decides to take, “because everybody 
doesn’t look at the same thing at the same aspect, or from the same angle or distance”.141 But, 
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in a whole, all the views come to “different faces of the same coin”.142 Besides, the 
divergence of doctrinal perceptions enables identification of two correlative issues in the 
debate, i.e. the existence of only one international legal system and the distinctive question of 
the unity of international law. Basically, international law constitutes the normative part 
(substantive, procedural and institutional) of the international legal system, which includes 
additional aspects related to ideology, culture, history and philosophy that very often 
influence the manner in which the normative part is interpreted, understood, modified, applied 
or abrogated.  
The unity of international law does not mean its universality.143 It could rather imply the fact 
that international law consists of the combination of both fragments of universal and regional 
(sub-regional) international law. These two categories of law may be on their side split into 
various disciplines or distinct legal regimes (human rights, criminal law, humanitarian law, 
collective security, trade law, etc.). These legal regimes can also be considered in generic 
terms as systems (orders) or sub-systems of international law. This is particularly the case 
with the concepts of African, American or European systems of human rights protection,144 or 
the United Nations and the AU collective security systems.145 In other words, it is this 
diversity of the two main fragments (universal and regional) of international law which makes 
its unity. However, all these fragments belong to the same international legal system/order 
which gives them the power of their legitimacy (interstate consent, treaties and customs, 
protected common values of justice, peace and order, mutual respect for sovereign equality of 
states, etc.). After all, there is no denial of this unity simply because of a lack of normative 
coherence (existence of normative antinomies) between fragments (normative systems) or 
various disciplines pertaining to them. The lack of coherence is a different problem which 
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must be taken into account in the development of any legal system and its solutions may be 
variable.   
Accordingly, it can be admitted that international legal fragmentation constitutes “a healthy 
phenomenon”.146 It shows the growth of international law and the fact that states, despite 
crises and their regional specificities, are more confident in it as a tool for the regulation of 
international relations. In the framework of regionalism, the development of African 
international criminal law is itself the proof of that confidence, but also of the will to reform 
the entire system in order to establish a new order of international criminal law which would 
be equitable and serve the interests of all states and peoples, regardless of their regional 
origin. 
This development, together with the aforementioned principle of regional territoriality, is 
likely to reshape relationships between the existing enforcement mechanisms of international 
criminal law at the universal, regional and domestic levels. African international criminal law 
will imply the adoption of specific rules (substantive norms, institutional and procedural 
mechanisms) additional to those which already exist in general international criminal law or 
the adaptation of the latter to global developments. The substantive norms relate to the 
extensive list of crimes to be dealt with at the regional level and the expansion of the scope of 
the definitions of some core international crimes such as war crimes and aggression. The 
procedural and institutional mechanisms of criminal accountability are embodied in the 
system of African regional criminal justice to put in place and its coordination with the 
international legal system as a whole. As such, the study of African international criminal law 
is amply justified. It is conducted in the light of Rowland Cole’s observation, noting that 
“legal doctrines do not develop from a vacuum. They are shaped in response to prevailing 
needs, and are the reflections of the conditions of prevailing problems that stimulate 
thought”.147  
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2. The Question of African International Criminal Law 
It has already been explained that public international law or the law between nations,148 the 
so-called jus gentium (law of nations),149 encompasses one universal legal fragment which 
coexists, in the framework of regionalism, with a variety of regional international laws such 
as African, European and American international law.150 However, in principle, what is called 
African international criminal law constitutes one of the various disciplines that can be 
attached to the fragment of African international law.151 From this schematic setting, it is now 
possible to deeply clarify its legal existence, precise its meaning, scope and development 
under the aegis of the AU, the problems it raises and how they will be approached and 
scrutinised in this study. All these problematic issues can be examined in two points, namely 
the landmark of the legal development of the concept of African international criminal law 
(2.1) and the axes of its analysis (2.2).    
2.1. The Landmarks of the Legal Development of the Concept 
There are two principal ideas demonstrating that African international criminal law does exist: 
on the one hand, the existence of African international law on the basis of which it develops is 
no longer challenged (2.1.1); on the other hand, African international criminal law has its own 
object (2.1.2).  
2.1.1. The Existence of African International Law 
A long time ago, it was not easy to defend the existence of African international law. Today, 
this existence has become uncontested.152 It seems that the term “African international law” 
was used, for the first time, by Pinto Accioly in his ‘Tratado de derecho internacional 
público’ (treatise of public international law) in 1945,153 before the beginning of African 
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independences in 1957.154 In 1963, short after the creation of the OAU, François Borella, 
commenting on the new African regionalism, also invoked the expression,155 while Pierre-
François Gonidec was probably the first, later in 1965, to raise the following central question: 
“Does African international law exist?”156 
In 1969, Boutros-Ghali pointed out that such law obviously existed thanks to the important 
normative action of the OUA which had already adopted a number of specific rules governing 
inter-African relations.157 One year later, Joseph-Marie Bipoun-Woum published his historic 
but old book entitled ‘Droit international africain: problèmes généraux, règlement des 
conflits’.158 Since then, it had become more common to invoke the expression, including in 
the Anglophone scholarship.159 But, authors who did not explicitly make use of the concept of 
African international law were ready to recognise the African region as “an innovator and 
generator”160 of norms of international law, meaning that this region was “a legal 
marketplace, not a lawless basket case”161 contributing to the development of international 
law as a whole.162 Only some minor objections were formulated by authors such as Auguste 
Mampuya, who suggested that African international law did not exist because it was not a 
new legal order distinct from the preexisting international legal system.163 However, besides 
the fact that his book published in 1984 is no longer updated, he might have forgot that the 
specificity of a normative system and the existence of one international legal order are, as 
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already indicated, two different issues that should not be conflated.164 Furthermore, in his 
recent Treatise of Public International Law, published in 2016, Auguste Mampuya has 
changed his position and now admits the existence of African international law.165 Thus, in 
view of such a widespread convergence of scholarly views, Gonidec argues that time has 
come to write a “Treatise of African International Law”.166 The existence of this discipline 
was definitely sealed after the creation of the African Union Commission on International 
Law (AUCIL), entitled to codify international law in Africa, with a particular attention to 
“African customary international law arising from the practice of member states”.167 
Three main arguments can be presented in favour of the existence of African international 
law. First of all, it appears that the ICJ has implicitly accepted the existence of regional 
international law. The question was expressly raised in the Asylum Case, in which Colombia 
alleged that it was competent, as the country granting the contested diplomatic asylum to 
Haya de la Torre, to qualify the offence for the purpose of said asylum by a unilateral and 
definitive decision binding on Peru, the defendant state, pursuant to a regional custom 
appertaining to American international law.168 The Court dismissed the contention, but it did 
not oppose the fact that regional customary law could exist. Colombia was only unable, in the 
Court’s view, to prove it and in such a manner that it had become binding on Peru irrespective 
of its consent.169 
                                                 
164 Ibid., at 196 and 202. On his side, Adam Kpodar seems to consider that African international law is only a 
matter of legal activism in Africa. See A. Kpodar, ‘A propos du militantisme juridique: le droit international 
africain’, in Comment fabrique-t-on le droit ? (Libreville : Institut français du Gabon, 2013), Symposium 
juridique de Libreville (21-22 novembre 2013), at 3.  
165 A. Mampuya Kanunk’a-Tshiabo, Traité de droit international public (Kinshasa : Médiaspaul, 2016), at 143-
174. See also B. Kahombo, ‘Présentation du Traité de droit international public du professeur Auguste 
Mampuya : Regards croisés sur le régionalisme africain’, 19 (2) Recht in Afrika – Law in Africa –Droit en 
Afrique (2016) 209-237, at 217-221. 
166 P.-F. Gonidec, ‘Towards a ‘Treatise’ of African International Law’, 9 African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law (1997) 807-821, at 809-818. 
167 Statute of the African Union Commission on International Law (4 February 2009), Article 4 (a). See also B. 
Tchikaya, ‘L’Union africaine et le nouveau droit international’, 44 Géopolitique africaine  (2012)145-154, at 
149.  
168 Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, Judgment of November 20th 1950, I.C. J. Reports 1950, at 276.  
169 Ibid., at 277-278. 
27 
Secondly, it is argued that there is no objective reason to refuse the existence of African 
international law, whereas American and European170 regional laws are admitted.171 In his 
dissenting opinion in the Asylum Case, Judge Alvarez, who was probably the greatest 
advocate of American international law, noted: 
 “this expression does not mean, as may appear at first sight and as many would have us 
believe, an international law which is peculiar to the New World and entirely distinct from 
universal international law, but rather the complex of principles, conventions, customs, 
practices, institutions and doctrines which are peculiar to the Republics of the New World. 
Certain jurists have sought to cal1 this complex the ‘peculiarities of international law in 
America’. This is merely a question of terminology. The designation ‘American international 
law’ has triumphed”.172 
In the Frontier Dispute case between Burkina Faso and Niger,173 Judge Yusuf tried, like what 
his former Chilean colleague did in regard to American international law, to insist, in his 
separate opinion, on the existence of “public law of Africa applicable to all African states”.174 
The principle of respect of borders existing on achievement of independence belongs to this 
body of law175 and is different from the principle of uti possidetis which originates from the 
Latin-American region.176 This is also the case of the AU’s right to intervene in a member 
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state in the event of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and the rejection and 
condemnation of unconstitutional changes of government. In brief, it is not doubtful that what 
Judge Yusuf has referred to is African international law.177 
Thirdly, and last, the status of Africa as a specific region is no longer contested;178 it has 
become a matter of truism and does not need to be anymore demonstrated.179 However, it is 
important to note that the continent’s institutional organisation characterises its regional 
uniqueness. It is now very far different from Latin-America with which it used to be 
compared.180 The specificity of the African regional model is based on its pyramidal and 
hierarchical character insofar as the continent contains three levels of Pan-African relations 
and cooperation (continental, regional and sub-regional), which are coordinated from the 
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summit by the AU, and stand above the national levels of member states.181 It is crucial to 
know what these three levels of Pan-African relations actually mean and draw from there 
some consequences regarding the definition of African international law.  
The terminology differs a little bit from the one which has been so far used.182 A Pan-African 
region is not the continent as a whole but a geographical space of cooperation within a limited 
group of African states. According to the Treaty of Abuja (Nigeria) of 3 June 1991 instituting 
the African Economic Community (AEC), now part of the AU,183 there are only five Pan-
African regions (Northern, Southern, West, East and Central Africa)184  in which eight 
recognised Regional Economic Communities (REC) exist.185 Each of these regions can 
contain, but not necessarily, one or several sub-regions in which various Sub-Regional 
Economic Communities (S/REC) are established.186 Contrary to the concept of Pan-African 
region, a sub-region is defined by the Treaty of Abuja as a set of at least three African states 
of the same or several regions.187 In other words, any Sub-Regional Economic Community 
must consist of at least three AU member states. These three levels of Pan-African relations 
constitute what is called the African institutional system of integration.188 A number of 
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African international organisations of simple cooperation are joined to them, when they are 
recognised by the AU, the coordinator and protector of the objective of African unity.189 
Therefore, other non-recognised arrangements and agencies, like the Organisation for the 
Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), established by the Treaty of Port-Louis 
(Maurice) of 17 October 1993, are outside that system.190 Such arrangements and agencies 
can even be open to non-African states,191 but the rules, practices and judicial mechanisms 
that they may develop are not part of African international law, in a Pan-African legal 
perspective. Moreover, African international law should not be confused with the laws of the 
AU which is generally referred to in the Statute of the AUCIL,192 since it is just one part of it, 
simply a normative system peculiar to the continental organisation. However, the meaning of 
African international law extends to all African rules adopted or prescribed at the continental, 
regional, sub-regional (and even bilateral) levels of Pan-African cooperation, of which 
purpose is to regulate and above all the specific and exclusive relationships between African 
states, looking for their own solutions in various fields to particular African problems.193 The 
nature of these rules may vary, but they mainly include African international treaty law and 
customary international law, applicable by specific African political or judicial institutions.194 
These rules are incorporated in African instruments from general international law through 
adoption by African states on a bilateral basis or within the multilateral framework of Pan-
African cooperation. This is the premise from which the object of African international 
criminal law can be presented.  
                                                 
189 See Mano River Union (MRU) and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).  
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193 See Bipoun-Woum, above note 158, at 8; Ndeshyo, above note 150, at 11-12. 
194 Borella, above note 153, at 189-190. 
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2.1.2. The Object of African International Criminal Law 
In 1971, the question was raised as to whether what the OAU Charter named the principle of 
“unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive 
activities (…)”195 in Africa, later strengthened by the Accra Declaration on the problem of 
subversion,196 could lead to the emergence of African international criminal law.197 The 
question increased in interest just after the adoption of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions (1949) in June 1977, which provides that “a mercenary shall not have the right to 
be a combatant or a prisoner of war”.198 The OAU Convention for the elimination of 
mercenarism in Africa was subsequently adopted.199 It defines mercenarism as a crime against 
peace and security in Africa.200 It also provides –what was a premier in the world –that each 
member state should punish it “by the severest penalties under its laws including capital 
punishment”.201 These normative developments together with the OUA’s will to prosecute the 
crime of apartheid committed in South Africa and Namibia pushed Oswald Ndeshyo and 
Raphael Nyabirungu to undertake, later in 1977, a research project raising the following 
monumental question: ‘does African criminal law exist?’202 With the creation of the AU 
Criminal Court and the possibility to create hybrid courts or to delegate the exercise of 
regional criminal jurisdiction to a member state, the answer to this question is today in the 
affirmative.  
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Furthermore, there is already a panoply of legal instruments, containing a criminal dimension, 
that have been adopted by the OAU or the AU,203 and by other Pan-African international 
organisations such as RECs.204 These legal instruments enrich the list of crimes against peace 
and security in Africa and offer an important basis for their definition as well as the technical 
methods or procedures to ensure their effective prosecution. In this regard, the African 
Charter of democracy, elections and governance provides that “perpetrators of 
unconstitutional change of government may also be tried before the competent court of the 
(African) Union”.205 Considering all this legal development, the existence of African 
international criminal law does no longer matter. It is a logical evolution of international law 
in Africa.206  Its development pre-dates –but has been influenced by it –the current contested 
system of global international criminal law with its institutions of criminal accountability, 
starting with the ICC.  
In very simple terms, African international criminal law refers to penal aspects of African 
international law, in the same way as general international criminal law bears on penal aspects 
of universal international law.207 However, it is a very fresh legal discipline at the beginning 
of its development. At this stage, it is submitted that the object of African international 
criminal law refers to a set of African rules governing the investigation, the prosecution and 
the trial of crimes gainst peace and security in Africa by African mechanisms of criminal 
accountability, established in the continent, whether at the national, sub-regional, regional or 
continental level.  
The list (a sort of code) of the crimes in question might not necessarily correspond or be 
limited to those over which universal judicial institutions have so far exercised their 
                                                 
203 See OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (14 July 1999); African Union 
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jurisdiction. Such a list is to be fixed by Africa itself and could reflect its peculiar 
preoccupations which may not be those of universal concern. This is the case with the 
inclusion of the crime of illicit exploitation of natural resources. The principal objective is to 
make the continent capable to prosecute and judge by itself the main presumed perpetrators of 
such crimes in Africa, which put in danger the African regional public order. In other words, 
all those who, individuals or corporations, Africans or non-Africans, commit crimes against 
peace and security in Africa should be prosecuted, tried and enventually punished by the 
competent African mechanisms of criminal accountability.   
African international criminal law can also be envisaged as a new security paradigm for the 
continent, integrated into the Common African Defence and Security Policy208 next to five 
other domains: conflict prevention and proactive/preventive diplomacy; peaceful settlement of 
African disputes; regional military intervention and peace support operations; disarmament; 
and post-conflict reconstruction mechanisms.209 It strengthens the continent’s means to deal 
with an increasing international criminality against which the classical techniques of 
international recourse to armed force (humanitarian intervention and peace support missions) 
appear less effective and, in some cases, inoperative, such as in the case of illicit exploitation 
of natural resources and trafficking in hazardous waste in Africa. Even international 
sanctions, in particular economic ones, are of little help. They reach hardly their targets and 
so, very often, only innocent victims become indeed affected.210   
Like general international criminal law,211 African international criminal law is a mixed legal 
discipline where may converge rules originating from universal international law, including 
humanitarian international law, regional human rights and collective security law, and even to 
some extent national criminal law. All these disciplines should impact on the law applicable 
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by the AU Criminal Court. This is a problem of legal sources which will be examined later in 
the present study. 
2.2. The Axes of Analysis 
What are the main problems posed by African international criminal law? How to study its 
current development? Indeed, the complexity of the topic dictates some methodological 
choices among what deserves or not to be examined. For this purpose, it can be resorted to a 
systemic approach (2.2.1) even though the treatment of the issue will also be influenced by 
Pan-African and TWAIL’s thoughts (2.2.2). 
2.2.1. The Search for a Regional Legal Regime in a System-Oriented Approach 
The choice of the systemic approach to this study is based on the fact that the development of 
African international criminal law has to be examined as an entirety. The primary goal does 
not consist of analysing in detail each part of this new legal discipline but to determine the 
bases for its development, to illustrate its content and to examine the principles that should 
govern its relationship with the global system of international criminal justice. Just a positivist 
view,212 notably in the Kelsen’s approach to pure normativism (wertfrei),213 would not suffice 
because it does not seize all the problems posed by African international criminal law in a 
holistic and interdisciplinary perspective. The positivist approach is crippled by its exaltation 
of the technical pure description of existing legal norms from various known formal sources 
of law.214 However, the study of the development of African international criminal law, the 
content of which may be found in disparate provisions and instruments, requires an original 
systematisation which actually goes beyond the mere technical examination of the legal rules 
                                                 
212 See H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945); N. Bobbio, 
Teoria generale del diritto (Torino: Giappichelli, 1993);  N. Bobbio and D. Zolo, ‘Hans Kelsen, the Theory of 
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35 
laid down. This systematisation must include other parts of the legal system, such as the 
institutions in charge of the application of the law, the history, the philosophy, the politics and 
the ideology which stand behind the development of African international criminal law. In 
this regard, the study goes beyond positivist formalism. However, this does not mean that 
positivist analyses as such become irrelevant for this study. It simply implies that the study 
will also rely on political and policy arguments that go beyond the techniques of international 
law by questioning a number of legal norms, institutions, reforms and the balance of power 
within the international legal system.215 The truth is that “lawyers do not fulfill their function 
if they fail to take account of the extra-legal environment in which legal work takes place”.216  
In theory, a system is a totality consisting of different elements, dynamic and organised in 
such a manner to reach a certain degree of coherence, in interaction and under the influence of 
internal and external parameters to the system’s environment.217 It is a holistic and 
interdisciplinary approach which prioritises, not just an isolated element, but the totality, its 
dynamic and evolution and the necessary coherence of its components dictated by their 
interaction.218 The systemic approach can be applied in this study in three different ways. 
First, the study will search to know the main factors deriving from the international legal 
system which justify the development of African international criminal law. One axis of 
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analysis is the external environment related to the crisis of general international criminal law 
of which Africa claims to be a political victim.219 The fact is that some African state officials 
have been prosecuted by non-African countries before their national courts on the basis of the 
principle of universal jurisdiction (Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, etc), while other 
proceedings are or have been conducted by the ICC in Africa, some against a handful of 
former and incumbent African Heads of State (Ivory Coast, Kenya, Libya, Soudan), allegedly 
without paying attention to crimes committed in other parts of the world. The situation has led 
the AU to the conviction that African states and the continent suffer from judicial 
imperialism.220 The AU thus disapproves “the abusive use of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction”221 and some parts of the ICC’s judicial work in Africa,222 such as the prosecution 
of President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan. What are the grievances that the continent has against 
these proceedings? In which dimensions can the overall crisis manifests itself in regard to 
Africa? What kinds of legal reforms are demanded by the AU and/or its member states? How 
to justify that, despite the claim for these reforms, Africa continues to develop its own 
regional international criminal law?    
Another axis of analysis is the internal environment related to the development of African 
regional public order. What can one understand by this expression? Is it a political concept or 
a legal one? It is also observed that the norms of jus cogens appertain to universal 
international law and are in the heart of the parallel notion of (universal) international public 
order.223 But, could there be an African regional public order without any ‘regional’ norm of 
jus cogens? What could be the foundations of African regional public order and the 
implications of its existence on the development of African international criminal law?   
Second, the systemic approach is useful for the definition of the content of African 
international criminal law. To illustrate how this law is so far developed, this study focuses on 
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two selected aspects. On the one hand, what would be the punishable crimes at the African 
regional level? Is it already possible to speak of a code of crimes against peace and security in 
Africa? How does Africa realise this codification and on the basis of which criterion of crimes 
selection? To what extent such a code is different from the ICC Statute? Who can be 
responsible for these crimes? Is the establishment of the AU Criminal Court a good thing? 
What would be, in terms of legal sources, the law applicable by it? Would this regional 
criminal court capable to try all the crimes over which it is given jurisdiction? Under which 
conditions could it represent a viable system of regional international criminal justice in 
Africa?     
On the other hand, the repression of international crimes also implies a national dimension.224 
Questions arise as to the role of AU member states, their availability to apply African 
international criminal law or to support the administration of criminal justice at the regional 
level. Of particular interest is the issue of judicial co-operation in criminal matters which very 
often subordinates the effective exercise of jurisdiction when criminals would try to hide 
behind national borders and/or behind the differences of state legal systems in order to escape 
justice. How would the problem be solved by the AU? Are there African treaties or 
arrangements or techniques of judicial co-operation which can help in the application of 
African international criminal law? Would there be any fruitful cooperation with the 
envisaged AU Criminal Court? Would it be possible and relevant to adopt a continental treaty 
dealing with judicial co-operation in criminal matters (extradition, police collaboration, etc.) 
between African States, on the one hand, themselves, the AU and other Pan-African 
intergovernmental organisations, on the other hand, for the protection of African regional 
public order?  
Finally, in its third application, the systemic approach commands the study of the potential 
relationship between African international criminal law and the global system of international 
criminal justice. One key point would be the state of relationship and coherence between the 
African region, the national and universal levels. The question will be examined with due 
regard to potential judicial conflicts resulting from the duplication of the ICC by the AU 
Criminal Court, in addition to national courts and other competent Pan-African tribunals.225 
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This problem of coordination of different tribunals goes beyond the work of the ILC on the 
fragmentation of international law.226 As Treves writes, “it (ILC) says nothing (…) of the 
parties’ rights to choose freely the competent judge, be it unilaterally when permitted by 
applicable rules, or by agreement, and of all the questions arising from the possible 
coexistence of competent judges”.227 Which principles or rules could be applicable to solve 
any possible judicial collision? Furthermore, which role could the Security Council play in the 
administration of justice by the AU Criminal Court as a way to assume its primary 
responsibility to maintain peace and security in the world?   
In the end, the study will discuss some prospects for the future of the system of international 
criminal justice. A particular attention will be paid to the aforementioned principle of regional 
territoriality, which prioritises international prosecutions and trials in situ, but in cooperation 
between states, different regions and the world in order to avoid any risk of impunity. The 
regionalisation of the ICC will be envisaged in connection with this principle. The goal is to 
explore alternative options for establishing a system of international criminal justice, which is 
multi-level, regionalised, integrated, unified and so coherent. This system could be one which 
guarantees effective participation of all states and regions in the enforcement of international 
criminal law, regional ownership of criminal justice and protection of the interest of mankind. 
As such, the study is under the influence of Pan-African and TWAIL thoughts.   
2.2.2. The Influence of Pan-African and TWAIL Thoughts 
It is very hard, in a study based on a systemic approach, to hide some personal sensibilities.228 
First of all, the reflections will be nourished by Pan-African thoughts. On the one hand, two 
main, but opposed, epistemological paradigms are generally invoked in African studies: afro-
pessimism and afro-optimism.229 Between these two paradigms there is a different 
understanding about Africa’s capacity to stabilise the continent or to develop its own means 
of individual and collective “self-reliance within the framework of the (African) Union”.230  
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Pessimists think that Africa must accept to be ruled from abroad because it is an incapable 
continent of all evils and misfortunes: political crises, armed conflicts, criminality and 
barbarianism, corruption, terrorism, diseases, under-development, coup d’état, impunity, etc. 
It is condemned to definitely remain in a situation “of chaos without way out, of tragedy 
without relief, of powerlessness without remedy (…)”.231 In this pessimistic perspective, the 
development of African international criminal law seems to be an unrealistic idea and has no 
positive prospect. It would not lead to African self-reliance in criminal matters within the 
framework of the AU, but to the consolidation of impunity for international crimes in Africa.  
In contrast, optimists would like to present another picture of the continent,232 which is 
supposed to know its specific problems, willing, motivated and capable to solve them by its 
own means.233 After all, it is the continent of the future,234 even with respect to the 
development of public international law. While this study considers that Africa must 
overcome numerous challenges to achieve effective regional justice, it relies on this optimistic 
view and demonstrates how African international criminal law may be a useful tool to realise 
the cardinal AU’s principle of “respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and 
rejection of impunity (…)”235 and the teleological objective to “promote peace, security, and 
stability on the continent”236 in order to “ensure the well being of the African peoples”.237  
On the other hand, the study develops a maximalist Pan-African view on African international 
criminal law, instead of a minimalist perspective which is reluctant to the building of the 
African community with self-reliance mechanisms which leaves more powers to the summit 
(the AU) to the detriment of lower levels of Pan-African relations (regions and sub-
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regions).238 Therefore, the study focuses more on the role of the AU (and its member states) in 
the development of African international criminal law than on the contribution of RECs and 
S/RECs or other Pan-African organisations of cooperation. As a matter of legal policy, 
multiplying and scattering regional mechanisms of criminal accountability must be avoided. 
Rather, for the better protection of African regional public order, it is preferable to adopt one 
continental code of crimes against peace and security in Africa, one African criminal 
jurisdiction within the AU’s institutional system and one continental treaty dealing with 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, binding on African states, the AU and other relevant 
Pan-African international organisations. 
Secondly, and last, the study borrows the critical viewpoint from TWAIL,239 the aim of which 
is to reveal, behind formal legal norms, the state of unfair subordination of powerless 
countries and regions of the world through the use of international law,240 and then to try to 
defang this law of “its imperialist and exploitative biases”.241 Even if this TWAIL approach is 
not strictly followed throughout the study, it is helpfut to explain if and how, in the past years, 
international criminal justice was manipulated, if not misused, to the detriment of Africa. The 
reflection will be combined with the idea that many African countries were, notwithstanding, 
among the main supporters of the system of international criminal justice, including the ICC, 
which is now supposed to be directed against their nationals. The development of African 
international criminal law will be examined in such a manner to identify, in terms of 
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solutions, concrete reforms which could lead Africa and the rest of the world to a fair system 
of international criminal law.242  
3. The Structure of the Thesis 
This study suggests that there are solid bases for the development of African international 
criminal law. These bases are not simply found in the crisis observed within the global system 
of international criminal law, but also and mainly in the policy of self-reliance of the AU and 
its member states aiming to protect and defend the African regional public order through 
regional institutions of criminal accountability for perpetrators of crimes against peace and 
security in Africa.  
Thus, the thesis contains two main parts. Part one elaborates on the crisis of universal 
international criminal law. It demonstrates that the latter crisis overall manifests itself in four 
different ways in relation to Africa: the decline of state sovereignty with the perception of 
unequal power sharing between states and with the international community; the alleged 
abusive exercise of universal jurisdiction by European states in African situations; the 
divergence of views on the ICC jurisdiction and its work in Africa; as well as the contention 
over the unheeded claim for legal reforms by the AU and its member states. Part two focuses 
on the regionalisation of international criminal law as a solution to this crisis. It deals with 
three regional pillars of the development of African international criminal law. The first one is 
the emerging notion of African regional public order, the violation of which may constitute a 
crime against peace and security in Africa. The second pillar is the promotion of a system of 
African regional criminal justice, including an African criminal jurisdiction. The third and last 
pillar relates to the coordination of the relationships between African international criminal 
law and the global system of international criminal justice.    
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Part I. The Crisis of Universal International Criminal Law 
The 20th century can be characterised as a revolution for international law. Many of the classic 
principles, rules and legal theories have fundamentally changed, starting with state 
sovereignty, criminal jurisdiction and immunities for state officials, in response to the 
increasing humanitarian and political concerns over the need to protect human rights and 
dignity.243 New institutions proliferate (United Nations, other intergovernmental organisations 
and international courts) while other actors have emerged in international relations (new 
states, non-governmental organisations and multinational corporations). A number of rules 
and values common to mankind, the violation of which cannot be tolerated, are widespread. 
The motto is that impunity must cease. The international community has become a subject of 
international law244 and plays a central role in the administration of international justice.   
However, there are serious disagreements on the content of the existing legal system, the risks 
it presents,245 the manner in which rules and principles are interpreted, implemented or 
applied to specific situations and cases. The problem is referred to as “the crisis of 
international law”,246 that is to say “the major crisis of international legal system that emerged 
from the horrors of the World War II and aimed at adhering justice, preventing aggressions 
and protecting victims”.247 International law now seems to be in need of reform in order to 
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continue its unachieved expansion and revolution.248 The future of international law is thus 
widely open and subject to regular debate.249   
In international criminal law, the crisis has a broad dimension. It relates in part to the 
insufficient coverage of new contemporary issues and cells of conflicts, such as financial 
crimes, attacks against the environment, the resurgence of piracy “after hundreds of years of 
dormancy”,250 terrorism, organised and transnational crimes and the liability of legal persons. 
The existing legal system also faces a problem of conception owing to inherent contradictions 
in policy choices: monist system against dualist order, liberal law against authoritarian system 
against state sovereignty,251 prosecutions and justice versus promotion of peace and 
reconciliation, protection of human security versus state national security. The perpetration of 
massive atrocities meanwhile continues around the world. Its looks as if legal norms are not a 
deterrent to criminals. International institutions, such as the UN Security Council and the ICC, 
which have been empowered to defend the law and to apply it, have shown their own 
weaknesses.252 They are contested and suspected of disregarding the law on the basis of which 
they are supposed to perform their functions. The de-legitimisation of (global) international 
criminal law has become a concrete problem. It means that when legal and political 
contestations come pouring in, legitimacy erodes because of an insufficient regional and state 
adherence to the fundementals of the system of international criminal law.   
A deep analysis is necessary in order to illustrate how such a legal crisis appears in relation to 
Africa. The study focuses on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, which is basically a 
sovereign right of every state.253 However, no state can claim today to have the right to 
exclusive jurisdiction over international crimes committed in its territory. Competing criminal 
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jurisdictions now exist between states and the international community. In this regard, state 
sovereignty has widely declined. While this development in law is potentially a good thing for 
the fight against impunity, it appears that the existence of extensive, tough and inflexible legal 
rules is in fact a source of difficult acceptance of the international legal system by many 
states. There are contestations against the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in different 
situations and cases. True, these contestations are proper to any legal system.254 However, 
they also signal the existence of symptoms showing that there is a crisis in international 
criminal law. Such a crisis relates to the decline of state sovereignty over domestic criminal 
jurisdiction (1), the rise of objections against the system of international criminal justice (2) 
and the contention over the claim for legal reforms (3). 
1. The Decline of State Sovereignty on Domestic Criminal Jurisdiction  
Jurisdiction is a legal concept which comes from Roman law. Literally, it means to speak 
(dicere) the law (jus). However, it possesses a wider meaning under international law. 
Classically, jurisdiction designates the lawful powers that a state may exercise, as an attribute 
to its legal personality and sovereignty,255 i.e. its independence (the power or even the duty to 
exercise the functions of a state in exclusion of any other –or even the international 
community –, but in accordance with international law),256 to determinate and realise its own 
political organisation, or “to define and enforce the rights and duties, and control the conduct, 
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of natural and juridical persons”,257 essentially within its national territory. This definition 
allows the distinction between prescriptive jurisdiction (i.e. the power to legislate or to 
establish legal norms) and enforcement jurisdiction (i.e. the power to implement and apply the 
law so laid down to persons, things and situations).258 Furthermore, the concept of jurisdiction 
means the powers that international law confers on the international community to deal with 
problems of common concern to all its members. It may also refer to a court as an institution 
or to its competences (substantive, personal, temporal and territorial). A court then exercises 
the powers of a state or jurisdiction conferred on the international community.  
There is a diversity of rules and principles on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction because of 
the diversification of municipal legislation. There is no common international code applicable 
to the exercise of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.259 But, international law governs and 
limits the exercise of every criminal power. In the case concerning the Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), the ICJ recalled that sovereign 
equality of states “is one of the fundamental principles of the international legal order”260 and 
“has to be viewed together with the principle that each state possesses sovereignty over its 
own territory and that there flows from that sovereignty the jurisdiction of the state over 
events and persons within that territory”.261 Hence, criminal law, and by the way criminal 
jurisdiction, is fundamentally a matter of territorial character in all national legal systems.262 
According to former judge Weiss, “this is a question of public security, and of public order, 
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which a state cannot ignore without neglecting its duty as a state, and one which arises 
whatever the nationality of the delinquent may be”.263  
However, the territoriality of criminal jurisdiction is not absolute. The principle of state 
sovereignty is challenged by the expansion of criminal phenomena due to the progress of 
international communication and exchanges. Although occurring abroad, these phenomena 
may have connections with the territorial state, thus justifying the latter’s right and interest to 
target offenses committed in a foreign country. In addition, the principle of state sovereignty 
has been humanised in order to protect human beings against international crimes.264 
International law now allows the prosecutions of presumed criminals outside their home 
country. In the Tadič case, the ICTY acknowledged this evolution as follows:  
the impetuous development and propagation in the international community of human rights 
doctrines, particularly after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, 
has brought about significant changes in international law, notably in the approach to problems 
besetting the world community. A state-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually 
supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach. Gradually the maxim hominum causa omne jus 
constitutum est (all law is created for the benefit of human beings) has gained a firm foothold in 
the international community as well.
265 
These types of criminal jurisdiction other than that of the territorial state and their lawfulness 
are already abundantly commented on.266 However, it is still necessary to indicate to which 
extent they imply the decline of state sovereignty in a manner that would be provocative of 
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contestations and disagreements by states and regions of the world. In this regard, legal 
developments have occurred in two principal directions: the existence of competing criminal 
jurisdictions between states and the international community (1.1) and the rise of a duty 
(rather than discretion) on the forum state to exercise its jurisdiction over relevant crimes 
committed in its territory (1.2).   
1.1. The Expansion of Competing Criminal Jurisdictions 
The issue of competing criminal jurisdictions is not new. It was extensively discussed by the 
Permanent International Court of Justice (PICJ) in the Lotus case.267 State sovereignty over 
criminal jurisdiction is challenged by the controversial extraterritorial jurisdiction of other 
states (1.1.1) and the jurisdiction of the international community as whole (1.1.2). 
1.1.1. The Scope of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
By definition, state extraterritorial jurisdiction, as opposed to its territorial jurisdiction, 
“connotes the exercise of jurisdiction, or legal power, outside (its) territorial borders”.268 It 
may be prescriptive or enforcement (executive and adjudicative) power. It is prescriptive 
when it comes to the regulation by a state of conducts of persons, situations and events within 
the territory of another state. It is an enforcement power when a state tends to implement, 
through its executive or judicial authority, its own law in the territory of a foreign state. The 
issue may lead to a conflict. As far as state sovereignty is concerned, bones of contention 
appear about the sources of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction (1.1.1.1) and its extent under 
international law (1.1.1.2). 
1.1.1.1. The Diverging Conceptions on the Sources of Extraterritoriality 
Two opposed conceptions have to be distinguished here. The first one is inspired by the PCIJ 
in the Lotus case, in which France contested that Turkey had jurisdiction to prosecute her 
citizen for offences which were allegedly committed in the high seas, out of a collision 
between a French ship (Lotus) and a Turkish one, and so outside its national territory. Even if 
the PCIJ was of the view that the matter also fell under the territorial jurisdiction of Turkey,269 
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owing to the fact that the effects of those offenses also occurred on a ship flying the Turkish 
flag, it advanced an important liberal dictum on extraterritoriality which acknowledged the 
freedom of any state to entertain its jurisdiction outside its borders, unless there was a 
prohibitive rule of international law. The PCIJ stated that “al1 that can be required of a State 
is that it should not overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction; 
within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty”.270 The dictum 
furthermore clarified: 
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the 
application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside 
their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited in 
certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the 
principles which it regards as best and most suitable.
271
 
This approach is said to be sovereign state-oriented272 and finds its regional resonance in the 
Pan-American Convention on Rights and Duties of States, the so-called Montevideo 
Convention of 26 December 1933.273 It may have become inconsistent with the state of 
contemporary international law which has developed, beyond interstate relationships, on the 
communitarian basis of values and interests common to mankind.274 The critique also 
mentions the fact that several judges dissented in the Lotus case, even though the PCIJ 
established a presumption in favour of extraterritoriality. Furthermore, it is advanced that the 
dictum is so weak on the matter because the Court rather ruled much more on the basis of 
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territoriality in addition to the fact that victims were Turkish nationals.275 Finally, the question 
should be whether international law authorises extraterritoriality rather than whether it 
prohibits it,276 since everything which is not expressly prohibited is not necessarily allowed at 
the present day. The sovereignty conception is then unclear on whether or why 
extraterritoriality is permissible.277 According to former Judge Alvarez, in post- League of 
Nations era, one must take into account the rights of other states and other factors relating to 
“the new international law”, 278 including the Charter of the United Nations and the general 
interests of international society.279    
Therefore, the second conception on criminal jurisdiction suggests that states may resort to 
extraterritorial powers if they are only expressly provided for by international law. In this 
sense, the sovereign state-oriented approach is supplanted by a constitutional perspective 
under the terms of which it is up to international law to allocate powers to states rather than 
the latter deriving from their sovereignty.280 In other words, a state has criminal jurisdiction if 
it can justify possessing a title of such kind under international law. This approach has 
founded the theory of grounds/heads/titles of criminal jurisdiction under international law and 
is perceptible even in the work of the Institute of International Law (IIL) with Christian 
Tomuschat as Rapporteur.281 Concerning international crimes, titles of jurisdiction may exist 
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in conventional provisions or, where not provided for by a treaty, under customary 
international law.  
The main critique against this constitutional approach to extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction 
is that it makes believe that states would be members of an international 
(constitutional/political) federation as if each one has specifically renounced its original 
sovereignty. Such an anti-state approach seems to be in contradiction with the world diversity 
and contemporary international law itself which in contrast variously reaffirms the relevance 
of state sovereignty.282 According to Jean D’Aspremont, the constitutional distribution of 
criminal jurisdictions among states does not exist under international law.283 It is nothing but 
“a construct of legal scholars”,284 which does not correspond with any positive rule of 
international law285. He agrees with the Lotus dictum and suggests that it “should not be taken 
for more than what it really is, i.e. the expression of the idea that international law does not 
distribute jurisdiction among states”.286  
Both conceptions are equally and partly mistaken. It is only their combination which can 
permit to see better into the matter. As Sir Robert Jennings has rightly put it, sovereignty has 
been transformed, rather than surrendered by states.287 The institution is still relevant to 
international law. It only evolves into new directions and is under control through proper legal 
devices to enable the making of collective decisions and the taking of effective collective 
actions over international political problems288 and to protect certain values.  
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At least, both conceptions allow admitting that state sovereignty is not absolute and remains 
subject to limitations under international law.289 This has been further acknowledged in the 
Advisory Opinions of both the PCIJ and the ICJ, concerning respectively the disputed 
domestic character of the French Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco290 and the 
Legality of the Threat or the Use of Nuclear Weapons.291 In particular, for many international 
(and even transnational) crimes, states have lost their freedom to fix the criminal jurisdiction 
they would individually desire to entertain. International law already prescribes one for them 
which must be established under their domestic laws. For example, the United Nations 
Convention against torture stipulates for states parties the obligation to take domestic 
measures establishing universal jurisdiction over this crime.292 The same duty is provided for 
by the United Nations Convention against mercenarism of 4 December 1989.293 This 
obligation is limited to contracting parties in pursuance with the principle of the relative effect 
of international treaties. But, it may evolve into a customary rule. In other cases, international 
law only permits but does not impose on states any kind of criminal jurisdiction. This is 
particularly acknowledged for the exercise of universal jurisdiction over war crimes,294 
including those committed during non-international armed conflicts.295 
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Moreover, where no title of jurisdiction directly emanates from international law, states 
remain free in principle to establish the one they desire under their domestic laws. Several 
international treaties even obviously stipulate this possibility after imposing a kind of criminal 
jurisdiction to be established by states parties. For example, both aforementioned conventions 
affirm that they do not “exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with 
national law”.296 The same is provided for by the International Convention for the protection 
of all persons from enforced disappearance (20 December 2006)297 and the Montreal 
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation (23 
September 1971).298 But, it is important to recall that the freedom must be exercised “without 
prejudice to the norms of general international law”,299 i.e. customary international law and 
general principles of law. In this regard, the initial distinction between prescriptive and 
enforcement extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction finds its application here. Both aspects are 
independent of each other.300 It means that it may be possible that the power to prescribe rules 
on a given type of criminal jurisdiction over certain acts or events which take place abroad 
remain total, while these rules must not be implemented and enforced within the territory of 
another state over which the latter also possesses and exercises its sovereign authority. In this 
sense, what may be called unilateral extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is not in essence 
affected by any problem of legality. It is the exercise of the authority to enforce jurisdiction 
abroad which is prohibited. The prosecuting state should wait until the offender, who is not its 
national, enters its territory before enforcing its jurisdiction. This territorial entry basically 
means that the accused person willingly submits himself to the jurisdiction of the forum state. 
Reversely, it is difficult to admit the lawfulness of the jurisdiction of a state which first 
abducts a suspect from the territory of a foreign country and then brings him to its own 
justice. The major precedent in this regard is the case of Adolph Eichmann in 1960s after his 
abduction by Israel from Argentina. The problem is that there is a prior illegality (culpa 
praecedens), consisting of the violation of the territorial integrity of a foreign state and the 
                                                 
296 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (10 December 
1984), Article 5 (3); International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries (4 December 1989), Article 9 (3). 
297 Article 9 (3). 
298 Article 5 (3).  
299 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (10 January 2000), Article 7(6). 
300 R. O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’, 2 Journal International Criminal Justice 
(2004) 735-760, at 741. 
53 
illegal use of force contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, which might normally 
nullify the (adjudicative) jurisdictional power acquired by force.301 Other limitations and 
contestations can derive from the double incrimination principle, the doctrine of the abuse of 
right or the law of immunities for state officials from foreign criminal courts.302 This 
distinction is thus central to all kinds of heads of extraterritorial jurisdiction.       
1.1.1.2. The Extension of Heads of Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction 
Crimes are no longer punishable only in the country where they were committed. The 
Grotius’s idea that no criminal would peacefully enjoy in a state impunity or the fruits of his 
crime committed abroad has gained much legal success.303 Developments have occurred not 
only on the types of heads of jurisdiction to take into account but also on the extensive list of 
international crimes subject to extraterritoriality and the justification behind this to trump state 
sovereignty. 
One of these developments has been the extension of the meaning of the territoriality 
principle with regard to the localisation of the commission of the crime (locus commissi 
delicti). The assumption is that the place where the injurious effects of a crime have been 
produced is also the place where it has been committed. This is what is known as the “effects 
doctrine”,304 which was already challenged by several dissenting judges in the Lotus case. It 
seems as if it found another application in the Lockerbie case, when the United Kingdom and 
the United States of America sought the extradition of two Libyan citizens for prosecutions in 
Scotland, where occurred the alleged terrorist destruction of the Pan Am 103 aircraft on 31 
December 1988. Instead, Libya contested the procedures and claimed at the same time for its 
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jurisdiction over the presumed offenders, present on its territory.305 It was however opined, 
for example in the Lotus case, that the locus commissi delicti is not the place where the effects 
of the crime are produced, but the place where it has been committed and “where the person 
responsible for that act was at the time when it was committed”.306 The effects doctrine may 
only be justified where the crime and its effects can be distinguished, i.e. “when there is a 
direct relationship between them; for instance, a shot fire at a person on the other side of the 
frontier”.307 It is perhaps because of this controversy that the effects doctrine was 
conventionally overturned in the law of the sea.308 
More familiar are developments on the nationality principle. It means that a state may 
entertain its extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction either when the offender (active personality) 
or the victim of the crime perpetrated abroad by a foreigner (passive personality) possesses its 
nationality. Active personality is widely practiced in national legal systems, since nationals of 
a state are normally submitted to the laws of their home countries. Sometimes, it is 
subordinated to the incrimination of the same facts in the state of the commission of the crime 
(double incrimination principle)309 in order to respect the legality principle, or even extended 
to foreigners who have their permanent residence in the prosecuting country.310 For some 
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states, only the accomplice of such crime committed abroad would be prosecuted.311 
However, it has been found that civil law states more likely resort to passive personality than 
common law countries, and that its existence and exercise are often controversial,312 despite 
its acceptability in principle.313 This principle is based on the obligation for a state to protect 
its citizens living abroad.314 It should not be conflated with the classic principle of diplomatic 
protection, whose aim is not the prosecution by that state of a crime committed abroad against 
its national, but to internationally endorse its citizen’s claim for a remedy against a foreign 
state which has failed to provide it to him under domestic law in breach of international law. 
In some cases, even in African countries close to the civil law system, the double 
incrimination principle and the presence of the accused on the territory of the prosecuting 
state are required.315  
Another development is made up of the protection principle under which a state may ascertain 
its jurisdiction when a foreigner has perpetrated an offence against its vital or security 
interests abroad. In many states, this jurisdiction is exercised over crimes such as 
counterfeiting of the national currency or seal and treason.316 The presence of the offender in 
the territory of the prosecuting state is often required,317 but several states also 
problematically provide for a possibility of prosecutions and trial in absentia.318  
This kind of extraterritoriality should not be conflated with the universality principle.319 Their 
difference lies upon the kind of crimes subjected to each other. For the protection principle, 
offenders are foreigners who commit a crime against a vital or security interest of the 
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prosecuting state, while universal jurisdiction is much more applicable to international crimes, 
whose perpetrator may be prosecuted irrespective of his nationality and that of the victim, or 
any other connection with the prosecuting state, except his presence within its territory.320 In 
the Furundzija case, in which the accused was convicted by the ICTY notably for acts of 
torture, it was held that the reason is that international crimes concerned are condemned by 
the entire community of states and so each one possesses an interest and the right to prosecute 
their authors,321 considered as the enemies of all mankind (hostes humanis generis).322 
However, it must be emphasised that the universal condemnation of a crime is by far a 
different and separate issue from the assertion of (adjudicative) jurisdiction. The former does 
not necessarily imply the latter. Likewise, (adjudicative) universal jurisdiction does not 
require in every case that the crime at stake is globally prescribed and outlawed. In addition, it 
does not amount to global jurisdiction in favor of whichever state. It is less than that. Indeed, 
any pronouncement on the exercise by a state of universal jurisdiction over international 
crimes must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The rationale of this kind of jurisdiction 
relates to the idea of international solidarity to ensure justice and to combat impunity, rather 
than that of the nature of the crimes in question or the traditional individualism of each state 
based on its sovereignty. International cooperation is required here for the sake of the entire 
humanity.323 Its realisation is one of the cardinal objectives of the United Nations.324    
But, this global conception of universal jurisdiction only relates to an expanded list of crimes 
over which “multilateral universal jurisdiction” is possible in accordance with (universal) 
treaties and (general) customary international law. This notably applies to piracy, torture, 
slavery, war crimes, forced disappearance, genocide and crimes against humanity.325 It does 
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not cover crimes which states may subject to their “unilateral universal jurisdiction”, through 
either their domestic laws326 or pursuant to some specific regional arrangements. In principle, 
as mentioned above, there is no problem of legality if the double incrimination condition is 
met, and provided that the enforcement is sought when the accused is present on the territory 
of the prosecuting state as in the case of the exercise of multilateral universal jurisdiction. It is 
probably for the latter reason that the former ICJ President, Gilbert Guillaume, said that 
(enforcement) universal jurisdiction in absentia –which can only be lawfully viewed in the 
aspect of prescriptive jurisdiction –was unknown under international law,327 except maybe 
informative and prospective investigations for future consideration. That is not the case for 
the jurisdiction of the international community. 
1.1.2. The Jurisdiction of the International Community 
This is another facet of the decline of state sovereignty. Today, international law confers on 
the international community the power to decide on matters of common interests to its 
members. The jurisdiction of the international community is to be exercised over 
iinternational (and potentially transnational) crimes, whereas the notion of extraterritoriality 
includes in most of the cases domestic offences. The decline of state sovereignty then appears 
as a consequence of the moralisation of the international system through a sort of 
humanisation of international law328 to fight impunity (1.1.2.1) and the diversification of 
sources of criminal powers conferred on the international community (1.1.2.2).   
1.1.2.1. The Shift towards Global Legal Moralisation and Humanitarianism 
International crimes which are the target of international criminal jurisdiction are generally 
acts of collective violence and so group crimes par excellence.329 They are committed under 
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the mask of a state sovereignty or even a non-state entity. Initially, the problem was to find a 
justification as to how individuals who may have acted under such masks are held responsible 
through a direct action of the international community. There are two justifications in this 
regard.  
The first one stems from the moral duty to detach perpetrators of international crimes from 
their institutional settings. Atrocities committed are so odious that they should make 
transparent the legal personality of the entity in the name of which perpetrators may have 
acted. So to speak, it is to individuals, not abstract entities, to which international law must 
apply. The ICTR Prosecutor underlined this idea in the Kanyabashi case in 1997 in order to 
reaffirm the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and beforehand the authority of the Security Council 
over individuals. He recalled what was said during the Nuremberg trial in 1946 as follows:  
It seems intolerable to every sensitized human being that the men who put their good will at the 
disposition of the state entity in order to make use of the power and the material resources of this 
entity to slaughter, as they have done, millions of human beings in the execution of a policy long 
since determined, should be assured immunity. The principle of state sovereignty which must 
protect these men is only a mask; this mask removed, the man’s responsibility appears.330  
Many idealist lawyers and philosophers called for the establishment of a permanent 
international criminal jurisdiction to directly enforce such individual responsibility.331 It 
seems that the initial call was a doctrinal proposal by Gustave Moynier to the Institut de Droit 
International in 1872.332 But, it was considered too premature to deserve legal 
consideration.333 Step by step, the idea made its own history which is well documented 
today.334 With its achievement, a monist perception of international criminal law seems to 
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have taken the lead over the dualist approach (distinctive national and international law). 
Everything tends towards the progressive realisation of a single “cosmopolitan criminal 
law”,335 bypassing the mask of state sovereignty as the consequence of the “ultimate 
individual responsibility towards “the global community of mankind”.336 The rationale behind 
this move is that international crimes, which may be repressed in any competent country, also 
empower the entire international community with the right and even the moral duty to 
prosecute them because they are of concern to all its members, even if not directed against 
each one in particular.337 This limitation of state sovereignty was also underlined by the ICTY 
in the Tadič case.338 The direct action of the international community is so essential owing to 
the fact that the responsibility of perpetrators high ranking within the state institutional 
settings may not be easy to enforce at the domestic levels. Either their own state would be 
incapable or unwilling to send them to justice or a foreign state’s jurisdiction would usually 
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have to face serious practical problems of judicial and diplomatic nature to secure 
international cooperation.     
The second justification is a move towards an increasingly global humanitarianism. The 
concept of humanitarianism may be understood here as both an ideology and a world policy. 
As an ideology, it contains the moral idea of having a certain sensibility to human sufferings, 
especially when values common to mankind are massively or systematically disregarded. In 
the past, human conscience was awoken on this basis to condemn, reject and abolish slavery 
and colonisation. As a policy, humanitarianism implies the duty to prevent the commission of 
widespread atrocities, to protect their victims or more generally to ensure respect for human 
rights, where a state fails to do so within its own territory. On 5 October 1987, the former 
French president, François Mitterrand, declared: “because it is proper to every human, the 
suffering is universal. No state can claim the ownership of sufferings it provokes or 
shelters”.339  
Historically, this idea goes back to the nineteenth century, particularly in Europe, where great 
powers (England, Russia, Germany, France and Italy) were keen to unilaterally intervene 
abroad in order to “rescue a group of foreign nationals from oppression at the hands of their 
rulers”.340 Hence, humanitarianism is designed to, and more broadly the “New International 
Humanitarian Order”,341 trump state sovereignty in order to safeguard some human rights 
standards342. It strengthens the role of the international community to protect mankind against 
heinous atrocities and crimes, irrespective of the region and the state where they occur or the 
nationality of the perpetrators.   
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This move has favoured the development of various legal tools necessary to discharge this 
responsibility: jus cogens and obligations erga omnes, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian 
military interventions, coercive international political sanctions, etc. In the field of judicial 
humanitarianism, the Security Council established ad hoc tribunals, for the former Yugoslavia 
in 1993 and for Rwanda after the genocide in 1994.343 While these tribunals were temporally 
limited jurisdictions, set up to address specific humanitarian situations, the need for a 
permanent judicial mechanism at the disposal of the international community became urgent. 
This justifies the establishment of the ICC which targets crimes that nobody would bear that 
they remain unpunished because no one would survive if they continued to be perpetrated. 
The Court is expected to have a deterrent effect on any of the would-be international 
criminals.344  
In essence, this kind of humanitarianism praises the theory of “human security” (i.e. that of 
individuals as opposed to the state)345 and the doctrine of “the responsibility to protect”346 
which has its resonance in the “2005 World Summit Outcome”.347 Sovereignty is then 
understood, since the post-Cold War time, as a concept amounting to state responsibility to 
discharge its duties, beginning by the exercise of effective control over its territory and the 
insurance of security to its citizens and foreigners under its jurisdiction.348 In other words, if a 
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sovereign state fails to protect its own people, by incapacity or (political) unwillingness, that 
responsibility must be exercised by the international community.349 This evolution of 
humanitarianism is purported to rescue victims of atrocities in countries failing to comply 
with their primary obligations which derive from the powers of state sovereignty and aims to 
enforce international law in the name of the whole of humanity. Thus, sovereignty defines not 
only state legal rights but also chiefly its duties vis-à-vis other states and the international 
community to assume its national responsibility. In case of failure, the international 
community may play a substitution role. The manner in which it will have to act to discharge 
its own (collective) responsibility will depend upon the sources of the powers it wishes to 
exercise. Any variation in this respect is simply a problem of policy and legal choices.   
1.1.2.2. The Sources of the International Criminal Jurisdiction    
The identification of the sources of criminal powers of the international community depends 
on which international body or institution is entitled to act on its behalf. Two main cases can 
be distinguished.  
First, the recourse to the Charter of the United Nations which highlights the competences of 
the Security Council and the General Assembly to maintain international peace and security, 
or to oversee the respect for human rights. Each of these political bodies may rely on the UN 
Charter to unilaterally legislate and create an adjudicative penal mechanism to repress 
international crimes, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The option 
which is so far well known, commented on and debated is the establishment of ad hoc 
criminal tribunals by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII.350 This is a limitation to 
state sovereignty in application of article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. It is an option whereby the 
undefined and flexible expression of “threats to international peace and security”,351 which 
was initially linked to military conflicts,352 is extended to the perpetration of international 
                                                                                                                                                        
Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 
1996); A. Etzioni, ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’, 50 (1) Orbis (2006) 71-85. 
349 See K. Quashigah, ‘The Future of the International Criminal Court in African Crisis and its Relationship with 
the R2P Project’, 21 Finnish Yearbook of International Law (2010) 89-99, at 90-91. 
350 See W. A. Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Part 1. 
351 UN Charter, Article 39.  
352 I. Österdahl, Threat to Peace: the Interpretation by the Security Council of Article 39 of the UN Charter 
(Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, 1998), at 85; R. Cryer, ‘The Security Council and Article 39: A Threat to Coherence?’, 
63 
crimes. As a consequence of this extension, the struggle against impunity and the search for 
justice have become a legitimate objective for the Security Council.  
On the other hand, the power of the General Assembly is controversial.353 Some authors 
consider that this body lacks a coercive authority such as the one enshrined in Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter in order to establish a criminal jurisdiction.354 Arguably, the matter is also 
among those for which the General Assembly is forbidden to make recommendations under 
the UN Charter.355 However, other commentators think that this body even holds more 
authority than the Security Council for the creation of ad hoc criminal tribunals.356 One reason 
is that it is a plenary body of all member states which thus possesses sufficient international 
legitimacy to take such measures.357 Another reason results from articles 10 and 11 of the UN 
Charter vesting the General Assembly with the power to discuss and make recommendations 
on any question within the United Nations jurisdiction. Under article 13 (1) of the UN 
Charter, it is also competent in the field of human rights to initiate studies and make 
recommendations, while there is no explicit provision of such kind in favour of the Security 
Council.358 Moreover, the practice within the General Assembly has developed in such a 
manner to circumvent the blockage of the Security Council in the exercise of its power for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. In such case, the General Assembly may 
discuss any issue which is not under active consideration before the Security Council. 
Furthermore, with notable exception to article 12 (1) of the UN Charter,359 the General 
Assembly may act pursuant to the “Uniting for Peace Resolution” of November 1950, when 
the Security Council fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
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international peace and security.360 Lastly, even if General Assembly recommendations are 
not coercive like resolutions of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII, the ICJ has 
held that they are not merely hortatory.361 Some recommendations may indeed be decisions 
binding on member states, even though not coercive, as stated in the advisory opinion in 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations.362 The opinion is confirmed by the reference to 
decisions of the General Assembly under article 18 (2) of the UN Charter on important 
questions which include the maintenance of international peace and security. But, 
enforcement measures of the General Assembly should be decided with the consent of the 
state concerned as non-coercive practices in peace keeping operations require.363 A tribunal 
established by the General Assembly would thus be its subsidiary organ, pursuant to article 22 
of the UN Charter.364     
The second source of power of the international community to exercise criminal jurisdiction is 
based on legal consensus among stakeholders concerned rather than on unilateral measures 
decided under the UN Charter. This leads to treaty-based criminal courts. The best example in 
this respect is the ICC Statute concerning four categories of crimes: aggression (crime against 
peace), genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. It is a treaty between states, which 
somewhat recalls a similar experience after World War II with the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
except for the fact that the London treaty of 8 August 1945365 was not concluded by the 
international community as such but by four victorious powers (United States of America, 
Soviet Union, Great Britain and France) exercising sovereign territorial authority of the 
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defeated Nazi German state as occupying foreign powers.366 Besides the ICC Statute, a treaty-
based jurisdiction has also been experienced in the case of internationalised criminal 
tribunals.367 The best example in this series is the SCSL. It is a nationalised international 
tribunal368 since it was established under a bilateral treaty between the United Nations and the 
government of Sierra Leone369 as a hybrid Court in composition (national and international 
staff) and jurisdiction (prosecution of international crimes and domestic crimes under Sierra 
Leonean legislation).370 Compared with the ICC, it is also an autonomous judicial institution 
from domestic courts systems, whose creation was however recommended by the Security 
Council.371 As such, it differs from internationalised national tribunals,372 especially in 
Cambodia, East Timor and Kosovo, which constitute a specific participation of the 
international community in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over international and 
domestic crimes by primarily municipal courts. In these cases, the UN involvement has 
ranged from acting as a transitional/interim administrator (which exercises territorial powers) 
establishing hybrid special panels of judges within the District Court in Dili in East Timor373 
and local courts in Kosovo,374 to providing judicial assistance (namely the allocation of 
international judges and prosecutors working with their national counterparts), under a 
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bilateral agreement with the territorial state,375 to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC)376, created under Cambodian law.377 
Unlike the UN unilateral criminal measures, the treaty-based court procedure may have the 
disadvantage of being slow in realisation, owing to the complexity of international 
negotiations and diverging constitutional requirements for treaty ratifications among states. It 
is probably the reason why the international community opted for the establishment of ad hoc 
tribunals under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in order to ensure “prompt and effective 
action”378 to deal with urgent humanitarian matters in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
However, a treaty remains relevant insofar as it enables to reconcile state sovereignty with the 
interest and action of the international community. Towards consenting states (those which 
ratify the founding treaty or the states not parties which provide an ad hoc acceptance of the 
jurisdiction it establishes for a particular situation), it is not a compulsory measure and more 
less a coercive one. It is only constitutive of a voluntary limitation of state powers. However, 
the jurisdiction may unwillingly affect third parties in some cases.  
With regard to the ICC Statute, three hypotheses can be distinguished. The first one was 
revealed by the ICTY in the Furundzija case later in December 1998, and was reaffirmed in 
the Tadič case in 1999.379 The Tribunal held that “the Rome Statute may be taken to restate, 
reflect or clarify customary rules or crystallize them”,380 therefore valid in effects towards 
those who are not parties to it. However, it is clear that those codified international customs 
remain distinct from the conventional instrument, in a manner that, as the ICJ stated in the 
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North Sea Continental Shelf Cases in 1969381 and particularly in the Nicaragua Judgment of 
27 June 1986, both sources of law retain their separate legal existence.382 It means that a third 
party to the ICC Statute is indeed bound by the relevant customary rule it codifies but not the 
conventional instrument itself as such. The ICC Statute is not even all identical to customary 
law since, in some other various areas, “it creates new law or modifies existing law”,383 
beginning by its institutional part. The second hypothesis is an eventual extension of the ICC 
jurisdiction on citizens of third states without consent of the latter,384 but on the ground that 
the crime was committed on the territory of a state party or by its national on the territory of a 
third party385. The nationality must be assessed according to principles of international law if 
the presumed offender simultaneously belongs to a state party and a third one.386 It must also 
be established either at the time of the commission of the crime (even if change of nationality 
occurs after commission) or at the time of the prosecution or punishment (even if the crime 
was committed before changing nationality) in conformity with principles of international law 
allowing a complete control by a state (party) over its nationals.387 The third and last 
hypothesis is the referral of a situation in a third state to the ICC Prosecutor by the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.388 Examples are provided here by the 
referral of the situations in Soudan and Libya to the ICC jurisdiction, respectively in 2005 and 
2011.389  
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Put together, extraterritoriality and international criminal jurisdiction do not theoretically 
leave any risk of non-prosecution and thus impunity for international crimes. It appears that 
states are now bound to exercise their domestic criminal jurisdiction unless the crimes 
concerned are prosecuted and tried by a foreign court or by the international community. 
1.2. The Duty on States to Exercise Domestic Criminal Jurisdiction 
This is another kind of limitation of state sovereignty. It underlines the primary role of states 
to investigate and prosecute international crimes. In other words, national courts, rather than 
the ICC or any other international tribunal,390 remain in the heart of the global system of 
international criminal justice. Conceptually, the duty to exercise municipal jurisdiction must 
be distinguished from the obligation for states to establish such jurisdiction391 or the duty to 
entertain a precise head of jurisdiction as it has been mentioned above. Where a type of 
jurisdiction has not been obligated to a state, its duty to exercise municipal jurisdiction, in its 
very basic adjudicative aspect, leaves a major margin for establishing and exercising one 
which it believes fits better as a matter of legal criminal policy. In essence, the exercise of 
domestic jurisdiction contains two separate but interdependent obligations (1.2.1) which may 
become a source of misunderstandings, disagreements and crisis due to the weak legal 
flexibility for territorial states in case of non-compliance (1.2.2).  
1.2.1. The Result of Two Separate and Interdependent Obligations         
Since jurisdiction is a prescriptive and executive/adjudicative power, the duty to exercise it 
must contain both aspects as well. Logically, a state would only be capable to exercise its 
municipal (enforcement) jurisdiction if it is beforehand available under its domestic legal 
order. Thus, the duty to take or to prescribe national implementation measures to this effect 
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(1.2.1.1) is a distinct obligation from the duty to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut 
judicare principle) the presumed criminals (1.2.1.2). 
1.2.1.1. The Duty to Take National Implementation Measures  
Implementation measures designate the means by which a state gives effect to international 
law under its domestic legal order. In most of the cases, they are legislative or executive 
measures. They can be prescribed, not only for the implementation of an obligation, but also 
outside binding commitments if international law only provides for hortatory measures for the 
application of which a state decides to opt at the municipal level. The manner in which a state 
may achieve such implementation under its domestic legal order chiefly depends upon 
national constitutional requirements and procedures.392 Classically, a distinction is made 
between the theories of monism and dualism.393 The monist approach suggests that 
international law and national laws are part of a single legal system.394 Thus, international law 
automatically becomes part of national law with primacy of the former or the latter, 
depending on the provisions of the constitutions of each state.395 However, in the view of 
dualism, both types of law belong to separate legal systems (international and municipal) and 
so, to implement international norms under domestic legal orders, international law must be 
subject to a means of transformation into national law.396 Therefore, it would have equal 
status to the one which is attached to the legal instrument of transformation under national 
legal system.   
These theories are today exceeded by the development of international law. For example, the 
mitigation of dualism is evidenced by the direct action of the international community against 
individuals. In addition, even individuals may directly hold some rights from international law 
that they can internationally oppose to their respective states. This is plainly evidenced by the 
development of human rights law. As for monism, it is evident that operational rules of 
international law for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction are not self-executing in that they 
cannot automatically be given effect under domestic legal order. In any case, even when 
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international law has obligated states to exercise their municipal (adjudicative) jurisdiction or 
restricted this exercise to a precise head of jurisdiction, it is up to each one to allocate such 
jurisdiction to its national courts, to criminalise the facts if necessary, to fix the penalties, to 
determine the necessary procedures for investigation, prosecutions and trials, as well as the 
relevant municipal rules governing the international police or judicial cooperation.397 
The specific type of national measures to take would depend on each international treaty. 
Thus, the obligation to enact legislation conferring jurisdiction to municipal courts, 
criminalising international crimes or attaching to them appropriate penalties under domestic 
law is found in numerous multilateral treaties.398 The best example is provided by the 
Genocide Convention which, after forbidding genocide as such, conspiracy to commit 
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide and 
complicity in genocide,399 stipulates: 
the Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the 
necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, 
to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or of any of the other acts 
enumerated in article III.
400
 
A similar obligation exists under the Geneva Conventions in regard to the enactment of 
domestic legislation providing for penalties for perpetrators of their grave breaches. In 
essence, this obligation stipulate that “the High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any 
legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering 
to be committed, any of the grave breaches”401 of these treaties. It also applies to grave 
breaches stipulated by their Additional Protocol I402 and fits for such kind of measures that 
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should be taken by contracting parties under their general obligation to respect and ensure 
respect for international humanitarian law.403 
However, like the Geneva Conventions concerning the suppression of grave breaches, the 
Genocide Convention does not obligate to legislate on a particular head of (adjudicative) 
jurisdiction to ensure effective national prosecutions. States parties remain free in their 
choices in this respect. Conversely, many other conventions impose to take domestic 
measures establishing such jurisdiction. For example, the Convention against torture,404 the 
United Nations Convention against mercenarism,405 the International Convention for the 
protection of all persons from enforced disappearance,406 the Montreal Convention for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Protocol’. See also GP I, Article 86 (1): ‘The High Contracting Parties and the Par ties to the conflict shall 
repress grave breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches, of the Conventions or of this 
Protocol which result from a failure to act when under a duty to do so’. 
403 GC I, GCII, GCIII, GCIV and GP I, Article 1 Common. See also C. Focarelli, ‘Common Article 1 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?’, 21 (1) European Journal of International Law (2010)125-171, at 127. 
404 Article 5: ‘1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over 
the offences referred to in article 4 in the following cases: (a) When the offences are committed in any territory 
under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State; (b) When the alleged offender is a 
national of that State; (c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it appropriate. 2. Each 
State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences 
in cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him 
pursuant to article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph I of this article. 3. This Convention does not 
exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with internal law’. 
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jurisdiction over the offence of enforced disappearance: (a) When the offence is committed in any territory under 
its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State; (h) When the alleged offender is one of its 
nationals; (c) When the disappeared person is one of its nationals and the State Party considers it appropriate. 2. 
Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its competence to exercise 
jurisdiction over the offence of enforced disappearance when the alleged offender is present in any territory 
under its jurisdiction, unless it extradites or surrenders him or her to another State in accordance with its 
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suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation,407 the International 
Convention for the suppression and punishment of the crime of apartheid (30 November 
1973),408 the International Convention against the taking of hostages (17 December 1979)409 
and the International Convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism (14 
September 2005)410 require domestic legislation on universal jurisdiction.  
                                                                                                                                                        
international obligations or surrenders him or her to an international criminal tribunal whose jurisdiction it has 
recognized. 3. This Convention does not exclude any additional criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance 
with national law’. 
407 Article 5: ‘1. Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction 
over the offences in the following cases: (a) when the offence is committed in the territory of that State; (o) when 
the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft registered in that State; (c) when the aircraft on board 
which the offence is committed lands in its territory with the alleged offender still on board; (d) when the offence 
is committed against or on board an aircraft leased without crew to a lessee who has his principal place of 
business or, if the lessee has no such place of business, his permanent residence, in that State. 2. Each 
Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the 
offences mentioned in Article 1, paragraph 1 (a), (b) and (c), and in Article 1, paragraph 2, in so far as that 
paragraph relates to those offences, in the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does 
not extradite him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article’. 
408 Article IV (b): ‘The State Parties to the present Convention undertake to adopt legislative, judicial and 
administrative measures to prosecute, bring to trial and punish in accordance with their jurisdiction persons 
responsible for, or accused of, the acts defined in article II of the present Convention, whether or not such 
persons reside in the territory of the State in which the acts are committed or are nationals of that State or of 
some other State or are stateless persons’. 
409 Article 5: ‘1.Each State party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over 
any of the offences set forth in article 1 which are committed : a) In its territory or on board a ship or aircraft 
registered in that State; b) By any of its nationals, or if that State considers it appropriate, by those stateless 
persons who have their habitual residence in its territory; c) In order to compel that State to do or abstain from 
doing any act; or d) With respect to a hostage who is a national of that State, if that State considers it appropriate. 
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the 
offences set forth in article 1 in cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not 
extradite him to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article. 3. This Convention does not exclude 
any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with internal law’. 
410 Article 9: ‘1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over 
the offences set forth in article 2 when: (a) The offence is committed in the territory of that State; or (b) The 
offence is committed on board a vessel flying the flag of that State or an aircraft which is registered under the 
laws of that State at the time the offence is committed; or (c) The offence is committed by a national of that 
State. 2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when: (a) The offence is 
committed against a national of that State; or (b) The offence is committed against a State or government facility 
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Concerning the specific case of the Rome Statute, there is no express obligation for states 
parties to enact domestic legislation for the national prosecution of ICC crimes (genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression). As Gerhard Kemp has argued, this is “a 
weaker international criminal law treaty compared to others”.411 It only contains two minor 
provisions in this regard. First, concerning the offences against the administration of justice, 
the Rome Statute obliges each state party to extend “its criminal laws penalising offences 
against the integrity of its own investigative or judicial process to offences against the 
administration of justice”,412 referred to in article 70 (1), “committed on its territory, or by one 
of its nationals”.413 Second, article 88 imposes that states parties ensure that “there are 
procedures available under their national law for all of the forms of cooperation which are 
specified under part IX of the Statute concerning “international cooperation and judicial 
assistance”. This provision is bound for ensuring respect for vertical obligation to cooperate 
between states parties and the ICC. There is no such provision for horizontal obligation to 
ensure cooperation between states parties themselves, except for the interstate cooperation 
relating to cases of competing requests,414 “that is, those cases where the ICC has made a 
request for cooperation from a state party and, at the same time, another state, whether party 
                                                                                                                                                        
of that State abroad, including an embassy or other diplomatic or consular premises of that State; or (c) The 
offence is committed by a stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in the territory of that State; or 
(d) The offence is committed in an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act; or (e) The 
offence is committed on board an aircraft which is operated by the Government of that State. 3. Upon ratifying, 
accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention, each State Party shall notify the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations of the jurisdiction it has established under its national law in accordance with paragraph 2 of the 
present article. Should any change take place, the State Party concerned shall immediately notify the Secretary-
General. 4. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction 
over the offences set forth in article 2 in cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not 
extradite that person to any of the States Parties which have established their jurisdiction in accordance with 
paragraph 1 or 2 of the present article. 5. This Convention does not exclude the exercise of any criminal 
jurisdiction established by a State Party in accordance with its national law’. 
411 G. Kemp, ‘The Implementation of the Rome Statute in Africa’, in G. Werle, L. Fernandez and M. Vormbaum 
(eds), Africa and the International Criminal Court –International Criminal Justice Series, Volume 1 (The 
Hague: Asser Press/Springer, 2014) 61-77, at 62. 
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413 Ibid. 
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Evolution of a Comprehensive International Criminal Justice System’, 29 Southern African Public Law (SAPL) 
(2014) 368-387, at 377. 
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to the Statute or not, has made a similar request”.415 In spite of these legal deficiencies, one 
may argue that the Rome Statute also seems to generally require the enactment of domestic 
legislation as a practical consequence of giving effect to the principle of complementarity 
indicating that states parties hold the primary responsibility for the repression of ICC 
crimes.416 This is confirmed in article 17 (1) referring to “a state which has jurisdiction”417 as 
a pre-condition in the assessment of whether it is unwilling or unable to prosecute in order to 
admit the ICC’s intervention. Obviously, such jurisdiction must be indicated and established 
by each state concerned under domestic law.418 Otherwise, the lack of appropriate legislation 
would amount to inability to exercise state jurisdiction,419 thereby possibly rendering the case 
admissible before the ICC. 
Thus, all these examples come to one conclusion. There is not a general duty on states to take 
pre-determined national implementation measures for the prosecution of all international 
crimes. Each treaty possesses its specificities and obligates only those contracting parties. The 
possible customary character of the obligation to enact national implementation measures for 
a particular crime would depend on another question: whether the duty to extradite or 
prosecute such a crime is also in itself of customary nature.    
 1.2.1.2. The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute 
Translation of the maxim aut dedere aut judicare, the duty to extradite or prosecute is a 
heritage of Grotius’ scholarly construction of the principle aut dedere aut puniere (to extradite 
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419 Stigen, above note 418, at 313-314 and 316-319. 
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or punish).420 Its rationale is “to ensure that those who commit crimes under international law 
are not granted safe haven anywhere in the world”.421 They must be brought to justice “by 
providing for the effective prosecution and punishment of such individuals by a competent 
jurisdiction”.422 The principle must not be conflated with universal jurisdiction. On the one 
hand, while the exercise of universal jurisdiction may only be permissive under certain 
circumstances, the duty to extradite or prosecute makes the exercise of domestic jurisdiction 
mandatory.423 On the other hand, the state on the part of which such obligation to prosecute 
exists will exercise only a title of jurisdiction which is already established for its municipal 
courts. It may be universal jurisdiction, active or passive personality, etc.424 In addition, the 
duty generally encompasses an alternative, depending on the state’s choice, whether it decides 
to prosecute or to extradite the presumed offender, if requested by another state having 
jurisdiction to try him.425 However, when a choice between multiple requests for extradition 
must be made, it is advisable that the responsive decision is taken with due regard to the state 
closer to the crime (notably by the place of commission or by the nationality of the offender). 
As the ILC has commented on the issue in its Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of the Mankind (1996), there is no priority between either optional courses of 
action.426 Any state on which lays an obligation to prosecute will have discharged the 
obligation if that state had also opted for the extradition of the alleged perpetrator to another 
state “which indicates that it is willing to prosecute by requesting extradition”.427 Similarly, to 
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Vianna Rigo, ‘The Obligation to Extradite or to Prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)’, 1 UFRGSMUN/UFRGS 
Model United Nations Journal (2013) 202-221, at 204. 
426 International Law Commission (1996), above note 68, at 31. 
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execute its obligation, the state may surrender such presumed offender to an international 
criminal jurisdiction, like the ICC.     
Serving as a basis for a mandatory exercise of domestic jurisdiction, the aut dedere aut 
judicare principle entails two implications on the state national criminal policy. First, the 
country concerned loses its discretion between prosecutions and non-prosecutions that could 
be dictated by national political and legal contexts which are specific to it. Non-prosecutions 
could occur only if from a preliminary inquiry of the alleged crimes, it is concluded that there 
is no sufficient evidence to submit the case to the competent national tribunal. Second, the 
state also loses control over the time of prosecutions. Any delay in this respect could be seen 
as an attempt to bypass the duty to prosecute or a failure to do so. Moreover, statutes of 
limitation for international crimes are hardly accepted. At least, they are inapplicable to 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.428 This is probably a rule of customary 
international law.429 In other cases, like the repression of enforced disappearances, it is 
required of those states which resort to statutes of limitations to ensure a long duration for 
their term, corresponding to the gravity of the crime.430 
The duty to extradite or prosecute is imposed on the territorial state, i.e. the state of 
commission of the crime, the state of residence of the offender or the state where the latter is 
found (even occasionally). There is no such obligation for other states.431 Sure, with respect to 
the Genocide case in 1996, the ICJ has noted that the obligation of each state to prevent and 
punish the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the Genocide Convention,432 
                                                 
428 ICC Statute, Article 29; Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
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namely to the state on the territory of which the crime has been committed. Basically, besides 
the fact that genocide can also be tried by an international tribunal, the ICJ’s statement may be 
true only for the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction. But, under international law, the 
exercise of adjudicative powers over foreigners who reside in another country is only 
possible, except in the case of informative inquiry or mere request for extradition, when they 
are present on the territory of the prosecuting state. This is a requirement of state sovereignty, 
as already explained. It is also in this way that should be understood the ICTR’s decision of 
18 March 1999 in which the Tribunal encouraged “all states, in application of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction, to prosecute and judge those responsible for serious crimes such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity and other grave violations of international humanitarian 
law”.433   
This duty to extradite or prosecute is formulated in numerous international treaties,434 
including the said Genocide Convention,435 the Geneva Conventions and their Additional 
                                                 
433 Ntuyahaga (ICTR-98-40-T), Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion to Withdraw the Indictment, Trial 
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434 Convention against Torture, Article 7(1); United Nations Convention against Mercenarism, Article 12; 
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Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’. 
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Protocol I.436 The best formulation is provided for by the International Convention for the 
protection of all persons from enforced disappearance which stipulates:  
the State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed an 
offence of enforced disappearance is found shall, if it does not extradite that person or surrender 
him or her to another State in accordance with its international obligations or surrender him or 
her to an international criminal tribunal whose jurisdiction it has recognized, submit the case to 
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
437
 
In contrast, the Rome Statute is a weaker instrument in this respect. It does not contain any 
express operative provision stipulating the duty on states parties and among themselves to 
exercise their national jurisdiction in prosecuting or extraditing alleged offenders of ICC 
                                                                                                                                                        
435 Article VI: ‘Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a 
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‘defective’. Besides this general problem, it feared that Axis war criminals might thwart attempts to hold them 
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‘The Rise and Fall of Universal Jurisdiction’, in W. A. Schabas and N. Bernaz (eds), Routledge Handbook of 
International Criminal Law (London/New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2011) 337-354, at 344-
345.  
437 Article 11 (1). 
79 
crimes.438 Only does the preamble of the treaty recall “the duty of every State to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes”439 in order to put an end 
to impunity for their perpetrators and thus to contribute to their prevention.440  It is worth 
noting that the preamble of a treaty is not binding on states parties. However, it may be freely 
domesticated under national law. In such case, the obligation will remain specific to the state 
concerned as a unilateral duty. For example, in the Zimbabwe Torture case, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in Pretoria, followed by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, held that 
there was a national duty to investigate (irrespective of whether or not the alleged perpetrator 
is present in South Africa) and to prosecute under South African ICC Implementation Act of 
2002.441 As for the Rome Statute, it is possible that a duty to prosecute indirectly exists in 
application of the principle of complementary ICC jurisdiction giving priority on states parties 
to counter the impunity of criminal offenders. The duty can be also implied on the basis of 
article 80 of the Rome Statute which leaves the power to states parties to apply to ICC crimes 
penalties provided for by their national laws. Overall, it means that the whole system rests on 
the idea that states parties should themselves prosecute these crimes, the ICC intervening only 
in case of failure. Such an obligation for states to prosecute is a duty vis-à-vis the international 
community and not an obligation between contracting parties as may be understood under 
other international treaties. In this regard, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision in the Kenya 
Admissibility case stated: 
(the) Chamber is also conscious of the fact that States not only have the right to exercise their 
criminal jurisdiction over those allegedly responsible for the commission of crimes that fall 
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within the jurisdiction of the Court, they are also under an existing duty to do so as explicitly 
stated in the Statute's preambular paragraph 6.
442
 
The question as to whether the duty to extradite or prosecute is also established under 
customary international law remains controversial. For example, Ilia Bantekas and Susan 
Nash think that the aut dedere aut judicare principle is only established by treaties.443 But, 
Cherif Bassiouni assumes that this principle is already a rule of customary international law 
regarding crimes against humanity.444 Such customary rule has also been recognised notably 
for war crimes, genocide, torture, apartheid and enforced disappearance.445 Scholars based 
their opinion on two principal arguments. First, there is a universal consensus, the expression 
of which is found in national laws, multilateral treaties and numerous non-conventional 
instruments of the United Nations,446 that these crimes must be prosecuted because they 
amount to violations of fundamental interests of the international community.447 Second, 
states that attempted not to comply with this duty have been declared by human rights 
monitoring mechanisms, beginning by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights since the 
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historic case of Velàsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras in 1988,448 in breach of their international 
obligation to investigate and prosecute serious violations of human rights (of customary 
nature) in the territory under their jurisdiction.449 
In short, where such a customary obligation to extradite or prosecute exists, it then becomes 
clear that the interdependent duty to take national implementation measures which derives 
therefrom must be customary by nature as well. After all, states are still confronted with 
persistent problems of non-compliance that may generate, because of a weak legal flexibility, 
crises in the system of international criminal justice. 
1.2.2. The Risks of a Weak Legal Flexibility for the Territorial State  
The weak flexibility of the law of criminal jurisdiction generates two main risks for the 
territorial state. They relate to the increasing traditional trend of the system of international 
criminal justice towards absolute criminal prosecutions and punishment of individual 
perpetrators (1.2.2.1) as well as to the potential consequences in case of failure to honor its 
obligation to prosecute (1.2.2.2). 
1.2.2.1. The Trend towards Absolute Individual Criminal Prosecutions 
It is important to hold individuals accountable for international crimes committed. 
International criminal law today focuses much more (if not exclusively) on prosecutions and 
sentencing goals.450 Before international courts, prison is even almost the sole penal sanction 
that may face a convicted person. In the framework of the ICC, fines and the forfeiture of 
proceeds, property or assets (directly linked to the crime committed) are envisaged only in 
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addition to imprisonment451 , but very probably for the purpose of securing further resources 
to the Trust fund for victims (TFV) or restitution to those who are entitled to reparations.452 
This policy may have some benefits (a), whereas it could also lead, if not inserted into a 
comprehensive approach to justice, to the denial of alternative mechanisms to criminal trials 
within the society which is primarily affected by the crimes committed (b).   
a) The Alleged Benefits of the Sentencing Goal of Criminal Prosecutions 
The presumed advantages of the sentencing goal of international criminal law vary in multiple 
aspects.453 First, criminal sentences constitute the punishment for the deviated behaviour in 
the society and proceed from the individualisation of guilty.454 As a matter of criminology, 
sentencing is associated with intimidation and deterrence effects on other potential criminals, 
since the end of impunity may lead the latter to abstain from violence and brutality as long as 
perpetrators of crimes are brought to justice, convicted and punished.455 The ultimate aim is in 
this respect the prevention and eradication of atrocities and crimes.456 But, it seems that the 
achievement depends upon the capability and the will of powerful states to back up 
international criminal justice.457 Prosecutions would then complement other contributing 
means, including collective sanctions or military (and even humanitarian) interventions, for 
the maintenance of peace and security or the promotion of reconciliation within a divided 
society. At least, this popular explanation458 was a shared conviction by the Security Council 
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when it decided to establish the ICTY459 and the ICTR.460 Second, criminal prosecutions are 
said to be conducted in favour of the victims.461 The latter have the right to justice and 
reparations through appropriate prosecutions. Otherwise, impunity would be “a betrayal of 
our human solidarity with the victims”.462 Indeed, two principal objectives come into 
consideration to this effect. On the one hand, forgetting committed crimes should be avoided 
at best because peace and reconciliation must be based on the right of victims to know the 
truth and to get reparations.463 On the other hand, the feeling of impunity should be prevented 
given the fact that the failure to prosecute could push victims of crimes into self-justice and 
vengeance by turning themselves into new criminals. Such potential cycle of atrocities could 
destroy the whole society and perhaps the civilisation at the global level. 
These stances are repeatedly highlighted by key proponents of international criminal justice. 
One important remark is that of the prosecutor Robert Jackson at the time of the first hearing 
of the Nuremberg trials in 1945. According to him, “[t]he crimes that we seek to condemn and 
punish have been so premeditated, perverse and devastating that civilisation cannot tolerate 
[that] they could be ignored because we would not survive if they were repeated”.464 On his 
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side, the ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, believed that the Trial Chamber’s judgment of 21 
March 2016, whereby Jean-Pierre Bemba was convicted, as a military commander, for murder 
and rape as crimes against humanity and for murder and pillage as war crimes, committed by 
soldiers under his effective authority and control in the Central African Republic (CAR), 
between October 2002 and March 2003,465 was a strong message to all war lords around the 
world. She underscored her opinion as follows: 
(…) this Decision is to be celebrated. What this Decision affirms is that commanders are 
responsible for the acts of the forces under their control. It is a key feature of this decision that 
those in command or authority and control positions have legal obligations over troops even 
when they are sent to a foreign country. They cannot take advantage of their power and status to 
grant to themselves, or their troops, unchecked powers over the life and fate of civilians.  They 
have a legal obligation to exercise responsible command and control over their troops – to 
provide sufficient training to ensure that their troops do not commit atrocities (…).This case is 
also noteworthy in that it has highlighted the critical need to eradicate sexual and gender-based 
crimes as weapons of war in conflict by holding accountable those who fail to exercise their 
duties and responsibilities that their status as commanders and leaders entail (…). We must 
continue to strive for the prosecution and accountability of those responsible for such crimes 
until they are a thing of the past.
466
 
In addition, there is arguably empirical evidence that non-prosecutions may lead to the 
commission of new crimes.467 In Sierra Leone, for example, the civil war between the 
government forces and the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Foday 
Sankoh, had started in March 1991 and officially ended on 18 January 2002. It was 
characterised by massive killings of innocent civilians and other widespread violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law. At the beginning of the peace process, the 
UN and the OAU sponsored an approach to political comprise granting amnesty for crimes 
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committed (notably by rebels)468 and promoting the establishment of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission,469 instead of bringing the presumed offenders to justice. But, 
unexpectedly, rather than contributing to achieving peace and security, this policy of non-
prosecutions had an incentive effect on the resumption of violence and atrocities after the 
conclusion of the Lomé Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999.470 As a result, the United Kingdom, 
the former colonial power, militarily intervened in the conflict and the rebel leader was 
arrested on 17 May 2000. More significantly, the UN Secretary General submitted to the 
Security Council his report on the establishment of the SCSL on 4 October 2000, in which 
amnesty granted under the aforementioned Lomé Peace Agreement was rejected as a bar to 
prosecutions of international crimes,471 while the tribunal was finally created on 6 January 
2002.472   
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However, several authors suggest that the expected effects of criminal prosecutions and their 
sentencing goal partly remain a matter of rhetoric.473 In fact, prosecutions occur after 
atrocities. As such, ex post prosecutions cannot in principle impact on peace and security at 
the first sight. This is particularly obvious for ad hoc tribunals, especially the ICTR which 
was established after the completion of the Rwandan genocide.474 Moreover, perpetration of 
crimes on a large scale may continue, despite the commencement of prosecutions, and extends 
more and more the number of victims. Such continuation of crimes could result from the 
relative impunity that may be enjoyed by inferior perpetrators of crimes since prosecutions 
would necessarily focus much more on those who bear the great criminal responsibility 
(notably at the command level).475 It could also be caused by the radicalisation of indictees or 
their supporters as a consequence of their judicial stigmatisation or the irrationality of blind 
violence (crimes being often the expression of heinous feelings and hatred in a society).476 
Worse, the status of victims is still weak.477 Before ad hoc tribunals (ICTR and ICTY), the 
victims could only appear as witnesses but do not benefit from any locus standing to request 
reparations proprio motu.478 The advent of the ICC has relatively improved this status.479 
Although victims have not yet acquired any direct power to refer, in that status, crimes to the 
Court, they can become parties to the criminal trial in which they are entitled to formulate 
their claim for adequate reparations of injuries suffered.480 But, it is a fact that only a handful 
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of victims would expect something from ICC’s prosecutions, namely those directly concerned 
by a case, while the vast majority which is affected by the situation in which the crimes have 
been committed would remain out of the proceedings (natural persons, communities, other 
states, etc.). In short, it is not self-evident that criminal prosecutions would necessarily lead to 
the precise expected positive results of the sentencing goal. On the contrary, they may prevent 
or undermine the exploration of local alternative mechanisms to criminal trials.  
b) The Potential Denial of Local Alternative Mechanisms to Criminal Prosecutions 
The unavoidable character of criminal prosecutions, trials and punishment of alleged 
perpetrators of international crimes seems to be the heritage of the Nuremberg trials. Its logic 
(i) does not seem at first sight to accommodate any state’s option for non-prosecution 
solutions (ii). 
i) The Logic of Nuremberg 
The “logic of Nuremberg”481 suggests that “criminal justice is the only politically viable and 
morally acceptable response to mass violence”,482 whose primary aim is to punish the 
offenders and to safeguard the memory of victims. It has triggered “the paradigm of victim’s 
justice”483 and has become “the cornerstone of the new human rights movement”,484 
especially after the end of the Cold War. As a consequence, criminal justice as a disputed 
matter generates a highly divisive and polarising trend.485 In fact, the basic cliché is the one 
between victims, survivors and offenders. In other circumstances, this cliché may turn into 
divisions between groups of people within a state when violence is based on religious, racial 
or ethnic differentiations. That was learnt between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims in the 
Balkans.486 It is also perceptible between the majority Hutu and the minority Tutsi in Rwanda. 
Normally, during the course of the dispensation of such a victim-centred justice, it is possible 
that one group protests, when members of the other group celebrate prosecutions and enjoy 
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the infliction of criminal sentences to the convicted persons belonging to the opposite 
community.487 The problem would be more perilous when justice institutions fail to conduct 
criminal prosecutions against alleged offenders from all belligerent parties to the conflict. 
This kind of justice, with its divisive and polarising posture, could increase rivalries, social 
and political tensions within a state rather than promoting peace and national reconciliation. It 
cannot be considered as the only option available for dealing with international crimes, 
including mass violence,488 in such a context that “no one is wholly innocent and no one 
wholly guilty”,489 given that each side may possess “a narrative of victimhood”.490 
Theoretically, besides criminal prosecutions (national or international), four other options for 
dealing with international crimes, including mass atrocities, are generally invoked, namely the 
refusal to prosecute through amnesty or pardon, the recourse to truth and reconciliation 
commissions, the granting of reparations and other forms of redress to victims, and the 
imposition of non-criminal sanctions to offenders, such as the exclusion from the civil service, 
the police or the army.491 It may be added to the list the traditional conflict resolution 
mechanisms based on traditions, customs and practices of justice within local communities of 
people in Africa. One of these mechanisms is generally known in the form of traditional 
tribunals. According to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, a traditional 
court means “a body which, in a particular locality, is recognised as having the power to 
resolve disputes in accordance with local customs, cultural or ethnic values, religious norms 
or tradition”.492 Such tribunals are not modern national court systems493 of the states imported 
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in Africa by way of colonisation. They are mechanisms designed for social conciliation and 
reconciliation. They do not normally apply written criminal law and classic sentences 
amounting to prison. Rather, they privilege participatory dialogue between offenders and 
victims, the amendment of the accused persons, the pardon by the victims, the reintegration of 
the convicted offenders into society, civil compensation to properties lost or damaged, as well 
as customary fines (e.g. payment of a cow, goat or local beer, etc., to the victims or the 
community) and any other communitarian retribution or sanction in the form of social 
services,494 etc. A well known and commented example495 of the involvement of traditional 
mechanisms in dealing with international crimes is the experience of the Gacaca tribunals in 
Rwanda,496 even though adapted to the circumstances of the 1994 genocide and thus allowed 
to apply criminal sentences.497 This diversification of available options shows that justice, 
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which is a more complex notion, is not (and should not be) limited to prosecutions, trials and 
criminal sentences. It usually encompasses different things to different people and states.498 
Normally, each option should remain available within a state because, although human rights 
may be universal, human wrongs to deal with are specific to each country, to each society and 
to victims.499 Non-prosecution should not necessarily be rejected.  
ii) The Difficult Acceptance of Local Non-Prosecution Options 
The current international criminal law potentially denies the validity of such alternative 
mechanisms to criminal trials. Non-prosecution options tend to be assimilated to enjoying 
impunity. As a result, they are either rejected or hardly accepted internationally. For example, 
to deal with Nazi crimes, besides the Nuremberg Tribunal which focused on the major 
perpetrators at the command level, the victorious occupying powers enacted the so-called 
Allied Control Council Law 10 whose article II (5) in relation to amnesty prescribed: 
In any trial or prosecution for a crime herein referred to, the accused shall not be entitled to 
benefits of any statute of limitation in respect of the period from 30 July 1933 to 1 July 1945, 
nor shall any immunity, pardon or amnesty granted under the Nazi regime be admitted as a bar 
to trial or punishment.
500
  
Human rights bodies, doing international criminal law by other means through their 
pronouncements on the human rights aspect of the legality of state investigations or 
prosecutions of international crimes,501 also view blanket amnesties as a converse to the 
obligation to prosecute. On 10 March 1992, the Human Rights Committee espoused the same 
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opinion in its general comment on the prohibition of torture.502 In his report of 2 October 1997 
to the 49th session of the Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities (UN Human Rights Commission), concerning the question of impunity of 
perpetrators of human rights violations, Louis Joinet also recommended the rejection of 
amnesties given the need to combat impunity and to safeguard the rights of victims to judicial 
remedy and reparations.503 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights espouses the 
same position, especially in Carmelo Soria Espinoza v. Chile504 and Ignacio Ellacuria and 
others v. El Salvador505 cases, since amnesty laws are said to be in contradiction with the duty 
of the state to investigate human rights violations, prosecute those responsible and avoid 
impunity.  
More recently, the SCSL has rejected the amnesty provided for under the Lomé Peace 
Agreement for Sierra Leone of 7 July 1999 on the ground that it could not cover international 
crimes subject to universal jurisdiction under international law506 and that it had legal force 
only in respect of the Sierra Leone legal system, not before the Court.507 However, the Sierra 
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, exercising a non-prosecution mandate, found 
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the rejection of that amnesty “to be too extreme and untenable a proposition”.508 It stated that 
amnesties should not be excluded entirely from the mechanisms available to those attempting 
to negotiate a cessation of hostilities after periods of brutal armed conflict, because 
“disallowing amnesty in all cases would be to deny the reality of violent conflict and the 
urgent need to bring such strife and suffering to an end”.509 On his side, William A. Schabas 
wrote: 
The problem with the conclusions of the Special Court on the issue of amnesty is that they are 
too absolute. They most certainly go beyond existing law, as is evident from even a cursory 
reading of the judgment. Their effect, for example, is to condemn not only the peacemakers at 
Lomé but also a process in South Africa that was supervised by such noble souls as Nelson 
Mandela and Desmond Tutu. The Special Court is, of course, quite correct to note that a grant 
of amnesty under one jurisdictional regime cannot deprive another of the authority to prosecute 
where universal jurisdiction exists (...). But in declaring that Sierra Leone actually violated 
customary international law by granting the amnesty, the Special Court attempted to establish a 
principle that applies to all armed conflicts to the effect that peace cannot be bargained for 
amnesty. Ever. The corollary of such a claim can only be the assertion that war should 
continue, even where combatants are prepared to lay down their arms in return for an assurance 
that they will not be prosecuted.
510
 
The uncertainty of the amnesty issue is further confirmed by two treaties. First, under 
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, there is an exhortation towards 
state authorities in power to grant “the broadest amnesty” to combatants in a civil war or those 
deprived of their liberty for reasons related to it.511 The practice does not so far well indicate 
whether such amnesty should be limited to offenses other than international crimes.512 For 
example, in South Africa, in the post-apartheid time, the Constitutional Court admitted, in its 
judgment of 25 July 1996, the validity of amnesty measures (after truth telling and upon 
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application to the Committee on amnesty) provided for in the 1995 Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act.513 It made it known that prosecutions of offenders are not an 
(imperative) obligation (even though undoubtedly deserved) when what is sought is to 
encourage the disclosure of the whole truth and to reconcile people (victims, offenders and 
others) in one country which is confronted with its dolorous national story of violence and 
conflict of the past.514 However, contrary to the example of the Lomé Peace Agreement for 
Sierra Leone of July 1999, the non-applicability of amnesties to genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes was ascertained in the DRC515 and implied by the Arusha Peace 
Agreement in Burundi.516 Second, in such circumstances of uncertainty, the drafters of the 
Rome Statute left the matter unsolved regarding the ICC jurisdiction. It seems that the 
relevance of amnesties as a bar to the ICC’s prosecutions would be decided on a case-by-case 
basis.517 In particular, it would be up to the Prosecutor to use his discretionary power and 
assess, where such amnesties have been granted for individual cases, whether those 
prosecutions could serve the interests of justice or not. 
Similarly, when any other non-prosecutions mechanism has been chosen in a particular 
circumstance, as an alternative to criminal trials, the ICC Prosecutor can determine if there is 
still a reasonable basis to proceed. The effectiveness of reparations provided to victims either 
through truth and reconciliation commissions or traditional conflict resolution mechanisms 
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could be among indicators that criminal prosecutions have to be relinquished. Anyway, owing 
to the textual silence on the issue, it is important to fill the gap and to develop the rules 
applicable to the relationship between the ICC and these potential complementary justice 
mechanisms whose use (often relevant in transitional post-conflict periods) should not be 
assimilated to the failure to prosecute international crimes or to impunity.   
1.2.2.2. The Consequences of the Failure to Prosecute 
The territorial state runs some risks in case of non-compliance with its duty to prosecute. It 
may be subject either to an external judicial intervention (a) or to the application of 
international sanctions (b). 
a) The External Judicial Intervention  
When the territorial state fails to comply with its duty to prosecute, prosecutions may be 
ensured through the judicial intervention of a foreign state or the international community. 
Historically, the most remote type of intervention was devoted for humanitarian assistance by 
humanitarian organisations like the Red Cross. In the Nicaragua Judgment of 27 June 1986, 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) acknowledged that such assistance could also be 
provided by a foreign state, on a non-discriminatory basis to the victims in need of help,518 
and without the use of force.519 The consent of the territorial state is not required. Such a 
charitable interventions are distinct from humanitarian military interventions mandated by the 
Security Council acting under chapter VII of the Charter.520 The establishment of the system 
of international criminal justice then enables to include judicial interventions in the margin of 
international action.521  
Yet, under certain circumstances, as the ICJ declared in the Corfu Chanel Case, intervention 
can be regarded “as the manifestation of a policy of force”.522 Extraterritorial or international 
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criminal jurisdiction being also a matter of powers, its exercise beforehand corresponds to the 
implementation of such a policy, before being a matter of justice dispensation. Both types of 
jurisdiction may serve the purpose of judicial dissuasion (dissuasion judiciaire),523 not only 
against potential individual offenders but also towards those states which may breach their 
international obligations.      
As a result, there are two consequences. On the one hand, the exercise of power goes 
alongside with state foreign policy or international politics. Justice then becomes a tool of 
politics behind which are hidden motives of human rights protection and the struggle against 
impunity. The claim for this kind of justice (without borders) is a major characteristic of the 
post-Cold War time, after the collapse of the communist bloc, headed by the Soviet Union. 
The time for a judicial globalisation has come. A “new spirit of relative optimism”524 (notably 
on the part of former states of the Soviet Union) for global accountability institutions has 
emerged. On the other hand, the exercise of judicial intervention by states would necessarily 
benefit to the most powerful ones. There will probably be prosecutions by courts of some 
states or the international community against nationals of weak countries, while great powers’ 
citizens would enjoy blanket impunity. In this respect, the former ICJ President, Gilbert 
Guillaume, opining on the principle of universal jurisdiction (enforcement in absentia), 
warned: 
International criminal law has itself undergone considerable development and constitutes today 
an impressive legal corpus. It recognizes in many situations the possibility, or indeed the 
obligation, for a State other than that on whose territory the offence was committed to confer 
jurisdiction on its courts to prosecute the authors of certain crimes where they are present on its 
territory. International criminal courts have been created. But at no time has it been envisaged 
that jurisdiction should be conferred upon the courts of every State in the world to prosecute 
such crimes, whoever their authors and victims and irrespective of the place where the offender 
is to be found. To do this would, moreover, risk creating total judicial chaos. It would also be to 
encourage the arbitrary, for the benefit of the powerful, purportedly acting as agent for an ill-
defined "international community". Contrary to what is advocated by certain publicists, such a 
development would represent not an advance in the law but a step backward.
525
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The potential risk of judicial chaos is aggravated by two additional problems. Primo, the fact 
that there is no legal instrument which pre-determines and organises how and when a state 
judicial intervention must be conducted in order to ensure prosecutions of crimes committed 
abroad and against nationals of a foreign country. If everything must depend upon judicial and 
scholarly legal constructions, arbitrary, repetitive prosecutions by national courts of different 
states and so conflicts are inevitable. It could be the case notably when a state has decided, 
after inquiry, not to prosecute, or if the accused person has been acquitted or sentenced with 
complacency. This is clearly a loophole in the system of international criminal justice.  
It is a setback in comparison to the legal framework applicable to the relationship between 
states and international tribunals. In particular, as a reminder, the ICC which possesses a 
complementary jurisdiction to states parties may intervene only when the latter has failed, by 
incapacity or unwillingness, to comply with their duty to investigate and to prosecute.526 The 
assessment of state incapacity (inability) or unwillingness to prosecute should normally result 
into a judicial rather than a political decision. Even if subjectivity is not entirely impossible, 
the principle of complementarity is better than nothing since it is protective of the 
jurisdictional power/right of states. In this sense, it appears less compulsory than the coercive 
principle of primacy of ad hoc tribunals over national courts. Primacy means here that the 
competent ad hoc tribunal may formally request, at any stage of the procedure, national courts 
to defer the pending case to its jurisdiction.527 Instead, the principle of complementarity 
preserves “the ICC’s power over irresponsible states that refuse to prosecute”.528 Therefore, it 
can help push states parties to be more active for prosecutions,529 while the principle of 
jurisdictional primacy takes from states their primary power to prosecute in favour of the 
international community. In any case, like in the event of the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, there is no guarantee against repetitive prosecutions after the accused has faced 
with proceedings before a national court. The double jeopardy principle (ne bis in idem) 
wholly operates only for decisions of international tribunals. According to this principle, it is 
prohibited to adjudicate the same (criminal) case (consisting of incidents/facts, incriminations 
                                                 
526 ICC Statute, Articles 1 and 17. 
527 ICTY Statute, Article 9 (2); ICTR Statute, Article 8 (2). See also David, above note 64, at 783. 
528 M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law: Origin, Development and 
Practice (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), at 158. 
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and parties) more than once by the same tribunal or another court having jurisdiction530. But, 
as for the ICC, George Fletcher has rightly interpreted the issue as follows:  
The ICC will respect its own judgments (which court would not?) but it will not respect 
judgments of member states unless it determines that the member state had “an intent to bring 
the person concerned to justice”. That is, the ICC will decide on a case-by case basis whether the 
judgments of other courts are worthy of its respect.
531
 
Politically, such one-side ne bis in idem principle would become harder to tolerate by states 
not parties, since they have not manifested their prior consent to this kind of scrutiny of final 
judgments of their own national courts, even when ICC’s proceedings are the result of a 
referral by the Security Council. Similarly, the ICC’s judicial intervention may have higher 
constitutional implications on the democratic governance of a non-member state than in a 
consenting or contacting party. In fact, for example, it may be that incumbent political leaders 
benefit from the suspension of criminal prosecutions until the end of their electoral terms 
pursuant to the constitutions in force in their countries. In this regard, the ICC’s judicial 
intervention could be criticised as being an attempt to national political independence (due to 
its potential impact on regime-change) and the democratic sovereignty of people to self-
determination, to choosing their rulers. The tension is thus real between political 
independence, democracy and eventual international judicial interventions.     
Secundo, the matter for a state to extradite its own nationals to a foreign country is not easy to 
resolve. Normally, the decision to extradite is governed by municipal law of the requested 
state. However, there is in principle an extradition treaty between parties as a matter of 
judicial cooperation. The problem then arises as to whether the state’s refusal to extradite its 
own citizens as an exigency of its domestic law could amount to the failure to prosecute.532 
True, the VCLT provides that “a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty”.533 National constitutions are also deemed to be 
part of internal law. But, the VCLT does not solve the matter since the refusal to extradite on 
the basis of national law is envisaged by the very treaty to perform, and there is no customary 
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rule which obliges a state to surrender its citizen to a foreign country.534 But, other penal 
conventions provide for a solution of compromise by making the decisition of a state to 
extradite its own nationals dependent on the conclusion of an ad hoc agreement with the 
requesting state.535 This may imply that in the absence of such an agreement, the refusal of a 
state to extradite its own nationals in accordance with its domestic law will remain relevant. 
The issue can thus turn into a political and diplomatic affair. The adoption of international 
sanctions against the requested state which refuses to extradite is possible.         
b) The Threat of International Sanctions          
A form of reaction of the international community to atrocities and international crimes has 
already been explained. It refers to the establishment of international courts, military and 
judicial interventions. International sanctions constitute another form of that reaction.536 They 
are of different kinds in under international law. A distinction must be drawn between 
sanctioning the commission of alleged crimes committed and the sanctions of impediments to 
the administration of justice. The breach of the obligation to extradite or prosecute relates to 
the latter category. Its author runs the risk of being subject to two kinds of international 
sanctions. It may be either (political and economic) sanctions of collective security (i) or 
sanctions of the state responsibility (ii). 
i) The Sanctions of Collective Security  
Experimented for the first time under the League of Nations, collective security is a 
preventive and defensive international system of mutualisation of states’ efforts and 
commitments to maintain peace and security through the implementation of decisions taken 
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536 Cassese, above note 210, at 3-5. 
99 
by a common political body empowered by all and by virtue of law to act on behalf of each of 
them. It entails a form of limitation to some individual prerogatives, for example the unilateral 
recourse to the use of armed force, in favour of the international community, presupposed 
more capable to deal efficiently with international threats to peace and security, with the 
support of all member states.537 Without being a monopoly of the United Nations,538 the most 
powerful forum of collective security is the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter. Some of its collective decisions lay down international sanctions. These sanctions are 
numerous and the list is not exhaustive. Under article 41 of the UN Charter,539 those sanctions 
“may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations”. They are taken not only because international crimes should not go unpunished, 
but chiefly owing to the fact that monitoring the respect for human rights or humanitarian law, 
as well as the enforcement of justice are now viewed as essential for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.540 As Martti Koskennienni writes, the Security Council has 
shown in this respect its “willingness to use its exceptionally ‘hard’ powers of enforcement, 
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binding resolutions, economic sanctions and military force for ‘soft’ purposes of international 
justice”.541  
Normally, as far as the exercise of state criminal jurisdiction is concerned, those sanctions are 
imposed as a consequence of the failure to carry out a pre-existing obligation to extradite or 
prosecute. But, innovatively, they can also follow the failure to discharge a duty to cooperate 
(through the surrender or extradition of the presumed offender, or via other means) that has 
been specifically created by a Security Council resolution, adopted under Chapter VII. This 
legal creativity to impose an obligation to cooperate may correct, although in part and only in 
a particular situation, the lack of a binding comprehensive legal framework organising 
(horizontal) state cooperation for the repression of international crimes. The legal construction 
is such that the failure to comply with this obligation to cooperate may be qualified, 
independently from the facts of the crimes in question, as a threat to international peace and 
security.542 
Outside the UN Charter, a reference to the powers of the Security Council is made in a 
number of international treaties. For example, an implicit reference is found under Additional 
Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. This treaty commits contracting state 
parties, in situations of serious violations (i.e. war crimes) of the said Conventions and the 
Protocol itself, to undertake to act, individually or jointly, in cooperation with the United 
Nations and in conformity with the UN Charter.543 An explicit reference is found in the Rome 
                                                 
541 M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Police in the Temple. Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical View’, 6 European 
Journal of International Law (1995) 325-348, at 341.  
542 K. Manusama, The United Nations Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era: Applying the Principle of 
Legality (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), at 107-109. For example, in the Lockerbie case,  
the Security Council established that the lack of co-operation by Libya in prosecuting and punishing the 
perpetrators of the terrorist attack of December 1988, notably by not responding to the requests for their 
extradition to the United Kingdom or the United States of America, was a threat to international peace and 
security. See SC Res.748 (1992), 31 March 1992, Preamble, para.8. 
543 GP I, Article 89. See also See also Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (13 January 1993), Article XII (3) and (4). 
These provisions read: ‘3. In cases where serious damage to the object and purpose of this Convention may 
result from activities prohibited under this Convention, in particular by Article I, the Conference (of States 
Parties) may recommend collective measures to States Parties in conformity with international law. 4. The 
Conference shall, in cases of particular gravity, bring the issue, including relevant information and conclusions, 
to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council’. The brackets 
101 
Statute which provides that the Security Council may be informed of any matter of non-
cooperation with the ICC in criminal proceedings which result from the situation of a third 
state which it has referred to the Prosecutor.544 Obviously, the information is designed to 
guarantee a follow-up of the matter, which does not exclude the adoption of sanctions against 
the state refusing to cooperate. 
In practice, the Security Council is not obliged to impose sanctions. Everything depends on 
the context of each case and the contingencies of international politics. Rather than adopting 
sanctions, the Security Council may even prefer to invite the state concerned to respect its 
international obligation, to put an end to its breach, if it does not just expressly recall the duty 
to extradite the accused person or prosecute the crime in question. 
The relevant example in this regard is the Lockerbie case. Two Libyan nationals and officials 
in the intelligence service of Libya were suspected of having caused a bomb to be placed 
aboard an aircraft on Pan Am flight 103, which bomb exploded causing the aeroplane to crash 
over the Scottish territory on 21 December 1988.545 Out of this terrorist attack, 270 persons 
(passengers and crew members) as well as 11 townspeople, most of them being British and 
American citizens, died.546 While the Libyan government indicated that it was willing to 
prosecute the suspects by its own courts, in accordance with the duty to extradite or prosecute 
under the Montreal Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil 
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aviation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America insisted that they should be 
extradited for prosecutions on their territories, since Libya itself was behind the attack.547  
These irreconcilable claims were due to a reciprocal lack of confidence in the respective 
national authorities, supposedly not being in a good position to carry out fair trials against the 
suspects. However, the balance of power being in favour of the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America, the matter was brought to the Security Council, which adopted the 
resolution 748, imposing the duty on Libya to extradite its nationals as requested by the 
opponent states.548 This resolution deviated from the conventional stipulations in two ways. 
On the one hand, it ruled out the right of Libya to exercise its criminal jurisdiction under the 
aforementioned Montreal Convention. On the other hand, it created an obligation for Libya to 
extradite under Chapter VII, which was not owed by virtue of any other treaty between the 
parties. This is why the dispute was brought in two cases before the ICJ,549 Libya alleging 
violations of the Montreal Convention against the requesting states. More interesting, the 
Security Council imposed a series of sanctions on Libya, including the denial of transport and 
communications links, the freeze of financial resources, the ban of military supplies and the 
diplomatic isolation, for its persistent failure to comply with the new obligation to extradite.550 
Finally, to put an end to the stalemate, an agreement was found between parties, later in 
December 1998, to make the suspects tried by Scottish judges under Scots law in a third and 
neutral state, the Netherlands.551  
After all, the Lockerbie case illustrated better the potential tensions and conflicts related to the 
lack of flexibility within the system of international criminal justice. There is so far no rule 
indicating “which state is entitled to exercise jurisdiction in any case where more than one 
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country claims this right”.552 The role that the Security Council is called to play within this 
system is also questionable. The recourse to its exorbitant powers under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter is not a license to do whatever it desires, irrespective of pre-existing rules of 
international law. Hence, the need to reconsider its relationships with the system of 
international criminal law in order to avoid any risk of arbitrary, diplomatic manipulations 
and contestations, capable to impede the efficiency of its actions.                 
ii) The Sanction of the State Responsibility 
State responsibility is a consequence of a state’s internationally wrongful act, i.e. its action or 
omission which constitutes a breach of its obligation under international law553. Two 
possibilities must be distinguished in the present context. State responsibility may be triggered 
by another state for an interstate adjudication or by individuals who consider themselves as 
having been prejudiced by crimes committed before international human rights monitoring 
mechanisms. This responsibility for failing to extradite or prosecute differs from the one 
deriving from the commission of the underlying crimes by state organs or agents (as 
perpetrator, co-perpetrator or accomplice) or the state approval of those committed by private 
individuals.554 As the ICJ said in the case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular 
Staff in Tehran, such approval is to translate private acts of individuals into acts of the state.555 
The shining example relating to state responsibility for its failure to extradite or prosecute is 
the trial of the former Chadian President, Hissène Habré.  
1°) The Case of President Hissène Habré 
President Hissène Habré came to power as a result of a civil war on 7 June 1982. During his 
innings until 1 December 1990, he transformed acts of persecutions, torture and physical 
elimination of his opponents as a means of governance. He established and resorted to a 
political police known as the “Direction de la Documentation et de la Sécurité” (DDS) to this 
effect. Reportedly, his regime produced “more than 40,000 victims (of murder and torture), 
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more than 80,000 orphans, more than 30,000 widows, and more than 200,000 persons who 
found themselves, due to this repression, to be without moral or material support”.556 On its 
side, Human Rights Watch reported to have discovered the files of the DDS in 2001.557 They 
allegedly revealed “the names of 1,208 persons who died in various jails, including one on the 
grounds of Habré’s presidential compound”558 and “a total of 12,321 victims of different 
forms of abuse”.559 
Having been ousted from power by his own chief of the army, the then becoming President 
Idriss Deby, he fled abroad and finally settled in Dakar (Senegal). Criminal proceedings 
commenced against him in February 2000. Seven victims, backed by a coalition of human 
rights organisations,560 brought their complaint to the Regional Tribunal of Dakar. They were 
probably encouraged by the highly publicised prosecutions against Pinochet, the former 
Chilean President, which had started in England since 1999. As a result, on 3 February 2000, 
Judge Demba Kandji charged Hissène Habré with complicity in the perpetration of acts of 
torture, barbarity and crimes against humanity, and placed him under house arrest.561 But, this 
saga was just the beginning of a protracted judicial battle at the end of which Senegal failed 
prosecute the accused person by itself and alone or to extradite him to Belgium which made a 
request in this respect. It has to be noted that the Belgian request for extradition was made 
following several complaints brought by some victims, who had acquired the Belgian 
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nationality, before the investigating judge of the Brussels Court of first instance, Daniel 
Fransen, between 30 November 2000 and 11 December 2001.562  
This failure of Senegal to discharge its international obligations was a consequence of three 
important judgments delivered by its own courts. First, on 4 July 2000, the Prosecution 
Division of the Dakar Court of Appeal delivered a judgment whereby it cancelled the initial 
proceedings before the Regional Tribunal of Dakar, in response to a motion raised by Hissène 
Habré’s defence council.563 The Court ruled that Senegalese tribunals lacked jurisdiction to 
prosecute and try foreigners present on the territory of Senegal for alleged crimes committed 
(against alien) outside Senegal.564 The decision was based on the absence of any legislative 
implementation measure incorporating into the Code of criminal procedure such universal 
jurisdiction, including over torture-related offences under the UN Convention against torture, 
to which Senegal was already a party.565 Second, on 20 March 2001, the Senegalese Court of 
cassation upheld this ruling.566 Third, concerning the Belgium extradition request, following 
Hissène Habré’s indictment on 19 September 2005 by the Belgian investigating judge, Daniel 
Fransen, for acts of torture, war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Prosecution Division 
of the Court of Appeal of Dakar held that it lacked jurisdiction to decide on the matter.567 This 
decision was based on the fact that the accused person enjoyed immunity from jurisdiction 
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due to his capacity as head of state at the time of the commission of the alleged offenses.568 
The Court referred to the ICJ judgment in the Arrest Warrant case.569 But, the judgment was 
criticised for its support for “the thesis of perpetual immunity”570 and its trend to cover any 
act performed in an official capacity, notably international crimes. Yet, Hissène Habré was a 
former head of state, while the issue resolved in the Arrest Warrant case pertained to 
(personal) immunity from prosecutions against an incumbent state official, namely a minister 
of foreign affairs, at the time of issuance of the arrest warrant. Moreover, it seems that 
(functional) immunity was not applicable to Hissène Habré for its incompatibility with the 
Senegalese obligation to prosecute. On its side, Chad had already indicated that in its view the 
accused enjoyed no immunity as its former Head of state.571 Consequently, Senegal had to 
face legal procedures engaging its international responsibility.   
2°) The State of Senegal on the Bench  
Two international procedures in relation to the trial of Hissène Habré were initiated against 
Senegal. The first one was a communication initiated before the Committee against torture, 
which has the power to consider individual complaints against a state party which recognises 
its competence to decide whether it is or not responsible for any alleged breach of the UN 
Convention against torture.572 The complaint was lodged on 18 April 2001 following the 
above mentioned judgment of the Senegalese Court of Cassation of 20 March 2001. The 
Chadian victims were alleging violations by the state of Senegal of article 5 (2) and 7 of the 
said Convention, i.e. the breach of the obligation to take national implementation measures to 
establish its domestic jurisdiction over crimes such as those presumably committed by 
Hissène Habré and the subsequent failure to prosecute or extradite him to a third country 
willing to organise his trial. While Senegal declared that it had given the accused one month 
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to leave the territory of Senegal after the Court of Cassation decision,573 the Committee issued 
a preliminary ruling on 23 April 2001 calling on the defendant state to “take all necessary 
measures to prevent Hissène Habré from leaving the territory of Senegal except pursuant to an 
extradition demand”.574 On 13 November 2001, it declared the case admissible for two 
reasons. On the one hand, the complainants were indeed individuals subject to the jurisdiction 
of the defendant state in the dispute to which their communication referred575 in accordance 
with article 22 (1) of the UN Convention against torture.576 On the other hand, the Committee 
considered that the principle of universal jurisdiction enunciated in article 5 (2) and article 7 
(1) of the said Convention implied that “the jurisdiction of States parties must extend to 
potential complainants in circumstances similar to the complainants”.577 On the merits, 
Senegal was found guilty of the alleged violations on 17 May 2006. The Committee thus 
made the following recommendation: 
In accordance with article 5, paragraph 2, of the Convention, the State party is obliged to adopt 
the necessary measures, including legislative measures, to establish its jurisdiction over the acts 
referred to in the present communication. Moreover, under article 7 of the Convention, the 
State party is obliged to submit the present case to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution or, failing that, since Belgium has made an extradition request, to comply with that 
request, or, should the case arise, with any other extradition request made by another State, in 
accordance with the Convention. This decision in no way influences the possibility of the 
complainants’ obtaining compensation through the domestic courts for the State party’s failure 
to comply with its obligations under the Convention.
578
 
The second international procedure was an interstate dispute between Belgium and Senegal 
before the ICJ. Belgium asked the Court to adjudicate and declare that Senegal breached its 
obligations under the Convention against torture and was obliged to cease these wrongful acts 
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574 Ibid. 
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by submitting without delay the case of Hissène Habré to its competent authorities “for the 
purpose of prosecution, or, failing that, by extraditing him to Belgium without further ado”.579 
The alleged breached obligations pertained to the failure to conduct a preliminary inquiry to 
establish the facts in view of potential prosecutions and the refusal to extradite him to the 
requesting state.580 True, Senegal had already taken those implementation measures (between 
2007 and 2008) to bring its domestic law into conformity with the Convention against 
torture.581 But, these measures were not simply sufficient to avoid responsibility for the failure 
to exercise its jurisdiction. There were unjustified delays in complying with its obligations in 
a manner which contrasted with the diligence with which its authorities should have acted in 
inquiring the facts, in violation of article 6(2) of the Convention against torture.582 Moreover, 
for the Court, the subsequent violation of the obligation to prosecute under article 7 (2) fell in 
the year 2000 or 2001 after the dismissal of the decision of the Dakar Court of Appeal 
indicting Hissène Habré.583 All these violations covered acts that had been committed since 
26 June 1987, the date when the Convention against torture came into force towards 
Senegal.584  
The ICJ rested on two major arguments in support of its ruling. On the one hand, the 
Senegalese courts’ decisions being part of domestic law, Senegal could not invoke them as a 
justification not to perform its conventional obligations pursuant to article 27 of the VCLT.585 
On the other hand, the compliance with these obligations could not be affected by the 
judgment of the ECOWAS Court of Justice of 18 November 2010 which held that 
amendments of the Senegalese Criminal Code for the purpose of Hissène Habré’s trial was a 
breach of the principle of non-retroactivity of penal laws and obliged Senegal to mobilise 
efforts in order to create an ad hoc tribunal of an international character,586 rather than 
prosecuting the accused person before its domestic courts.587 However, the ICJ did not 
                                                 
579 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, above note 425, paras.71 and 118. 
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provide any argument in support of this position. Yet, Senegal had argued that the judgment 
of the ECOWAS Court of Justice was not a constraint of domestic nature, unlike its 
aforementioned national judicial decisions, and contended that it was also subject to the 
authority of this Court.588 In its view, Belgium objected that this judgment was not opposable 
to its domestic court.589 It advanced that if the forum state was confronted with a situation of 
conflict of two international obligations, it was the result of its own failings in implementing 
the Convention against torture.590  
In this regard, one may argue that invoking such a judgment could amount to relying on one’s 
own turpitudes, in that prior Senegalese illegal behaviours having led to that judgment should 
not justify current violations of the Convention against torture, alleged by Belgium.591 But, a 
more convincing argument at the disposal of the ICJ was the relative authority of the res 
judicata principle generally attached to judicial decisions. According to this principle, courts’ 
decisions under international law do not in principle possess binding force except between the 
parties and in a particular case.592 In other words, a legal matter which has been judged once 
between parties cannot be adjudicated again in a manner which could enable to reverse the 
authority of the prior decision by the same court or another for the same purpose.593 This 
respect owed to the courts’ decisions is a guarantee of judicial security between parties. It 
follows that the authority of the judgment of the ECOWAS Court of Justice could not affect 
the rights of Belgium, not just because it was not a party to that case, but, more important, 
given the fact that the ICJ was adjudicating and deciding on a different issue, i.e. the non-
compliance by Senegal with its treaty obligations towards another contracting state.  
After all, this overlapping of judgments of international tribunals (universal and regional) 
shows the extent to which Hissène Habré’s trial was a hard case to handle. Senegal was 
                                                 
588 Ibid., para.110. 
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reluctant to extradite him to Belgium and to create a precedent whereby a former African 
Head of state was to be tried by a former European colonial power. Reasons behind this 
political will are numerous. Some pertain to the policy of self-reliance in dealing with African 
problems. In this respect, Hissène Habré deserved prosecutions by Africa itself. Other 
reasons, which are the imminent ones to explore, relate to objections against the system of 
international criminal justice.   
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2. The Rise of Objections against the System of International Criminal Justice 
African objections against the system of international criminal justice reached a turning point 
in 2002. This year is historic for two main reasons. First, it marks the anniversary of the AU 
inauguration at Durban (South Africa), exactly at the same moment as the entry into force of 
the ICC Statute.594 While the contribution of Africa to the development of general 
international criminal law is widely recognised,595 the conclusion of the AU Constitutive Act 
of 11 July 2000 appears to be a renewal of the regional claim for legal autonomy in order to 
deal with African (criminal) matters by Africans themselves. Second, the general euphoria 
with which the advent of the ICC was welcome made forget the negative impact of the Arrest 
Warrant case of 11 April 2000 between the DRC and Belgium on the perception of 
international criminal justice in Africa. The ICJ judgment of 14 February 2002 in this case 
wakened some states that systematically started to oppose indictments and prosecutions of 
their leaders outside the continent, in some European countries,596 in application of the 
principle of universal jurisdiction. In this regard, the Republic of Congo, for example, 
initiated proceedings against France before the ICJ in December 2002.597 Previously, African 
states also raised objections against a number of provisions of the ICC Statute during the UN 
diplomatic negotiations convened in Rome in 1998, some years before their current criticisms 
against the ICC’s judicial work in Africa.       
These criticisms and contestations have been regarded as a setback in the development of 
international criminal law and a way to weaken its enforcement at the expense of common 
values to mankind that deserve universal protection.598 It does however appear that the values 
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in question (justice, human rights, peace, reconciliation, end of impunity, etc.) and the need –
even the duty- to protect them are not the problem at stake.599 The issue is rather the manner 
in which justice is regulated, sought and delivered,600 and the failure of global international 
criminal law to catch a number of problems which are of specific interest or concern to the 
African continent. Objections relate to many issues, in particular: abusive application of rules 
and principles of international criminal law, selectivity and partiality of justice, inequality of 
states before the law, political calculations behind institutions vested with the power to 
administer justice, policy choice of priorities between protected values and list of crimes 
subject to international prosecutions. The main actors of this crisis are African and European 
states, the AU, the EU, the UN Security Council and the ICC.   
To sum up, African objections against the system of international criminal justice are 
diversified. They can be grouped and examined in two principal aspects, namely the 
disapproval of the presumed abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction (2.1) and the 
contention over the ICC jurisdiction and its judicial work in Africa (2.2). 
2.1. The Disapproval of the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction 
Universal jurisdiction is one of the core principles of international criminal justice. Connected 
with the ICC justice system, it gives efficacy to the principle of complementarity because it 
expands the state basis for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to prosecute the 
offender.601 African states do not contest the relevance of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction but acknowledge its useful role in the struggle against impunity.602 In the view of 
the AU Assembly, the contention is rather over its blatant abusive application by some 
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European states.603 This issue is far from being exclusively African. Other interstate 
contestations, including by countries such as Israel and the United States of America (USA), 
gave rise to the fear that the principle of universal jurisdiction was “on its last legs, if not 
already in its death throes”.604 This pessimistic point of view tells us much about the gravity 
of the problem rather than the potential end of the principle of universal jurisdiction. The 
reason is that it is equally possible that contestations of a rule or principle result in the 
consolidation of its binding force and legitimacy,605 especially when states have managed to 
reach a consensus which eliminates their respective disagreements on the matter.  
The question which is to be addressed relates to the justification of African objections to the 
application of the principle of universal jurisdiction. Normally, when states want to defend 
their interests, they do not necessarily behave in accordance with some legal rationality. If 
they wish to divert from a legal principle or to provoke the modification of the applicable law, 
they will not hesitate to do so. If they say no and radically persist in their view, there would be 
no logic to invoke against them the rule or the principle the scope of which they reject or with 
the application of which they disagree. The analyser is then obliged to take the new 
postulations into account and try to find out the best ways to reconcile the conflicting 
positions in a manner that would preserve the defence of protected common values.  
Thus, in order to grasp the significance and the content of the contestations against the 
abusive application of the principle of universal jurisdiction, it is important to link the 
discussion to the context in which the disagreement with European states has emerged. The 
broad context shows that the matter is part of a series of persistent contestations, which are 
aggravated by the African conception of state sovereignty (2.1.1), whereas the specific 
context reflects the irreconcilable character between the African objection and European 
judicial activism and interventionism in Africa (2.1.2).  
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2.1.1. The Repetition of Persistent Interstate Contestations 
International crimes are in many cases committed by state agents in their official capacity, 
sometimes with the tolerance, approval or direct support of the state.606 The subject raises two 
pivotal issues regarding the persistence of interstate contestations of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction: whether the adjudicative exercise of this kind of jurisdiction should be 
subordinated to the presence of the accused on the territory of the prosecuting state (2.1.1.1) 
and how the subjugation of state’s own officials to the jurisdiction of a foreign country is 
perceived as compromise of sovereignty (2.1.1.2). 
2.1.1.1. The Presence of the Accused in the Territory of the Prosecuting State  
This question raises the issue of conceptions of the principle of universal jurisdiction. If no 
territorial connection with the presumed offender is required for it to be exercised and 
enforced, it becomes the so-called “absolute universal jurisdiction”, “universality in absentia” 
(competence universelle par défaut) or pure universal jurisdiction.607 Conversely, if the 
exercise of this jurisdiction is subordinated to conditions, one of which being the presence of 
the accused person on the territory of the prosecuting state, it becomes “conditional universal 
jurisdiction”.608 The problem which is open to debate is not only whether states may exercise 
universal jurisdiction in respect of international crimes but also and mainly whether this 
exercise is to be absolute or dependent on the condition of the presence of the accused person 
in the territory of the prosecuting state. The stakes are high given the fact that sovereign 
equality of states must be respected. In practice, the territorial presence of the accused person 
can limit the number of cases to open on the basis of universal jurisdiction and help secure 
some internal support (legitimacy) to criminal proceedings initiated by the prosecuting 
state.609 This territorial condition is also a guarantee of fair trial (in absentia trials being a 
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violation of international human rights law) so long as the accused person submits his means 
of defence against the accusation before the competent court.610  
The issue was particularly raised by the DRC against Belgium in the Arrest Warrant case. In 
its application of 17 October 2000, the DRC contended that the arrest warrant violated not 
only Yerodia’s immunity as Congolese Minister of foreign affairs but also, the accused being 
outside of Belgium, the principle of sovereign equality of states insofar as no country is 
allowed to exercise its adjudicative authority with effect on the territory of another.611 
Accordingly, the applicant concluded that article 7 of the Belgian Law of 16 June 1993 
establishing absolute or unconditional universal jurisdiction of the Belgian courts over serious 
violations of international humanitarian law, as amended by the Law of 10 February 1999, 
pursuant to which the arrest warrant had been issued, violated international law.612  
Even if the DRC relinquished the contestation of unconditional universal jurisdiction of the 
Belgian courts in its final submissions to the ICJ – reason for which the Court did not itself 
rule upon it in accordance with the non ultra petita principle that prohibits any tribunal to 
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make judgment on a matter which was not submitted by the applicant – judges invoked the 
issue in their opinions appended to the judgment of 14 February 2002. Was there any ground 
for the defendant state to exercise on the basis of its municipal law absolute universal 
jurisdiction under international law? The answer depends on the state of an international 
treaty (a) and customary international law (b). 
a) The Debate under International Treaty Law 
There is no treaty which provides for universal jurisdiction in absentia in international law, 
apart from the UN Convention on the suppression and punishment of the crime of apartheid of 
1973. Basically, this Convention allows “any state party”613 which has jurisdiction to 
prosecute and try persons responsible for acts of apartheid, “whether or not such persons 
reside in the territory of the State in which the acts are committed or are nationals of that State 
or of some other State or are stateless persons”.614 For other international crimes, the presence 
of the accused in the territory of the prosecuting state is always required for the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction.   
This legal requirement has a historical justification. In fact, before examples of crimes subject 
to universal jurisdiction proliferated, many states were reluctant to accept the 
conventionalisation of such a broad jurisdiction. For example, the principle of universality 
was not included in the Genocide Convention of 1948, which is the first UN-sponsored treaty 
on international criminal law. Article VII of the draft treaty prepared by the UN Secretariat 
and laying down universal jurisdiction was rejected.615  The USA submitted a proposal of 
amendment to the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, which was accepted by 
other states and embodied in article VI of the final version of the Convention.616 The new 
article provides that, on the one hand, the national courts competent to try acts of genocide are 
those of the state on the territory of which the crime is committed. This provision does not 
however preclude prosecutions on the basis of active and passive personality,617 nor unilateral 
universal jurisdiction. On the other hand, an international criminal tribunal was foreseen to 
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deliver justice with regard to those contracting parties that recognise its jurisdiction.618 In the 
drafters’ view, this international criminal tribunal could intervene only when the territorial 
state failed to comply with its obligation to prosecute genocide, in particular if committed or 
tolerated by the state authorities.619   
Furthermore, the principle of universality was not included in the Geneva Conventions of 
1949.620 The contracting parties opted for the aut dedere aut judicare principle whose 
implementation is subordinated to the presence of the accused in the territory of the 
prosecuting state.621 Even in the exceptional case of uncontested universal jurisdiction over 
piracy at that time,622 it was implied that its exercise required the presence of the pirate in the 
territory of the prosecuting state. He may be caught in this territory or apprehended in the high 
seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state. The requirement aims to avoid 
positive conflicts of (adjudicative) jurisdictions by those states which could be eager to 
prosecute piracy.623 Only the state of apprehension has jurisdiction to prosecute by the courts 
established within its territory. This condition is also consistent with the law of the sea,624 
which does not however preclude prosecutions on the basis of other traditional bases of 
jurisdiction such as the principle of personality.625 
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As to the only existing exception of absolute universal jurisdiction, Luc Reydams explains the 
reason of this fundamental change in states’ policy, in reverse of what they supported at the 
time of the adoption of the Genocide Convention, as follows: 
The prospect of establishing an international criminal court which both conventions envisage 
was much bleaker in 1973 than in 1948 and the prospect of the target countries adhering to the 
Convention was zero. More importantly, the Apartheid Convention was clearly drafted with 
three countries in mind, or more accurately three regimes, namely the white minority regimes in 
the former Rhodesia, Namibia, and the Republic of South Africa. The Convention is in fact 
tailored to the officials of regimes that were the last vestiges of colonialism in Africa. Therefore, 
states parties have little reason to fear reciprocity. No (former) apartheid official has ever been 
prosecuted in a third State. Interestingly, and tellingly, none of the countries that are now in the 
forefront of universal jurisdiction has signed the convention, let alone ratify. During the drafting 
Western countries considered the initiative redundant and took issue with the definition of the 
crime of apartheid (overly broad), its qualification as a crime against humanity - and the 
jurisdiction clause.626 
Admittedly, the express imposition of the condition of the presence of the accused in the 
territory of the prosecuting state seems to have been an incentive for states to accept the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction under numerous multilateral international treaties. To use 
Anne-Marie Slaughter’s words, this condition is, so to speak, the reflection of a sort of 
“universal jurisdiction plus”.627 In this regard, the principle of the relative effect of 
international treaties requires that the state of nationality of the presumed offender or that of 
the commission of the crime is a party to the treaty on the basis of which such jurisdiction is 
exercised. In the Arrest Warrant case, the question thus became, for the ICJ judges opining on 
the issue, whether the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia was at least permitted 
under customary international law.  
b) The Debate under Customary International Law 
The ICJ judges delivered two different contradictory positions in the Arrest Warrant case, 
concerning the issue of universal jurisdiction plus the presence of the accused person on the 
territory of the prosecuting state.    
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First of all, the President of the Court, Gilbert Guillaume, was of the view that, as a matter of 
customary international law, the exercise of universal jurisdiction requires the presence of the 
accused.628 Ad hoc Judge Bula Bula and Judge Ranjeva espoused the same opinion.629 Judge 
Rezek also wrote: 
In no way does international law as it now stands allow for activist intervention, whereby a 
State seeks out on another State's territory, by means of an extradition request or an 
international arrest warrant, an individual accused of crimes under public international law but 
having no factual connection with the forum State. It required considerable presumption to 
suggest that Belgium was "obliged" to initiate criminal proceedings in the present case. 
Something which is not permitted cannot, a fortiori, be required. Even disregarding the 
question of the accused's immunity, the Respondent has been unable to point to a single other 
State which has in similar circumstances gone ahead with a public prosecution. No "nascent 
customary law" derives from the isolated action of one State; there is no embryonic customary 
rule in the making, notwithstanding that the Court, in addressing the issue of jurisdiction, 
acceded to the Respondent's request not to impose any restraint on the formative process of the 
law.630    
On the contrary, ad hoc Judge Van Den Wyngaert suggested that international law permitted 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia, and there was no rule prohibiting it under 
customary international law.631 Other judges, namely Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal 
maintained that absolute universal jurisdiction was not prohibited under customary 
international law under certain conditions.632 To give more authority to her assumption, ad 
hoc Judge Van Den Wyngaert particularly invoked the “Princeton Principles on Universal 
                                                 
628 Separate Opinion of Judge Gilbert Guillaume, above note 303, paras.4 and 15. 
629 Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, I.C.J. Reports 2002, paras.76-81; Declaration of Judge 
Ranjeva, above note 622, paras.8-11. 
630 Separate Opinion of Judge Rezek, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, I.C.J. Reports 2002, para.6. 
631 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, I.C.J. Reports 2002, para.56. 
632 Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, above note 294, paras.59-60 and 79-
85. The conditions they set out are: 1) all applicable immunities shall be respected; 2) the national State of the 
accused person shall be first given the opportunity to act upon the charges alleged; 3) the charges shall be laid by 
a prosecutor or an investing judge who acts in full independence, without links to or control by the government 
of the State; 4) it is reserved for only the most heinous international crimes.  
120 
Jurisdiction”,633 which were drafted by a group of scholars convened at the Princeton 
University (USA) between 2000 and 2001.634 Principle 1 (2) of this doctrine states that a 
competent and ordinary judicial body may try the accused person on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction, “provided the person is present before such judicial body”.635 But, in the 
following comment, the language is brought into clarity and holds that this principle “does not 
prevent a state from initiating the criminal process, conducting an investigation, issuing an 
indictment, or requesting extradition, when the accused is not present”.636 In addition, ad hoc 
Judge Van Den Wyngaert, relying on the aut dedere aut judicare principle as codified in the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, in particular the Geneva Convention IV on the protection of 
civilians, unconvincingly argued that the prosecution of war crimes on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction was not subordinated, under customary international law, to the presence of the 
accused in the territory of the prosecuting state.637  
A preliminary observation is that ad hoc Judge Van Den Wyngaert’s approach is in line with 
the constitutionalisation of jurisdictions between states which does not rest, as already 
indicated, on any sound basis under international law.638 The real issue at stake is rather 
whether international law does not prohibit or permits the exercise of absolute universal 
jurisdiction.  
The answer to this question should be in the negative. The exercise of universal jurisdiction in 
absentia is incompatible with the principle of sovereign equality of states, which is part of 
customary international law, codified and specially protected by the UN Charter. This 
principle, which beforehand confines the powers of each state within its territory, remains the 
justification of any state criminal jurisdiction and the cornerstone of its limitations. It cannot 
be overturned by a contrary customary rule in the present case for two main reasons. First, the 
UN Charter is a special law in regard to customary international law.639 In this respect, the 
                                                 
633 See S. Macedo (ed.), The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (Princeton: Princeton University, 
2001), at 28. 
634 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert, above note 631, paras.57-58. 
635 Macedo, above note 633, at 28. 
636 Ibid., at 44. Emphasis is mine. 
637 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert, above note 631, paras.59 and 62. 
638 See chapter one of this Part concerning‘the Diverging Conceptions on the Sources of Extraterritoriality’. 
639 R. Kolb, ‘L’article 103 de la Charte des Nations Unies’, 367 Receuil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit 
International (2013) 9-252, at 214-215. 
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conflict norm is that special laws prevail over general rules. This assertion is not mitigated by 
the fact that states may have the obligation to prosecute international crimes in accordance 
with the aut dedere aut judicare principle. In essence, such an obligation is different from the 
manner in which it can be fulfilled, and particularly the rules concerning states’ jurisdictional 
powers. In other words, the obligation to prosecute and the jurisdictional power of states are 
distinct pieces of law by far, even though they stay in interaction. A state prosecutes because 
it has jurisdiction, whereas it possesses jurisdiction for the purpose of prosecution. But, the 
obligation to prosecute does not confer jurisdiction nor does it allow infringing the territorial 
limits of the state’s own powers. Second, there is no limitation to the territorial authority 
between states without their express consent. In contemporary international law, such a 
limitation is exceptionally possible, thus not as a matter of general rule, by virtue of collective 
decisions such as those which the Security Council can take in accordance with Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter.  
Even authors who problematically attempt to find a customary rule enabling the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction in absentia have confessed their difficulty to establish it, owing to the 
discrepancy of available national practices.640 The main legislation which is generally invoked 
as legal practice not requiring the presence of the accused in the territory of the prosecuting 
state consists of western laws. Yet, this consideration is simply illogical, because one cannot 
rely on the legislation of the same states in which laws and judicial procedures are contested, 
mainly by non-western countries. A similar remark equally applies to their existing case-law. 
All of them lack legal representativeness of the community of states and particularly those 
countries which are most interested from other parts of the world. Establishing a customary 
rule in this way could amount, if one borrows Achilles Skordas’s expression, to creating a 
“hegemonic custom”.641 In addition, even the leading western states on the matter (Belgium, 
Spain and Switzerland)642 have amended, except Germany,643 their previous legislation in 
                                                 
640 R. Rabinovitch, ‘Universal Jurisdiction in absentia’, 28 (2) Fordham International law Journal (2004) 499-
530, at 511 and 529; M. P. Scharf, ‘Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime: Universal Jurisdiction and the Harvard 
Research’, in J. P. Grant and J. C. Barker (eds), The Harvard Research in International Law: Contemporary 
Analysis and Appraisal (Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 2007) 275-306, at 282-283. 
641 A. Skordas, ‘Hegemonic Custom?’, in M. Byers and G. Nolte (eds), United States Hegemony and the 
Foundations of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 317-347. 
642 See Loi du 23 avril 2003 modifiant la loi du16 juin 1993 relative 6 la répression des violations graves du 
droit international humanitaire et l'article 144ter du Code judiciaire [Law of 23 April 2003], Moniteur Belge (7 
May 2003) ; Loi du 5 août 2003 relative à la répression des violations graves du droit international humanitaire 
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order to subordinate the exercise of any universal jurisdiction to the territorial presence of the 
accused person.644 This is not a setback in law but a necessary effort to make national laws be 
                                                                                                                                                        
[Law of 5 August 2003],Moniteur Belge (7 August 2003) ; Loi du 22 mai 2006 modifiant certaines dispositions 
de la loi du 17 avril 1878 contenant le Titre préliminaire du Code de procédure pénale, ainsi qu'une disposition 
de la loi du 5 août 2003 relative aux violations graves de droit international humanitaire [Law of 22 May 2006], 
Moniteur Belge (7 July 2006).  According to the Law of 23 April 2003, any prosecution on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction, even when the offender is not present in Belgium, was subordinated to the request of the Federal 
Attorney General (Procureur fédéral). The latter became the gatekeeper of any private complaint that had no 
longer to be admitted outside his hands. More radical, the Law of 5 August 2003 came to require that the 
presumed perpetrator of a crime under universal jurisdiction be resident in Belgium (Article 14), except where 
the Kingdom has an obligation to exercise jurisdiction over the case on the basis of a treaty to which it is a party. 
In addition, the victim of the crime must have been resident in Belgium for at least three years at the time of 
commission, if she is not a Belgium citizen (passive personality) (Article 16). Pursuant to the Law of 22 May 
2006, the decision of the Federal Attorney General not to prosecute under universal jurisdiction may be subject 
to a review by an appellate panel of judges (Article 2). 
643Völkerstrafgesetzbuch (26 June 2002), para.1. Under this paragraph, the German Code of Crimes against 
International Law provides : ‘Dieses Gesetz gilt für alle in ihm bezeichneten Straftaten gegen das Völkerrecht, 
für die in ihm bezeichneten Verbrechen auch dann, wenn die Tat im Ausland begangen wurde und keinen Bezug 
zum Inland aufweist’ (this Act shall apply to all criminal offences against international law designated under this 
Act, to serious criminal offences designated therein even when the offence was committed abroad and bears no 
relation to Germany). However, the Public Prosecutor enjoys a wide discretion not to prosecute. See German 
Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozeßordnung) (7 April 1987), Sections 153 (c) and 153 (f), 
<https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/deu/1987/the_german_code_of_criminal_procedure_html/german_cri
minal_procedure_code_as_of_2013.pdf> accessed 30 June 2016. Under Section 153 (f), the Public Prosecutor 
may not prosecute in particular if: ‘1. no German is suspected of having committed the crime; 2.the offence was 
not committed against a German; 3.no suspect is, or is expected to be, resident in Germany; 4.the offence is 
being prosecuted by an international court of justice or by a country on whose territory the offence was 
committed, a citizen of which is either suspected of the offence, or suffered injury as a result of the offence. The 
same shall apply if a foreigner who is accused of a criminal offence that was committed abroad is resident in 
Germany but the requirements of the first sentence, numbers 2 and 4, are met and transfer to an international 
court of justice or extradition to the prosecuting state is admissible and intended’. Anyway, Germany has not yet 
exercised universal jurisdiction in absentia because the Office of the Public Prosecutor is said to be keen to 
reject complaints submitted by victims of crimes under international law and NGOs. See International Federation 
of Human Rights Leagues, ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the European Union: a Study of the Laws and Practice 
in the 27 Member States of the European Union’ (December 2010), at 139 
<http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/Extraterritorial_Jurisdiction_In_the_27_Member_States_of_the
_European_Union.pdf> accessed 2 July 2016. 
644 A. Lagerwall, ‘Que reste-t-il de la compétence universelle au regard de certaines évolutions législatives 
récentes ?’, 55 Annuaire français de droit international (2009) 743-763, at 751-760 ; R. B. Baker, ‘Universal 
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consistent with international law. Moreover, contrary to the Princeton Principles on Universal 
Jurisdiction, the Institute of International Law restated the same condition in a resolution of 
2005: “apart from acts of investigation and requests for extradition, the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction requires the presence of the alleged offender in the territory of the prosecuting 
State or on board a vessel flying its flag or an aircraft which is registered under its laws, or 
other lawful forms of control over the alleged offender”.645 Here, the major difference with 
the Princeton Principles is the exclusion of criminal indictments in absentia, while other pre-
trial proceedings which might require mutual assistance between states (thus consent to them) 
may be legal. This is so convincing that such proceedings are normally discreet and do not 
amount to prosecutions. The latter commence only when individual suspects are indicted or 
with the issuance of arrest warrants.  
Four other documents evidence the solidity of this position. First, the same condition was 
indirectly mentioned by the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 
elaborated by Harvard University in 1935. In fact, the forum state could exercise universal 
jurisdiction provided that surrender of the alien has been offered to other states for 
prosecution and remains unaccepted; which implies that the accused should be on the territory 
of the prosecuting state.646 Second, it is clearly mentioned in the comment of the first of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Jurisdiction and the Case of Belgium: A Critical Assessment’, 16 (1) ILSA Journal of International and 
Comparative Law (2009) 141-167, at 155-160. 
645 Resolution on Universal Criminal Jurisdiction with regard to the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against 
Humanity and War Crimes, above note 281, para.3 (b). 
646 Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime (1935), Art.10. In relation to crimes other 
than piracy, counterfeiting, crimes against the security of the state and those committed by alien in connection 
with the function for which he has been employed by the prosecuting state or as a personnel of a ship or an 
aircraft possessing its nationality, this Article stipulates the exercise of universal jurisdiction in the following 
terms: ‘A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed outside its territory by an alien, other than 
the crimes mentioned in Articles 6, 7, 8 and 9, as follows. (a) When committed in a place not subject to its 
authority but subject to the authority of another State, if the act or omission which constitutes the crime is also an 
offence by the law of the place where it was committed, if surrender of the alien for prosecution has been 
offered to such other State or States and the offer remains unaccepted, and if prosecution is not barred by lapse 
of time under the law of the place where the crime was committed. The penalty imposed shall in no case be more 
severe than the penalty prescribed for the same act or omission by the law of the place where the crime was 
committed. (b) When committed in a place not subject to the authority of any State, if the act or omission which 
constitutes the crime is also an offence by the law of a State of which the alien is a national, if surrender of the 
alien for prosecution has been offered to the State or States of which he is a national and the offer remains 
unaccepted, and if prosecution is not barred by lapse of time under the law of a State of which the alien is a 
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fourteen Principles on the Effective Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction, developed by the Non-
Governmental Organisation (NGO), Amnesty International, in 1999.647 Third, the Cairo-
Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences, 
elaborated and proposed to African states by legal experts convened by the NGO, Africa 
Legal Aid, do not envisage the matter explicitly.648 However, one can argue that the presence 
of the accused on the territory of the prosecuting state is implied by the fact that the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction is referred to in connection with principle 19 concerning the duty to 
extradite/surrender or prosecute, whose implementation requires that the offender is found in 
the territory of the forum state.649 Fourth, the territorial presence of the accused is an explicit 
condition for the organisation of any trial (but not for the exercise of the prosecution authority 
prior to that trial, in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality of states) before a 
                                                                                                                                                        
national. The penalty imposed shall in no case be more severe than the penalty prescribed for the same act or 
omission by the law of a State of which the alien is a national. (c) When committed in a place not subject to the 
authority of any State, if the crime was committed to the injury of the State assuming jurisdiction, or of one of its 
nationals, or of a corporation or juristic person having its national character. (d) When committed in a place not 
subject to the authority of any State and the alien is not a national of any State’. Emphasis is mine. 
647 Amnesty International, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: 14 Principles on the Effective Exercise of Universal 
Jurisdiction (1 May 1999) AI Index: IOR 53/001/1999, at 4 
<https://www.amnesty.org/download/.../ior530011999en.pdf> accessed 1 June 2016. The related first principle 
reads as follows: ‘States should ensure that their national courts can exercise universal jurisdiction over 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, extrajudicial executions and “disappearances”’. 
Paragraph one of its comments indicates: ‘States should ensure that their national courts exercise universal 
jurisdiction on behalf of the international community over grave crimes under international law when a person 
suspected of such crimes is found in their territories or jurisdiction. If they do not do so, they should extradite 
the suspect to a state able and willing to do so or surrender the suspect to an international court with jurisdiction. 
When a state fails to fulfill this responsibility, other states should request the suspect’s extradition and exercise 
universal jurisdiction’. Emphasis is mine. 
648 Africa Legal Aid, ‘The Cairo - Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights 
Offences: An African Perspective’ (21 October 2002), 
<www.africalegalaid.com/.../4321_366498_pSBb_The_Cairo-_Aru.> accessed 1 June 2016. 
649 See Principle 19 which reads as follows : ‘A State in whose territory a gross human rights offence suspect is 
found shall prosecute him or her in good faith or extradite or surrender him or her to any other State or 
international tribunal willing and able to prosecute such suspect. The absence of an extradition treaty or other 
enabling legislation shall not bar the extradition, surrender or transfer of such a suspect to any State or 
international tribunal willing and able to prosecute the suspect’. 
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foreign court under the African Union Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over 
International Crimes, adopted by the Executive Council on 13 July 2012.650              
According to Antonio Cassese, the requirement of the territorial presence of the accused 
person implies in practical terms that “in most of cases the suspect’s (or accused’s) presence 
may not be short (say for a brief holiday)”,651 because “otherwise there would be no time to 
conduct preliminary criminal proceedings leading to the issuance of an indictment (however, 
the mere presence may suffice when criminal proceedings have already been instituted in 
another state, which request the extradition of the alleged offender)”.652 It can be added that 
the territorial state which has already conducted an informative investigation (in absentia) or 
sent a request for extradition may prosecute if the accused is found (even occasionally) in its 
territory. If, by any chance, he escapes or otherwise leaves the forum state after the launch of 
the proceedings, the international legality of the prosecutions would not be affected. The 
permanent territorial presence is not required.653 Accordingly, it is unnecessary to require that 
the accused person be resident in the prosecuting state (physically or just by holding a 
domicile there). Such kind of imposition is more restrictive than what international law 
actually requires.  
In any case, should the aforementioned condition not be satisfied, it is submitted that the 
following acts of the prosecuting state could be violations of another state sovereignty: i) the 
lodging of an indictment act with a foreign court having jurisdiction and declared admissible; 
ii) the issuance of an arrest warrant and its international circulation; iii) the delivery of 
summons to appear before a foreign court, particularly if it is accompanied by an act of 
constraint in the event of default to appear; iv) the conduct of prosecutions/trials in absentia. 
In line with these restrictions, it is also submitted that any request for extradition should be 
free of an arrest warrant, because it is the power of the state where the accused person is 
present or resides to decide on his arrest as well as to provide an answer to the requesting 
state. These violations would encompass aggravated circumstances if the accused person stays 
in his home country or, a fortiori, if he is a state official.  
                                                 
650 African Union Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes (13 July 2012), 
Article 4 (a).  
651 Cassese, above note 604, at 593 
652 Ibid. 
653 F. Lafontaine, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: the Realistic Utopia’, 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
(2012)1277-1302, at 1285. 
126 
2.1.1.2. The Subjection of State Officials to Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction  
It is a fact that the subjection of state’s own officials, former or incumbent, to the criminal 
jurisdiction of a foreign country, which has no traditional connection with the crime (place of 
commission, active or passive personality), is a source of contestations of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction. In this regard, international criminal law seems to evolve in a reverse 
motion to the classic principle which requires that a sovereign state cannot be subjected to the 
jurisdiction of another state for international crimes. The ICJ recalled this rule in the dispute 
which opposed Germany to Italy concerning alleged German crimes related to the Second 
World War between 1943 and 1945 for which civil suits seeking reparation for injuries 
suffered by victims were lodged with Italian courts.654 As already indicated, the state 
reluctance to this evolution is aggravated when state officials are prosecuted abroad while 
they reside in their home country. Many states perceive this as a serious danger to their 
sovereignty (a), especially in the African context (b).    
a) The Perception of a Serious Danger in the Relationship between Independent States 
Prosecuting former or incumbent state officials abroad, before foreign courts having no 
proximate connection with the crime, is a controversial issue. Most of the criticisms reflect 
the way international politics affect international criminal law and justice.655 In 1948, when 
the Genocide Convention was adopted, it was by far the main argument in support of the 
rejection of the principle of universal jurisdiction, because the majority of negotiating states 
were of the view that: 
 (…) universal repression was against the traditional principles of international law and that it 
would lead national courts to judge the acts of foreign Governments, as genocide generally 
involved the responsibility of the State on the territory of which the crime was committed. 
Universal repression might therefore create dangerous international tensions.656 
                                                 
654 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above note 260, paras.37, 107 and 139 (1). 
655 See Q. Trinh, H. Bannister and M. O’Brien, ‘The Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’, Research Paper of 
Mallesons Stephen Jaques (Humanitarian Law Perspectives and Australian Red Cross, 2010), at 11. See also M. 
Mutua, ‘From Nuremberg to the Rwanda Tribunal: Justice or Retribution?’, 6 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review  
(2000)77-91, at 79-82; R. Kolb, ‘Les influences du droit international pénal sur le droit international public’, 12 
Annuaire français de relations internationales (2011)149-169. 
656 United Nations, above note 334, at 33. 
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More interesting, during the discussion in the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, 
Egypt rejected the principle because “it would be very dangerous if statesmen could be tried 
by courts of a country with a political ideology different from that of their own country”.657 
The dangerousness perceived by Egypt related to the prevailing context of international 
relations at that time. The Cold War had just begun a year before in 1947,658 causing the 
division of the world into two major ideological blocs, the West and the East, headed 
respectively by the USA and the Soviet Union. In these circumstances, it seems that creating 
an international tribunal to try acts of genocide was perceived to be appropriate as it had 
appeared to be more compatible with the obligation to respect states’ sovereign equality. Even 
those hesitating countries which would have wished no conventional reference to such a 
tribunal were not opposed to the idea of an international criminal jurisdiction, but they 
indicated that “they were unable to vote for a provision which did not express a reality but 
only a hope”.659  
It is curious to observe that, while African countries which were still under colonial 
domination did not participate in the UN negotiations of the Genocide Convention, those 
states which had opposed the principle of universal jurisdiction at that time, particularly 
western countries, have become most motivated to exercise it. There is in fact a trend towards 
a “hegemonistic jurisdiction exercised mainly by western powers against persons from 
developing countries”,660 to which it is imposed a certain conception of democracy, justice 
and the rule of law.661  
Yet, the dangerousness of universal jurisdiction, as perceived in 1948, has not totally 
disappeared. To be true, the Cold War is over. But, the world remains legally, politically, 
economically, socially and culturally divided. The cliché between western countries, the Arab 
states, the rising powers (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and other states from 
the global south still persists. In this context, exercising universal jurisdiction over crimes 
                                                 
657 Thalmann, above note 617, at 235.  
658 See M. Gounelle, Relations internationales : mémentos (6th edn., Paris : Dalloz, 2004), at 15 ; P. M. Defarges, 
Relations internationales : questions mondiales (Paris : Seuil, 1994), at 13.  
659 United Nations, above note 334, at 41. See also Graefrath, above note 618, at 69. 
660 M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary 
Practice’, 42 Virginia Journal of International Law (2001) 81-162, at 155. 
661 See J. Verhoeven, ‘Vers un ordre répressif universel ? Quelques observations’, 45 Annuaire français de droit 
international (1999) 55-71, at 63. 
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allegedly committed by foreign state officials risks substituting “the tyranny of judges for that 
of governments”662 which may use the legitimacy of the law to deal with political enemies or 
conflicts.663 The exercise of universal jurisdiction in this context can create new frictions and 
disputes while it ironically aims to resolve past ones.664 In addition, it offers the opportunity to 
prosecuting states, with different cultural values or conflicting perception on the society 
where the alleged crimes have been committed or the state of nationality of the offender, to 
judicially write the history of foreign nations. If justice is politicised, fears of falsification of 
historical facts and errors of any kind cannot be totally excluded. 
Worse, there is a risk of selective justice. First of all, the forum state would be inclined to 
prosecuting foreign personalities and never its own officials (involved in the same situation) 
or those of friend states. For example, concerning the Spanish indictment of high-ranking 
Rwandan officials,665 notably for presumed crimes committed in relation to the circumstances 
of the genocide of 1994, nothing was initiated against the French officials who were 
themselves suspected by Rwanda of having been implicated in that criminal event. Likewise, 
in April 2000, when Belgium decided to indict the DRC’s Minister of foreign affairs, 
Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndomasi, it was questioned why the extermination of millions of 
Congolese in the territory under foreign occupation by Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda since 
August 1998 was of no concern to the Belgian authorities.666 All in all, this selectivity 
amounts to what Alan Morton Dershowitz has called “the hypocrisy of universal 
jurisdiction”,667 in reaction to the 2009 attempts to arrest and to prosecute Israeli officials in 
Great Britain.668 The declared aim would normally be to ensure justice, whereas indictments 
                                                 
662 H. A. Kissinger, ‘The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction’, Foreign Affairs (July-August 2001), 
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2001-07-01/pitfalls-universal-jurisdiction>, accessed on 5 June 2015. 
663 Ibid. See also Trinh, Bannister and O’Brien, above note 655, at 12. 
664 D. Morrison and J. R. Weiner, ‘Curbing the Manipulation of Universal Jurisdiction’, Jerusalem Center for 
Public Affairs (Jerusalem: 2010), at 6.   
665 See Commentator, ‘The Spanish Indictment of High-Ranking Rwandan Officials’, 6 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2008) 1003-1011. 
666 Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula, above note 629, para.82. 
667 A. M. Dershowitz, ‘The Hypocrisy of “Universal Jurisdiction”: Why Are Israel Officials Arrested While 
Hamas’ Leaders Are Honored?’, Frontpage Mag (6 Octobre 2009), <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/848/the-
hypocrisy-of-universal-jurisdiction> accessed 5 June 2015. 
668 Ibid. The authors writes :’ Last week, Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak -the former Dovish Prime 
Minister who offered the Palestinians a state on all of the Gaza Strip, 95% of the West Bank and a capital in East 
Jerusalem- was arrested when he set foot in Great Britain. (He was quickly released on grounds of diplomatic 
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might hide the intent to harass foreign leaders or governments. NGO are put into contribution, 
while the plaintiffs in the proceedings may even be opponents in exile in the forum state.669 
This criticism is thus radical owing to the African conception of state sovereignty.  
b) The Shield of the African Conception of Horizontal State Sovereignty   
Sovereignty is a concept which has a specific connotation for African states in their relation 
with the rest of the world, and particularly former European colonial powers. Rwanda is the 
leading country to have strongly relied on this conception when President Paul Kagame 
declared in May 2008:     
(…) lately, some in the more powerful parts of the world have given themselves the right to 
extend their national jurisdiction to indict weaker nations. This is total disregard of international 
justice and order. Where does this right come from? Would the reverse apply – such that a 
judgment from less powerful nations indicts those from the more powerful? 
This is mere arrogance which simply has to be resisted. (…) We envisage a world community in 
which sovereign nations govern themselves, and where the dignity of a nation’s inhabitants is 
paramount whether a country is powerful or not.670 
The AU-EU Expert Group on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction restated the same 
concern of the African side by indicating that “indictments issued by European states against 
officials of African states have the effect of subjecting the latter to the jurisdiction of 
European states, contrary to the sovereign equality and independence of states”671 and that 
“for African states, this evokes memories of colonialism”.672 These indictments would amount 
                                                                                                                                                        
immunity because he was an official visitor.) And now Moshe Yaalon, an Israeli government minister and 
former Army Chief of Staff, was forced to cancel a trip he was scheduled to make in London on behalf of a 
charity, for fear that he too would be arrested’.  
669 It was the case in the Belgian proceedings against the Congolese Minister of foreign affairs, Abdoulaye 
Yerodia Ndombasi. See Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula, above note 629, para.23.   
670 Republic of Rwanda, ‘Paul Kagame’s Remarks at the "Facing Tomorrow Conference”, Jerusalem (Israel), 13 
May 2008 
<http://presidency.gov.rw/index.php?id=23&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=10&cHash=950c52f08187b85fe4ab85
7981ca4b73> accessed 20 June 2016. 
671 African Union and European Union, ‘Report of the AU-EU Expert Group on the Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction’ (16 April 2009), 8672/1/09 REV 1, para.37. 
672 Ibid.  
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to an attempt to re-colonise Africa through the alibi of pursuing justice “under the guise of 
judicial independence and universal jurisdiction”.673  
Two concepts are aligned with the African discourse on state sovereignty: colonialism and 
neo-colonialism. They are conceived as forms of imperialism and must be understood in the 
light of their historical, ideological and political contexts of inception. As Kenneth Omeje has 
pointed out, the term imperialism involves “forms of subjugation (including the actual 
exercise of behavioural influence) of one people or a country by another”.674 It derives from 
the concept of empire. In his words, “empires (…) stem from significant power asymmetries 
among political units, and this inequality consequently enables the domination of, and control 
by one party, the strong (metropole or core), over the weak satellites (periphery)”.675 Against 
this backdrop, colonialism, which was preceded by ten centuries of slavery and slave trade 
against Africans (from the ninth to the nineteenth),676 was at the climax between the 
nineteenth and twentieth century. It is generally associated with the following topical 
issues677: the reliance on the instrumentality and arrogance of organised violence; the exercise 
of (colonial) sovereignty with impunity for crimes committed; the abuse of the law and 
sovereign authority for private ends; the exacerbation of racial and cultural discrimination 
between peoples; and the fiction of humanitarian compassion and benevolence in support of 
the ideology of civilising the colonised peoples.678 Neocolonialism is then invoked to mean “a 
new form of colonialism after the end of the original form”.679 According to Kwame 
N’krumah, the first President of the Republic of Ghana, it is indeed “the last stage of 
imperialism”.680 It encompasses different aspects of domination, of political, legal, economic 
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and socio-cultural nature.681 Neocolonialism is thus perceived as a way to perpetuate the 
colonial logic, to reinforce its legacy or the asymmetrical relationship between former 
colonial powers and newly (formally) independent states.682 In this regard, it is believed that 
“the imperialists have shifted their focus from direct to indirect rule”.683 
This nexus between sovereignty, colonialism and neo-colonialism has been stressed in various 
African legal instruments. For example, the Charter of the Union of African States, which is 
the first Pan-African intergovernmental organisation, founded by Ghana, Guinea (Conakry) 
and Mali in April 1961, assigned to the community the objective of consolidating the 
independence of member states and eliminating imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism 
from the continent.684 The OAU Charter of 25 May 1963 also aimed “to eradicate all forms of 
colonialism from Africa”.685 In addition, it proclaimed the determination of member states “to 
safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity (…), and to fight against neocolonialism in all its forms”.686 The AU 
recognises the significance of these objectives on the bases of which the Constitutive Act of 
11 July 2000 was adopted.687   
This nexus does not imply that African states view their sovereignty as absolute. Sovereignty 
is not and has never been a supreme power.688 Classically, international law tempers the 
exercise of sovereign rights in two manners. First, there is the notion of the limitation of state 
sovereignty. This notion applies when the state, keeping the entirety of its rights or powers, 
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loses the freedom to act as it desires because international law requires them to be exercised 
in a certain way.689 Second, there may be an abandonment of sovereignty in favour of a 
foreign state or the international community. There is an abandonment of sovereignty if the 
state, by virtue of a treaty, has conceded to any of the latter actors the power to exercise a part 
of its sovereign rights or powers in order to achieve common goods.690 In this case, the state 
becomes incompetent to act in favour of the jurisdiction of the external actor who has 
benefited from that concession of authority. Total abandonment of sovereignty is not 
conceivable, except in the context of the finalisation of a political process of community 
integration,691 since it amounts to the demise of the state entity. In line with this conception, 
the PCIJ declined to see in the conclusion by a state of any treaty an abandonment of its 
sovereignty.692 But, no doubt that it can limit its exercise.693 The issue is best illustrated 
through the conventionalisation of the principle of universal jurisdiction. There is not in it any 
abandonment of sovereignty, simply because of the consubstantiality of the notion with the 
theory of competing criminal jurisdictions. To be clear, at least in its multilateral dimension, 
the principle involves the idea of “shared sovereignty”,694 which is a specific restriction upon 
the exercise of sovereign powers, according to which each country keeps its right to 
contribute to the effective repression of international crimes committed abroad against aliens 
under the legal limits of the jurisdiction which is recognised to another state.  
Such a contribution might be unequal. The reason is that the corollary of state sovereignty, the 
principle of equality, is a fiction. In fact, states are unequal. This inequality in turn impacts on 
the exercise of their powers. As a consequence, powerful states would likely contribute more 
to law enforcement than weak countries. The exercise of universal jurisdiction obeys the same 
logic. It is a difficult mechanism to handle by weak countries owing to its heavy diplomatic 
                                                 
689 Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, above note 290, at 23. See also Combacau and Sur, above 
note 92, at 263; Ulimubenshi, above note 253, at 32. 
690 Kahombo, above note 190, at 109.  
691 This is the case of the African continent. See AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, Article 4 (d). 
It provides: ‘As part of the vision of building a strong and united Africa, State Parties undertake to establish an 
African Army at the final stage of the political and economic integration of the continent (…)’. 
692 SS Wimbledon (United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan v. Germany), Judgment of 27 August 1923, P.C.I.J., 
Series A. –No.1, at 25. 
693 Ibid. 
694 See S. D. Krasner, ‘Building Democracy after Conflict: the Case for Shared Sovereignty’, 16 (1) Journal of 
Democracy (2005) 69-83, at 70. 
133 
costs as well as the practical difficulties and financial implications to sustain prosecutions by 
a distant state. As a commentator has noted, “every legal system contains rules perpetuating 
actual inequalities, and the international legal system is no exception”.695 Therefore, the 
concern over the power of western states to prosecute African officials should not be 
overestimated. Theoretically, universal jurisdiction is even a reciprocal and shared 
prerogative. 
However, the matter remains one of serious concern at the political level. It looks as if 
African states would be palatable to limitations of their sovereignty or to its sharing with the 
international community, beginning by the regional community of states and peoples, rather 
than with non-African countries, in particular former colonial powers. In this regard, June 
Wanjiru Gichuki argues that “the fact that European countries used humanitarian grounds as a 
reason for colonising African states has made African states inherently wary of external 
allegations of munificence of humanitarian protection”.696 In the same vein, Jonathan 
Samkange suggests that “the exploitation and degradation that resulted from African societies 
losing sovereignty and control to a foreign colonial entity, has prompted post-colonial states 
in Africa to be fiercely attached to international rights, protections and recognition of that 
regained sovereignty”.697 There is a sense that the independence that they have fought for 
tends to be maliciously re-taken back through the means of legal devices. Yet, René-Jean 
Dupuy has warned that defending the primacy of international law should not let forget that 
sovereignty is a historic notion and that history cannot be overturned just through logical 
(legal) arguments.698 In the words of Charles C. Jalloh, “it is precisely the history of colonial 
domination between European and non-European states that makes it difficult, if not 
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impossible, for the former colonists to render credible justice in relation to African cases- or 
to be perceived as doing so”.699   
Thus, it is better to become proactive and think about the best way to regulate the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction in a manner that would reduce, if not eradicate, the risks of political 
tensions between states in different regions. There is a need to articulate legal requirements 
common to all states and to harmonise their legislation. In particular, proximate prosecutions 
should be given priority, while farther external judicial interventions may remain very 
exceptional. Otherwise, persistent contestations would render the principle of universal 
jurisdiction ineffective or, at least, inefficient. The specific context of the African objection 
against the European judicial activism and interventions in Africa is a striking illustration.         
2.1.2. The Contestation of the European Judicial Interventions in Africa    
The multiplication of indictments against African leaders in European states resulted in a 
dispute with African countries. Both regional organisations, the EU and the AU, also stepped 
into the matter. The dialogue between the two parties did not cool down the tension. It is to 
the United Nations and its bodies that the African side referred the issue, either in order to 
secure judicial decisions on the matter before the ICJ or to request the UN General Assembly 
to search to find a common understanding of the principle of universal jurisdiction which 
might be acceptable and applicable for all. This involvement of almost the entire international 
community in the matter evidences the gravity of the African contestation. At the basis of it, 
there is a sort of paradox opposing narratives of justice to those of impunity (2.1.2.1), while 
the African side persists that some European states have been guilty of a blatant abusive 
application of the principle of universal jurisdiction which deserves to be specifically assessed 
(2.1.2.2). 
2.1.2.1. The Paradox Characterising the Dispute 
After the endurance by Africa of the colonial time, which was initially justified by 
international law through the idea of civilising other nations,700 the European judicial 
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interventions in the continent appear as a repetition of the history. Again, unilateral 
interventions are based on the moral and humanitarian idea of justice for Africans, although 
the sores of slave trade and colonialism are not yet completely healed. These interventions 
also bear a paradox: the push for accountability through the indictments of African leaders in 
Europe (a) radically diverges from and may counter the culture of impunity of heinous crimes 
that offenders are said to enjoy within African countries (b).    
a) The Indictments of African Leaders in European States 
The increase in the number of indictments and prosecutions against Africans (in general) in 
Europe requires some preliminary observations (i), before invoking four main examples in 
order to highlight the scope of the matter, namely from France (ii), Belgium and Spain (iii) .  
i) The Preliminary Observations 
Before the end of the Cold War, cases brought before domestic courts on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction were very scarce. Until the case of Pinochet, the former Chilean 
President, whose extradition was requested by Spain to the United Kingdom for acts of torture 
in 1998, the reference to prosecutions under universal jurisdiction involved Nazi criminals. 
The outstanding example is the case of Adolph Eichmann, who was brought to trial under 
Israel’s Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law of 1950.701 He was convicted and sentenced by 
the District Court of Jerusalem to the death penalty for genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity 11 December 1961.702 Israel’s Supreme Court of Justice upheld his 
judgment on 29 May 1962.703 However, the practical revival of universal jurisdiction was a 
post Cold War event and coincided with the creation of ad hoc tribunals and the ICC. Since 
the 1990s, criminal proceedings have relatively increased up to several hundreds of cases in 
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Europe.704 The initial proceedings involving Africans related to the Rwandan genocide of 
1994. Belgium is the first European country to have dealt with the matter under its Law of 
1993. It organised the so-called Butare Four Case, in which the four accused persons 
(Vincent Ntezimana, Alphonse Higaniro, Consolata Mukangango and Julienne Mukabutera) 
were convicted on 8 June 2001 by the Cour d’assises de Bruxelles, and sentenced for war 
crimes perpetrated in the Rwandan prefecture of Butare.705 Other cases in the same situation 
were initiated in countries such as France, Germany and the Netherland.706 
All these proceedings relating to the Rwandan genocide did not provoke contestations from 
African states and the AU. It is also the case of the German prosecutions of crimes committed 
by the Rwandan rebellion, the Forces démocratique de liberation du Rwanda (FDLR), active 
in the Kivu provinces in the eastern part of the DRC. In particular, on 28 September 2015, the 
Higher Regional Court in Stuttgart (Oberlandsgericht Stuttgart) sentenced two political 
leaders of the FDLR, Ignace Murwanashyaka and Straton Musoni, who had their residence in 
Germany, respectively to thirteen and eight years of imprisonment. Ignace Murwanashyaka 
was convicted of aiding the commission of five war crimes while Straton Musoni was 
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sentenced for the leadership of a foreign terrorist group under the German Code of Crimes 
against International Law (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch) of 2002.707  
The main reason for the absence of contestation of the European proceedings, including the 
German prosecutions against the FDLR’s leadership, is double. First, it is apparent that these 
proceedings were either acquiesced or demanded by Rwanda, the state of nationality of the 
accused. In the same vein, the DRC’s government declared that it was satisfied with the 
punishment of the two leaders of the FDLR in Germany.708 Secondly, these proceedings 
resulted from a strong international demand. On the one hand, it is well known that the United 
Nations had several times and explicitly called for the prosecutions of crimes committed by 
armed groups in the DRC, in particular those perpetrated by the FDLR forces.709 On the other 
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hand, the ICTR which was created with primacy jurisdiction over national tribunals to try 
persons who bore the greatest responsibility for the Rwandan genocide could not prosecute all 
the offenders.  
Moreover, also supported by the OAU and the AU, the ICTR favoured some prosecutions by 
domestic courts on the basis of the principle of universal jurisdiction. In this regard, Harmen 
Van der Wilt writes: 
Has the ICTR officially endorsed these prosecutions on the basis of universal jurisdiction or 
even orchestrated them? In some cases - the Swiss prosecution of Fulgence Niyonteze and the 
Canadian case Mugesera - no interference on the part of the ICTR took place. In other cases - 
Augustin Ngirabatware in Germany and Laurent Bucyibaruta and Wenceslas Munyeshaka in 
France - the suspects were arrested pursuant to international arrest warrants issued by the 
ICTR. In the French cases, the suspects were originally supposed to be transferred to the ICTR 
in order to face criminal proceedings, but the Tribunal ultimately decided to transfer the cases 
to French courts. (…) Belgium had deferred proceedings against a number of suspects at the 
request of the ICTR, while it had pursued prosecution of several others. In the case of 
Mpambara, the ICTR Prosecutor officially notified the Dutch Prosecutor’s Office that he did 
not intend to prosecute Mpambara before the ICTR and that the ICTR would thus not exercise 
its primary rights.710  
It follows that the African contestations of indictments and prosecutions of African leaders in 
European countries would likely occur in two cases. First, constestations could be due to the 
accused’s capacity as incumbent state officials at the time of prosecutions. This also seems to 
be the basic AU understanding of the matter when it expressed, in July 2009, “its deep 
concern that indictments have continued to be issued in some European States against African 
leaders and personalities”.711 Second, contestations were possible because of the lack of 
support for those proceedings by the states of nationality of the indictees or when 
prosecutions were not strongly backed by the international community, including states and 
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intergovernmental organisations at the regional level. Four examples may illustrate these 
assertions. 
ii) The French Proceedings  
It is not true that the dispute between European and African states concerning the application 
of the principle of universal jurisdiction dates back to the protests by Rwanda against the 
indictment of its 40 statesmen in Spain in 2008.712 In fact, the very first indictment was 
initiated in France against the Mauritanian captain, Ely Ould Dah, member of the intelligence 
military service. While attending an internship in France, he was accused of having ordered or 
directly participated in acts of torture and barbarism between 1990 and 1991 in relation to a 
supposed coup d’état fomented by black officers of the national army.713 The French 
universal jurisdiction to try acts of torture was founded on the UN torture Convention, in spite 
of the Mauritanian Amnesty Law of 14 June 1993 which allegedly covered the crimes for 
which the accused was prosecuted.714 The main reason for ignoring this amnesty in the French 
proceedings was that it could not be opposed to France in a manner that the principle of 
universal competence became ineffective on the French territory.715 In a later procedure 
before the European Court of Human Rights, Ely Ould Dah raised the same issue of amnesty 
without success. The Court, having envisaged the relevance of an amnesty law only after trial 
and judgment, excluded it when it hindered the suspect from facing justice. In specie, the 
Court recalled that such amnesty was incompatible with the state obligation to investigate and 
prosecute the crime of torture and could not be opposed to a foreign country. The main 
paragraph of the Court’s decision reads as follows: 
It has to be said that in the present case the Mauritanian amnesty law was enacted not after the 
applicant had been tried and convicted, but specifically with a view to preventing him from 
being prosecuted. Admittedly, the possibility of a conflict arising between, on the one hand, the 
need to prosecute criminals and, on the other hand, a country’s determination to promote 
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reconciliation in society cannot, generally speaking, be ruled out. In any event, no 
reconciliation process of this type has been put in place in Mauritania. However, as the Court 
has already observed, the prohibition of torture occupies a prominent place in all international 
instruments relating to the protection of human rights and enshrines one of the basic values of 
democratic societies. The obligation to prosecute criminals should not therefore be undermined 
by granting impunity to the perpetrator in the form of an amnesty law that may be considered 
contrary to international law. In addition, the Court notes that international law does not 
preclude a person who has benefited from an amnesty before being tried in his or her 
originating State from being tried by another State, as can be seen for example from Article 17 
of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, which does not list this situation among the 
grounds for dismissing a case as inadmissible.716 
But, Mauritania considered the French proceedings as an affront to the Mauritanian people 
and took counter-measures. It expelled the French military aid workers and repatriated her 
trainees from France.717 In addition, the government re-established the visa service for any 
French citizen who would travel to Mauritania.718 Consequently, very quickly, the accused 
person, who was arrested on 2 July 1999, was released under conditions on 28 September 
1999, while the French government was suspected of having maneuvered so that he left the 
country and escaped justice on 5 April 2000.719 After all, the trial was held in absentia. The 
Cour d’assises de Nimes/Gard finally sentenced Ely Ould Dah to ten years of imprisonment 
on 1 July 2005.720 The judgment has never been executed and extradition is unexpected.721 
The same observation applies to the trial before the Strasbourg Cour d’assises du Bas-Rhin 
and the judgment in absentia for acts of torture of Khaled Ben Saïd, a senior police agent of 
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the Tunisian Ministry of interior affairs, who was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment on 
15 December 2008.722  
The second most striking example from France relates to the case of the Disparus du Beach 
de Brazzaville.723 Proceedings started on 5 December 2001 with a complaint submitted by the 
International Federation of Human Rights Leagues and others to the Public Prosecutor of the 
Paris Tribunal de grande instance against five incumbent officials of the Republic of 
Congo724: Sassou Nguesso (President of the Republic), General Pierre Oba (Minister of the 
interior affairs, public security and territorial administration), General Norbert Dabira 
(Inspector-General of the armed forces), General Blaise Adoua (Commander of the 
presidential military guards) and General Jean-François Ndengue (Head of the national 
police). They were accused of having committed acts of torture and forced disappearances as 
crimes against humanity in the course of repatriations of the Congolese refugees from the 
neighboring DRC, between April and June 1999, after the end of the civil war which began in 
the Republic of Congo in 1997.725 The United Nations denounced and took stock of some 353 
names of forced disappeared persons.726 It seems that they were selected among the returnees 
by the security services at their arrival at the Beach of Brazzaville, isolated, checked whether 
they were former rebels or not, before finally disappearing.727  
Oil was put on the fire when the French justice arrested General Norbert Dabira, who was 
found in his residence in France, on 23 May 2002, in order to interrogate him. His release and 
his failure to appear before the investigating judge for further interrogations caused the 
                                                 
722 International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, ‘L’affaire Khaled Ben Saïd: le premier procès en France 
d’un fonctionnaire tunisien accusé de torture’ (March 2009), at 63-65 
<https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/Bensaid512fr2008_FINAL.pdf> accessed 7 July 2016. 
723 See A. C. Makosso, E. Bosuku, O. Kande and E. Tambwe, L'affaire des disparus du Beach de Brazzaville : 
mises au point pour l'Histoire (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2007). 
724 International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, ‘République du Congo: affaire des "Disparus du Beach" 
de Brazzaville - Développements et enjeux des procédures en cours en France, en République du Congo et 
devant la Cour internationale de Justice: décembre 2001 - novembre 2007 (Novembre 2007), at 7 
<https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/GAJRepCongoBeach400fr2007.pdf> accessed 5 July 2016. 
725 Ibid., at 5-7. 
726 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances on its 
Mission to the Republic of the Congo (24 September –3 October 2011): Addendum’ (20 January 2012) 
A/HRC/19/58/Add.3, paras.75-80.  
727 Ibid., paras.69-74. 
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issuance against him of a French international arrest warrant on 15 January 2004.728 On his 
part, General Jean-François Ndengue was arrested in Paris and put in custody on 2 April 
2004.729 Before these incidents, during his state visit in France on 18 September 2002, 
President Sassou Nguesso had been requested by the investigating judge of the Tribunal de 
grande instance de Meaux, through a commission rogatoire (warrant), to bestow his written 
testimony on the case,730 but in vain. Given the strong opposition of the Republic of Congo to 
these proceedings, General Jean-François Ndengue was released, with again the orchestration 
of the French government at 2:00 p.m., in the night of 3 April 2004, and went back to 
Brazzaville.731 He was later acknowledged by the Versailles Court of Appeal enjoyment of 
immunities from the French jurisdiction on the ground that he was in a diplomatic visit in 
France.732          
Meanwhile, the Republic of Congo lodged an application with the ICJ in 2003 and argued that 
France had violated, besides the question of immunities, the principle of universal jurisdiction 
in the following terms: 
Violation of the principle that a State may not, in breach of the principle of sovereign equality 
among all Members of the United Nations, as laid down in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter 
of the United Nations, exercise its authority on the territory of another State, by unilaterally 
attributing to itself universal jurisdiction in criminal matters and by arrogating to itself the power 
to prosecute and try the Minister of the Interior of a foreign State for crimes allegedly committed 
in connection with the exercise of his powers for the maintenance of public order in his 
country.733 
This allegation was not examined on the merits as the Republic of Congo decided to withdraw 
its application instituting proceedings and obtained, given the absence of objection on the part 
                                                 
728 International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, above note 724, at 7. 
729 Ibid., at 8. 
730 Ibid., at 7 and 12. See also Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France), above 
note 597, at 5. 
731 International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, above note 724, at 13-14. 
732 Versailles, Chambre de l’instruction, 20 June 2007, Extrait des minutes du Greffe de la Cour d’appel de 
Versailles 2007, at 25 
<https://competenceuniverselle.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/arrt_de_la_cour_dappel_d.pdf> accessed 5 July 
2016. 
733 Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France), above note 597, at 7. 
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of France, the removal of the case from the list of the ICJ on 16 November 2010.734 But, 
attempts to make the national prosecutions cancelled have been several times rejected by the 
French justice.735 It is however difficult to predict if the failure of effective prosecutions in 
application of the principle of universal jurisdiction since 2001 would be overcome. Such a 
judicial failure can also be seen, even in a radical way, in regard to Belgium and Spanish 
proceedings with which much of the discourse on the African contestation of the abusive 
application of universal jurisdiction is connected. 
iii)  The Belgian and Spanish Proceedings    
Chronologically, the most contentious proceedings which followed the indictment of Captain 
Ely Ould Dah in France was the Belgium arrest warrant of 11 April 2000, delivered by the 
investigating judge of the Brussels Tribunal de grande instance against Abdoulaye Yerodia 
Ndombasi, for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The DRC’s Minister of foreign 
affairs was accused of having spread hatred messages and called for the extermination of 
Tutsi ethnic group, in the context of the war of aggression by Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda, 
backed by their Congolese rebel allies, to overthrow the Congolese government in August 
1998.736 It has to be noted that this proceeding followed the attempt to indict Laurent-Désiré 
Kabila, the DRC reigning President, during his state visit in France in November 1998.737 The 
Public Prosecutor of the Paris Tribunal de grande instance immediately relinquished the 
procedure on the basis of head of state’s immunity.738 However, the Congolese contestation 
                                                 
734 Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France), Order of 16 November 2010, 
I.C.J. Reports 2010, at 637. 
735 S. Abba, ‘« Disparus du Beach » de Brazzaville : les familles suspendues à la poursuite de l’instruction 
française’, Le Monde (17 May 2016) <http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/05/17/disparus-du-beach-de-
brazzaville-les-familles-suspendues-a-la-poursuite-de-l-instruction-francaise_4920787_3212.html> accessed 5 
July 2016 ; V. Rambolamanana, ‘République du Congo : un espoir en France pour les 353 "disparus du Beach"’ 
(13 June 2016), <http://www.justiceinfo.net/fr/crimes/27826-r%C3%A9publique-du-congo-un-espoir-en-france-
pour-les-353-disparus-du-beach.html> accessed 5 July 2016.  
736 In particular, the accused, Mr. Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, has allegedly called on ‘his brothers’ to ‘rise up 
as one to throw the common enemy out of the country’ using all possible weapons, and then to have said of the 
enemies that ‘they are scum, germs that must be methodically eradicated. We are determined to utilize the most 
effective remedy’. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), above 
note 569, at 5. 
737 International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, above note 713, at 30. 
738 Ibid.  
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against the Belgium proceeding led to the famous Arrest Warrant case before the ICJ, whose 
judgment terminated the dispute in 2002, even if the Court did not rule on the controversial 
question of universal jurisdiction because the applicant who invoked the issue abstained to 
conclude on it.  
The question of abusive application of universal jurisdiction reached a turning point when the 
investigating judge of the Spanish High Court739 (Audiencia Nacional),740 Fernando Andreu 
Merelles, indicted, on 6 February 2008, 40 Rwandan officials (all of them being high-ranking 
officers of the Rwandan national army) for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and terrorism, allegedly committed in Rwanda and the neighboring DRC during the war of 
aggression of 1996 and 1998, as well as their continuation until 2003.741 To compare with the 
Belgium proceedings, the Spanish indictment under the Organic Law on the Competence of 
the Courts of 1 July 1985 was like a judicial balance enabling to have, for the first time, 
foreign prosecutions of prominent suspects, Congolese and Rwandan, who had been involved 
in the DRC’s armed conflicts, documented even by the United Nations742, which caused the 
death of millions of people.743 The factual accusations were that the former rebels of the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) against the government of the then Rwandan President 
Juvenal Habyarimana, and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the new national army after 
genocide in 1994, “developed and implemented a criminal plan to eliminate the Hutu ethnic 
group and to take control over Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (‘DRC’) 
(then Zaire)”.744 In particular, according to an anonymous commentator for the Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, the indictment reportedly mentioned that:  
-the RPF invaded Rwanda in 1990 causing the death of countless Hutus; 
                                                 
739 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment 
of 19 December 2005, I.C.J. Reports 2005, at 168.  
740 Organic Law 6/1985 on the Competence of the Courts (1 July 1985), Article 65. 
741 Commentator, above note 665, at 1003-1004. 
742 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
1993–2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
between March 1993 and June 2003’ (August 2010), 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf> accessed 15 
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743 Ibid., para.15. 
744 Commentator, above note 665, at 1004. 
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-from 1990 to 1994, the RPF carried out a great number of military operations against civilians 
through the RPF’s regular army and the Directorate Military Intelligence, and created special 
death squads such as the ‘Network Commando’and the ‘Death Squads’; 
-the leaders of the RPF planned and executed the attack against the then Rwandan President 
Habyarimana, in order to trigger a civil war and to take control over Rwanda; 
-the RPF took control over Rwanda, generated a regime of terror and carried out mass killings, 
motivated by ethnic and/or political reasons; 
-together with other military-political groups, the RPF invaded the DRC twice and systematically 
exterminated an undetermined number of Rwandan refugees and members of the Congolese 
civilian population; and 
-the RPF created a criminal network of exploitation and pillage of the DRC’s mineral resources 
in order to finance its wars, maintain its geo-strategic power and control in the area and pursue 
and implement its plan of extermination and domination.745 
But, like his Congolese counterpart, late Laurent-Désiré Kabila, with respect to French 
tentative indictment of 1998, President Paul Kagame could not be prosecuted as an incumbent 
head of state because of his immunity from the Spanish domestic jurisdiction. Even though, 
the Rwandan protestation was strong after the arrest of the Chief Protocol of the Rwandan 
President, Rose Kabuye, in Frankfurt (Germany) where she arrived in a private visit (and thus 
no immunity)746 on 10 November 2008. It must be noted that the proceeding was initiated in 
Germany in execution of the French arrest warrant of 17 November 2006 against nine 
Rwandan senior military officers, allegedly involved in the shooting down of the aircraft of 
President Juvenal Habyarimana, killing him, the President of Burundi (Cyprien Ntaryamira), 
several ministers and high ranking military officers of both countries, as well as three French 
crew members (hence passive personality and not universal jurisdiction), on 6 April 1994. 
The arrest warrant was issued out of investigations of the French judge, Jean-Louis 
Bruguiere.747   
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The attack against the aircraft of President Juvenal Habyarimana is so important that it is 
considered to have been the trigger of the Rwandan genocide. But, surprisingly, it has not led 
to any successful prosecution up to now. Thus, extradited to France on 18 November 2008, 
Rose Kabuye was released a day later and allowed to move back to her country. Prior to her 
release, Rwanda had decided counter-measures and ceased diplomatic relations with France, a 
country that he accused of complicity in genocide in a counter-report of 15 November 
2007.748 Likewise, no one among the 40 indictees in the Spanish proceedings has been 
brought to justice more than eight years later. On 20 June 2015, General Karenzi Karake (the 
then head of the Rwandan intelligence services) was arrested in London (United Kingdom) on 
the demand of Spain, but he was quickly released after Rwanda reiterated his opposition to 
such prosecutions,749 with support from prominent British and American politicians.750 In this 
regard, the UK justice decided not to extradite General Karenzi Karake due to the lack of 
jurisdiction: there was no extradition offence because the relevant applicable laws751 did not 
arguably cover acts of non-UK nationals or residents abroad.752 On 24 September 2015, Spain 
                                                 
748 Republic of Rwanda, ‘Commission nationale indépendante chargée de rassembler les preuves montrant 
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also indicated that it relinquished the prosecutions, except if any of the 40 accused is found in 
Spain, and removed its arrest warrants previously issued against them.753     
These proceedings do not constitute the entire story of indictments of African leaders in 
Europe. There have been many other unsuccessful complaints for international crimes against 
notably Presidents Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe) in the UK, Laurent Gbagbo (Ivory Coast) and 
Ange-Felix Patasse (Central African Republic) in Belgium,754 President Obiang Nguema 
(Equatorial Guinea) and King Hassan II (Morocco) in Spain,755 as well as General Khaled 
Nezzar (Algeria) in France.756 While these indictments radicalised criticisms against the 
alleged abusive application by European states of the principle of universal jurisdiction, one 
may argue, on the contrary, that the multiplication of complaints and indictments against 
African leaders in Europe signaled that victims of egregious crimes needed justice that they 
were denied in Africa because of the culture of impunity that the suspects enjoy. 
b) The Impunity of African Leaders in the African Continent 
The scourge of impunity in African countries is viewed as an argument strengthening the 
legitimacy of the exercise by European states of universal jurisdiction over international 
crimes committed in Africa.757 But, there is no evidence of a total judicial inertia. A small 
experience to encourage does exist. This position can be verified by assessing the impact of 
European criminal proceedings on the struggle against impunity in African states (i), the poor 
performance of African domestic courts in the prosecutions of international crimes (ii) and the 
plausible causes of what appears to be a relative judicial inertia to deal with such crimes 
within the continent (iii).  
i) The Relative Positive Impact of European Proceedings in African States  
It could be expected that opposition to the indictments of African leaders in European states 
entails their systematic prosecutions by African states themselves. But, in general, the scourge 
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of impunity prevails. For example, no criminal case was initiated against Abdoulaye Yerodia 
Ndomasi in the DRC after the failure of the Belgium proceedings. Instead, he was designated, 
short after the delivery of the ICJ judgment in February 2002, vice-President of the country in 
2003.758 Exceptions to this observation are seldom to find. One may just recall the trial of the 
former Chadian head of state, Hissène Habré, in Senegal. In two other examples, European 
criminal proceedings have only had a very relative impact on African states on which lays the 
obligation to prosecute the alleged crimes in question.  
First, the French proceedings in the case of the Disparus du Beach de Brazzaville led the 
Republic of Congo to accelerate the prosecutions it had launched in August 2000 pursuant to 
the Law of 31 October 1998.759 Fifteen suspects charged with genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity were sent to the bench, of which three who were involved in the 
French proceedings (Generals Blaise Adoua, Norbert Dabira and Jean-François Ndengue).760 
However, neither any minister nor President Sassou Nguesso was indicted. Even the inquiry 
commission which the transitional parliament established in August 2001 with the mandate to 
clarify the issue of forced disappearances in the country since 1992 suspended its work before 
being abolished on 7 August 2002.761 Worse, President Sassou Nguesso declared that the 
national prosecutions were in fact initiated before the Brazzaville Court of Appeal in order to 
demonstrate that no massacre of Congolese returnees from refuge in the DRC had been 
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761 UN Human Rights Council, above note 726, para.81. 
149 
committed.762 The trial took place from 21 July to 17 August 2005. Consequently, without 
any surprise, the Court of Appeal acquitted all the accused.763 But, it recognised the 
occurrence of the alleged forced disappearances by ordering the Republic of Congo to pay 
compensations to victims. According to the Court, the state was responsible on the basis of a 
presumption of fault, even though no criminal offender could be identified among the 
indictees on the bench.764 The Court found that, at the time of repatriations, "the State ought 
to have ensured the scrupulous organisation of the general security measures justified by the 
state of war”.765 Its judgment was upheld by the Court of Cassation on 5 July 2007.766 
However, the trial was criticised for having been organised for the sole purpose of shielding 
those responsible from justice, and to impede the course of the French proceedings. The UN 
also highlighted the trial unfairness in the following terms:  
the accused appeared in liberty at the hearings, as they had not been served with arrest warrants 
by the Indictments Chamber. According to various sources, the atmosphere at the trial was 
extremely tense. Some of the civil parties, led by their counsel, disputed the independence of the 
judgement pronounced. The civil parties said that they had been intimidated many times by the 
presence of people with weapons in the courtroom. Some people said they had decided before 
the trial not to become civil parties to the case or to testify in the hearing for fear of reprisals. No 
measures were adopted to provide protection for the victims or witnesses, although the accused 
held senior positions in the various State security services.767 
Second, unlike Congo Brazzaville, Rwanda drew almost no judicial consequence from the 
Spanish proceedings. There is not a single case that has been opened in Rwanda in relation to 
the alleged crimes committed in the DRC. This confirms that when individuals are presumed 
to have perpetrated crimes with the support of their state, it is improbable that the latter 
endeavors to prosecute them. This lack of prosecutions in Rwanda even contravenes several 
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Security Council resolutions.768 In the same vein, the deadly attack on Juvenal Habyarima’s 
aircraft on 6 April 1994 remains unpunished. Rwanda opted for an offensive policy. It 
published a counter-report, named the Mutsinzi report, on 20 April 2009, in which it 
developed the theory, challenged by other experts,769 according to which this attack had not 
been committed by the RPF but by Juvenal Habyarimana’s own army (from the Hutu 
majority) to prevent any power sharing he had accepted with the Tutsi rebels as a result of the 
Arusha peace process.770 Such report and all other contradictory findings on this tragic event 
substantiate the de facto impunity, whoever may be responsible for the attack in question, 
                                                 
768 SC Res.1291 (2000), 24 February 2000, para.15; SC Res.1565 (2004), 1 October 2004, para.19. In paragraph 
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Habyarimana’s Dassault Falcon-50 Aircraft’ (20 April 2009), <http://mutsinzireport.com/wp-
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whereas the best way to end the polemic could be to submit the matter to an independent 
commission of inquiry and tribunal.  
The ICTR, which had jurisdiction to prosecute the crimes committed by all belligerent parties 
involved in the Rwandan genocide,771 failed to address the attack of 6 April 1994. The main 
reason is that Rwanda systematically opposed any inquiry of crimes that would potentially 
implicate the RPF. The first ICTR Prosecutor, Louise Arbur, left the matter in a shadow. The 
second, Carl Del Ponte, who came in office in August 1999, tried to activate the issue. But, 
due to pressure by Rwanda, she was taken away from the ICTR in 2003 at the end of her four 
year-term.772 It was decided that the ICTY Prosecutor should not any longer be in charge of 
the ICTR Prosecution Office. Yet, being aware of the risk of impunity, the Security Council 
precisely called upon states, through the resolution 1503 of 28 August 2003 relating to the 
ICTR completion strategy, “to intensify cooperation with and render all necessary assistance 
to the ICTR, including on investigations of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (…)”.773 But, this 
indication was not followed by effects during the first four year-term mandate (2003-2007) of 
Carl Del Ponte’s successor, Hassan Bubacar Jallow,774 appointed on 4 September 2003.775 
The ICTR arguably feared loss of cooperation if it had attempted to launch investigations and 
prosecutions without Rwanda’s support.776 It seems that there was also some partiality in the 
prosecutorial strategy, which permitted RPF members to avoid justice due to their 
consideration as the liberators from genocide.777 Finally, the new ICTR Prosecutor made it 
clear that Rwanda could deal itself with presumed crimes committed by its own officials, 
because he ought to complete his work with the tribunal, to select and concentrate on the most 
                                                 
771 ICTR Statute, Article 1. This Article states: ‘The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to 
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory 
of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring 
States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute’. 
772 See C. Onana, Les secrets de la justice internationale : enquêtes truquées sur le génocide rwandais (Paris : 
Editions Duboiris, 2005). 
773 SC Res.1503 (2003), 28 August 2003, para.3. 
774 He was appointed for the first time on 28 August 2003.  See SC Res.1503 (2003), 28 August 2003, para.3. 
775 SC Res.1505 (2003), 4 September 2003. 
776 Wilt, above note 710, at 1062.  
777 L. Reydams, ‘The ICTR Ten Years On: Back to the Nuremberg Paradigm’, 3 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2005) 977-988, at 986.  
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serious cases,778 as if those crimes potentially committed by RPF members were not so grave 
to deserve his attention. In consequence, on 4 June 2008, in the aftermath of the Spanish 
proceedings, he spoke to the Security Council and averted:  
In my last report to the Council I indicated that there had been some progress in the investigation 
of allegations against the members of the RPF. Rwanda has collaborated with us in this process 
as requested by the Council in its Resolution 1503 (2003). We have together been able to 
establish a prima facie case that on 5th June 1994 RPF soldiers killed some thirteen clergymen, 
including five Bishops and two other civilians at the Kabgayi Parish in Gitarama. Some of the 
perpetrators of this crime are reported to have died whilst others are now serving within the 
Rwanda Army. Following inquiries the Rwanda Prosecutor General has communicated to me his 
decision to shortly indict and prosecute four serving senior military officers of the Rwandan 
Army with murder and complicity to murder as war crimes in connection with this incident. 
Rwanda as you know shares concurrent jurisdiction with the ICTR over such offences. I have 
decided to hold in abeyance further action on my part on the clear understanding that any such 
prosecutions in and by Rwanda should be effective, expeditious, fair and open to the public. My 
office will also monitor these proceedings.
779
 
This ICTR-Rwanda perspective has never gone farther. As in many other African countries, 
the culture of impunity prevails. The prosecution of African leaders for international crimes is 
still poor and very exceptional. 
ii) The Poor Performance of African Domestic Courts  
There are not a lot of examples of African leaders, in particular heads of states and 
governmental ministers in power, who have been effectively prosecuted and tried by domestic 
courts in the state of their nationality or of the commission of international crimes. This 
observation is not however specific to Africa. Even in Europe, examples are hard to find. Yet, 
there are situations in which European leaders might also have faced their own national 
justice for crimes allegedly committed in foreign countries (Iraq, Ivory Coast, Libya, 
Afghanistan, etc.). The main difference with African leaders is that the latter commit crimes 
against their own peoples. This makes a commentator say that “many of the practices from the 
                                                 
778 H.B. Jalloh, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion and International Criminal Justice’, 3 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2005) 145-161, at 150.  
779 ICTR, ‘Statement by Justice Hassan B. Jallow Prosecutor of the ICTR, to the UN Security Council’ (4 June 
2008) < http://ictr-archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLISH/speeches/jallow080604.html>  accessed 23 May 
2016. 
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colonial period reappeared”780 and “the rule of law (expected) changed to the rule of force”781 
in numerous African states after accession to independence. But, a crime is a crime, regardless 
of the nationality of victims and perpetrators. It becomes hypocrisy when European states, 
particularly those which have initiated criminal proceedings against African leaders, push for 
accountability for international crimes in Africa, whereas their own presumed criminals 
benefit from a de facto impunity. This differentiation seems to reflect the perpetuation of the 
past cliché of civilised and uncivilised nations, and thus weakens the ideals of international 
justice that should be rather sought in equality of all the suspects and nations. The poor 
performance of African domestic courts in the fight against impunity can be illustrated by the 
limits of the exercise of jurisdiction by states over crimes committed on their territories (1°) 
and the relative default of other countries to resort to the principle of universal jurisdiction 
(2°). 
1°) The Limits of the Exercise of Territorial Jurisdiction  
A survey of the judicial situation in Africa shows that there are not many cases of 
prosecutions of African leaders before domestic courts of the states on the territory of which 
crimes are committed. In addition, problems of the quality of the work which is done sensibly 
reduce the merits of the small number of cases which does exist. This statement relies on three 
main examples. 
The first one comes from Equatorial Guinea, which gained its independence from Spain on 12 
October 1968. From that year, it had been ruled by Francisco Macias Nguema. His regime 
turned into a brutal dictatorship, characterised by the systematic oppression and elimination of 
his political opponents, murders, arbitrary detention, corruption, embezzlement of public 
funds, etc. Under the Constitution of 29 July 1973, which repealed the one of 1968, Francisco 
Macias Nguema acquired absolute political powers, including presidency for life. On 3 
August 1979, he was overthrown out of a military coup by his own nephew, the then 
becoming President Teodore Obiang Nguema. On 5 September 1979, the new government 
decided to convene a special military tribunal to try the deposed dictator, as well as ten of his 
                                                 
780 L. Wohlgemuth and E. Sall, ‘Introduction’, in L. Wohlgemuth and E. Sall (eds), Human Rights, Regionalism 
and the Dilemmas of Democracy in Africa (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2006) 1-18, at 4.  
781 Ibid. The brackets are mine. 
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close collaborators.782 The trial began on 24 September 1979.  Francisco Macias Nguema and 
his collaborators were charged with several crimes, particularly genocide, committed between 
5 May 1969 and 18 August 1979.783 This was the second time that genocide was tried by a 
national jurisdiction after the Israel experience of the Eichmann case in 1962. But, the law 
missed several aspects. On the one hand, the charges were mainly based on the Genocide 
Convention, which had never been ratified by Equatorial Guinea, and the Spanish Penal Code 
of 1971,784 which was not applicable to the country.785 In fact, the Constitution of 1968 
provided that the Spanish legislation remained in force after independence until abrogated or 
modified by the competent Guinean authority.786 It was repealed in its entirety by the 
Constitution of 1973.787 On the other hand, the Genocide Convention could not allow 
prosecution for genocide of members of political groups. It only envisages three categories of 
protected groups: national, ethnic, racial and religious groups. But, despite these flaws, which 
were not addressed by the tribunal,788 Francisco Macias Nguema was convicted, sentenced to 
the death penalty. Unfortunately, he had no right to appeal and he was executed the same day 
of his conviction on 29 October 1979. 
The second example is the trial of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia, a country he 
has ruled between 1974 and 1991. He staged a military coup against the last Ethiopian 
emperor, Haile Selasie, before being himself ousted from power by rebels on 28 May 1991. 
He fled to Kenya and subsequently went in exile to Zimbabwe. Mengistu’s pro Marxist-
Leninist reign was marked by political terror and oppression of anybody who tried to oppose 
his dictatorship. The Special Prosecutor who was mandated to investigate his atrocities listed 
                                                 
782 A. Artucio, ‘The Trial of Macias in Equatorial Guinea: the Story of a Dictatorship’, International Commission 
of Jurists (Geneva: 1979), at 21.  
783 Ibid., at 27. 
784 It is the Law No. 44/1971 of 15 November 1971 which added Article 137bis to the Spanish Penal Code, 
implementating the genocide Convention of 1948, ratified by Spain on 13 September 1968. But, this Article 
includes “social groups’ in addition to those which are mentioned under Article II of the genocide Convention. 
See J. Quigley, The Genocide Convention: an International Law Analysis (Hampshire/Burlington: Ashgate, 
2006), at 17.    
785 Artucio, above note 782, at 28-29. 
786 Ibid. 
787 Ibid. 
788 Quigley, above note 784, at 32. 
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12.315 individuals who were killed and 2.681 victims of torture.789 Charges were filed against 
5.119 suspects pursuant to the Ethiopian Penal Code of 1957. But, the most important trial 
related to the case of Special Prosecutor v. Mengistu Haile Mariam and others before the 
Federal High Court in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia).790 The former head of state and twenty-four of 
his co-accused were prosecuted in absentia for genocide, crimes against humanity and willful 
bodily injury, and convicted at the first degree on 12 December 2006.791 The final judgment 
was issued by the Federal Supreme Court in 2008, whereby Mengistu Haile Mariam was 
sentenced to the death penalty.792 Unlike the trial of Francisco Macias Nguema, the Ethiopian 
courts established the crime of genocide against political groups under a sound national legal 
basis, namely article 281 of the Ethiopian Penal Code of 1957.793 This expansion of the list of 
protected groups against genocide, in comparison to the Genocide Convention, was renewed 
in the more progressive Ethiopian Penal Code of 2004.794 But, among other limits, the 
Ethiopian prosecutions were one-side oriented. While crimes were committed by all parties to 
the civil war, none of the former rebel combatants was brought to justice and victims were not 
                                                 
789 F. K. Tiba, ‘The Trial of Mengistu and Other Derg Members for Genocide, Torture and Summary Executions 
in Ethiopia’, in C. Murungu and J. Biegon (eds), Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa (Pretoria: Pretoria 
University Press, 2011) 163-184, at 165. 
790 See F.K. Tiba, ‘The Mengistu Genocide Trial in Ethiopia’, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007) 
513-528.  
791 Ibid., at 514. 
792 Tiba, above note 769, at 171. 
793 This Article reads : ‘Whosoever, with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, religious 
or political group, organizes, orders or engaged in, be it in time of war or in time of peace: (a) Killings, bodily 
harm or serious injury to the physical or mental health of members of the group, in any way whatsoever; or (b) 
measures to prevent the propagation or continued survival of its members or their progeny; or (c) the compulsory 
movement or dispersion of peoples or children, or their placing under living conditions calculated to result in 
their death or disappearance, is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from five years to life, or, in cases of 
exceptional gravity, with death’. Emphasis is mine.  
794Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Proclamation No.414/2004). Under Article 
269, this Code states: ‘Whoever, in time of war or in time of peace, with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
nation, nationality, ethnical, racial, national, colour, religious or political group, organizes, orders or engages 
in: (a) killing, bodily harm or serious injury to the physical or mental health of members of the group, in any way 
whatsoever or causing them to disappear; or (b) measures to prevent the propagation or continued survival of its 
members or their progeny; or (c) the compulsory movement or dispersion of peoples or children or their placing 
under living conditions calculated to result in their death or disappearance, is punishable with rigorous 
imprisonment from five years to twenty five years, or, in more serious cases, with life imprisonment or death’. 
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granted reparations by the court. Anyway, the prominent convicted leader, Mengistu Haile 
Mariam, is still at large enjoying his safe haven in Zimbabwe.  
The third example comes from the DRC, which is the first African country to have organised 
trials on the basis of the direct application of the ICC Statute in 2004. Three observations 
must be noted in relation to this experience. Primo, the period of time of the perpetration of 
atrocities brought before the Congolese justice is very restricted. All the cases relate to crimes 
which have been committed in the country from 2002 and beyond. The initial judgment was 
delivered by the Military Court of Appeal of Katanga (South-East of the DRC) on crimes 
against humanity.795 The case involved incidents which occurred in the area of Ankoro 
(North-East of Katanga) between the national army and several militias groups in November 
2002. Previous atrocities in the context of the DRC’s armed conflicts have not attracted the 
eyes of the Congolese justice. These atrocities are comprised of three distinct periods, namely 
the interethnic armed conflicts in the North and South Kivu provinces (1993-1996), the first 
war of aggression and rebellion which overthrew President Mobutu’s government and 
dismantled the Rwandan refugees’ camps in the east of the country (1996-1997), as well as 
the second war of aggression and rebellions against President Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s regime 
(1998-2003).796 De facto, the vast majority of those serious criminal incidents listed by the 
UN Mapping Report of 2010, covering a ten-year period of atrocities (1993-2003), remain 
unpunished.797 Secundo, the offenders that are targeted by the Congolese justice are small 
fishes,798 among which there is not a single foreigner who resides abroad. The only prominent 
high ranking military officer to have been prosecuted by the Military High Court at the first 
and last degree (no appeal) is General Jerome Kakwavu. He was convicted of war crimes 
committed in the Ituri region (North-East of the DRC) between 2003 and 2005 and sentenced 
to ten years of imprisonment for his individual and command responsibility.799 The UN seems 
to have positively welcomed this conviction even if it deplored the light sentence handed 
                                                 
795 Public Prosecutor and 54 Civil Parties v. Émile Tabwangu Kayembe and 29 Others, Judgment of 20 
December 2004, Military Court of Appeal of Katanga Province, RP 01/2003 (unpublished). 
796 B. Kahombo, L’Afrique des grands lacs: la paix recherchée dans l’incohérence de l’action de la communauté 
internationale (Saarbrücken : Editions universitaires européennes, 2015), at 49-50.  
797 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, above note 742. 
798 Kahombo, above note 796, at 11. 
799 Public Prosecutor and Civil Parties v. Kakwavu, Judgment of 7 November 2014, Military High Court, RPN 
n° 004/2010 (unpublished). 
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down by the Court and the lack of the right to appeal against the judgment.800 But, it does not 
appear that the Kakwavu case is indeed an outstanding example regarding the duty to fight the 
impunity of the most powerful criminals at the command level. In fact, General Jerome 
Kakwavu, a former militiaman, integrated the national army with his soldiers out of a peace 
process which was supported by the Congolese government in 2003. He was already a much 
weakened man at the time of his arrest in 2010, deprived of his military capabilities and 
having no interior support from the national political system. Tertio, the quality of judgments 
of the Congolese justice are prey to a lot of criticisms.801 Except in one case, in which a lower 
civil tribunal sat to try genocide without possessing any substantive competence,802 these 
judgments were issued by military courts which had exclusive jurisdiction over international 
crimes, pursuant to the Law n° 024/2002 of 12 November 2002 laying down the Military 
Criminal Code,803 before the reform of 2013804 and the adoption of the legislation 
                                                 
800 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (30 December 2014) S/2014/956, para.11.  
801 See M. Wetsh’okonda, La République démocratique du Congo.  La justice militaire et le respect des droits de 
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relation to the political support provided by this group to President Joseph Kabila during the 2011 electoral 
process. It means that the murder was basically motivated by political reasons rather than religious ones. At that 
time, the Court could uphold genocide committed against a political group under the Military Criminal Code 
(Article 164) which was still in force. But, it preferred to directly apply the Rome Statute (rule of primacy of 
treaties over national laws), which does not include genocide against political groups.      
803 Article 161. 
804 Organic Law No.13/011-B of11 April 2013 Laying down the Organization, the Functioning and the 
Competences Courts of the Judicial Order. Article 91 attributes jurisdiction over international crimes (genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity) to (civil) Court of Appeal, except for presumed offenders who do not 
fall under its jurisdiction ratione personae.  
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implementing the ICC Statute in 2015.805 In this regard, the UN Mapping Report summarised 
the main criticisms against the performance of the Congolese military courts as follows: 
It is undeniable that some Judges of the Congolese military justice system, inspired by the 
DRC’s ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC in 2002 and supported by the international 
community, rendered a small number of courageous decisions in relation to crimes under 
international law. Although they braved physical and psychological barriers as well as apparent 
political pressure to do so, all the cases studied nonetheless illustrate the significant operational 
limitations of the military justice system. Botched and dubious investigations, poorly drafted or 
inadequately substantiated court documents, irrational decisions, violations of due process and 
various instances of interference by the civilian and military authorities in the judicial process, 
are apparent defects that characterised some of these cases (…).806 
These examples of poor justice in quality (in terms of law application and due process 
standards) and in number (not a lot of cases across the continent) are maybe more tolerable 
than nothing, as they seem to be well connected with concrete situations of brutality and 
atrocities. In other states, domestic courts stand in a worrying inertia. The principle of 
universal jurisdiction, which is available under national laws, remains largely unapplied, 
ineffective.   
2°) The Relative Default of the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction  
Unlike European states, African countries have very little experience in the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction over international crimes. This observation is not due to the lack of 
legislation covering the matter. On the contrary, many African states possess universal 
jurisdiction laws. This has been widely recognised by the EU-AU Expert Group in its report 
of 2009.807 On his side, T. Ondo has tried to depict some characteristics of national legislation 
on universal jurisdiction in Africa.808 He has observed that, before even the European-African 
controversy over universal jurisdiction, several African countries had acknowledged the 
                                                 
805 See Law No.15/022 of 31 December 2015 Modifying and Complementing the Decree of 30 January 1940 
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principle of universal jurisdiction. The best example is the Ethiopian Penal Code of 1957 
which provides for universal jurisdiction over “offenses committed in a foreign country 
against international law or universal order”,809 including genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes.810 This jurisdictional power was renewed in similar terms in the Penal Code 
of 2004.811 But, Ondo’s observation applies much to (Anglophone) countries rather than 
(francophone) states.812 For example, Kenya,813 Nigeria,814 Uganda815 and Zimbabwe816 
adopted laws providing for universal jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.817 These laws were colonial acts and re-promulgated after 
independence.818 In the meanwhile, some states expanded their laws on universal jurisdiction 
to organised crimes and even domestic offenses of some seriousness. The best illustrations in 
this regard are the Ghanaian Courts Act 459 of 1993819 and the DRC’s Penal Code of 1940.820 
Since 2002, despite the aforementioned European-African controversy, the practice on 
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810 Articles 281-284. 
811 Article 17. 
812 Ondo, above note 808, at 77. 
813 Geneva Conventions Act (1968), Section 3 (1) and (2). 
814 Geneva Conventions Act (1960), Section 3 (1) and (2). 
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816 Geneva Conventions Act (1981), Section 3 (1) and (3). 
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hijacking;  (i) unlawful traffic in narcotics;  (j) attacks on any international communications system, canal or 
submarine cable;  (k) unauthorised disclosure of an official secret of the Republic;  (l) an offence by or against a 
person in the employment of the Republic or a statutory corporation while acting in the course of the duties of 
such employment;  (m) traffic in obscene publications; and  (n) any other offence which is authorised or required 
by a convention or treaty to which the Republic is a signatory to be prosecuted and punished in Ghana wherever 
the offence was committed’. 
820 Article 3. Among other conditions, the offense to prosecute under universal jurisdiction should be one which 
is punishable of at least more than two months of imprisonment.  
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universal jurisdiction has continued to flourish. The main reason pertains to the adoption by a 
number of states of the legislation implementing the ICC Statute. This is notably the case of 
South Africa,821 Uganda,822 Burundi823 and Senegal.824 Outside the ICC framework, the 
principle of universal jurisdiction is still recognised, sometimes in application of various 
international treaties on human rights. For example, South Africa applies it over terrorism.825 
The principle is also known by states not parties to the ICC Statute. The most striking 
example is Rwanda, the leading state in the African contestations of European indictments 
against African leaders, which establishes it over various international, cross-border and 
domestic crimes.826 A part from the African Anglophone legislation, adopted before 2002, 
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822 International Criminal Court Act (2010), Section 18. 
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to the Code of Criminal Procedure (24 May 2013), Article 209. In particular, Article 16 of the Rwanda Penal 
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Rwandan laws as if any of the following crimes had been committed in Rwanda : 1° terrorism; 2° hostage-
taking;  3° piracy; 4° drug trafficking;  5° illicit manufacturing and trafficking in arms; 6° money laundering; 7° 
cross-border theft of vehicles with the intent of selling them abroad; 8° information and communication 
technology related offences; 9° trafficking in human beings especially children; 10° slavery and torture; 11° 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; 12° genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; 13° genocide 
denial or revisionism; 14° encouraging, mobilizing, assisting, facilitating or participating in any other manner, 
whether directly or indirectly, in the commission of any of the offences specified in this Article or any other 
related offences’.   
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notably the ones relating to the repression of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949, the presence of the accused in the territory of the prosecuting state is expressly required. 
In any case, given the discrepancy of domestic laws in Africa, the UA has proposed a 
framework for their harmonisation through the Model National Law on Universal 
Jurisdiction, adopted in 2012, which covers genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
piracy, trafficking in drugs and terrorism.827 
In practice, these legislative achievements remain largely unapplied. It appears that at least 
two countries have meaningful experience in prosecutions and trials on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction, namely Senegal and South Africa. Some two cases which were brought before 
courts in each of both countries can be highlighted.  
Concerning Senegal, the first experience is that of the now well-known trail of Hissène Habré 
in 2000. The second experience relates to the Paul Milambwe case, which was triggered by a 
private complaint of 2 June 2014 for acts of torture before the investigating judge of the 
Dakar Tribunal de grande instance.828 Paul Milambwe was a senior officer of the DRC’s 
national police, who fled the country after the assassination of Floribert Chibeya, a human 
rights activist, and the forced disappearance of his collaborator, Fidèle Bazana, on 2 June 
2010. The tragic event occurred within the premises of the headquarters of the national police 
in Kinshasa where both victims sought to honor an appointment on the invitation of General 
John Numbi, the head of the police at that time. Major Paul Milambwe was the officer in 
charge of the security of John Numbi’s office. He escaped the Congolese justice and found 
exile in Dakar, whereas his presumed co-authors were convicted of assassination, abduction 
and arbitrary detention by the Military Court of Appeal of Kinshasa/Gombe (first degree)829 
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and the High Military Court (on appeal),830 respectively on 23 June 2011 and 17 September 
2015. However, the trial was severely criticised by human rights organisations as a parody of 
justice, acquitting some of the principal suspects and sentencing lightly those convicted, while 
General John Numbi, who was removed from power under pressure after the assassination, 
remained free and enjoyed impunity.831 The Paul Milambwe case is still pending in Dakar. 
The suspect was officially indicted for acts of torture and assassination on 15 January 2015.832          
In South Africa, the first experience to mention is the so-called Zimbabwe Torture Case. In 
fact, the Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC), an organisation promoting human rights 
in the southern African region, suspected seventeen (17) Zimbabwean state officials to have 
committed acts of torture in connection with a raid on opposition headquarters in Zimbabwe 
in March 2007. It lodged a complaint with the South African Police Services (SAPS) and 
South Africa’s National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) in order to have the issue investigated 
and the acts of torture prosecuted as crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute 
Implementation Act 27 of 2002.833 The second experience relates to the so-called Okah case 
in which the South African High Court in Johannesburg issued its judgment on 21 January 
2013.834 In this case, Henry Emomotimi Okah, a Nigerian citizen, was suspected of being 
involved in the planning and the organisation of terrorist attacks in Warri and Abuja (Nigeria), 
on 15 March 2010 and 1 October 2010 respectively, which caused the death of ten persons 
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and seriously injured 64 people.835 He was arrested in Johannesburg on 10 September 2010 
and prosecuted in accordance with the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against 
Terrorist and Related Activities Act of 2004.  
In this case, the decision on jurisdiction was quite easy to establish as the accused, finally 
convicted of terrorism, resided with his family in South Africa.836 However, in the Zimbabwe 
Torture Case, the SAPS and NPA refused to investigate the matter on the ground that, among 
other reasons, there was no jurisdiction to investigate because the suspects were neither 
present nor resident in South Africa.837 The SALC challenged this decision before the High 
Court in Pretoria, which found that there was a duty to investigate under the Implementation 
of the Rome Statute Act and pursuant to South African international law obligations.838 The 
position was upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeal; what led the NPA to raise the issue 
before the Constitutional Court of South Africa.839 In its order of 30 October 2014, the latter 
Court espoused the position of the Supreme Court of Appeal.840 It clarified that the territorial 
presence or residence in South Africa was a requirement for the exercise of enforcement 
jurisdiction “in relation to prosecutions and not investigations”.841 According to the 
Constitutional Court, the initiation of such investigations only depends on the balance of 
certain factors in order to determine their practicability and reasonableness.842 These factors 
may include considerations of resource allocation, the possibility to gather evidence, the 
anticipated presence of a suspect in South Africa and the principle of subsidiarity (which 
requires that primacy of action is left to a foreign state having a proximate connection with 
the crime if it is able and willing to investigate it).843  
In any case, all these examples contrast with many other criminal situations which happen in 
Africa for which nobody is successfully brought to justice. One must now try to identify the 
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843 Ibid., paras.78, 79 and 81 
164 
reasons which favour this relative judicial inertia to prosecute and try perpetrators of 
international crimes in Africa.    
iii) The Causes of the Judicial Inertia of African States 
One of the prominent examples of impunity of African leaders for international crimes comes 
from Uganda. In this country, the former head of state and late dictator, Idi Amin Dada, who 
stood in power from 25 January 1971 to 11 April 1979, is said to have murdered more than 
100,000 peoples.844 Other dictators such as Mengistu Haile Mariam and Hissène Habré did 
less than that. But, Idi Amin Dada did not answer his crimes in Uganda. He was removed 
from power by a Tanzanian-backed rebellion and died in exile in Saudi Arabia on 16 August 
2003. The same impunity is seen in respect of crimes allegedly committed by Ugandan 
statesmen under President Yoweri Museveni (in power since 1986) in the DRC during the 
wars of aggressions of 1996 and particularly 1998, despite the acknowledgement of these 
crimes by the ICJ in its judgment of 19 December 2005845 and the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.846 In both situations, the Ugandan Geneva Conventions Act 
(1964) remained unapplied and ineffective. This almost decorative legislation was 
complemented by the Ugandan ICC Act of 2010. 
Likewise, in Central African Republic (CAR), two former dictators and heads of state, Ange 
Felix Patassé (1993-2003) and François Bozizé (2003-2013), played a crucial role in 
permanent crises affecting this country since the 1990s. But, none of them has been brought to 
justice. Ange Felix Patassé died in Douala (Cameroon) on 5 April 2011, while being accused 
of numerous crimes, particularly those committed during the civil war which took place 
between 2002 and 2003, at the end of which François Bozizé came to power. The arrest 
warrant which was delivered against him, on 22 August 2003, by the investigating judge of 
the Tribunal de grande instance of Bangui, Oradino Pamphile, was executed neither by 
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Cameroon nor Togo, the first country of his exile.847 Moreover, the prosecutions were based 
on ordinary offenses under the Criminal Code of 1962, which did not contain provisions on 
international crimes.848 On his part, François Bozizé enjoys the same impunity in his refuge in 
Cameroon after being overthrown by rebels, named the Seleka, backed by Chad, in March 
2013. The Central African justice has accused him of 22 murders and 119 summary 
executions, 53 abductions and arbitrary detentions as well as the destruction of nearly 4,000 
homes.849 The arrest warrant of 30 May 2013 which was issued against him for crimes against 
humanity and incitement to commit genocide850 under the new Penal Code of 10 January 
2010851 remains a dead letter. While the territorial state fails to prosecute, it is understandable 
that other African countries do not exercise universal jurisdiction.   
To sum up, the relative inertia of African domestic courts in the prosecution of international 
crimes could have several different explanations. First of all, it is submitted that impunity 
seems to prevail owing to six interconnected facts, namely if: i) those persons to be 
prosecuted are the same to be in power; ii) the potential suspects benefit from the support of 
the authorities in power; iii) the leaders in power are reluctant to prosecutions as they might 
fear themselves the disclosure of unknown facts which may elucidate their own crimes before 
the public opinion; iv) the refusal of judicial cooperation by foreign states; v) the problem of 
immunities of states’ officials; vi) the denial by different governments of the independence of 
the judiciary. As President Yuweri Museveni said, judges should “settle chicken and goat 
theft cases but not (…) determine the country’s destiny”.852 Beyond this dictatorship over the 
judiciary, judges and prosecutors may also fear for their personal physical security as they 
would deal with crimes of prominent offenders who possess influential means and ties of 
                                                 
847 International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, ‘Rapport de mission internationale d’enquête en 
République centrafricaine -Oubliées, stigmatisées : la double peine des victimes de crimes internationaux’ 
(October 2006), at 34-35 <https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/RCA457-2006.pdf> accessed 21 July 2016. 
848 Ibid., at 32-33. 
849 C. Bensimon, ‘RCA: François Bozizé visé par un mandat d'arrêt international’, Radio France Internationale 
(1 June 2013) <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130601-rca-bozize-mandat-arret-international-bangui> accessed 19 
July 2016.  
850 Ibid. 
851 Law No.10.001 Laying down the Central African Penal Code (6 January 2010). Title IV of this Code is 
entirely devoted to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (Articles 152-161). 
852 Hansungule, above note 844, at 55. 
166 
nuisance all over their countries.853 Basically, this is a problem of political will. Secondly, 
national courts may be limited in the exercise of their functions, not only because of 
insufficient or poorly qualified human resources and legal deficiency in domestic orders, but 
also and chiefly owing to the lack of materials and financial means necessary to deliver 
credible justice. This limitation can be explained by the situation of under-development and 
the fragility of states emerging from armed conflicts or political instability. A fortiori, a state 
could not be capable to administrate justice in extraterritorial cases when it is unable to do so 
for crimes committed on its territory or by its citizens.  
Thus, in the case of Ange Félix Patassé, Jean-Pierre Bemba and others, the CAR’s Court of 
Cassation issued the judgment of 11 April 2006 in which it confirmed the doubtless 
incapacity of the country’s judicial services to conduct criminal investigations or prosecutions 
against the accused.854 But, it did not provide sufficient details on the constituent elements of 
this incapacity. The judgment only acknowledged that the judicial services were powerless 
enough to exercise with efficacy jurisdiction over persons who were all outside the CAR’s 
territory.855 But, one could also explain this extraterritorial obstacle by the lack of 
equipment/financial means and the default of cooperation of third states where the suspects 
had found refuge or resided as citizens (Cameroon, DRC, France, Sudan and Togo). 
Regarding Jean-Pierre Bemba, in particular, this incapacity included the fact that, as vice 
President of the DRC (2003-2006), he was immune from the CAR’s jurisdiction, as posited 
by the investigating judge of the Tribunal de grande instance of Bangui on 16 September 
2004.856 More important, the CAR had no domestic law on the basis of which it could initiate 
prosecutions of international crimes. It was because of this series of incapacity, initially 
upheld by the Court of Appeal of Bangui in its judgment of 16 December 2004,857 that the 
first situation regarding the 2002-2003 armed conflict was referred to the ICC on 22 
December 2004 (CAR I). In the same vein, it justified the referral to the same Court of the 
second situation regarding the 2012-2013 armed conflict, on 30 May 2014 (CAR II).  
In such circumstances, to generalise the observation, one must wonder whether the allegation 
of the abusive exercise of universal jurisdiction by some European states over crimes 
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committed in Africa is still tenable. The ICC or any other international criminal tribunal 
cannot deal with all the crimes and all the offenders who enjoy choking impunity in Africa.  
2.1.2.2. The Alleged Abuse of Jurisdictional Power by European States  
The previous contextual facts and developments can now enable to understand better the 
pertinence or the irrelevance of the allegation of abuse or misuse of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction by some European states against a number of African leaders. In this regard, it is 
important to seize the arguments in support of the allegation (a) before trying to mitigate the 
disagreement between both sides (b). 
a) The Arguments in Support of the Allegation   
Until 2008, the African contestations of European proceedings remained limited to the 
interstate level. Protests were raised through judicial applications before the ICJ (DRC v. 
Belgium and Republic of Congo v. France).The regionalisation of the matter commenced with 
Rwanda’s protest against the indictment of its 40 officials in Spain. The reason why the 
conflict between Rwanda and Spain was not submitted, like the previous cases, to the ICJ or 
any other mechanism of peaceful settlement of interstate disputes is difficult to find. One must 
realise that Rwanda does not recognise the ICJ’s jurisdiction contrary to Spain. But, this 
justification becomes a non-sense when it is observed that Rwanda had previously invited 
France, which declined the offer, to adjudication before the ICJ after the French justice had 
indicted nine Rwandan officials in 2006.858 In the light of this duplicity of the state behaviour, 
it can be assumed that the shift by Rwanda to the regional forum was deliberately intended to 
highly politicise the matter, to find a diplomatic support for the impunity of its officials from 
the community of African states and peoples as a whole and to provoke a debate about the 
common understanding on what should be the fundamental conditions for the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction in contemporary international law. 
In those cases brought before the ICJ, it suffices to recall that two arguments were repeatedly 
advanced: violation of African states’ sovereignty and immunities of their officials. These 
arguments are found in the pronouncements of various regional actors on the then Africa-
Europe dispute over universal jurisdiction. The issue was initially invoked by Rwanda during 
the first meeting of Justice Ministers and/or Attorneys General of African states, gathered in 
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Addis Ababa on 18 April 2008. But, the Pan-African Parliament, the AU legislative body, is 
the first institution to have made a formal statement on the matter in May 2008. Through the 
so-called Johannesburg Declaration of the Pan-African Parliament on Universal Jurisdiction, 
it declared its firm resolution: 
1. To condemn the action of the said French and Spanish Judges as a blatant affront to the 
sovereignty of an African Union Member state.  
2. To urge the African Union Heads of State to add their voice in denouncing the attempt on the 
part of these judges at derogating on the well-established international standards of natural 
justice and self determination within a sovereign State.  
3. In light of the concerns raised, to urge the African Union Commission to take up this concern 
through a comprehensive study on the subject and do come up with appropriate mechanisms to 
safeguard the sovereignty of its member states from the consequences of undue abuse and 
misinterpretation of principles of international law by some states for political gain (…).859 
The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), which is an organisation 
created in 2004 for the promotion of peace, security, integration and development in this part 
of Africa, followed and generalised the issue. At the end of the meeting of its Regional Inter-
Ministerial Committee, held from 21 to 22 May 2008 in Brazzaville (Republic of Congo), the 
Ministers of foreign affairs of eleven member states made the statement that “working on the 
basis of the presentation by the delegation of Rwanda condemning the abuse of the principles 
of universal jurisdiction by some European judges”,860 they expressed concern that “the abuse 
was a blatant affront to the sovereignty of the member states of the ICGLR and other 
countries of Africa in general”.861 
It is in the light of these initial declarations that the AU Assembly decided to step in. From 
July 2008 to July 2012, it delivered a total number of seven decisions formulating the regional 
common position against the European indictments and arrest warrants against African 
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leaders on the basis of universal jurisdiction, “thereby creating tension between the AU and 
the EU”.862 This federation of voices was believed to be “the appropriate collective response 
to counter the exercise of power by strong states over weak states”863 and to put an end to a 
sort of judicial imperialism on the part of some western powers. The AU Assembly recalled 
that immunities of states officials should be respected.864 In the meantime, it urged and 
encouraged its member states to apply the principle of reciprocity so that they could defend 
themselves against the abusive exercise of universal jurisdiction by EU member states.865 
Rwanda, for example, envisaged its own prosecutions of several French officials for their 
alleged implication in the 1994 genocide. In fact, Rwanda’s National Independent 
Commission which inquired into the matter made the recommendation that the Rwandan 
Government should support individual and collective complaints of victims brought to justice 
against France or its agents.866 In its decision of July 2008, the AU Assembly summarised 
three arguments against the European indictments of African leaders as follows:    
(i)the abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction is a development that could endanger 
international law, order and security;  
(ii) the political nature and abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction by judges from some 
non-African States against African leaders, particularly Rwanda, is a clear violation of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of these States;  
(iii) the abuse and misuse of indictments against African leaders have a destabilizing effect that 
will negatively impact on the political, social and economic development of states and their 
ability to conduct international relations (…).867  
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Therefore, the AU Assembly requested the termination of all pending indictments in Europe 
and decided that none of the arrest warrants issued in this respect could be implemented in 
Africa.868 The question is now to finally assess whether this African allegation against 
European states remains totally pertinent. The facts show that the disagreement with European 
states should be mitigated. 
b) The Mitigation of the Disagreement with European States  
The starting point of discussion is the question as to whether the African allegation of the 
abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction by some European states amounts to an abuse 
of right. Historically, the doctrine of abuse of right originates from national legal systems.869 
It has already been a subject of numerous writings in international law.870 Rather than 
exhuming the existing theoretical debate among authors, it suffices to refer to some of the 
initial studies which were published on the issue.871 Generally, the doctrine of abuse of right 
postulates that any possessor of a right should not exercise it in a manner which unduly harms 
the enjoyment of the right of another person or use it in the accomplishment of purposes for 
which it is not destined.872 There is an abuse of right if the possessor is actually in a legal 
position to rely on his prerogative. If by its use or exercise he infringes the rules protecting the 
right of another subject, he does not abuse his own right because he does not possess any in 
such case but violates the law.873 Otherwise, the doctrine would be redundant in positive 
international law. That is why it is commonly accepted that the doctrine of abuse of right is 
useful only for those legal areas where there is a need to restrict the exercise by a state of its 
discretionary powers or those prerogatives for which it holds a margin of action which is not 
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conditioned or limited by the respect of distinct rules of international law. The reason is that 
any exercise of right must be free from the arbitrariness and unreasonableness of its holder 
towards other legal subjects as a command of the rule of law.874  
In the light of these clarifications, it appears that what is largely at stake in the African 
allegation against European states is the violation of positive rules of international law to 
which the exercise of universal jurisdiction is subordinated, namely sovereignty, territorial 
presence of the accused and immunities. Considerations of abuse of right seem to appear only 
in relation to the alleged political end of the European proceedings and the unequal judicial 
treatment of potential offenders involved in the same African situations. But, on the merits, 
these two aspects of the African allegation have to be mitigated.  
On the one hand, there has been some exaggeration on the part of Africa.875 The facts 
submitted to the jurisdictional power of European states were invented. All the proceedings 
are related to situations in which non-contested appalling crimes have been committed and of 
which perpetrators enjoy impunity in Africa. It is even cynical that those African leaders who 
could face justice for their own crimes stand at the frontline to object to the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction by some European states to the detriment of their victims and the 
interest of the entire humanity. Moreover, in some cases, it has been observed that the right to 
immunity of African leaders, such as Laurent-Désiré Kabila, Paul Kagame and Jean-François 
Ndengue, had been acknowledged by European judges and prosecutors. Effective trials for the 
substantive matter have not been organised. In some others cases, Africa seems to have 
conflated indictments on the basis of passive personality with the principle of universal 
jurisdiction. This is particularly the case of the French proceedings against Rwandan officials 
or the complaints of family members of Spaniard murdered victims that were lodged with the 
Spanish justice for the events which took place in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994.876     
On the other hand, in contrast, there have also been some violations of international law on 
the part of European states. This is the case of the Belgium arrest warrant of 11 April 2000, 
delivered in total disregard of personal immunity of a minister of foreign affairs. In the same 
vein, indictments, arrest warrants and their circulation through media, between countries and 
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by the International Police Organisation were issued against presumed offenders who were 
not present or found in the territory of the prosecuting states. This is particularly the case of 
the Belgium arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 again and the Spanish indictment of Rwandan 
officials in February 2008. One may add to this conclusion the abuse of right in some 
circumstances. For example, the launch of the Belgium arrest warrant against the DRC’s 
Minister of foreign affairs occurred in the context of ongoing peace negotiations to end the 
war which started in 1998. As a consequence, the accused person could no longer travel at the 
precise moment when his functions were much needed by his country. This kind of judicial 
blockage of one country’s foreign relations, its impact on the peace process and the 
continuation of the bloody armed conflict evidenced that Belgium’s exercise of universal 
jurisdiction was not reasonable. The end of impunity of one man was not equivalent in 
interest to ending the war (with the involvement of at least eight countries) and thus curbing 
the number of its numerous victims. Worse, the politicisation of the prosecutions was very 
obvious. Even if proceedings were triggered by private complaints of victims, it seems that 
some of the plaintiffs were political opponents to the ruling government in Kinshasa.877 
Therefore, it was doubtful whether Belgium was entirely engaged in the struggle against 
impunity or just in the harassment of an undesirable government in order to take control of its 
foreign policy or to make it adopt a certain line of political conduct.878 Actually, a country 
which wished justice to prevail should have equally paid attention to the DRC’s occupied 
territory where the vast majority of reported crimes were perpetrated, rather than 
concentrating unreasonably on the case of one governmental member.              
Finally, contrary to the position of some commentators,879 the abusive application of universal 
jurisdiction cannot be mitigated towards the African continent just on the ground that 
proceedings have been also conducted against nationals of states from other parts of the 
world: North and Latin America (United States of America, Argentina and Chile), Asia 
(China, Iran, Iraq, Israel and Palestine) and the Caribbean (Cuba).880 The reason is that these 
proceedings have raised similar contestations to those of African states. More important, it is 
precisely because of American and Israeli protests that the leading European countries on the 
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issue of universal jurisdiction modified their respective national legislation.881 For example, 
the United States of America threatened Belgium with punitive counter-measures, notably to 
remove the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) from its 
territory.882 These protests confirm that there would rarely be domestic prosecutions of 
individuals from powerful states or their protégés.883 Thus, the judges and prosecutors should 
satisfy themselves with cases from weak countries such as the prosecutions of African 
leaders. But, the most insoluble question remains the refusal by African states themselves to 
have their officials and personalities be prosecuted outside their continent. This refusal looks 
like the negation of the principle of universal jurisdiction or the tentative restriction of its 
application in relation to geographical preferences and historical ties. It is in view of this 
development that a common understanding of the principle of universal jurisdiction should be 
promoted, the law re-articulated and reformed. It would be unwise to keep such jurisdictional 
power untouchable, or non-negotiable in the terms of the European perspective,884 while it 
could not lead anymore to effective prosecutions of crimes committed by prominent states’ 
officials except politically unprotected small fishes. The law, which has to be equal to 
everybody and every country, must be adapted to contemporary circumstances. The same 
necessity of legal adaptation applies to the contention over ICC jurisdiction and judicial work 
in Africa.           
2.2. The Contention over the International Criminal Court  
As it is well known, the ICC Statute was adopted in Rome on 17 July 1998. It is perceived as 
the most important international organisation ever created in the world after the United 
Nations (UN) in June 1945.885 The historic significance of the adoption of this Statute was 
acknowledged by the General Assembly on 26 January 1999.886 The ICC’s objective is to 
ensure justice for victims of the most serious international crimes such as genocide, crimes 
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against humanity, war crimes and aggression. It is expected to have a deterrent effect on any 
would-be international criminal, especially in countries and regions subject to widespread 
atrocities and armed conflicts.887 In order to discharge this mandate, the ICC consists of three 
main units and four organs. First, the judicial unit is composed of 18 judges and two organs, 
i.e. the Presidency of the Court and the appeals, trial and pre-trial divisions. Each division 
possesses, depending on the number of cases brought to the Court, one or several chambers. 
Second, there is the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), headed by the Prosecutor and assisted by 
one or more Deputy Prosecutors, who are all elected for a non-renewable mandate of nine 
years. The OTP encompasses three main divisions, namely the Jurisdiction, Complementarity 
and Cooperation Division,888 the Investigation Division889 and the Prosecution Division.890 
The third unit is the Registry which is mainly responsible for the non-judicial aspects of the 
administration and services of the Court.891  
The ICC Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002, earlier than what several commentators 
foresaw,892 after the acquisition of the required sixty ratifications.893 Just this swift entry into 
force is indicative of the euphoria with which states and the international community 
welcomed the new judicial icon, giving the impression to a commentator that it is “the best 
instrument (…) to deliver justice and fight impunity at the international level”.894 But, 
                                                 
887 Manirabona, above note 344, at 281; A. Arieff, R. Margesson, M.A. Browne, M. C. Weed, International 
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Committees of Congress: 22 July 2011), at 26. 
888 Its mandate is to conduct preliminary examinations, to provide advice on issues of jurisdiction, admissibility 
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892 L. Condorelli, ‘La Cour pénale internationale: un pas de géant (pourvu qu’il soit accompli…)’, CIII Revue 
générale de droit international public (1999) 7-21, at 8. 
893 ICC Statute, Article 126 (1). 
894 A. Mbata Mangu, ‘The International Criminal Court, Justice, Peace and the Fight against Impunity in Africa: 
An Overview’, XL (2) Africa Development (2015) 7-32, at 9-10. 
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warnings were made against any blind triumphalism.895 Apparently, the ICC Statute was 
adopted in a hurry while “the idea of having a single and permanent international criminal 
court acting as a dominant source of international law enforcement [was still] unpalatable to 
states”.896 Hence, pessimism on the future of the world Court was beginning to replace the 
initial optimism. 
Criticisms have progressively increased owing to the manner in which it accomplishes its 
mandate. Hostility against the Court’s work has generated what can now be termed “the ICC 
crisis”.897 Accordingly, to the initial divergence of views on the establishment of the Court 
(2.2.1) has succeeded a period of hostility against its judicial work in Africa (2.2.2), including 
the disagreement with the rules (and chiefly their interpretation) on the immunity of state 
officials before international criminal tribunals (2.2.3).  
2.2.1. The Divergence of Views between States on the Court’s Establishment 
The outcome of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of the ICC (15 June-17 July 1998) could show that negotiating parties have 
failed to find a global consensus on major legal aspects of the Court’s Statute. A number of 
unrealised legal expectations (2.2.1.1) have therefore led into the crisis of participation in the 
ICC (2.2.1.2). 
2.2.1.1. The Unrealised Legal Expectations on the Part of African States        
African states and regional organisations actively participated in negotiations regarding the 
ICC Statute.898 Forty-nine African countries,899 the OAU and the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC) were present. Despite this wide participation in the 
                                                 
895 Condorelli, above note 892, at 7-8. 
896 R. JV Cole, ‘Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court: More Political than Legal’, 14 
Melbourne Journal of International Law (2013) 1-29, at 28.  
897 K. Carlson, ‘The International Criminal Court: Challenges and Possibilities’, 6(1) The Bulletin of Fridays of 
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negotiations, dissatisfaction with the outcomes of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries in Rome is perceptible. To demonstrate this assumption, two main 
preparatory documents to the Rome negotiations can serve as a means of evidence. On the 
one hand, some twenty-five African countries adopted the Dakar Declaration dated 6 
February 1998 for the establishment of the ICC.900 It was also acknowledged by the OAU 
Council of Ministers on 27 February 1998 which appealed to all its member states to support 
the creation of the ICC.901 On the other hand, the SADC principles of consensus on the ICC 
were approved by fourteen member states during the Pretoria meeting held from 11 to 14 
September 1997902. These two non-binding documents were variously reiterated in official 
declarations during the United Nations Diplomatic Conference in Rome.903 Therefore, they 
represented the shared vision by the majority of African states on the court which had to be 
created. In this respect, the first unrealised expectation refers to the Court’s institutional status 
(b) and the second to the scope of its jurisdiction (b).  
a) The Court’s Institutional Status   
The ICC’s status within the international legal system was a disputed matter between the 
negotiating states in Rome. Controversies were particularly sharp on its relationship with the 
United Nations and the power of the Prosecutor.  
It is worth noting that the ILC Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court of 1994 had 
resolved these issues in a manner which widely diminished the independence of the Court. 
True, the latter was built as an intergovernmental organisation, in the meaning of the Vienna 
Conventions on the law of treaties,904 and thus, enjoyed the status as a legal subject distinct 
                                                 
900 Dakar Declaration for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998 (6 February 1998), 
<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/DakarDeclarationFeb98Eng.pdf > accessed 12 March 2015.  
901 C.B. Murungu, ‘Immunity of State Officials and Prosecutions of International Crimes in Africa’ (PhD Thesis, 
University of Pretoria 2011), at 180. 
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903 United Nations, ‘Summary Report of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Committee of the 
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from member states and any other international organisation. However, it could have operated 
only in the hands of states parties and the Security Council. This connection to the 
international system was reflected in two principal ways.  
First, the Prosecutor was deprived of his proper power to initiate investigations and 
prosecutions. He could only act out of a referral by the Security Council, states parties 
accepting its jurisdiction and states parties to the genocide Convention.905 According to the 
ILC, this connection was necessary “in order to enable the Council to make use of the court, 
as an alternative to establishing ad hoc tribunals and as a response to crimes which affront the 
conscience of mankind”.906 However, the Security Council did not receive the power to defer 
investigations or prosecutions. The ICC’s Prosecutor was expected to remain free in order to 
conduct his action, without interference, until the end of the proceedings. Second, no 
prosecution in situations (maybe even referred to the Court) would have been commenced if 
the latter proceedings were being dealt with by the Security Council as a threat to, or breach 
of the peace, or an act of aggression, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, unless the Security 
Council otherwise decided.907 For the ILC, this was “an acknowledgement of the priority 
given by article 12 of the Charter, as well as for the need for coordination between the Court 
and the Council in such cases”.908 But, it can be objected that this argument is weak because 
article 12 of the UN Charter regulates the relationship between the General Assembly and the 
Security Council.909 It could not be diverted from its context for the purpose of making the 
judicial action of a new separate organisation dependent on the processes of a political body 
of the United Nations. Likewise, any referral for the crime of aggression could not be brought 
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to the Court by a state without the prior determination of the Security Council as provided for 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.910    
This vision was not shared by the Dakar and SADC groups of African states.  They were in 
favour of a court which could be, as a separate institution from the United Nations, 
“independent, permanent, impartial, just and effective”,911 whose actions were not be 
prejudiced by political considerations.912 Consequently, they furthered the mandate of a 
Prosecutor with effective broad powers to act and initiate investigations proprio motu, outside 
the hands of states parties and the Security Council. The ICC was expected to be based on the 
sovereign equality of all states and the consent to its jurisdiction through ratifications, state 
referrals of situations or ad hoc acceptance by third parties. African states were opposed to 
any form of interference of the Security Council into the functioning of the ICC. There is not 
a better formulation than what the Ugandan representative declared: “[…] the role of the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter should not be allowed to influence the 
acceptability and the independence of the Court”.913 Although this position evolved within the 
SADC group of states, only a mere referral of situations by the Security Council to the 
independent Prosecutor, but not the power of deferral of investigations or prosecutions, 
appeared bearable.914 African states presumably feared to vest a political body dominated by 
five permanent members (five great powers and not a single African country) with the 
competence to decide which situation to investigate or even to influence the judicial choice of 
the Prosecutor. They wanted to avoid settlements of political scores through international 
judicial means.  
By the end of the negotiations, these expectations were not fully realised. If the ICC is a 
distinct intergovernmental organisation, it is linked, pursuant to article 2 of the Statute915 and 
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through a special agreement,916 to the United Nations, with which it shares a number of 
objectives, i.e. the preservation of peace and justice in the world. Concerning the Court’s 
connection with the Security Council, its independence has been more undermined. On the 
insistence of great powers and particularly the United States of America, the Security Council 
is vested with new exorbitant powers. It received the so-called competence to defer 
investigations or prosecutions,917 which is actually a capability for paralysing the ICC’s 
proceedings through a political decision. It was also attributed the power to refer to the 
Prosecutor, under article 13 (b) of the ICC Statute, situations implicating non-contracting 
states. This article is quite an unprecedented conventional provision which destroys the basic 
principle of the law of treaties requiring that international agreements should not produce 
effects on third parties without their consent. It seems that exceptions to this principle were 
(so far) simply scarce, if not impossible, to find.918  
Yet, one must observe that the Security Council does not enjoy any referral or deferral power 
in regard to ad hoc tribunals (ICTY and ICTR), which are in addition its subsidiary organs. 
Moreover, it is actually doubtful that Chapter VII of the UN Charter has allocated for this 
political body the power to impose a treaty on a third party under the alibi of maintaining 
international peace and security or avoiding the establishment of costly ad hoc tribunals. This 
strong dependency of a judicial institution on the will of a political body, if affirmed at a 
national level, would simply be a legal scandal, including in a dictatorial regime. Even if 
international law is different from national law, this comparison better illustrates the 
magnitude of powers granted to the Security Council. Therefore, the ICC is an actor of a 
politicised justice919 which might highly fluctuate according to the course of international 
politics.920 This danger invokes the parallel high risk of selective justice in the hands of 
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powerful states or the victorious parties to an armed conflict. The situation recalls the western 
historical roots of the system of international criminal justice in the aftermath of World War I 
and II. The most powerful state crushes the weaker country, makes himself or his allies 
innocent of any crime, and then imposes his moral supremacy through selective justice and 
law enforcement.  
Concerning the ICC Prosecutor, his status is improved compared with the stipulations of the 
ILC Draft Statute of 1994. Of course, he is not the agent at the service of states parties or the 
Security Council as such. He enjoys the power to act and initiate investigations proprio 
motu,921 including for the crime of aggression.922 He is independent in his action after any 
referral of a situation to his office. In particular, he freely assesses whether to proceed with an 
investigation or not, or whether to prosecute or not. His decision is only placed under the 
judicial control of the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC). In other words, the PTC can authorise the 
commencement of an investigation or review the Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed or not 
to prosecute upon investigation in relation to a situation in which a crime falling under the 
ICC jurisdiction might have been committed.923 Furthermore, the Prosecutor is free in the 
selection of incidents to investigate, crimes and persons to be prosecuted. But, this is a 
discretionary power which does not fall under the judicial review of the PTC, meaning that 
the Prosecutor cannot be compelled to any choice in this respect. Even the Assembly of States 
Parties (ASP), which is a body outside the judicial structure of the Court, is theoretically 
incapable to politically control and to influence his judicial function. It can only “provide 
management oversight to the Presidency, the Prosecutor and the Registrar regarding the 
administration of the Court”.924 The dismissal of the ICC Prosecutor in the course of his nine-
year-term mandate is thus apparently excluded. What’s about the Court’s jurisdiction? 
b) The Scope of the Court’s Jurisdiction 
Previous developments have already shown that the ICC does not enjoy unlimited 
jurisdictional power or even a sort of universal jurisdiction to the effect that it can try any 
person who is suspected of having committed international crimes provided for by its Statute. 
Only crimes committed on the territory of a state which consents to the founding treaty of the 
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Court or by nationals of that state in the territory of a non-contracting party are concerned. 
Sure, the eventual extension of the ICC jurisdiction to nationals of third states under this legal 
framework or out of a referral resolution of the Security Council has found a lot of resistance 
in Rome. But, at this stage, it is important to focus on three other specific bones of contention, 
that is to say the selection of crimes within the ICC jurisdiction, the Court’s competence to try 
legal persons and the principle of complementarity. 
Concerning the list of crimes, the initial approach of the ILC, with James Crawford as Special 
Rapporteur, did not aim to incorporate a list of international crimes in the ICC Statute.925 It 
was believed reasonable to leave the determination about which crime to try in the power of 
the Court in application of existing treaty and customary international law. It was not intended 
to establish a code of international crimes which was rather a separate topic on the ILC’s 
table. In this regard, the ICC Statute was expected to be “primarily procedural and 
adjectival”926 and to line itself with the respect of the legality principal, very especially in the 
event of the Court’s intervention in a non-contracting country. Therefore, in the ILC Draft 
Statute  for an International Criminal Court of 1993, the Court was given jurisdiction over 
crimes “under a norm of international law accepted and recognised by the international 
community of States as a whole as being of such a fundamental character that its violation 
attracts the criminal responsibility of individuals”.927 
However, this approach was abandoned in the Draft Statute of 1994928 as well as in the ICC 
Statute of 1998. It was relinquished by the ILC because doing so would have given the Court 
a quasi-legislative function.929 Instead, during the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries in Rome, negotiating states did not want to adopt the ICC Statute, with 
potential prosecutions against their high ranking officials, without knowing exactly in 
advance for which kind of international crimes.930 Even if the new approach consisting of 
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defining the crimes concerned under the Statute did not intend to create new progressive 
norms on criminal conducts either, it was the result of the need to find a political compromise 
on the list of crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the Court.931 
As for African states, they were favourable to the inclusion of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and aggression in the ICC Statute. A part of them, like Libya, also 
wanted to extend the list to other crimes and include particularly financial, economic and 
environmental crimes.932 But, the threshold of the gravity of crimes listed under the ICC 
Statute had been put so high that only “the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole”,933 which “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the 
world”,934 were accepted, i.e. genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression, 
even though the definition of the latter crime (aggression) was postponed for future 
considerations.935 As a result, the Court cannot deal with crimes which may be of specific 
concern to a community of states at the regional or sub-regional level. This selectivity of the 
substantive competence is somewhat a retreat in law compared with the ILC Draft Statute of 
1994 which included, in addition to the list of four crimes agreed upon in Rome, “crimes, 
established under or pursuant to the treaty provisions listed in the Annex, which, having 
regard to the conduct alleged, constitute exceptionally serious crimes of international 
concern”.936 If this provision could have the effect of covering more international crimes, 
there was a practical hindrance in that the Court could not receive unlimited resources, 
beginning by financial ones, in order to deal with so many crimes and offenders. Since the 
adoption of the ILC Draft Statute of 1994, it had been warned that the extension of the list of 
crimes beyond those which were of concern for the international community as a whole 
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would have provoked the reluctance of many states (probably outside Africa) to consent to the 
ICC Statute.937  
Concerning corporate liability, the SADC group of states requested that the ICC has 
jurisdiction over legal persons like companies and other forms of corporations.938 Emphasis 
must be put here on the liability of multinational corporations. These types of legal persons 
are suspected of being behind some of the most serious human rights abuses on the continent 
when they engage in business activities (i.e. control and plundering of natural resources, trade 
and trafficking of weapons) with states or non-states actors in areas affected by conflicts or of 
limited statehood.939 It has been demonstrated that many African countries in conflict are at 
extreme and high risks for corporate complicity in the perpetration of international crimes.940 
Hence, it did not appear wise for the SADC group of states to have only individuals being 
criminalised, whereas a multinational company, for example, could make money in the blood 
of innocent people, to the detriment of their nation, and in impunity. One of the reasons why 
the ICC Statute did not target legal persons might be that remote conception dating back to 
the Nuremberg trials according to which international crimes are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only the punishment of individual perpetrators of such crimes may 
contribute to the enforcement of international criminal law with efficacy.941 In the same vein, 
William A. Schabas writes: 
Proposals that the Court also exercise jurisdiction over corporate bodies in addition to 
individuals were seriously considered at the Rome Conference. While all national legal systems 
provide for individual criminal responsibility, their approaches to corporate criminal liability 
vary considerably. With a Court predicated on the principle of complementarity, it would have 
been unfair to establish a form of jurisdiction that would in effect be inapplicable to those States 
that do not punish corporate bodies under criminal law. During negotiations, attempts at 
encompassing some form of corporate liability made considerable progress. But time was simply 
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too short for the delegates to reach a consensus and ultimately the concept had to be 
abandoned.942 
Finally, African states differently perceived the scope of the ICC jurisdiction in regard to the 
principle of complementarity. This principle reconciles the Court’s jurisdiction and the 
sovereignty of states parties in that the latter states keep their jurisdictional primacy while the 
ICC subsidiarily intervenes in case of their failure to investigate or to prosecute the 
underlying crimes. Complementary jurisdiction was adopted for the ICC in order to gain 
much support for the Rome Statute. Without it, it was probable that many other states would 
not have accepted the new treaty.943 But, if the Court was expected to be complementary to 
national criminal justice systems, the Dakar Declaration added that complementarity also 
existed between the ICC and regional tribunals.944 It is worth noting that this complementarity 
was required on the eve of the establishment of the AU on 11 July 2000. It is imaginable that 
some African states already had in mind that the new organisation could be in a position to 
create a regional tribunal to deal with African criminal matters before any external 
international judicial action. After all, the ICC Statute intentionally ignored complementarity 
with potential regional criminal tribunals in favour of a binary system, ICC-national 
jurisdictions.945 That was also the option already agreed upon by the ILC in its Draft Statute 
of 1994.946 It means that there is no power sharing between stakeholders of universalism and 
defenders of a flexible regime in which regions could have a say in the matter. In the light of 
all these controversies, the subsequent crisis of participation to the Court is not a surprise.  
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2.2.1.2. The Crisis of Participation in the Court 
According to Sivu Maqungo, the draft of the Rome Statute was unacceptable for many 
delegations, including African states.947 But, despite the apparent failure to find a global legal 
consensus in Rome, which did not appear in official speeches of satisfaction to see the advent 
of the judicial icon, African states voted for the ICC Statute, signed and quickly ratified it in 
their vast majority. Senegal was the first country to become a member of the ICC on 2 
February 1999. Statistically, by the end of August 2016, they constitute the largest group of 
states parties among 124 ICC members: 34 African states, 19 Asia-pacific states, 18 from 
Eastern Europe, 28 Latin American and Caribbean states and 25 from Western Europe, 
Northern America and Oceana.948 Only twenty-one other African countries have not yet 
joined the ICC.949  
In comparison, the United States of America, China, Israel and India950 explicitly stated that 
they had not voted for the Rome Statute. Russia adopted and signed the new treaty, but it has 
never ratified it. The United States of America finally decided to sign it on 31 December 
2000.951 But, on 6 May 2002, it withdrew its signature, the new administration under 
President George W. Bush advancing that the country was not intending to become an ICC 
member.952 It seems that the other three states that opted against joining the ICC were Arabic 
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countries, two from Africa: Libya, Iraq and “Algeria, Qatar or Yemen”.953 It is remarkable 
that no Asian Arabic country is a member of the ICC, except Jordan.   
Thus, the crisis of participation in the ICC gives the impression that some states keep their 
sovereignty jealously untouchable, while others are subjected, by will, constraint or 
enticement, to the global criminal justice system. This phenomenon of unbalance of powers 
and inequality of states dictates the international attitude towards the ICC. The assumption 
can be chiefly illustrated by the case of African states’ non-membership (a) and membership 
to the Court (b).   
a) The Justification of Non-membership 
There are various reasons to be mentioned. First, some African states not parties to the ICC 
Statute are those which did not attend the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries in Rome: Equatorial Guinea (under a non-opened dictatorial regime), 
Somalia (a failed state lacking a legitimate representative government), Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic (recognised by the AU, but not the United Nations) and South Sudan 
(not yet born). While the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic cannot accede to the Statute due 
to its non-recognition as a state by the United Nations, the three other remaining countries are 
presumably not encouraged to join the ICC while being in a deteriorated relationship with 
Africa.  
Second, speaking on behalf of the Group of Arab states, Sudan advanced several arguments as 
to why they disagreed with the proposed ICC Statute. Sudan notably pointed out: i) the fact 
that the treaty included general expressions concerning the crime of aggression, and that it 
would be many years before the Court could exercise its jurisdiction in that field; ii) the fear 
that the Security Council might be granted powers that could affect the role of the Court 
concerning any war criminal, regardless of country, religion, or nationality; and that the text 
adopted might increase the powers of the Security Council over and above those set out in 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter; iii) the Prosecutor should not enjoy powers proprio motu and 
must be put under reasonable and logic control.954 This position was shared by Afro-Arabic 
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countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania and Morocco. As Libya clarified it, just at 
the beginning of the negotiations, the Court should not be established on the basis of 
hegemony and everything had to be done to avoid that those permanent members of the 
Security Council used their position to influence its work.955 Morocco even added the 
necessity of a court free from relations with non-governmental organisations (NGOs).956 It 
had to be avoided that a state having some control over an NGO (financially or by nationality) 
utilised their channel to indirectly influence the work of the Court. Furthermore, Libya 
considered it was not acceptable that the substantive jurisdiction of this Court confined to 
matters of interest for some states while ignoring different issues of concern to others, 
including drug trafficking, organised crimes, financial and economic crimes and aggression 
against the environment.957  
Third, it is probably for quite similar reasons that some other African states remain reluctant 
to join the ICC. Angola, for example, underlined that “an international court should not have 
fewer guarantees of independence and impartiality than a national court in determining what 
crimes and criminals it would try”.958 In this regard, the power granted to the Security Council 
was not acceptable. On their side, Zimbabwe and Mozambique could not be far from this line, 
particularly as they shared a similar position as members of the SADC group of states. 
Rwanda added the fact that the Court could not apply the death penalty.959  
Some of these disagreements were also raised by several great powers to justify their stance 
against the new Court. For example, the United States of America argued that they could not 
accept its Statute inasmuch as it extended the jurisdiction of the Court to nationals of third 
states, while it could not blindly believe in the independence of an apolitical prosecutor vested 
with proprio motu powers, without a risk of highly politicised justice against American 
citizens.960 This position was shared by China.961 In addition, the United States of America 
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put it clear that this Court should have been entirely accountable to the Security Council for 
any investigation or prosecution.962 However, India refuted the power granted to the Security 
Council which might arguably be destructive of the Court.963 It criticised this regime of 
inequality of states in favour of the permanent members of the Security Council, underlining 
the message that the Court was not created for their leaders and citizens.964 Worse, some 
members of the Security Council, not parties to the Statute, would illegitimately exercise the 
power to bind other states not parties.965 Finally, India questioned the independence of the 
prosecutor and the failure to criminalise the use of nuclear weapons.966   
The question is now why the majority of African states joined the ICC, when a minority of 
them and some important great powers refused to do so, in the absence of any regime of 
reservation.967  
b) The Justification of Membership 
It is not easy to explain the euphoric attitude of the majority of African states to become ICC 
members. Each country possesses its own national specificities in how and why it intends to 
be bound by an international treaty. But, their votes, signatures and swift ratifications of the 
ICC Statute may depend on a number of cumulative and interconnected plausible factors. 
Two theses come here into consideration. The first one exposes the free consent of African 
states to the ICC Statute (i), while the second relies on the context of international pressure 
and strategy of enticement of weak countries to join the Court (ii). 
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i) The Free Consent of African States to the ICC Statute 
It is by far the most popular thesis in the literature explaining African states’ free consent to 
the Rome Statute. The ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, has authoritatively recalled it when 
she emphasises on Sir Mochochoko’s comment on the issue which tells as follows: 
Contrary to the view that the ICC was shoved down the throats of unwilling Africans who were 
dragged screaming and shouting to Rome and who had no alternative but to follow their 
Western Masters under threat of withholding of economic aid if they did not follow, the 
historical developments leading up to the establishment of the Court portray an international 
will of which Africa was a part, to enforce humanitarian norms and to bring to justice those 
responsible for the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.968 
Several reasons can be brought forward in support of the idea of African states’ free consent 
to the ICC Statute. First, the elementary reason relates to the idea of diplomatic concessions 
inherent to any international negotiation. Second, there is a general impression that prior to 
the ICC creation, international criminal justice was already part of regional efforts to ensure 
respect for human rights.969 Thus, the consent to the ICC Statute was simply a reiteration of a 
common African will to struggle against impunity, to promote the rule of law and peace 
across the continent. The conviction seemingly became irreversible after the genocide that 
could have been prevented and avoided in Rwanda in 1994.970 This will is also testified by the 
1996 warning by the OAU Council of Ministers, with support from the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS),971 saying that it would call for the establishment of a war 
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crimes tribunal to try those who bore the responsibility for gross violations of human rights 
and peace during the armed conflict which had started in Liberia in 1989.972 Moreover, the 
OAU fully supported trials against perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide973 among them Jean 
Kambanda, former Rwanda Prime Minister in the course of atrocities, who was convicted and 
sentenced to life prison by the ICTR.974 Third, and last, it is repeated that the African 
involvement in the establishment of the ICC constitutes in itself another proof that their 
consent to its Statute was free.975 Arguably, the idea includes the African wide participation in 
the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries in Rome as well as regional 
initiatives aiming to assist African states in the process of ratification and implementation of 
the Rome Statute.976 For example, this might be the case of the Windhoek Plan of Action on 
ICC Ratification and Implementation in SADC, adopted in May 2001.977 The Windhoek Plan 
of Action978 followed the Pretoria Statement on Common Understanding on the ICC in SADC 
Region, adopted on 9 July 1999,979 which “recommended to the relevant authorities the 
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expeditious ratification of the ICC Statute in their respective countries”.980 More important, 
calls for ratification also emanated from continental institutions themselves, including the 
African Human Rights Commission981 and the Conference on Security, Stability, 
Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA).982   
However, the strength of some of these arguments may be partly mitigated by three main 
criticisms. First, they seem to rest on a basic conflation with the issue at stake. In fact, the 
African participation in the negotiation process of the ICC Statute and the belief in the 
international criminal justice system as a means to tackle impunity for gross violations of 
human rights in Africa evidence that African states also wanted and supported, like many 
other countries around the world, the establishment of the Court. But, these arguments do not 
tell anything more on the different issue as to whether African states freely decided to consent 
to its Statute, in spite of the fact that some of their primary aspirations were not met at the end 
of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries in Rome. Logically, both 
issues (wanting the creation of the Court and consenting to its founding treaty) may have 
distinct explanations and causalities. Moreover, concerning the so-called regional initiatives 
to boost African ratifications of the ICC Statute, it is important to note that not all of them 
were exclusively Africans by nature. For example, the Windhoek Plan of Action was the 
result of a conference,983 sponsored by Canada and the European Commission, hosted by 
Namibia and co-organised by two private organisations (based in the United States of 
America and Canada respectively), that is to say Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA) 
and the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (ICCLR) 
with its International Criminal Court Technical Assistance Program (ICCTAP). Likewise, the 
Pretoria Statement on Common Understanding on the ICC emanated from a joint conference 
between SADC member states and the International Committee of the Red Cross, the 
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Community Law Centre (South Africa), Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 
Lawyers for Human Rights (South Africa) and again Parliamentarians for Global Action.984 
It follows that the thesis of (exclusive) free consent of African states to the ICC Statute seems 
to a some extent be weakened. The opposite, complementary, realistic and stronger thesis 
explaining better the ratification of the ICC Statute by the majority of African states could be 
the context of pressure which these states have faced and the international strategy aiming to 
attatract them towards the new world Court.    
ii) The Context of Pressure and the International Strategy of Enticement of African States 
According to Serge Sur, many states among the 120, which adopted by a non-recorded vote 
the ICC Statute, were under pressure and excessive influence of NGOs.985 That created an 
unbalanced situation among states because that pressure proved to be efficient towards weak 
countries, but the said pressure had no chance to overcome resistance from those powerful 
ones or with sufficient national political support.986 The power and influence of NGOs rested 
above all on their massive participation in the negotiations process.987 The influential NGO 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) accredited to Rome over 200 of its 800 
member organisations (more than the number of negotiating states), with 450 
representatives.988 It seems that the coordination and support of these NGOs by the CICC, its 
worldwide computer network and information system deeply influenced every aspect of the 
Rome Conference and justified much of its success.989 They formed an alliance with the Like-
Minded Group (LMG) consisting of some sixty (60) countries (including Germany, Canada, 
Netherlands and Australia) that shared similar views on the Court which had to be created.990 
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Much of the work was done during their private meetings,991 with the support team of the 
United Nations, thus reflecting a serious lack of transparency. It is doubtless that the treaty 
adopted did not exactly correspond in all of its provisions to the true intent of many individual 
states. David J. Scheffer, an American negotiator, testified about the final forty-eight hours of 
the Rome Conference as follows: 
The treaty text was subjected to a mysterious, closed-door and exclusionary process of revision 
by a small number of delegates, mostly from the Like-Minded Group, who cut deals to attract 
certain wavering governments into supporting a text that was produced at 2:00 a.m. on the final 
day of the Conference, July 17. (…) This “take it or leave it” text for a permanent institution of 
law was not subjected to rigorous review (…)  and was rushed to adaption hours later on the 
evening of July 17 without debate. (…) Some provisions had never once been openly considered. 
No one had time to undertake a rigorous line-by-line review of the final text.992 
Those wavering states voted for the ICC Statute thanks to the NGOs’ lobbying993 and the 
political mobilisation by member states of the LMG, which believed it was “a more robust 
instrument than even the ICC’s strongest supporters could sensibly have hoped for”.994 
Rather, a wise course of events commanded to suspend the Rome Conference and convene 
new negotiations later to solve all the controversial legal issues.995  
After this precipitous adoption of the ICC Statute, the pressure continued. According to 
Charles C. Jalloh, “once the treaty was adopted, African and other human rights NGOs 
quickly transformed themselves into an effective global campaign for swift achievement of 
the 60 ratifications required for the Rome Statute to enter into force”.996 This campaign was 
combined with a second factor: an international strategy of enticement of African states 
towards the ICC in the name of the struggle against impunity, required for economic and 
development partnerships. This is especially the case between the European Union (EU), 
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Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific Group of States under the Cotonou Agreement of 23 
June 2000.997 The strategy obviously tallied with that of NGOs, because the EU’s objective 
was “to pursue and support an early entry into force of the Rome Statute and the 
establishment of the Court”.998  
Therefore, those authors who defend the exclusive free consent of African states to the ICC 
Statute do not hold all the facts on their side. The context of pressure, the strategy of 
enticement, the NGOs’ extraordinary campaign for the ICC in the continent and their relay by 
media of propaganda have played a crucial role to convince most African states, even though 
not coercing them, to join the new Court. Sayman Bula Bula confirms this view when he 
writes:  
(…) the majority of African states, except members of the Arab League –outside Comoros- 
which are not parties to the Rome Statute, have subscribed to the international agreement, 
either under foreign pressure, or after a quick and superficial overview on subsequent 
international obligations. (…) Governments have naively allowed judicial interference of extra-
African powers (…).999     
For example, the case of the DRC is pertinent. The alleged ratification of the ICC Statute 
happened in the aftermath of the assassination of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila on 16 
January 2001. It is curious to observe that, at least, two other countries (Ivory Coast and 
Tunisia) have also acceded to this treaty only after violent changes of their governments.1000 
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Benefits have been apparently taken from the weakness of the new governments, still affected 
by the emotion of dramatic events and with destroyed economies, to persuade them to join the 
ICC. In the DRC, the new President, Joseph Kabila, signed the Decree-law of 30 March 2002 
(a legislative Act) to authorise the ratification of the Rome Statute.1001 The true ratification 
through a mere presidential decree, not a legislative act, as it was constitutionally required, 
never followed.1002 On the contrary, the Decree-law of 30 March 2002 was irregularly taken 
for ratification.1003 It was acted upon by the depositary of the ICC Statute, the Secretary 
General of the United Nations, on 11 April 2002.1004 Worse, while the President was deprived 
of any legislative authority,1005 the national Parliament which had the power to authorise such 
presidential act of ratification was not associated to the procedure, although being able to sit 
and adopt laws in other fields of national interest.1006 More striking, the Parliament was even 
able to adopt only a short period later an Act to authorise the President to ratify the AU 
Constitutive Act of 11 July 2000.1007 As for the ICC, everything was done quickly and in a 
total lack of transparency.1008 Officially, the enactment of the Decree-law of 30 March 2002 
was simply justified by a matter of “emergency and necessity”.1009 It is perhaps not useless to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Constitution of 23 July 2000, which allowed immunities and other forms of judicial privileges to a category of 
national authorities. The new regime of President Alassane Ouattara had then to amend the Constitution in order 
to accede to the Rome Statute. As for Tunisia, it has ratified the treaty on 24 June 2011after the eviction of 
President Ben Ali as a result of political events relating to the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, in December 2010. 
1001 Decree-law No. 0013/2002 of 30 March 2002 Authorising the Ratification of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. 
1002 J. Kazadi Mpiana, ‘La Cour pénale international et la République démocratique du Congo: 10 après. Etude 
de l’impact du Statut de Rome dans le droit interne congolais’, 25 (1) Revue québécoise de droit international 
(2012) 57-90, at 60. 
1003 J. Kazadi Mpiana, ‘La position du droit international dans l’ordre juridique congolais et l’application de ses 
normes’ (PhD Thesis, Sapienza Università di Roma 2012), at 141 and 171-180.  
1004 Ibid., at 61. 
1005 See ‘Décret-loi constitutionnel n°003 du 27 mai 1997 relatif à l’organisation et à l’exercice du pouvoir en 
République démocratique du Congo, tel que modifié et complété à ce jour (textes coordonnés et mis à jour au 1er 
juillet 2000)’, Official Journal of the Democratic Republic of Congo (May 2001) 91-101. 
1006 For example, Law No. 002/2001 of 3 July 2001 on the Trade Tribunals; Law n°016/2002 of 16 October 2002 
Relating to the Labour Tribunals; Law n° 023/2002 of 12 November 2002 on the Military Judicial Code; Law n° 
024/2002 of 12 November 2002 Laying down the Military Criminal Code. 
1007 See ‘Loi n°006/2002 du 07 juillet 2002 autorisant la ratification de l’Acte constitutif de l’Union africaine’. 
1008 Bula Bula, above note 999, at 302. 
1009 See Decree-law No. 0013/2002 of 30 March 2002 Authorising the Ratification of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, preamble, para.3.  
196 
observe that it was signed at exactly the same date as the other irregular and unconstitutional 
presidential Decree-law which authorised the ratification of the aforementioned Cotonou 
Agreement between the EU, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific Group of States.1010 In 
other words, financial assistance to the new regime had to go with the option for the ICC. It 
does not mean that the DRC did not need international criminal justice on its territory. Rather, 
the manner in which this justice was sought is questioned by the darkness of the process 
followed to join the ICC, whose temporal jurisdiction moreover already excluded crimes 
committed in the country before 1 July 2002.          
Thus, ratifications of the Rome Statute by African states became a way to look after their 
images before international partners by attempting to secure quasi certificates of good conduct 
about compliance with human rights obligations, the fight against impunity and the rule of 
law.1011 Anyway, the ICC risked to be used against political opponents and to provoke 
national divisions. As soon as it started focusing on leading states officials, diplomatic 
hypocrisy ended and hostility grew up against the Court throughout the continent.  
2.2.2. The Hostility against the Court’s Judicial Work in Africa 
The origin of the tension between African states and the ICC is dated back to 2009 with the 
delivery of the arrest warrant against the Sudanese President, Omar Al Bashir.1012 However, 
even though the arrest warrant against President Omar Al Bashir has played an important role 
in worsening the situation, previous developments demonstrate that the Court was 
questionable since the adoption of its Statute in 1998. Some opposition started emerging at the 
dawn of its judicial activities in Africa, albeit in an unofficial manner. It is not the institution 
as such which generates hostility or becomes unwanted. Rather, criticisms are raised against 
its judicial work and strategy towards the continent. The ICC seems to have missed some 
political advises in order to succeed in the judicial ground.1013 It has exacerbated the situation 
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instead of bringing remedies to its denounced weakness. Therefore, African states have 
radicalised their criticisms (2.2.2.1), while the ICC sinks into a defensive posture (2.2.2.2). 
2.2.2.1. The Radicalisation of African Criticisms 
The ICC started working in 2003, after the investiture of its first Prosecutor, Moreno Ocampo. 
By the end of August 2016, twenty-three cases in ten situations under investigations were 
already initiated before it.1014 Except the situation in Georgia in which the PTC has authorised 
investigations on 27 January 2016, all other situations relate to African countries: Uganda, 
DRC, Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Kenya, Libya, Ivory Coast and Mali. In others 
African states, the ICC Prosecutor leads preliminary examinations which normally precede 
formal openings of investigations: Burundi, Gabon, Guinea and Nigeria. These statistics 
illustrate, at the first sight, an active cooperation between African states and the ICC. Among 
nine situations under investigations, five have been brought by states parties themselves 
(Uganda, DRC, Mali, CAR I and II), two initiated by the Prosecutor proprio motu with 
support of the states concerned (Kenya and Ivory Coast),1015 while two others have been 
referred by the Security Council (Sudan and Libya).1016 The first case was that of Thomas 
Lubanga from the DRC, whose final judgment was issued on 1 December 2014.1017 All of 
these situations and cases are in the heart of the African position on the ICC (a) criticising that 
politics against African states have invaded the Court in the name of law enforcement and 
justice (b). 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
<http://www.ijr.org.za/publications/pdfs/IJR%20Policy%20Brief%20No%208%20Tim%20Miruthi.pdf> 
accessed 9 December 2015. 
1014International Criminal Court, ‘Situations and Cases’, <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx> accessed 30 August 
2017. 
1015 About the situation in Kenya, the Prosecutor has initiated investigations on the basis of a Kenyan report sent 
to him by the Commission of Inquiry on Post-elections Violence (CIPEV) on 16 July 2009. Concerning Ivory 
Coast, the Prosecutor has acted before even the country becomes a state party to the ICC Statute (15 February 
2013) but on the basis of a declaration of acceptance of the ICC jurisdiction under article 12 (3) of the Statute, 
made on 18 April 2003. This declaration was confirmed by the letter of 10 December 2010.       
1016 See respectively SC Res. 1593 (2005), above note 389, para.1; SC Res. 1970 (2011), above note 389, para.4.  
1017 Lubanga ((ICC-01/04-01/06 A5), Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his 
Conviction, Appeals Chamber, 1 December 2014.   
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a) The Development of the Common African Position on the ICC  
At the beginning, the African-focused proceedings of the ICC were not opposed by states. 
Only some opposition parties in countries like the DRC, CAR and Ivory Coast have suspected 
the Court of being diverted from its mandate by governments which want to get rid of 
embarrassing political opponents (Jean-Pierre Bemba, Laurent Gbagbo, etc.). Later, inter-state 
criticisms emerged in addition to prior opposition of those countries which had in principle 
refused to join the ICC. However, they are of a different nature, politically and legally. They 
are formulated in the Common African Position on the ICC, pursuant to the Constitutive Act 
of the AU which stipulates that one of the objectives of this continental organisation is “to 
promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its 
people”.1018 This position constitutes a regional federation of protests against the Court’s work 
by all African states, except Morocco.1019 Its embryo was elaborated in the Communiqué of 
the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of 21 July 2008 which actually aimed to warn the ICC 
that the Prosecutor’s demand to inculpate an incumbent African head of state was 
unacceptable.1020 This warning was approved by the AU Assembly in February 2009.1021 
Since then, the AU has adopted various decisions that are binding to all its 54 member states 
on the issue. At this stage, it may just kept in mind that the Constitutive Act provides a 
general threat of sanctions in the event of non-compliance as follows: 
(…) any member state that fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union may be 
subjected to (…) sanctions, such as the denial of transport and communications links with other 




The allergy to see high states officials tried outside the continent was already implicit when 
the AU mandated Senegal, in 2006, to try, on behalf of Africa, the former Chadian President, 
Hissène Habré, even though he was sought by Belgium as well. The position also coincides 
with the opposition against the so-called abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction, 
particularly by a number of European states. But, despite this clearly polluted regional 
context, the ICC decided, besides prosecutions against several rebel leaders and Sudanese 
                                                 
1018 Article 3 (d). 
1019 Morocco is neither a party to the Rome Statute nor a member of the AU. 
1020 PSC/MIN/Comm (CXLII), 21 July 2008, paras.3 and 9. 
1021 Assembly/AU/DEC.221 (XII), above note 222, para.3. 
1022 Article 23 (2).  
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officials, to indict and issue two arrest warrants against President Omar Al Bashir, as an 
indirect perpetrator or an indirect co-perpetrator, for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity,1023 as well as for genocide.1024 These indictments actually poisoned the ICC’s 
relationship with the AU and its member states. Apart from Sudan, Ethiopia, Rwanda and 
Zimbabwe, Afro-Arabic countries like Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Mauritania were among the 
most irritated. They played a crucial role in the elaboration of the Common African Position 
on the ICC. Beyond the continent, they also succeeded to drag into opposition member states 
of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which announced that the precedent would 
“adversely affect the credibility of the international legal system”.1025 Similar support was 
provided by the League of Arab States.1026 What are the bones of contention concerning the 
judicial work of the ICC in Africa? 
b) The Allegations of Politics behind the Means of Law and Justice    
The AU has organised several meetings in order to consolidate the Common African Position 
on the ICC. The most important ones were held in October 2013, in June and November 2009. 
At each meeting, the ICC’s judicial work was examined and criticised. Criticisms may be 
grouped in two branches, in addition to the general protest against the excessive procedural 
delays of trials, as illustrated by Thomas Lubanga and Jean-Pierre Bemba’s cases.1027 The first 
one is a critique of the suspicion of the collusion between the Court and some great powers 
(i), whereas the second branch deals with the avoidance of positive application of the 
principle of complementarity (ii). 
  
                                                 
1023 Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 4 
March 2009. 
1024 Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, 12 July 2010. 
1025 Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), ‘The OIC Rejects the ICC’s Arrest Warrant against Bashir’, 10 
OIC Journal (January-April 2009) 23, at 23.   
 1026See N. Bakr and S. Abdel Shafi, ‘Arab Official Positions towards President Al Bashir’s Indictment’, in E. 
Moreno (ed.), The Gap between Narratives and Practices. Darfur: Responses from the Arab World (Madrid: 
FRIDE Publications, 2009) <http://fride.org/download/OP_Darfur_President_alBashir2_ENG_mar10.pdf> 
accessed 15 August 2015. 
1027 For Thomas Lubanga, the final judgment of December 2014 was rendered eight years after his surrender to 
the Court on 16 March 2006. Jean-Pierre Bemba was arrested on 23 May 2008, but his judgment at the first 
instance was delivered only on 21 March 2016, almost eight years later.  
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i) The Suspicion of Collusion between the Court and Great Powers   
On the one hand, African states and the AU have shown that they disagree with the strategy of 
the Prosecutor. Concerns have been raised about why only African situations are investigated 
by the ICC and not others from elsewhere around the world. It has also been questioned why 
cases drawn from these situations involved only Africans, while non-African actors arguably 
also participated in conflicts and atrocities in the continent.1028 The problem posed here is thus 
that of the selection of situations to investigate and notably that of cases to be tried by the 
ICC. The AU has denounced the conduct of the ICC Prosecutor, “who has been making 
egregiously unacceptable, rude and condescending statements on the case of President Omar 
Al Bashir of the Sudan and other situations in Africa”.1029 Concerning the arrest warrant of 27 
June 2011 against Muhammar Kadhafi, the former Libyan leader, the AU has expressed 
concerns on “the manner in which the ICC Prosecutor handles the situation in Libya”.1030 This 
was probably a protest against two things. One might be the rapidity with which the 
Prosecutor decided to indict Muhammar Kadhafi and his two followers (his son Saif Al-Islam 
Kadhafi and the head of military intelligence, Abdullah Al-Senussi). He spent only four 
months (for a preliminary examination and investigations) after the Security Council referral 
resolution of 26 February 2011, while he took almost four years before indicting President 
Omar Al Bashir of Sudan. This judicial action was perceived to be a quick support for the 
ongoing military campaign which resulted in the change of regime in Libya.1031 Another one 
refers to the problem of selective justice, since the ICC has targeted presumed offenders only 
from Kadhafi’s side. It seems to be an expression of victors’ justice.  
The AU also expressed “its deep concern regarding the conduct of the Office of the 
Prosecutor and the Court and the wisdom of the continued prosecutions against African 
                                                 
1028 I. Eberechi, ‘Armed Conflicts in Africa and Western Complicity: a Disincentive African Union’s 
Cooperation with the ICC’, 3 African Journal of Legal Studies (2009) 53-76, at 56-71 and 75-76.  
1029 Assembly/AU/DEC.296 (XV), Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of 
the Decision Assembly/AU/DEC.270 (XIV) on the Second Ministerial Meeting on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) (Doc. Assembly/AU/10 (XV)), 15th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the 
African Union, Kampala (Uganda), 25-27 July 2010, para.9. 
1030 Assembly/AU/DEC.366 (XVII), Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly decisions on the 
International Criminal Court (Doc.EX.CL/670 (XIX)), 17th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African 
Union, Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), 30 June- 1 July 2011, para.6.  
1031 Bourgi, above note 885, at 59-64. 
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leaders”,1032 in particular President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Deputy, William Ruto, for their 
alleged implication in the 2007-2008 post-electoral violence. This is so particular because it 
happened after the replacement of the first Prosecutor, Moreno Ocampo, by the new one, 
Fatou Bensouda, from The Gambia. The ICC Prosecutor has been suspected of being in 
collusion with some (geo-) political agenda of the most powerful countries, including states 
not parties to the ICC Statute like the United States of America.1033 Great powers have indeed 
succeeded to take control of the Court.1034 In the words of William A. Schabas, this judicial 
institution has become “far too deferential to the established (international) order”1035 and in 
particular “marches in lock step with the permanent members”1036 of the Security Council. 
Stephanie Maupas, who observed the functioning of the Court during the first twelve years of 
its existence for the French Journal “Le Monde”, also reveals that American officials of the 
State Departement and National Security Council met with the ICC Prosecutor in The Hague 
and pressured him to request the arrest warrant against Muhammar Kadhafi.1037 The 
precipitious issuance of this arrest warrant occurred without any serious judicial investigations 
into the alleged crimes committed in Libya, on the basis of informations received by the 
OTP.1038 Hence, the AU’s deep concern over “the politicization and misuse of indictments 
against African leaders by the ICC (…)”.1039 On its side, Rwanda explicitly stigmatised this 
kind of collusion between the ICC and great powers at the Security Council after the failure to 
defer the situation in Kenya on 13 November 2013. It declared:  
                                                 
1032 Assembly/AU/DEC.547 (XXIV), Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation 
of Previous Decisions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Doc. Assembly/AU/18 (XIV)), 24th Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 30-31 January 2015, para.4 (b). 
1033 F. Soudan, ‘Albert Bourgi : “La CPI est influence par les grandes puissances”’, Jeune Afrique (25 February 
2014) <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/134469/politique/albert-bourgi-la-cpi-est-influenc-e-par-les-grandes-
puissances/> accessed 1 September 2016. 
1034 J. Branco, L’ordre et le monde : Critique de la Cour pénale internationale (Paris : Fayard, 2016), at 231-233 
and 235. 
1035 W. A. Schabas, ‘The Banality of International Justice’, 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2013) 
545-551, at 551. The brackets are mine. 
1036 Ibid. 
1037 S. Maupas, Le Joker des puissant: le grand roman de la Cour pénale internationale (Villeneuve-D’Ascq : 
Don Quichotte éditions, 2016), at 20. 
1038 Ibid., at 50. 
1039 Ext/Assembly/AU/DEC.1 (Oct.2013),  Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 12 October 
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(…) Today’s disappointing vote undermines the principle of the sovereign equality of states 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, and confirms our long-held view that 
international mechanisms are subject to political manipulation and are used only in situations 
that suit the interests of some countries (…). (…)‘Our colleagues who did not vote in favour of 
the draft resolution have argued —as members have heard— that the Kenyan situation does not 
meet the threshold needed to trigger the application of article 16 of the Rome Statute. (…) That 
article was not proposed by an African State —not at all. It was proposed by some of the 
Western powers present at the Council table to be applied solely in their interest. In other words, 
article 16 was never meant to be used by an African State or any of the developing countries. It 
seems to have been conceived as an additional tool for the big powers to protect themselves and 
protect their own. Is that not so? That is how it appears here today. (…). Justice becomes so 
when the vulnerable and the strong have equal protection. It is unfortunate that the ICC will 
continue to lose face and credibility in the world as long as it continues to be used as a tool for 
the big powers against the developing nations. On the subject of the Court, let me say that, with 
respect to acting too precipitously, we have to be very careful about what the Council is stating. 
Let me say that, after five long years of procedures against Kenyan leaders, we were surprised 
that, suddenly, the ICC was willing to show flexibility on the very day that the African Contact 
Group was interacting with the Council. Whose hand was behind that? Why was it on that very 
day? Why did they decide that very day?  (…) So how can the Council explain to me the fact 
that, all of a sudden, the Prosecutor said: “You know what? Let me give you four months now. It 
is okay, you do not need to go and bother that exclusive club. No. Get out of there.”  (…) No, it 
cannot work and it cannot continue like this. The Group was also surprised, actually, to learn that 
members of the Council were aware of that issue. Indeed, they asked us about the decision to 
request a postponement of the commencement of the case against the President of Kenya even 
before the decision was actually taken. That raises serious questions concerning the 
independence of the handling of this case.1040 
In this regard, the AU has stressed “the need for international justice to be conducted in a 
transparent and fair manner, in order to avoid any perception of double standard”.1041 It has 
also claimed that indicting incumbent African leaders would constitute a threat to the 
sovereignty of African states, the integrity and dignity of the continent.1042  
It is submitted that the issue of the dignity of the continent relates to the colonial past of 
Africa. Colonialism as envisaged is perceived as a shame and a dishonor for the continent, 
                                                 
1040 SC 7060th meeting, S.PV/7060 (15 November 2013), at 10-12.  
1041Assembly/AU/DEC.482 (XXI), Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice and the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) (Doc. Assembly/AU/13 (XXI)), 21st Ordinary Session of the African Union, Addis Ababa 
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with the dehumanisation of its peoples. It is actually feared that another kind of domination 
(neocolonialism) resurges in Africa by means of international law and criminal justice. 
Powerful states are suspected to utilise the judicial way to get control of African states and 
their leaders. The ICC, which was a common enterprise, is arguably transformed de facto into 
a tool of neo-colonial agenda. This is exactly what President Paul Kagame said: “Rwanda 
cannot be part of that colonialism, slavery and imperialism”.1043 President Uhuru Kenyatta of 
Kenya, a state party, has also criticised the politicisation of the Court and claimed to have 
been victim of humiliations within and outside the ICC during the prosecutions brought 
against him.1044 According to him, the ICC is now used to try to provoke regime-changes in 
Africa or to secure countries favorable to policies of great powers.1045 
Another argument made by the AU is that the indictments of African leaders may endanger 
the poor security and stability within the continent. Yet, there is no need to give priority to 
expeditious justice in African countries where peace is not established. Therefore, the AU has 
averted the “strong (regional) conviction that the search for justice should be pursued in a way 
that does not impede or jeopardise efforts aimed at promoting lasting peace”.1046 In the same 
vein, the immunity of third state officials from the ICC jurisdiction must be respected. 
According to the AU, “article 98(1) was included in the Rome Statute (…) out of recognition 
that the Statute is not capable of removing an immunity which international law grants to the 
officials of states that are not parties to the Rome Statute (…)”.1047  
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It seems that the beneficiaries who are referred to are primarily the AU sitting heads of state 
or government or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity. In any case, the Court’s 
intervention should remain the last resort in accordance with the principle of 
complementarity.  
ii) The Avoidance of Positive Application of the Principle of Complementarity   
The avoidance to give positive effects to the principle of complementarity is another point of 
disagreement. As a reminder, the complementarity of the ICC jurisdiction requires that states 
primarily investigate and prosecute international crimes, whilst the Court is to intervene only 
when they fail to do so and as a mechanism of last resort. The avoidance of this principle 
which prioritises, towards the ICC, the respect of the sovereign right of states to suppress such 
crimes has been particularly posited in respect of the situations in Kenya (1°) and in Sudan 
(2°). 
1°) The Situation in Kenya 
Kenya ratified the ICC Statute on 15 March 2005. The ICC’s intervention in the country was 
caused by the events relating to the 2007-2008 post-electoral violence in which the right of 
Kenya to exercise its primacy rights to investigate and prosecute those persons allegedly 
responsible for crimes committed seems to have been disregarded or even denied. 
-  The Trigger of the ICC’s Intervention  
On 27 December 2007, Kenya organised the presidential election which turned to be a dual 
between the Party of National Unity (PNU), led by Mwai Kibaki, and the Orange Democratic 
Movement (OMD), headed by Raila Odiga. But, the election transformed itself into an ethnic 
contest. PNU was supported by the majority ethnic group Gikuyu, while ODM had most of its 
supporters from Kalenjin and Luo peoples. Mwai Kibaki, who was running for a second 
presidential mandate after the first one obtained in 2002, was announced the winner of the 
election by the Electoral Commission of Kenya on 31 December 2007. Raila Odinga and his 
ODM rejected this result and refused to go to court as he believed the judiciary was not 
independent to adjudicate fairly the matter. Soon after, the electoral contest left the place to 
post-election violence during which numerous offences amounting to crimes against humanity 
were allegedly committed (murders, rapes, pillages, destruction of private properties, etc.) by 
all sides to the crisis. Nairobi (capital city) and other five provinces, namely North Rift 
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Valley, Central Rift Valley, South Rift Valley, Nyanza Province and Western Province, were 
most affected.1048  
Violence lasted until 28 February 2008, when ODM and PNU finally concluded, out of the 
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR), an agreement under the AU mediation. 
Among other things, the KNDR agreement established a government coalition to rule the 
country, with Raila Odinga as Prime minister and a cabinet consisted of ministers from all 
sides. The agreement also established the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence 
(CIPEV) whose mandate covered the period between 28 December 2007 and 28 February 
2008. The Commission was put under the leadership of the Kenyan judge, Philip Waki. Hence 
the denomination Waki Commission. It released its report on 15 October 2008 recommending 
that Kenya established a special tribunal to prosecute crimes related to the post-electoral 
conflict. The recommendation was based on three main reasons.1049 First, there were doubts 
that the ICC Statute might be applicable to the situation in the absence of its legislative 
incorporation into the Kenyan legal order. Second, the International Crimes Act of 2008, 
which came into operation on 1 January 2009,1050 could not be retroactively applied. Third, 
the ICC Statute could not cover all the offenses and the Court could not prosecute all the 
presumed perpetrators. But, the failure by the Kenyan Parliament to create such a special 
tribunal, owing to general fears of a politicised and partial justice for one side to the crisis 
against the other,1051 pushed the said Waki Commission to send to the ICC Prosecutor its 
findings and a secret list of individuals whom it believed were most involved and responsible 
for the crimes allegedly committed. 
The ICC Prosecutor then accelerated the procedure. Upon his request of 26 November 2009, 
he received from the PTC, on 31 March 2010, the authorisation to investigate the alleged 
crimes against humanity related to the post-electoral violence, in the period fixed between 1 
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June 2005 and 26 November 2009.1052 Later, on 8 March 2011, six Kenyan individuals were 
summoned to appear before the Court, including Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, who 
became President and Deputy President of the country after winning the presidential election 
of March 2013.1053 Prior to these indictments, Kenya adopted a new Constitution in 2010 and 
reformed its judiciary. Among other innovations, a Supreme Court was created,1054 while the 
Constitution now provided that “the general rules of international law shall form part of the 
law of Kenya”.1055 According to a commentator, such rules refer to customary international 
law of which “(…) the Constitution envisages the direct and automatic application (…) within 
the municipal law of Kenya, without further legislative intervention”.1056 Instead, only treaties 
ratified by the country should need, in line with the dualist approach to international law, 
legislative domestication in order to be applied by the courts.1057 In the light of this political 
and legal development, the dissatisfaction with the ICC’s intervention in Kenya led to 
attempts aiming to preserve the right of Kenya to investigate and to prosecute itself the crimes 
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presumably committed. In the box before the ICC, only remained four individuals against 
whom charges were confirmed by the PTC which committed them to trials.1058 
- The Denial of Kenya’s Primary Jurisdictional Right 
Three different actions were taken in order to enable all criminal proceedings relating to the 
2007-2008 post-election violence to be conducted by Kenya itself. These actions are of 
political, diplomatic and judicial nature. But, none of them flourished.  
First of all, Kenya brought the matter to the AU. The Pan-African organisation then made the 
option that the ICC’s investigations and prosecutions should be deferred for two main 
reasons. On the one hand, it believed that deferral would allow for “a National Mechanism to 
investigate and prosecute the cases under a reformed judiciary provided for in the new 
constitutional dispensation, in line with the principle of complementarity”.1059 But, obviously, 
this reason is out of the reach of the Security Council which may act in this respect only if the 
suspension of ICC’s proceedings contributes to the maintenance of international peace and 
security in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. On the other hand, the AU 
considered that the deferral request worked “in support of the ongoing peace building and 
national reconciliation processes, in order to prevent the resumption of conflict and 
violence”.1060 In other words, as Ethiopia put it before the Security Council, the continuation 
of the ICC’s action constituted itself a threat to stability in Kenya and the African region, 
which were facing the threat of terrorism.1061 The reason is that the ICC targets sitting senior 
state officials with direct impact on the normal functioning of the Kenyan political institutions 
and so distracts these officials from discharging their political and constitutional duties to 
stabilise the country.1062 This deferral option was also supported by the East African 
                                                 
1058 For Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, see Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali (ICC-01/09-
02/11 ), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, Pre-
Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012, para.429; for William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang , see Ruto, Kosgey 
and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of 
the Rome Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012, paras.349, 366-367. 
1059 Assembly/AU/Dec.334(XVI), Decision on the Implementation of the Decisions on the International Criminal 
Court (Doc. EX.CL/639(XVIII)), 16th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa 
(Ethiopia), 30-31 January 2011, para.6.  
1060 Ibid. See also Assembly/AU/Dec.366 (XVII), above note 1030, para.4.  
1061 SC 7060th meeting, S.PV/7060, above note 1040, at 15.  
1062 Ibid. 
208 
Community.1063 In any event, the latter community suggested it could take with it the 
investigation and the prosecution in the place of Kenya, even though it had beforehand to 
confer to the East African Court of Justice criminal jurisdiction to this effect.1064  
In practice, the AU request was submitted to the Security Council by Azerbaijan, Burundi, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Togo and Uganda. But, the related draft resolution deferring investigation and prosecution 
against President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto was rejected.1065 
Among members of the Security Council, none voted against, while votes in favour from 
Azerbaijan, China, Morocco, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Rwanda and Togo turned to be 
in the minority given the abstentions of eight members, including all western powers 
(Argentina, Australia, France, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America).1066 
Second, the diplomatic dialogue with the ICC had also failed. On 29 July 2013, the President 
of the Court, Judge Song Sang-Hyun, rightly notified to the AU delegation that “the judicial 
nature of ICC does not allow it to take into account matters of a political nature”1067 and that 
only the Security Council could defer cases under the Statute.1068 But, the Prosecutor’s 
sensitivity to the AU request was disappointing while he possessed a margin of appreciation 
to suspend the investigation or the prosecution, before any judicial escalation, in order to 
allow positive application of the contended complementarity principle and so to cool down 
the tension with Africa. In her response to the AU delegation, Fatou Bensouda maintained, 
like the President of the Court, that Kenya should go to the Security Council for any matter of 
deferral.1069 Furthermore, she made the observation that if Kenya had the primary 
responsibility to investigate and prosecute, article 143 (1) of its Constitution of 2010 
precluded criminal proceedings against the President or a person performing the function of 
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1065 SC 7060th meeting, S.PV/7060, above note 1040, at 2. 
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1067 Executive Council of the African Union, ‘Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the 
Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.482 (XXI) on International Jurisdiction, Justice and the International Criminal 
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that office during their tenure of office.1070 But, she omitted that the same Constitution 
specified that “the immunity of the President under this article shall not extend to a crime for 
which the President may be prosecuted under any treaty to which Kenya is party and which 
prohibits such immunity”.1071  
Third, the remaining option was to challenge the admissibility of the cases before the Court. 
On 31 March 2011, Kenya filed to the PTC an application to this effect on the basis of article 
19 (2) (b) of the ICC Statute. This article provides that “a State which has jurisdiction over a 
case, on the ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or 
prosecuted” may submit such an application to the Court. The whole debate focused on the 
potential inadmissibility of the cases on the basis of article 17 (1) (a) of the Statute.1072 
According to this provision, there is inadmissibility where “the case is being investigated or 
prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution”. In this regard, Kenya claimed it was 
willing and able, after the enactment of the new Constitution and the judicial reform of 2010, 
to carry out its own investigations and prosecutions.1073 In support of this claim, Kenya 
argued before the PTC that its competent authorities have opened investigations in the 2007-
2008 post-election violence and that it would undertake further investigations1074 for the 
success of which it requested the Court’s assistance through the transmission of all 
statements, documents and other types of evidence obtained by the Prosecutor.1075 It 
committed itself to provide detailed progress reports on its own proceedings and readiness for 
trials to the Court by the end of July, August and September 2011, regarding their extensions 
to those suspects at the highest state level, who might be responsible for crimes 
committed.1076 According to Kenya, it was not necessary that the state which claimed its 
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1072 Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-101), Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya 
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Trial Chamber II, 30 May 2011, para.46. 
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jurisdictional power investigate the same conducts and the same accused persons before the 
ICC. This is because the Court’s determination must rely on the relevant state’s proceeding at 
the time of the admissibility challenge.1077 For Kenya, the investigation of the same conduct 
in respect of persons at the same level in the hierarchy would be therefore sufficient to declare 
the cases inadmissible under article 17 (1) (a) of the Statute.1078  
The PTC rejected the Kenyan application on 30 May 2011. First, it recalled the jurisprudence 
of the Appeals Chamber in Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui case regarding the 
three dimensions of the issue of complementarity under article 17 (1) (a) of the Statute, 
namely inaction of the state, unwillingness and inability.1079 It found that Kenya was not 
investigating or prosecuting the same case and so, because of this inaction, the question of 
unwillingness or inability on its side was not at issue.1080 Second, for the PTC, to determine 
whether Kenya was investigating the same case or not, it applied the “same conduct/same 
person” test. This test requires that, at the stage of prosecutions of indentified individual 
suspects in concrete cases,1081 national investigations covered, for the question of 
inadmissibility, not only the same conducts but also the same suspects brought before the 
Court.1082 The PTC held that the request of the Court’s judicial assistance was a different 
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1080Ibid., para.70 and para.66.  
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issue pertaining to cooperation with states parties and so did not have any relevance to the 
matter of admissibility.1083 The impugned decision was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber 
on 30 August 2011.1084      
One of the three judges of the Appeals Chamber, Anita Ušacka, dissented with the majority 
decisions. The central argument in her opinion was that neither the PTC nor the Appeals 
Chamber gave sufficient weight to the sovereign right of Kenya to investigate and to 
prosecute, in line with the principle of complementarity, in balancing the interests at stake.1085 
The strict focus, without any adaptability to changing circumstances, on the non-existence of 
investigations into the same conducts and covering the accused persons before the Court was, 
according to her, a misapprehension of the issue,1086 while anything indicated that the 
appellant state was not acting in good faith when stating that it intended to conduct 
investigations in Kenya.1087 In the words of Charles C. Jalloh, the Court’s approach actually 
turns the principle of complementarity into primacy of the ICC.1088 He writes: 
(…) the Court lost an opportunity to breathe life into the oft view of the ambit of the provision in 
an effect to encourage or promote national attempts to prosecute. In its interpretative stance, the 
Appeals Chamber gave itself wide latitude that could be invoked to engage in outright judicial 
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1088 C.C. Jalloh, ‘Kenya vs. The ICC Prosecutor’, 53 Harvard International Law Journal (2012) 269-285, at 276. 
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rejection of any legitimate national attempt to prosecute crimes that occur within a state thereby 
effectively turning complementarity into primacy.1089  
Moreover, the material content of the “same conduct/same person” test is much criticised in 
the scholarship.1090 For example, concerning the so-called “same conduct” test, William A. 
Schabas has warned that the determination of admissibility should not be reduced to “a 
mechanistic comparison of charges in the national and the international jurisdiction”.1091 
Rather, this determination “must involve an assessment of the relative gravity of the offenses 
tried by national jurisdiction put alongside those of the international jurisdiction, in order to 
see whether a crime contemplated by the Rome Statute is being prosecuted directly or even 
indirectly”.1092 That gravity criterion can be established on a case-by-case basis. Factors such 
as the types of charges, the number of incidents, the manner of commission of crimes or their 
impact on victims may be taken into consideration. But, another position suggests a sentence-
based approach for offenses to be tried by a national jurisdiction, compared with the sentence 
the perpetrator would have received if he was tried by the ICC.1093 This approach might be 
particularly relevant in the event of the ICC’s intervention in a state which may not have the 
corresponding legislation on international crimes, like a given state not party to the Court’s 
Statute, but which investigates or prosecutes them as ordinary offenses under its domestic 
law. Linked to this critique, the “same conduct/same person” test is also very strict in that it 
could deny the possibility for competent national authorities to investigate other crimes or to 
prosecute individuals other than those who are tried by the ICC without that being dictated by 
the independent national appreciation of the situation or the case in the light of available 
factual, evidentiary and normative data. According to Kevin Jon Heller, “adopting a 
complementarity heuristic that provides states with maximum flexibility to prosecute 
international crimes as ordinary crimes will level the complementarity playing-field between 
Western and non-Western states”1094 and could also increase the willingness of non-member 
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states to ratify the Court’s Statute.1095 But, this approach could not be applied to all cases.1096 
According to Carsten Stahn, “a case-by-case assessment, which makes best use of the existing 
flexibility under the Statute and takes into account “sentencing” criteria as part of the 
admissibility criteria under Article 17, might in the end present a more nuanced and suitable 
approach”.1097 
Thus, considering the failure to give positive effect to the principle of complementarity in the 
situation in Kenya, the AU averted its deep regret that the decisions of the ICC on the 
admissibility challenge of the cases, dated 30 May and 30 August 2011 respectively, “denied 
the right of Kenya to prosecute and try alleged perpetrators of crimes committed on its 
territory in relation to the 2007 post-election violence”.1098 A similar criticism pertains to the 
situation in Sudan.  
2°) The Situation in Sudan 
The ICC intervened in Sudan in relation to the armed conflict which broke out in February 
2003 in the west region of Darfur, where hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians were 
reportedly said to have been killed. The armed conflict opposed the Sudan People’s Armed 
Forces (the Sudanese Armed Forces) and the Popular Defence Force (PDF) along with the 
Janjaweed militia against several rebel groups, including the Sudanese Liberation 
Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Unlike Kenya, 
Sudan is not a state party to the ICC Statute. The situation in Darfur was referred to the ICC 
Prosecutor, out of the recommendation of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on 
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Darfur,1099 by the Security Council on 31 March 2005.1100 The ICC jurisdiction extends to 
crimes that have been committed in Darfur since 1 July 2002.1101 The investigations 
commenced on 1 June 2005 and resulted in the indictments of six Sudan nationals, including 
its head of state, the former Minister of interior affairs (Ahmad Harun), the former Special 
Representative of the President in Darfur (Muhammad Hussein), one of the leaders of the 
Janjaweed militia (Ali Kushayb) and two rebels (Abu Garda and Abdallah Banda).1102  
Like the situation in Kenya, the AU invoked primary jurisdiction of Sudan to investigate or 
prosecute crimes committed in Darfur region, without prejudice to the achievement of the 
peace and reconciliation process of the Sudanese people. In fact, the PSC urged the 
government of Sudan in its Communiqué of 21 July 2008, which was endorsed by the AU 
Assembly in February 2009, “to take immediate and concrete steps to investigate and bring 
the perpetrators (of serious crimes) to justice and to take advantage of the availability of 
qualified lawyers to be seconded by the AU and the League of Arab States (…)”.1103 Clearly, 
the continental organisation intended to support the Sudanese efforts to ensure justice, which 
had taken an important step with the establishment of the Special Criminal Court on the 
Events in Darfur (SCCED) with jurisdiction to deal with international crimes since 7 June 
2005. In contrast, the ICC abstained from supporting this Sudanese initiative. Yet, until the 
situation escalated before the ICC with the indictment of President Omar Al Bashir, Sudan 
was cooperating with the Court and even the Prosecutor acknowledged that he had received 
relevant details on ongoing national investigations and prosecutions against the alleged 
perpetrators of crimes in Darfur from Sudanese authorities.1104 For example, the ICC 
Prosecutor received such details in relation to Ali Kushayb who was arrested on 26 November 
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2006.1105 But, the Prosecutor submitted to the PTC and the latter Chamber agreed with him 
that Sudanese proceedings did not cover the same conduct, namely the same counts of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity which were the subject of the case before the ICC.1106 
True, the AU itself recognised the operational difficulties of the SCCED. Its own High-Level 
Panel on Darfur,1107 which had been established by the PSC on 21 July 2008,1108 and chaired 
by the former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, noted: 
The SCCED initially operated as a roving court. It has dealt with cases in the three capitals of the 
states of Darfur: El Fasher, Nyala, and El Geneina. As a Darfur‐wide court, it would have been 
expected to have a full docket with cases across the three states. However, during its visits to 
Darfur, the Panel did not find evidence of the kind of judicial activity, which the situation in 
Darfur ought to have generated. It was reported to the Panel that only 13 cases had come before 
the SCCED thus far; that these cases all involved ordinary crimes; and, that the only charges 
relating to a large‐scale attack against civilians – the usual subject matter of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity – led only to convictions on theft that allegedly took place after the 
attack. Whatever the reasons cited for this outcome it was quite clear to all observers that the 
SCCED has so far accomplished very little. The major violations in Darfur have yet to be the 
subject of any serious judicial process.
1109
 
But, in order to support the Sudanese efforts to ensure national criminal accountability in hard 
manageable cases, the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur came up with new proposals. In its 
report, entitled “Darfur: the Quest for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation”,1110 it proposed an 
integrated “Justice and Reconciliation Response to Darfur (JRRD)”1111 in the place of the ICC 
in order to fight impunity and to achieve peace and reconciliation in Sudan. This mechanism 
could have consisted of four interconnected parts. First, a comprehensive, independent and 
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integrated national criminal justice process which includes investigations and re‐invigoration 
of all aspects of the SCCED “as the principal forum for delivering criminal justice for crimes 
relating to the conflict in Darfur”.1112 Second, Soudan could establish a Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission (TJRC).1113 Third, the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur 
recommended the creation of a Hybrid Criminal Court (AU-Sudan) which could be 
empowered to exercise “original and appellate jurisdiction over individuals who appear to 
bear particular responsibility for the gravest crimes committed during the conflict in Darfur, 
and to be constituted by judges of Sudanese and other nationalities”,1114 but all of them being 
Africans.1115 Fourth, the remaining job would be left to other “traditional mechanisms of 
justice to deal with those perpetrators who appear to bear responsibility for crimes other than 
the most serious violations”.1116 Seemingly, the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur excluded the 
ICC in its proposed JRRD for various reasons. Above all, this Court had already raised 
contestations and credibility problems in Sudan. Then, though important for the situation in 
Darfur, the ICC is a jurisdiction of last resort. Finally, the report above noted that this Court 
was obliged “to take into consideration the fact that a state had taken or was taking effective 
justice measures to deal with relevant crimes”,1117 according to the principle of (positive) 
complementarity.  
However, again, the ICC did not support the AU proposals. It preferred to stick on the radical 
judicial interpretation of the principle of complementarity principle, with the “same 
conduct/same person” test. De facto, its actions became a response in contradiction with the 
AU JRRD; what might not have been the intent of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry 
on Darfur, chaired by the late Italian judge, Antonio Cassesse,1118 when it recommended that 
the Security Council referred the situation to the Prosecutor.     




1115 Ibid., para.331. 
1116 Ibid., para.337. 
1117 Ibid., para.339. 
1118 United Nations, ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Secretary-General, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004’ (25 January 2005), 
para.647. 
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Therefore, given the judicial escalation at the ICC, the AU made further steps in the 
radicalisation of its position. It formulated three principal responsive measures “in order to 
preserve and safeguard the dignity, sovereignty and integrity of the continent”.1119 First of all, 
this time it requested the Security Council to defer, pursuant to article 16 of the ICC Statute, 
all the situations in which cases had been initiated against sitting African heads of state 
(Sudan, Libya and Kenya).1120 Secondly, the AU decided that no African states should 
comply with ICC’s arrest warrants against President Omar Al Bashir and the Libyan leader, 
Muhammar Kadhafi, before his death.1121 Thirdly, the understanding of the immunity regime 
was extended to include senior officials of any AU member states and thus would require the 
amendment of article 27 (2) of the ICC Statute.1122 Against this position, many voices have 
risen to defend the ICC. What are the counter-arguments presented?   
2.2.2.2. The Defence of the Court  
Counter-arguments to African criticisms can be split in three groups: the alleged continuing 
support for the ICC in Africa (a), the vindication of the Office of the Prosecutor (b) and the 
search for justice before any political concern over peace (c). 
a) The Continuing Support for the ICC in Africa 
Presumably, the matter of African contestations against the ICC was underestimated. There 
have been advanced perceptions of division based on a pluralism of views on the Court in 
Africa.1123 In this regard, the AU’s position can be perceived to be distinct from the one of 
individual states or the position which is shared by the African peoples and civil society 
organisations. Arguably, one has to distinguish the AU’s contestations and the civil society’s 
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voices approving the ICC’s interventions in Africa.1124 Therefore, a number of authors 
suggest that despite criticisms, there is still a strong support for the Court across the 
continent.1125  
However, this perception of division is actually inconsistent with the facts. First of all, it is 
worthy to recall that this Court owes its legal existence to the will of sovereign states, whose 
governments are supposed to be representative of their peoples. In this representation 
function, they do not go in competition with any civil society organisation, no matter how 
important it is. The ICC remained an interstate jurisdiction, created on the basis of an 
international treaty.   
Secondly, the AU and its member states are not against the ICC as such. They simply 
disapprove a part of its proceedings and judicial strategy in Africa. True, there have been 
attempts by some states (Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Namibia, South Africa, 
etc.) to incite the entire regional group to reject and withdraw from the institution. However, 
this incitation may just remain a political and diplomatic instrument to pressure that African 
protests, requests and proposals for reform are duly considered by other ICC’s member states 
and the rest of the international community, beginning by the Security Council. Still, Africa 
strongly needs justice to tackle mass atrocities across the continent and the ICC may continue 
to play a role in the matter. This explains why many African states have continued to stress 
the ICC importance during sessions of the ASP. Despite the crisis, some others countries have 
decided to refer new situations to the Prosecutor (Comoros, Mali and CAR II),1126 to actively 
cooperate with the Court in specific cases (DRC and Uganda), to ratify the Rome Statute 
(Seychelles, Tunisia, Cape Verde and Ivory Coast)1127 or to adopt domestic legislation to 
implement the ICC Statute at the national levels (Uganda and DRC).1128   
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Thirdly, it is a matter of fact that the Common African Position on the ICC, replaced in a 
plural Africa, may sometimes be violated by a few number of states or denounced by some 
civil society organisations. But these violations and denouncements evidence the strength of 
the AU position, which is combated, rather than a strong support for the ICC’s controversial 
work on the continent. True, some disagreements appear between states from time to time 
about complying with the arrest warrants against President Omar Al Bashir.1129 Chad entered 
reservation to the AU non-cooperation decision in July 2009,1130 but it did not maintain such 
reservation to similar subsequent regional decisions. Botswana also made a reservation to the 
entire decision of May 2013, concerning the request for deferral of the situations in Kenya 
and Sudan by the Security Council, the claim for the primary jurisdiction of Kenya in line 
with the complementarity principle and the disapproval of the alleged misuse of indictments 
against African leaders.1131 But, like Djibouti, Kenya, Malawi, the DRC, South Africa and 
many other countries, visited by Omar Al Bashir, Chad changed its position and chose to obey 
the AU decisions,1132 despite regular ICC’s protests and notifications of non-cooperation to 
the Assembly of States Parties and the Security Council.  
Finally, the tension between the AU and the ICC shows that the Court is not powerful enough 
to work against the will of independent states and without sufficient regional support. There is 
always a need for a dialogue and common understanding with the most interested actors in the 
region concerned in order to ensure the success of judicial actions.1133 That could have 
avoided the suspension of the investigations in the Darfur region in Sudan on 12 December 
                                                                                                                                                        
Decree of 30 January 1940 Laying down the Congolese Penal Code, Law No.15/023 of 31 December 2015 
Modifying the Law No.024-2002 of 18 November 2002 Laying down the Congolese Military Criminal Code, 
and Law No.15/024 of 31 December 2015 Modifying and Complementing the Decree of 6 August 1959 Laying 
down the Congolese Code of Criminal Procedure.  
1129 See P.A. Kasaija, ‘Kenya’s Provisional Warrant of Arrest for President Omar al Bashir of the Republic of 
Sudan’, 12 (2) African Human Rights Law Journal (2012) 623-640, at 623-640.  
1130 Assembly/AU/Dec.245 (XIII) Rev.1, above note 1119. 
1131Assembly/AU/DEC.482 (XXI), above note 1041. 
1132 See P. Oyugi, ‘Cooperation Disputes between African States Parties to the Rome Statute and the 
International Criminal Court: Is the End Anywhere Near?’, 2 Speculum Juris (2014) 123-142, at 125-141.  
1133 A. Fall, ‘Improving Political Dialogue to Address Contentious Issues: the Case of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC)’, 6(1) The Bulletin of Fridays of the Commission (AU) (2014) 41-44.  
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2014,1134 while the Prosecutor had already withdrawn charges against President Uhuru 
Kenyatta on 5 December 2014 on the ground of a lack of evidence,1135 in the absence of 
witnesses willing and free from Kenyan pressure to testify before the Court. In the AU’s view, 
a similar withdrawal must apply to the Kenyan Deputy President, William Ruto.1136 On 5 
April 2016, the Trial Chamber vacated the charges against him and his co-accused, Joshua 
Sang. It terminated the case without prejudice to re-prosecution, not because of the AU call as 
such,1137 but given the fact that the Prosecutor did not present sufficient evidence on which 
the conviction could be have based,1138 mainly due to much obstruction to justice on the part 
of Kenya. This collapse of cases can also be a product of bad judicial strategies, which hinder 
the judicial cooperation because of the stubborn opposition between the Court and its 
member. Yet, the proceedings could have made progress in Kenya, with the ICC’s support, 
had the complementarity principle been interpreted and applied with much flexibility. 
Anyway, there is still a trend to vindicate the Office of the Prosecutor.  
b) The Attempt to Vindicate the Office of the Prosecutor 
Here, the argument suggests that the Prosecutor and his office have nothing to do with 
African contestations. It is argued that African situations have been initiated by states 
themselves or with their support or through referrals by the Security Council. This argument 
though formally tenable is extremely fallacious in its merits. In fact, Africa’s criticisms do not 
hinge on referrals of African situations to the ICC, including those by the Security Council 
which African member states have also voted for.1139 It is not right to argue that the 
Prosecutor and his office are blamed for referrals of African situations to the Court by African 
                                                 
1134 D. Smith, ‘ICC Chief Prosecutor Shelves War Crimes Probe’, The Guardian (14 December 2014), 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/14/icc-darfur-war-crimes-fatou-bensouda-sudan> accessed 12 
March 2015. 
1135 Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-1005), Decision on the Withdrawal of Charges against Mr. Kenyatta, Trial 
Chamber V (B), 13 March 2015, para.4. 
1136 Assembly/AU/DEC.547 (XXIV), above note 1032, para.8. 
1137 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-2027), Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, Trial 
Chamber V(A), 5 April 2016, paras.211-2014. 
1138 Ibid., para.464. 
1139 For the referral of the situation in Sudan, Benin and Tanzania voted in favor of the resolution 1593 (31 
March 2005), while Algeria abstained. Instead,  for the situation in Libya, all African states voted unanimously 
for the resolution 1970 (26 February 2011): Gabon, Nigeria, South Africa,   
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states themselves or the Security Council.1140 Such statement sheds a deliberate confusion on 
the role of the Prosecutor, who is actually the central engine for the ICC’s success.1141 In fact, 
there is a distinction between the power to refer situations to the Court and the Prosecutor’s 
exclusive competence for the selection of cases. To this effect, the Prosecutor makes some 
discretionary choices of incidents to investigate, crimes and suspects to be brought before the 
Court. True, such exercise of discretionary powers cannot be envisaged as absolute,1142 
despite the Prosecutor’s independence which is a principle necessary for the flexibility, the 
adaptability and efficacy of the system of criminal justice.1143 But, some of his choices and 
assessment do not fall under judicial control. For instance, in the situation in Darfur, the 
Sudan Workers Trade Unions Federation and the Sudan International Defence Group sought 
to intervene as amici curiae, pursuant to rule 103 of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence,1144 to contend that the Prosecutor’s request for the indictment of President Omar Al 
Bashir (as well as several alleged commanders of organised armed groups in the Darfur 
region) and the issuance of an arrest warrant against him would not serve the interests of 
justice. The PTC dismissed the application, thereby refusing to grant a leave for that purpose, 
on the ground that the matters to which the applicants referred were “unrelated to any issue 
currently before the Chamber”,1145 relevant for the proper determination of the case. To come 
to this conclusion, the PTC held that it received powers to review only the Prosecutor’s 
decision not to proceed with an investigation or prosecution.1146 In particular, if he decides not 
to proceed in order to preserve the interest of justice according to available information in his 
                                                 
1140 Bensouda, above note 968, at 30. 
1141 H.-P. Kaul, ‘The International Criminal Court: Current Challenges and Perspectives’, 6 Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review (2007) 575-582, at 579. 
1142 See H. B. Jallow, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion and International Criminal Justice’, 3 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2005) 145-161, at 154-160. 
1143 Ibid., at 145-146 and 154. 
1144 This Rule which deals with ‘Amicus curiae and other forms of submission’ to the Court provides: ‘1.At any 
stage of the proceedings, a Chamber may, if it considers it desirable for the proper determination of the case, 
invite or grant leave to a State, organization or person to submit, in writing or orally, any observation on any 
issue that the Chamber deems appropriate.  2. The Prosecutor and the defence shall have the opportunity to 
respond to the observations submitted under sub-rule 1.  3. A written observation submitted under sub-rule 1 
shall be filed with the Registrar, who shall provide copies to the Prosecutor and the defence. The Chamber shall 
determine what time limits shall apply to the filing of such observations’. 
1145 Situation in Darfur, Sudan (ICC-02/05-185), Decision on Application under Rule 103, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
4 February 2009, para.32. 
1146 Ibid., para.21. 
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hands, the PTC may not confirm this decision,1147 but the Prosecutor remains free for 
subsequent analysis and considerations. Furthermore, if a case is initiated, the Chamber 
recalled that it was only competent to decide on the matter of admissibility1148 in accordance 
with article 19 (1) of the Court’s Statute.1149 However, it lacked the power to review the 
Prosecutor’s discretion in his assessment that the initiation of a given case would not be 
detrimental to the interests of justice.1150 That is his sole and full responsibility.1151   
Moreover, the selectivity of cases brought to the Court by the Prosecutor from the African 
situations is a concrete problem. It engenders a serious threat to the legitimacy of (global) 
international criminal justice (starting by its acceptance by interested stakeholders).1152 In fact, 
the Prosecutor’s judicial choice does not reflect the complexity of African crises and armed 
conflicts, whose actors are not exclusively Africans, even if the latter remain, in most cases, 
the primary actors directly responsible for atrocities. External participation in African crises 
and armed conflicts may take different forms: illicit trafficking of weapons likely to be used 
in the commission of crimes, illegal control over natural resources and illicit trade with armed 
groups in knowledge of the use of generated money in criminal activities, mercenarism, direct 
foreign military intervention, etc. For example, concerning Libya, the military campaign 
which overthrew Muhammar Kadhafi in 2011 implicated the governmental army against 
Libyan rebels, supported by a coalition of NATO member states, headed by the United States 
of America, the United Kingdom and France. This was the so-called NATO military 
“Operation Unified Protector”. At the Ivory Coast, and outside Ivoirians, two other forces 
were active in the country, namely the United Nations Peace Keeping Operation (ONUCI) 
since 27 February 2004, and the French troops acting in the framework of the so-called 
“Operation Licorne”, in the course of an armed conflict which had started in 2002 and 
officially ended on 11 April 2011 with the capture of defeated President Laurent Gbagbo.      
                                                 
1147 ICC Statute, Article 53 (3) (b). 
1148Situation in Darfur, Sudan, above note 1145, paras.24-25.   
1149 This provision states: ‘The Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it. The 
Court may, on its own motion, determine the admissibility of a case in accordance with article 17’. The latter 
Article 17 alludes to issues of admissibility, that is to say the Court’s competence in relation with the principle of 
complementarity, including the gravity of crimes at stake.  
1150Situation in Darfur, Sudan, above note 1145, para.29.  
1151 Ibid., para.30. 
1152 M. M. deGuzman, ‘Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court’, 33 (2) 
Michigan Journal of International Law (2012) 265-320, at 271-274.  
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In the judicial field, the situation in Libya shows that non-Africans could also face ICC 
proceedings. The fact that there were contradictory reports on eventual crimes by NATO 
forces in this country1153 could have motivated the Prosecutor to have his own in-depth sight 
into the matter. But, this kind of failure or reluctance to investigate or to prosecute crimes 
potentially committed by powerful states is not new. The ICTY Prosecutor also refused to 
investigate NATO alleged crimes committed during the war and air bombings campaign 
against the former Yugoslavia from 24 March to 9 June 1999.1154 In the situation in Libya, a 
counter-argument could be found in the complementarity principle which may have prevented 
the ICC from investigating alleged committed crimes in favour of national jurisdictions. 
However, none of the concerned NATO member states (especially those which are parties to 
                                                 
1153 The Human Rights Council of the United Nations Inquiry Commission has Vindicated NATO Forces. See 
UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to Investigate all Alleged 
Violations of International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ (1 June 2011) A/HRC/17/44, at 6; 
UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya’ (18 March 2012) 
A/HRC/19/68, at 17 and 21. Reversely, findings in a report issued by some organisations appertaining to the 
Arab civil society, with participation of one Sweden civil organisation, have incriminated NATO forces. See 
Arab Organisation for Human Rights (AOHR), Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) and International 
Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC), ‘Report of  the Independent Civil Society Fact-Finding Mission to Libya’ 
(January 2012), para.196, at 201-204 <http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/2012/FFM_Libya-Report.pdf> accessed 26 
September 2015.   
1154 The Office of the Prosecutor first established an internal inquiry committee with the mandate ‘to assess the 
allegations and material accompanying them, and advise the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor whether or not 
there is a sufficient basis to proceed with an investigation into some or all the allegations or into other incidents 
related to the NATO bombing’ (para.3 of the report below). The Prosecutor then hid himself behind the report 
delivered by this committee which simply vindicated NATO forces as follows: ‘[…]the committee is of the 
opinion that neither an in-depth investigation related to the bombing campaign as a whole nor investigations 
related to specific incidents are justified. In all cases, either the law is not sufficiently clear or investigations are 
unlikely to result in the acquisition of sufficient evidence to substantiate charges against high level accused or 
against lower accused for particularly heinous offences’ (para.90). Therefore, the committee recommended that 
no investigation be commenced by the Office of the Prosecutor (para.91). See International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia, ‘Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ (8 June 2000), 
<http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/IM/ISSMI/Corsi/Corso_Consigliere_Giuridico/Documents/72470_final_rep
ort.pdf> accessed 25 September 2015. See also A-S. Massa, ‘NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo and the Decision 
of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia not to Investigate: an 
Abusive Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion’, 44 (2) Berkeley Journal of International Law (2006) 610-649, at 
627-633 and 643-646.    
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the Rome Statute) seems to have initiated genuine criminal proceedings in this regard, despite 
several calls for investigations and eventual prosecutions by two authoritative western NGOs, 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.1155 Obviously, there is a lack of (political) 
will to investigate and/or to prosecute the potential offenders. The same criticism applies to 
the situation at the Ivory Coast, where the French played a crucial military role during the 
armed conflict and particularly during the 2010-2011 post-electoral violence. Criminal 
investigations have been requested even by some French parliamentarians themselves, but to 
no avail.1156  
The initiation of cases concerning non-African suspects could also be possible in the situation 
in the DRC, which involves a wide regional and international participation –direct or indirect 
–in atrocities.1157 The Prosecutor has chosen, outside those who had sponsored violence there, 
to focus on small fishes from the Ituri region, namely Thomas Lubanga, Bosco Ntaganda (his 
Rwandan presumed co-author), Germain Katanga and the acquitted Mathieu Ngudjolo. 
Worse, since the Congolese self-referral of 19 April 2004, he has done nothing so far, with his 
unfinished investigations, for the appalling events which continue to strike innocent civilians 
in northern Katanga, North and South Kivu provinces, except prosecutions of two presumed 
                                                 
1155 Amnesty International, ‘Libya: the Forgotten Victims of NATO Strikes’ (March 2012), 
<http://www.amnesty.ch/de/laender/naher-osten-nordafrika/libyen/nato-einsatz-die-vergessenen-opfer/bericht-
libya-the-forgotten-victims-of-nato-strikes-.-maerz-2012.-22-seiten> accessed 25 September 2015; Human 
Rights Watch, ‘Unacknowledged Deaths: Civilian Casualties in NATO’s Air Campaign in Libya’ (May 2012), 
<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya0512webwcover.pdf> accessed 25 September 2015. In this 
regard, Amnesty International called on NATO to ‘ensure that prompt, independent, impartial and thorough 
investigations are conducted into any allegations which may arise of serious violations of international law by 
participants in Operation Unified Protector and that the findings be publicly disclosed, and wherever there is 
sufficient admissible evidence, ensure that suspects are prosecuted in proceedings that fully comply with 
international fair trial standards’ (ibid.). And Human Right Watch recommended to NATO to ‘conduct 
transparent and impartial investigations into credible allegations of laws-of-war violations during NATO’s air 
war in Libya. Make public the findings and include recommendations for disciplinary measures or criminal 
prosecutions where violations are found’ (Ibid).     
1156 France, ‘Assemblée nationale : Proposition de résolution visant à créer une commission d’enquête sur le rôle 
de la Force Licorne en Côte d’Ivoire’ N° 131 (26 juillet 2012), at 5-7 <http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/14/pdf/propositions/pion0131.pdf> accessed 26 March 2015. 
1157 J. B. Mbokani, ‘La Cour pénale internationale: une Cour contre les Africains ou une Cour attentive à la 
souffrance des victimes africaines’, 26 (2) Revue québécoise de droit international  (2013) 47-100, at 75-76. 
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leaders of the Rwandan rebellion (Callixte Mbarushimana and Sylvestre Mudacumura),1158 
but quite second figures of the Congo tragedy. 
Outside Africa, the Prosecutor can be blamed for his lack of initiative1159 where the criteria 
for the exercise of his powers are met: ICC jurisdiction, admissibility conditions 
(complementarity and gravity) and the interests of justice. Some preliminary examinations 
that have been opened either late and suspiciously in reaction to African criticisms or on 
communications by human rights organisations cannot be an excuse for him and his office.1160 
c) The Interaction between Peace and Justice   
If a court does not rely on a good prosecutor, the latter can blemish the reputation of the entire 
institution. He should be independent of mind, vigorous and firm in his judicial choices, 
cooperative, political, diplomat and strategist. These qualities are required by the state of the 
                                                 
1158 While Sylvestre Mudacumura is at large since the issuance of the arrest warrant of 12 July 2012, the Pre-
Trial Chamber declined to confirm charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity against Callixte 
Mbarushimana – and the decision was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber- given that that the evidence 
submitted by the Prosecution was not sufficient to establish substantial grounds to believe that the accused was 
responsible within the meaning of Article 25 (3) (d) of the ICC Statute. The latter provision prescribes: ‘In 
accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: (…) In any other way contributes to the commission or 
attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution 
shall be intentional and shall either: (i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal 
purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime’. See 
Mbarushimana (ICC-01/04-01/10), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 16 
December 2011, para.339-340; Mbarushimana (ICC-01/04-01/10 OA 4), Judgment on the appeal of the 
Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on the 
confirmation of charges", Appeals Chamber, 30 May 2012, para.70. 
1159 R. Adjovi, ‘L’Afrique et le droit international pénal’, 17 African Yearbook of International Law (2011) 3-11, 
at 10.  
1160 By the end of August 2017, here are the on-going preliminary examinations: Afghanistan (2007), Colombia 
(2012), Iraq (re-opening in 2014 after closing in 2006), Ukraine (2014), Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece 
and Cambodia (re-opened in 2015 after closing in 2013) and Palestine (2015). Moreover, the preliminary 
examination of the situation in Georgia commenced on 14 August 2008 and resulted into investigation 
proceedings only on 27 January 2016, i.e. more than seven years later. Other preliminary examinations of 
situations in the Republic of Korea (2011), Honduras (2010) and Venezuela (2006) have also been closed owing 
to the lack of reasonable basis to initiate investigations.   
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international relations in which the ICC operates, i.e. a politicised international society whose 
principal actors remain sovereign states, having diverging interests of every kind. Hence, the 
ICC Prosecutor must be aware of all the stakes, and political ones in particular, which may 
derive from his judicial action and take all the relevant contextual factors into consideration. 
He should not hide himself behind abstract and strict interpretation of formal provisions of the 
Court’s Statute, while making unwise assessments and judicial choices.    
If a crime is alleged to have been committed, nothing in the ICC Statute prevents the 
Prosecutor from initiating investigations or prosecutions with due regard to contextual factors 
on the ground,1161 particularly peace process negotiations or agreement.1162 No deadline is 
fixed between the commencement of investigations and when indictments may be launched. 
In addition, the expression “interests of justice” to which it is referred in article 53 (1) (c) and 
(2) (c) of the Court’s Statute for the exercise of the Prosecutor’s discretionary powers could 
receive a broad interpretation to allow, on a case-by-case evaluation, a decline of 
investigations or prosecution for the purpose of peace promotion. This could notably be the 
case if the proceedings might lead to the indictments and/or the issuance of arrest warrants 
against senior officials of states subject to armed conflicts or instability. Formally, the room 
exists for the Prosecutor. On the one hand, his assessment of whether the initiation of an 
investigation could not serve the interests of justice must be based on a number of factors. 
Article 53 (1) (c) expressly quotes the gravity of the crime (scale, nature, manner of 
commission of the crimes, and their impact) and the interests of victims.1163 But nothing 
indicates that these factors are exhaustive for the Prosecutor’s evaluation that “there are 
                                                 
1161 T. Murithi, ‘Ensuring Peace and Reconciliation while Holding Leaders Accountable: the Politics of ICC 
Cases in Kenya and Sudan’ (CODESRIA Conference on International Justice, Reconciliation and Peace in 
Africa: the ICC and Beyond, Dakar, 10-12 July 2014), at 21 
<http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/14_tim_murithi.pdf> accessed 16 April 2015.     
1162 L. A. Nkansah, ‘International Criminal Court in the Trenches of Africa’, 1 (1) African Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2014) 8-37, at 34 and 36. 
1163 In its Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations of November 2013, it is explained: ‘Pursuant to article 
53(1)(c), the Office will consider, in particular, the interests of victims, including the views expressed by the 
victims themselves as well as by trusted representatives and other relevant actors such as community, religious, 
political or tribal leaders, States, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations’. See International 
Criminal Court, ‘Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’ (November 2013), para.68 <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Documents/OTP%20Preliminary%20Examinati
ons/OTP%20-%20Policy%20Paper%20Preliminary%20Examinations%20%202013.pdf> accessed 27 March 
2015. 
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nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of 
justice”.1164 It seems that he may take into account other factors,1165 including the promotion 
of peace and security or national reconciliation processes. On the other hand, article 53 (2) (c) 
precisely requires him to consider “all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, 
the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role 
in the alleged crime”1166 when he concludes, upon investigation, that there is not a sufficient 
basis for a prosecution. The use of the word “including” clearly indicates that the list of 
factors that have been quoted is not exhaustive. The reason why a wide interpretation of the 
expression “interests of justice” may be specifically relevant in respect of Africa is that 
African leaders (beginning by heads of state or government) need to receive positive support 
to stabilise their fragile countries rather than putting oil on the fire through expeditious 
prosecutions.   
It is a concern that the Prosecutor maintains that “interests of justice” are not “interests of 
peace”,1167 while the ICC Statute has connected both indirectly in the preamble1168 and 
expressly in article 16.1169 Regarding this apparent conflicting relationship between peace and 
justice, a commentator has assumed that because of the duty upon states to investigate and to 
prosecute serious international crimes, there is a presumption in favour of prosecution.1170 
                                                 
1164Article 53 (1) (c) reads as follows:  ‘(…) In deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall 
consider whether: Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless 
substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice’. 
1165 F.M. Rashid, ‘The Interests of Justice under the ICC Prosecutor Power: Escaping Forward’, in C. Esin, J. 
Johanssen, C. Lake, P. Schwartz, M. Tamboukou and F.M. Rashid (eds), Crossing Conceptual Boundaries ( 
London: University of East London, 2013) 53-69, at 55. 
1166 Article 53 (2) (c) provides: ‘If, upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that there is not a sufficient 
basis for a prosecution because: A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the 
circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged 
perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime;’. Emphasis is mine. 
1167 International Criminal Court, above note 1163, para.69; ‘Policy Paper on the Interest of Justice’ (September 
2007), at 1 <http://icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/organs/otp/ICC-OTP-InterestsOfJustice.pdf> accessed 27 
March 2015.  
1168 ICC Statute, Preamble, paras.3-5.   
1169 This is the case of deferral of investigations or prosecutions by the Security Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.  
1170 M. Du Plessis, ‘A Critical Appraisal of Africa’s Response to the World’s First Permanent International 
Criminal Court’ (PhD Thesis through Publications, University of KwaZulu-Natal 2011), at 141. 
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But, this statement is based on a narrow conception of justice, which cannot be reduced to 
criminal prosecutions. Instead, the relationship may imply that (criminal) justice does not 
prevail over peace and vice versa, but both values should work together, and this connection 
must be each time reflected in a well-balanced prosecutorial strategy. Promoting peace, 
security and stability can be at least part of the interests of victims and then a substantial 
reason to believe that continuing investigations or prosecutions could not serve the interests of 
justice. 
The AU High-Level Panel on Darfur (Sudan) captured this relationship between peace, justice 
and even reconciliation in its report to the PSC in October 2009. It stated: 
It is self‐evident that the objectives of peace, justice and reconciliation in Darfur are 
interconnected, mutually interdependent and equally desirable. However, it is also equally 
self‐evident that the most urgent desire of the people of Darfur is to live in peace and security. 
This is a universal Sudanese demand, particularly underlined by the Internally Displaced 
Persons.1171  
The decline of investigations or prosecutions may be reconsidered at any time.1172 Therefore, 
it could not be a source of impunity. Moreover, a claim for peace promotion should not be 
rejected just on the ground that it is of a political nature for which a judicial institution is not 
the appropriate forum.1173 If the ICC must be anti-politics,1174 it needs, however, not a 
politicised, but a more political Prosecutor1175 so that it becomes, not a court against states, 
but an institution truly anti-impunity.  
The refusal to consider any factor of peace promotion in the prosecutorial strategy 
encourages, rather than avoids, deferral requests to the Security Council, whose success or 
failure to stop on-going investigations or prosecutions ultimately affects the credibility of the 
ICC. It is even inconsistent with the idea of positive or proactive complementarity, which 
requires that states’ tribunals are incited and supported to carry out trials for ICC crimes by 
                                                 
1171 Mbeki, Abubakar, Buyoya, El Sayed, Mumba, Mohamed, Omaar, above note 1109, para.293. 
1172 ICC Statute, Article 53 (4). 
1173 Rashid, above note 1165, at 56.  
1174 A. Tiemessen, ‘The Anti-Politics of the International Criminal Court’ Working Paper Series (Centre for 
Transitional Justice and Post Conflict Reconstruction)(2010), at 1-2 
<http://tjcentre.uwo.ca/documents/Tiemessen2.pdf> accessed 4 May 2015.  
1175 See also R. H. Mnookin, ‘Rethinking the Tension between Peace and Justice: the International Criminal 
Court Prosecutor as Diplomat’, 18 Harvard Negotiations Law Review (2013) 145-174, at 145-446. 
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themselves,1176 rather than “the ICC taking advantage of the situation and supplant national 
jurisdictions by intervening into the situation”.1177  
It seems that the Court had to find “exemplary and successful handled cases”1178 to prove to 
the world that it was “a meaningful and useful institution”.1179 This explains, though only in 
part, the trials of individuals (small fishes) who could have been prosecuted, without problem, 
at the domestic level. It also enlightens the policy behind the strict interpretation of the 
principle of complementarity and the indictments of sitting heads of states and/or government. 
Even though, the ICC seems to have made only little judicial progress. In all three main 
controversial situations (Kenya, Soudan and Libya), it has not achieved any proceeding. On 
the contrary, cases collapse as illustrated by the termination of prosecutions against President 
Uhuru Kenyatta and his Deputy, William Ruto, regarding the Kenyan situation. All this 
judicial failure can be put on the account of the deficiency of flexibility on the part of the ICC, 
the perceived politicisation of its proceedings, its competition with hostile African states 
parties and the AU, the unwise prosecutorial strategy and the bad judicial choices of the OPT. 
A close related criticism pertains to the disagreement on the interpretation given to the rules 
of state officials’ immunity, particularly heads of state, before international criminal 
jurisdictions.     
2.2.3. The Disagreement on the Irrelevance of State Officials’ Immunity 
Immunity from criminal jurisdiction is a wide and very controversial issue. The topic is 
subject to extensive and various doctrinal developments regarding its applicability in the 
event of the commission of international crimes.1180 The disagreement between states is still 
                                                 
1176 W. Burke-White, ‘Proactive Complementarity: the International Criminal Court and National Courts in the 
Rome System of International Justice’, 49 Harvard International Law Journal (2008) 53-108, at 54-55. 
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1178 Kaul, above note 1141, at 577. 
1179 Ibid., at 578. 
1180 R. Pedretti, Immunity of Heads of State and State Officials for International Crimes (Leiden/Boston: Brill 
Nijhoff, 2015); B. Baban, Mise en oeuvre de la responsabilité pénale du Chef d’Etat (Bruxelles:Larcier, 2012); 
H. M. Kasrineh, ‘Immunity of Heads of State and its Effects on the Context of International Criminal Law’ (PhD 
Thesis, Hamburg University 2012); U.N. Nwosu, ‘Head of State Immunity in International Law’ (PhD Thesis, 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2011); Murungu, above note 901; A. Watts, ‘The Legal 
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very high. As already indicated, several African countries complained before the ICJ alleging 
violations of immunities of their officials from foreign domestic jurisdictions by some 
European states. But, the most important disagreement relates to potential immunities of 
sitting senior state officials, particularly heads of states, before international criminal 
tribunals. In essence, the issue of (personal) immunity before domestic courts seems to have 
found a satisfactory solution towards African countries since the ICJ ruling of 2002 in the 
Arrest Warrant case, contrary to the continuing controversy in respect of international 
criminal tribunals. The matrix of the debate is based on the African disagreement about the 
way the ICC interpreted and applied the relevant rules on immunity in Omar Al Bashir case.  
Two main questions are in the heart of the debate. First, is there any plea for state officials’ 
immunity before international courts and in particular the ICC? Second, is the Security 
Council capable to remove immunities that may be recognised to state officials in relation to 
proceedings pending before the ICC? 
The debate reached its climax during the 25th summit of the AU after the arrival of President 
Omar Al Bashir of Sudan in South Africa,1181 the host country. At the request of the ICC 
Prosecutor, the PTC II rendered an urgent decision on 13 June 2015 to recall that “South 
Africa is under the duty under the Rome Statute to immediately arrest Omar Al Bashir and 
surrender him to the Court, as the existence of this duty is already clear and needs not be 
further reiterated”.1182 However, South Africa refused to obey the ICC’s injunction as had 
done many other African countries visited by President Omar Al Bashir (Chad, Djibouti, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mauritania, RDC, Uganda, etc.). African countries argue that they cannot 
arrest and surrender the accused due to his immunity as head of state and according to the AU 
position on the issue. As a reminder, the AU has decided that none of its member states shall 
cooperate with the ICC and implement arrest warrants against any sitting African heads of 
state. The central position is that “no charges shall be commenced or continued before any 
international court or tribunal against any serving AU Head of State or Government or 
                                                                                                                                                        
Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers’, 247 Recueil des 
Cours de l’Académie de Droit International (1994) 9-130. 
1181 It was the 25th ordinary session of the Assembly of the African Union, held in Johannesburg (South Africa), 
from 14 to 15 June 2015. 
1182 Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-242), Decision Following the Prosecutor’s Request for an Order Further 
Clarifying that the Republic of South Africa is under the Obligation to Immediately Arrest and Surrender Omar 
al-Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 13 June 2015, para.10.  
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anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity during their tenure of office”.1183 But, the 
PTC has totally refuted these arguments. Resorting to a different and even contradictory 
reasoning, it has ruled several times that President Omar Al Bashir does no longer enjoy any 
(personal) immunity before the Court, owing either to its conventional removal under the ICC 
Statute, or its exceptional waiver under customary international law, or again its implicit 
removal by the Security Council by virtue of resolution 1593 (2005).1184 According to the 
PTC, this resolution, which was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, prevailed over 
any other obligation, including the AU decision, pursuant to articles 25 and 103 of the United 
Nations Charter.1185  
These ICC’s findings on the rules of immunity are prey to a lot of criticism. First, there are 
important contradictions within its different decisions on the potential plea for state officials’ 
immunity before international tribunals (2.2.3.1). Second, one may argue that it has created a 
serious misunderstanding on the intent and the power of the Security Council when the latter 
refers a situation to the ICC Prosecutor (2.2.3.2). Thirdly, the Court has tried to improve its 
ruling on immunity in its Decision of 6 July 2017 on South Africa’s non-compliance with the 
request to arrest and surrender Omar Al Bashir (2.2.3.3). 
2.2.3.1. The Potential Plea for State Officials’ Immunity before International Tribunals 
There are three different categories of ICC’s decisions on heads of state immunity, delivered 
in Omar Al Bashir case. The initial decision was issued on 4 March 2009 with respect to the 
prosecution’s application for an arrest warrant against the accused.1186 It was followed by the 
decisions of 12 and 13 December 2011 on the failure by Malawi1187 and Chad1188 to comply 
                                                 
1183 Ext/Assembly/AU/DEC.1 (Oct.2013), above note 1039, para.10 (i). 
1184 Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-242), above note 1182, para.6. 
1185 Article 25 of the United Nations Charter states: ‘The members of the United Nations agree to accept and 
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1186 Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-3), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against 
Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 4 March 2009.   
1187Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-139), Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by 
the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest 
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with the request for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al Bashir to the Court. The last 
decisions are those which were delivered on 9 April 20141189 and on 13 June 20151190 
concerning the failure to cooperate by the DRC and South Africa respectively. Since then, 
several other decisions confirmative of the latter have been issued, particularly the decisions 
of 11 July 2016 on the non-compliance by Uganda1191 and Djibouti1192 with the request to 
arrest and surrender President Omar Al Bashir to the Court. Before analysing the main 
findings of the Court through all these decisions (b), it is better to clarify the legal issue at 
stake (a).   
a) The Clarification of the Legal Issue at Stake 
Immunities of state officials before international criminal tribunals are different from those to 
which they may be entitled before foreign domestic tribunals. Likewise, immunities of state 
officials differ from those which are granted by virtue of treaties to agents of 
intergovernmental organisations.1193 The ICC has ruled on immunities of state officials before 
international criminal tribunals. In the Decision of 9 April 2014, the PTC II has made clear 
that the central legal problem to be settled in Omar Al Bashir case pertains to the issue of 
personal immunity (immunity ratione peronnae) rather than functional immunity (immunity 
ratione materiae) before the Court.1194  
                                                                                                                                                        
1188 Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-140-tENG), Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the 
Refusal of the Republic of Chad to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to 
the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 13 December 2011. 
1189 Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-195), Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Regarding Omar al-Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 9 April 2014.  
1190 Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-242), above note 1182. 
1191 Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-267),Decision on the non-compliance by the Republic of Uganda with the 
request to arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court and referring the matter to the United Nations 
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1192 Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-266), Decision on the non-compliance by the Republic of Djibouti with the 
request to arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court and referring the matter to the United Nations 
Security Council and the Assembly of the State Parties to the Rome Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 11 July 2016. 
1193 See B. Kahombo, ‘Les privilèges et immunités diplomatiques des agents internationaux : revue de la pratique 
internationale’, in O. Ndeshyo (ed.), Mélanges Célestin Nguya-Ndila. La République démocratique du Congo : 
les défis récurrents de décolonisation et de développement économique et social (Kinshasa : Editions 
CEDESURK, 2012) 401-449, at 417-418.   
1194 Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-195), above note 1189, para. 25.  
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By definition, functional immunity precludes criminal prosecutions against the beneficiary for 
official acts performed as a representative of a state (or even an intergovernmental 
organisation).1195 It is normally a definitive immunity (relevant even after cessation of public 
functions) based on the idea that legal persons are responsible for the consequences of acts 
performed by their representatives (or organs) in an official capacity. The purpose of this kind 
of immunity is to protect any of these legal persons, and especially the state itself,1196 against 
a foreign judicial control over its actions through criminal prosecutions against its current or 
former officials. In this sense, this type of immunity does not cover acts performed in a 
private capacity. In the event of the commission of serious international crimes, there is 
already a customary rule which provides for an exception before international tribunals.1197 In 
general, this rule may be written as follows: any official position of an individual shall in no 
case exempt him from criminal responsibility, even if he acted as head of state or government, 
nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence under international 
law.1198 Therefore, with respect to prosecutions of state officials before international tribunals, 
article 27 (1) of the ICC Statute restating the same rule is declarative of customary 
international law.  
Regarding prosecutions before national courts, the same emerging customary rule may be 
applicable.1199 The inconsistent character of functional immunity with the prohibitions of 
breaches of peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) or other gross violations of 
                                                 
1195 See R.A. Kolodkin, ‘Second Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction 
(International Law Commission)’, Sixthly-second session (3 May-4 June and 5 July-6 August 2010), General 
Assembly (A/CN.4/631), 10 June 2010, at 12-13. 
1196 See I. Wuerth, ‘Foreign Official Immunity: Invocation, Purpose, and Exceptions’, Vanderbilt Public Law 
Research Paper Number 13-22 (2013), at 13. 
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human rights is also often invoked.1200 The argument seems to be a heritage of the Pinochet 
trial (1998-2000).1201 But, it is highly contested because of the confusion it makes between 
violated primary rules of human rights pertaining to jus cogens and the secondary rule of 
functional immunity which, due to its different nature, could not be regarded as standing in 
conflict with the former and as a result be irrelevant.1202 This viewpoint relying on the 
distinction between substantive and procedural rules is approved by the ICJ. This is the case, 
outside the issue of immunity, of Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo. In particular, 
the Court has made the observation that violation of jus cogens, namely the prohibition of 
genocide, does not imply of itself a basis for establishing its jurisdiction to entertain the 
dispute.1203 More precisely,  recalling the position which it had espoused in the Arrest 
Warrant case1204 as well as in the case of Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters,1205 the Court has said in its judgement of 3 February 2012 in the case concerning the 
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1204 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), above note 569, para.60. In 
this paragraph, the ICJ emphasised:  ‘(…) the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they might have committed, 
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1205 Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment of 4 June 2008, 
I.C.J. Reports 2008, para.196. In this paragraph, the Court said: ‘The State which seeks to claim immunity for 
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Jurisdictional Immunities of the State that “(…) albeit in the different context of the immunity 
of State officials from criminal proceedings, the fact that immunity may bar the exercise of 
jurisdiction in a particular case does not alter the applicability of the substantive rules of 
international law”.1206 Ingrid Wuerth has even argued that there is indeed no exception to the 
rule of functional immunity under customary international law.1207 A certain doctrine has 
espoused the view that international crimes should not be regarded as official acts “because 
they are neither normal State functions nor functions that a State alone (in contrast to an 
individual) can perform (…)”.1208 But, empirically, in the context of the state, it appears less 
reasonable to conceive that such crimes are committed in a private capacity since their 
perpetration is facilitated by the mobilisation of official means and institutions (army, police, 
intelligence services, public funds, etc.).1209 That is why one may agree with the other 
doctrine which suggests that any exceptional waiver of functional immunity before foreign 
national courts should be based on the obligation for a state to prosecute the crime 
concerned.1210 It means that the accused person should not enjoy functional immunity where a 
foreign state is bound by such obligation because “it would be contradictory to require 
prosecutions and at the same time to confer immunity from criminal prosecution”.1211 
Otherwise, the duty on the forum state to prosecute would remain meaningless and 
ineffective. That is particularly the case in regard to the obligation enshrined in the 
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of 
10 December 1984.1212 The matter should be therefore decided on a case-by-case basis.  
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In contrast, personal immunity is a procedural bar to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in 
foreign states, but only a temporary one. It precludes criminal prosecutions against a small 
number of representatives of a state (notably heads of state, heads of government and 
ministers of foreign affairs) as long as they remain in office.1213 It applies to both official and 
private acts. This type of immunity protects the free and effective exercise of public functions 
of the beneficiary as a matter of state sovereignty, without any impediment and interference of 
a foreign court.1214 It is a matter of customary international law as the ICJ held in the Arrest 
Warrant case in February 2002.1215 In this respect, the determining factor in assessing whether 
or not there has been an attack on the immunity of state officials lies in the subjection of the 
latter to a constraining act of authority of a foreign state.1216 Clarifying the rules in relation to 
heads of state, in particular, the ICJ stated that this protection included the obligation to 
respect their honor and dignity, in connection with their inviolability, through the abstention 
to pass confidential information from the offices of the judiciary of the foreign state to the 
media.1217 But, the question whether such immunity also applies before international tribunals 
remains very controversial. Concerning the ICC Statute, article 27 (2) provides for a 
conventional exceptional waiver of personal immunity of officials of states parties in the 
following terms: “Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official 
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from 
exercising its jurisdiction over such a person”. The PTC II discussed the issue concerning a 
national of a state not party (Sudan) and the effects of article 98 (1) which prescribes:  
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the 
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to 
the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can 
first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity. 
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It is commonly recognised that immunities of state officials other than diplomatic immunity 
(recognised to diplomats under customary international law and the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961) and state immunity are implied by this provision.1218 
In particular, heads of state immunity is an aspect of state immunity.1219 Likewise, even 
though this provision does not explicitly mention the arrest of the accused person, it may be 
argued that the hypothesis is implied by the fact that his surrender to the Court presupposes 
that he is beforehand arrested. The problem posed by article 98 (1) is therefore, in the context 
of the ICC’s request for arrest or surrender of the accused person, who is a national of a third 
state (i.e. a non-contracting party or just a state not party), the respect of his inviolability in 
the territory of a state party where he would potentially enjoy personal immunity.  
The PTC I failed to make this distinction between immunity ratione materiae and immunity 
ratione personae in its Decision of 12 December 2011 regarding the failure of the Republic of 
Malawi to comply with the cooperation request to arrest and surrender Omar Al Bashir.1220 
The confusion (perceptible in the entire reasoning) was even reiterated a day later in the 
Decision on the refusal of the Republic of Chad to cooperate with the Court.1221 Even though 
the PTC II corrected this conceptual problem, particularly in its decisions of 13 June 2015 and 
9 April 2014, it brought some new legal defects into the Court’s main judicial findings. 
b) The Court’s Main Findings 
The Court’s main findings on personal immunity encompass two principal aspects with their 
own legal defects. At the first place, there is the recourse to the UN Charter to reject Omar Al 
Bashir’s personal immunity. The issue has explicitly arisen for the first time in the Decision 
of 9 April 2014 and confirmed in subsequent decisions, notable the one of 13 June 2015. 
Beyond the applicability of the UN Charter (i), the second aspect of the matter relates to three 
different and contradictory theses in support of the irrelevance of immunity before the same 
Court, on the same issue and in the same case (ii). 
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i) The Recourse to the Charter of the United Nations to Reject the Plea for Personal Immunity 
In its Decision of 13 June 2015, the PTC II accorded a prevalence effect to the Security 
Council resolution 1953 (2005) in order to solve an alleged conflict of obligations binding on 
South Africa, pursuant to articles 25 and 103 of the Charter of the United Nations. It decided 
that South Africa was under the duty to arrest and surrender Omar Al Bashir to the Court 
insofar as this resolution which arguably lifted his personal immunity overrode any other 
obligation to the contrary.  
This decision is not convincing. In fact, if the Security Council had allegedly lifted the 
argument of immunity as a bar to the ICC jurisdiction, the obligation for South Africa to 
cooperate remained applicable under the ICC Statute rather than under the UN Charter. The 
Security Council did not create any obligation to cooperate with the Court under Chapter VII, 
neither for states parties nor for third ones, except for Sudan and other parties to the conflict 
in Darfur.1222 Accordingly, the said resolution could only be capable to prevail over any other 
contrary obligation about immunity, but not the obligation not to cooperate with the Court, 
which was not in conflict with any other one under the Charter of the United Nations. The 
primary condition of conflict of obligations for the applicability of article 103 of the Charter 
was not met.1223 
In other words, despite the Security Council resolution, South Africa’s duty to cooperate 
under the ICC Statute continued to compete with the obligation not to cooperate pursuant to 
the decisions of the AU Assembly. The latter decisions fully remained in effect since their 
object goes far beyond the immunity claim arguably removed by the Security Council. In this 
respect, it is worth noting that the AU decisions regarding the obligation for member states 
not to cooperate with the ICC are based on many other reasons, including the search for peace 
that should not be jeopardised by expeditious criminal prosecutions,1224 the claim for a 
positive complementarity for Sudan,1225 the politicisation and misuse of indictments against 
African leaders,1226 the protection of the dignity of the continent,1227 etc. Therefore, at this 
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specific point of prevalence effect, the PTC II exceeded the object of the Security Council 
resolution 1953 (2005), violated the Charter of the United Nations and deprived the AU 
decisions binding on South Africa of their object. The same criticism applies to the failure of 
other African countries to cooperate on this issue with the Court, including the DRC. In 
contrast, in its decisions of 11 July 2016 on the non-compliance by Uganda and Djibouti with 
the request to arrest and surrender President Omar Al Bashir, the PTC II attempted to come 
back to one of the reasons raised by the requested states that it had never dealt with, namely 
the need to promote and realise permanent peace and stability in the region. The mere answer 
was simply that the Court could not rule on political considerations even though sensitive to 
them.1228 In this regard, the PTC II stressed that “State Parties to the Statute must pursue any 
legitimate, or even desirable, political objectives within the boundaries of their legal 
obligations vis-à-vis the Court. Indeed, it is not in the nature of legal obligations that they can 
be put aside or qualified for political expediency”.1229 But, it is difficult to follow the 
Chamber’s reasoning in that it denies that the pursuit of such political objectives in 
accordance with AU binding decisions is equally an obligation to take into account for 
member states of the regional organisation. Worse, its Decision of 13 June 2015, based on the 
one of 9 April 2014, stands into contradiction with previous findings on Omar Al Bashir’s 
personal immunity. 
ii) The Paradox of Three Contradictory Theses on Head of State’s Personal Immunity 
The Decision of 13 June 2015, based upon the one delivered on 9 April 2014, constitutes an 
important judicial change (revirement jurisprudentiel) in comparison with previous ICC’s 
decisions in Omar Al Bashir case. Three different and contradictory theses may be 
highlighted here. The first one was developed in March 2009. The PTC I invoked the ICC 
Statute and especially its article 27 (2) which provides for the irrelevance of personal 
immunity before the Court, before applying it to Omar Al Bashir as if Sudan was a state 
party.1230 According to the Chamber, the denial of personal immunity to Omar Al Bashir was 
based on three reasons.1231 Primo, the purpose of the establishment of the ICC was to put an 
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end to impunity. Secundo the provision of article 27 (2) of the Statute precluded such kind of 
immunity. Tertio, there was no lacuna in the ICC Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence which might allow to refer to other rules of international 
law. But, it is obvious that reasons number one and three are beside the point, while number 
two is irrelevant, since article 27 (2) is a conventional provision which cannot apply to a third 
state. The second thesis was elaborated in December 2011. The PTC I relinquished its 
previous reasoning and said that the accused could no longer enjoy personal immunity 
because there was already an exceptional waiver of such immunity of sitting heads of state 
before international tribunals under customary international law.1232 The third thesis, in 
contrast, rejected all these findings. In its Decision of 9 April 2014, confirmed by the one of 
13 June 2015, the PTC II started recalling that the ICC Statute, which is a multilateral 
convention governed by the law of treaties, could not impose obligations on third states 
without their consent.1233 As a consequence, article 27 (2) was inapplicable in the present 
case. According to this Chamber, the removal of immunity was still required to allow the 
Court to proceed against Omar Al Bashir. In other words, such requirement recognised that 
the theory of exceptional waiver of personal immunity before international tribunals under 
customary international law was also legally inaccurate. In this regard, the PTC II rightly 
concluded: 
It follows that when the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court entails the prosecution of a Head of 
State of a non-State Party, the question of personal immunities might validly arise. The solution 
provided for in the Statute to resolve such a conflict is found in article 98(1) of the Statute. This 
provision directs the Court to secure the cooperation of the third State for the waiver or lifting 
the immunity of its Head of State. This course of action envisaged by article 98(1) of the Statute 
aims at preventing the requested State from acting inconsistently with its international 
obligations towards the non-State Party with respect to the immunities attached to the latter’s 
Head of State.1234 
An abundant literature against the theory of exceptional waiver of personal immunity of 
sitting heads of state before international tribunals under customary international law already 
                                                 
1232 Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-139), above note 1187, paras.36-43; Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-140-tENG), 
above note 1188, para.13. 
1233 Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-195), above note 1189, para.26.  
1234 Ibid., para.27. 
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existed.1235 The PTC II seems to have paid attention to it, even if the scholarship in defence of 
the same exception was also available.1236 A third and neutral position in this debate is 
supported by Dire Tladi, who thinks that customary international law does not require nor 
forbid (personal) immunity before international courts.1237 His line of argument contains two 
parts.  
On the one hand, he departs from the AU position that “as a general matter, the immunities 
provided for by international law apply not only to proceedings in foreign domestic courts but 
also to international tribunals”.1238 This is because “states cannot contract out of their 
international legal obligations vis-à-vis third states by establishing an international 
tribunal”.1239 He then assumes that there is no proof in support of the AU position insofar as 
in general, there is no specific rule granting immunity to state officials before international 
courts.1240 According to Dire Tladi, the UA position might be relevant in the case of a tribunal 
established by a handful of states that exercise control over its jurisdiction.1241 But, this 
argument is unconvincing when applied to a court such as the ICC, because none of its 134 
members can exercise control over its decisions.1242 It is an impartial institution, which is not 
an organ of a state, capable to affect the equal sovereignty of another country. But, one may 
object to his argument that he himself provides no proof as to the statement that a court like 
the ICC cannot be controlled by any of its members. He forgets the linkage between this 
Court and the world order, and particularly the Security Council. In addition, as already 
                                                 
1235 See B. Tranchant, ‘Les immunités des Etats tiers devant la Cour pénale internationale’, CXVII Revue 
générale de droit international public (2013) 633-656, at 639-645 and 651-656; W.A. Schabas, The 
International Criminal Court: a Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010), at 449-450. 
1236 C. Kreβ, ‘The International Criminal Court and Immunity under International Law for States not Party to the 
Court’s Statute’, in M. Bergsmo and L. Yan (eds), State Sovereignty and International Criminal Law (Beijing: 
Torkel Opsahl Academic Epublisher, 2012) 223-265, at 243-257; A. Abass, ‘The Competence of the Security 
Council to Terminate the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court’, 40 Texas International Law Journal  
(2005) 263-297, at 278-282. 
1237 D. Tladi, ‘The Immunity Provision of the AU Amendment Protocol: Separating the (Doctrinal) Wheat from 
the (Normative) Chaff, 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2015) 3-17, at 12, 15 and 17. 
1238 African Union Commission, above note 1047, at 2. 
1239 Ibid. 




indicated, there is evidence that even states, which are not parties such as the United States of 
America, are interfering with the ICC’s proceedings, undermine its independence and 
influence its work. Formally, Dire Tladi’s thesis also falters in that it renders article 27 (2) of 
the Court’s Statute unnecessary as there seems to be no explanation in his argument as to why 
it has been included in this treaty. The objection is so pertinent that the author suggests, on the 
other hand, that there is no customary rule denying immunity to state officials before 
international tribunals, while proponents of this position argue that the underlying provision is 
rather declarative of customary international law.1243  
It is important to note that even the exceptional waiver of personal immunity of state officials 
(notably heads of state) before international tribunals under customary international law is 
defective in the ICC’s Decisions of December 2011 on five principal points. First, this theory 
had the effect of nullifying article 98 (1) of the ICC Statute by excluding any kind of 
immunity for officials of third states in relation to states parties before the Court. It rendered it 
non-operational and meaningless.1244 Second, to establish that article 27 (2) of the ICC Statute 
was declarative of customary international law, the PTC I resorted to arguments about 
functional immunity on the issue of personal immunity. This is very clear when it relies on the 
fact that international crimes are acts which cannot be covered by immunity. But, this 
position, though tenable in the past, is already overturned by the ICJ in the sense that 
substantive rules, even violations of international law amounting to international crimes, do 
not affect the relevance of procedural norms of immunities. In line with the customary rule of 
functional immunity, the PTC I recalled the formula of various legal instruments providing 
that the official position of an individual who commits an international crime shall in no case 
relieve him from criminal responsibility, nor shall it constitute a ground for reduction of 
sentence under international law. Third, with regard to case-law, the PTC I made the ICJ say 
what did not correspond to the language used in the Arrest Warrant case concerning the 
potential irrelevance of immunities before international tribunals. In fact, the ICJ never said 
that personal immunity was inapplicable before the ICC with respect to officials who were 
nationals of states not parties to its Statute. Rather, the ICJ said that immunities could not 
                                                 
1243 This is also the position espoused by Judge Eboe-Osuji on the defence applications for judgments of 
acquittal in the situation in Kenya. See Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-2027), above note 1137, paras.241 and 
245. 
1244African Union Commission, above note 1047, at 1.  
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operate “before certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction”.1245 In 
other words, not all international criminal tribunals can exercise jurisdiction irrespective of 
immunities that may enjoy officials of any state. That is why Sarah Williams and Lena Sherif 
rightly suggested the following position: 
(...) in order to ascertain whether a tribunal falls within the dictum of the ICJ in the Arrest 
Warrant case, it is necessary to consider the nature of the Court, its method of establishment 
and its constituent instrument. It must be determined whether the provisions of the instrument 
creating jurisdiction on the tribunal, expressly or implicitly, lift immunity and whether the state 
concerned is bound by that instrument.1246    
As for the ICC, the basic condition of state consent to the conventional waiver of immunity 
must be met, either through the ratification of its founding treaty or the ad hoc acceptance of 
its jurisdiction.1247 Fourth, concerning immunity referred to with regard to the arrest and 
surrender of the accused (article 98 (1) of the ICC Statute), the PTC I invoked a number of 
international practices about indictments of heads of state which were rather contrary to its 
own finding on the waiver of that immunity. In particular, it suffices to affirm that neither of 
these former heads of state were arrested and surrendered to an international tribunal while 
being still in office: Charles Taylor, Slobodan Milosevic, Laurent Gbagbo and Muhammar 
Kadhafi. In addition, some of the examples provided by the Chamber were even outside the 
position on the exceptional waiver of immunity before international tribunals under customary 
international law. For example, proceedings against Laurent Gbagbo were initiated with the 
consent of the Republic of Ivory Coast to the ICC jurisdiction, including its Statute.1248 
Similarly, Slobodan Milosevic was indicted before an ad hoc tribunal created by the Security 
Council. It could take compulsory measures against him owing to the powers deriving from 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and which the ICC is deprived of. More important, Slobodan 
was arrested and surrendered to the ICTY by his won country, meaning that immunity under 
international law could not apply to him accordingly. Fifth, and last, to ascertain a rule of 
                                                 
1245 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), above note 569, para.61. 
Emphasis is mine. 
1246 S. Williams and L. Sherif, ‘The Arrest Warrant for President al-Bashir: Immunities of Incumbent Heads of 
State and the International Criminal Court’, 14 (1) Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2009) 71-92, at 76-77. 
See also Akande, above note 1197, at 408-409.  
1247 Ibid. 
1248 This consent was given through the declaration accepting the ICC jurisdiction under Article 12 (3) of the 
Rome Statute, made on 18 April 2003, and confirmed by the letter of 10 December 2010. 
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customary international law, the mere establishment of a practice does not suffice. It must be 
associated with a legal conviction of states (opinio juris) that such practice has acquired status 
of a positive rule under international law. Again, on this point, the PTC I unconvincingly 
advanced arguments relating to the rule of functional immunity to establish a customary rule 
on personal immunity. It forgot that the ICC Statute was in this respect unique in its kind. It is 
the first legal instrument to contain provisions which make a clear distinction between 
functional immunity and personal immunity in international criminal law.1249 Given this 
innovative dimension, the opinio juris of states could not be proved out of reasonable 
doubt.1250 On the contrary, the objection to the Decisions of 12 and 13 December 2011 by the 
AU,1251 with its 54 member states, saying that they do not recognise such a customary rule of 
international law, strongly consolidated the view of a lack of “a general practice accepted as 
law”.1252  
Thus, given that personal immunity of officials of third states is still valid before the ICC, the 
problem which then arises relates to who should remove it. In Omar Al Bashir case, the PTC 
II upheld, starting by its decisions of 9 April 2014 and 13 June 2015, the theory of implicit 
waiver of immunity whereby it rather seems to have misunderstood the intent and the power 
of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
2.2.3.2. The Misunderstanding of the Intent and the Power of the Security Council 
There are two different assumptions at the basis of the theory of implicit waiver of immunity. 
First, the language used by the PTC II in its initial Decisions of on 9 April 2014 and13 June 
2015 shows that this waiver, instead of being absolutely explicit, can simply be implicit, in 
case of textual silence, since it can derive by means of interpretation from the intent of the 
Security Council. Second, and above all, it also means that the Security Council, which enjoys 
powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, is in a position to lift immunity of the accused 
persons who are nationals of states not parties to the ICC Statute. These assumptions generate 
                                                 
1249 E. David, ‘La Cour pénale internationale’, 313, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 
(2005) 325-454, at 420. 
1250 J. Mouangue Kobila, ‘L’Afrique et les juridictions pénales internationales’, 17 African Yearbook of 
International Law (2011) 13-55, at 41; Tladi, above note 1237, at 13-14. 
1251 Assembly/AU/DEC.397 (XVIII), Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation 
of Assembly Decisions on the International Criminal Court (ICC), Doc. EX.CL/710 (XX), 18th Ordinary Session 
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three problematic issues, namely the debate on implicit or explicit waiver of immunity (a), the 
lack of logic in the judicial construction of the PTC II (b) and the question of the power of the 
UN Security Council to lift immunities otherwise applicable before the ICC (c).    
a) The Issue of Implicit Waiver of Immunity   
In the scholarship, the theory of implicit waiver of immunity before the ICC was already 
defended by Eric David in 2005.1253 He then underlined that a Security Council referral of a 
situation to the ICC would implicitly signify removal of immunity, unless it was otherwise 
determined by it.1254 For example, the Security Council may immune nationals of some third 
states concerned by a situation of a state not party which it has referred to the ICC.1255 Later, 
the theory was thoroughly developed by Dapo Akande in reaction to the Decision of 4 March 
2009.1256 This author believes that denying implicitly personal immunity to Omar Al Bashir 
was the best argument for the conclusion of the PTC I.1257 To justify his position, Dapo 
Akande emphasised that “the very decision to refer a situation to the Court is a decision to 
bring whatever individuals may be covered by the referral within the jurisdiction of the Court 
and therefore within the operation of its Statute”.1258 This is the scholarly pedigree which 
presumably influenced the reasoning of the PTC II.  
However, for the AU, should the Security Council hold the power under Chapter VII to lift 
Omar Al Bashir’s personal immunity, this removal must be explicit.1259 This view is also 
defended by Dire Tladi, who writes: 
For one thing, Resolution 1593 places a duty on Sudan; it does not waive immunities of 
Sudan. The Security Council does have the power to deviate from the rules of international 
law, but whenever it does, it does so expressly and not by implications. Linked to this point, 
                                                 
1253 David, above note 1249, at 424. 
1254 Ibid. 
1255 This is the practice of the Security Council concerning referrals of situations in Darfur (Sudan) and in Libya. 
See respectively SC Res.1593 (2005), above note 389, para.6; SC Res. 1970 (2011), above note 389, para.6. The 
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1256 D. Akande, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its Impact on al-Bashir’s 
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1257 Ibid., at 341-342.  
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as a general rule, immunity is never waived implicitly but explicitly. The notion of an 
implicit waiver of immunity is, therefore, a fiction.1260 
Claus Kreβ refutes this assertion on the ground that explicit lift of immunity is not required by 
the UN Charter or the ICC Statute.1261 According to him, “whether or not the Security Council 
has decided that an otherwise existing international law immunity shall not apply with respect 
to certain proceedings before the ICC, is a matter of construction of the relevant Security 
Council resolution”.1262  
In the Namibia Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, the ICJ indicated four applicable means of 
interpretation in order to establish the meaning of a resolution of the Security Council in case 
of ambiguity.1263 It stated that everything must be determined in each case with regard to : i) 
the terms of the resolution to be interpreted; ii) the discussion leading to it; iii) the Charter 
provisions invoked; iv) and all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal 
consequences of the resolution of the Security Council.1264 In other words, what a resolution 
of the Security Council actually provides for may be implied as a result of a sound legal 
construction, in application of any of these non-cumulative means of interpretation, when 
nothing enables to solve the matter prima facie through the explicit language of the text itself. 
In the Tadič case of October 1995, the ICTY also resorted to the debates within the Security 
Council, following the adoption of the resolution establishing the tribunal,1265 in order to 
clarify the kind of crimes falling under its substantive competence as violations of the “laws 
or customs of war” under article 3 of its Statute.1266 Moreover, general rules of interpretation 
provided for by the law of treaties remain relevant.1267  
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1265 SC Res. 827 (1993), above note 343. 
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In light of this jurisprudence, the judicial construction of the PTC II is justified, even though 
the interpretation of the intent of the Security Council does not appear to be logical. 
b) The Lack of Logic in the Judicial Construction of the Pre-Trial Chamber II  
The theory of implicit waiver of immunity by the Security Council is not an invention of the 
PTC II in the Decision of 13 June 2015. It was already implicitly mentioned in the Decision 
of 4 February 20091268 and reiterated in the one of 4 March 2009 in which the PTC I said: 
(…) by referring the Darfur situation to the Court, pursuant to article 13(b) of the Statute, the 
Security Council of the United Nations has also accepted that the investigation into the said 
situation, as well as any prosecution arising therefrom, will take place in accordance with the 
statutory framework provided for in the Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the Rules as a 
whole.1269  
But, the theory clearly appeared for the first time in the Decision of 9 April 2014. In this 
respect, the PTC II settled the same matter of non-cooperation raised by South Africa with 
regard to the DRC.1270 The Decision of 13 June 2015 is therefore a confirmation of the one of 
April 2014 in similar terms as follows: 
[B]y issuing Resolution 1593(2005) the SC decided that the “Government of Sudan […] shall 
cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor 
pursuant to this resolution”. Since immunities attached to Omar al-Bashir are a procedural bar 
from prosecution before the Court, the cooperation envisaged in said resolution was meant to 
eliminate any impediment to the proceedings before the Court, including the lifting of 
immunities. Any other interpretation would render the SC decision requiring that Sudan 
“cooperate fully” and “provide any necessary assistance to the Court” senseless. Accordingly, 
the “cooperation of that third State [Sudan] for the waiver of the immunity”, as required under 
the last sentence of article 98(1) of the Statute, was already ensured by the language used in 
paragraph 2 of SC Resolution 1593(2005). By virtue of said paragraph, the SC implicitly waived 
the immunities granted to Omar Al Bashir under international law and attached to his position as 
a Head of State.1271 
There is no controversy about the basis of this resolution in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
But, the meaning attached to the terms about the duty on Sudan to cooperate with the Court 
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appears unconvincing. The PTC II drew therefrom a conclusion which sheds a serious 
misunderstanding on the intent of the Security Council. To summarise it, the Decision may 
lead to the statement that the resolution of the Security Council would become senseless on 
the matter of the obligation for Sudan to cooperate with the Court, should it not be regarded as 
having implicitly removed Omar Al Bashir’s personal immunity.  
In the merits, such a general statement is inaccurate. It may be objected that the obligation to 
cooperate cannot itself eliminate the right to enjoy personal immunity. Similarly, the right to 
enjoy personal immunity does not preclude by itself the duty to cooperate with the Court. 
Both pieces of law are different and operate independently from each other. There is no 
contradiction in their coexistence on the part of Sudan. Rather, the problem is that the PTC II 
seems to have polarised its reasoning just on the case of one person. It did not take into 
account “all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the 
resolution of the Security Council”,1272 as advised by the ICJ on 21 June 1971.  
In fact, contrary to that Decision, one may argue that the duty to cooperate was meant by the 
Security Council to ensure that Sudan was obliged to lift personal immunity to which any of 
its nationals could be internationally entitled, should the Court require it in order to give 
effects to its decision to prosecute. Moreover, this is not all about the duty to cooperate. 
Normally, it goes beyond the issue of removal of immunity. It includes other forms of 
cooperation in support of effective investigations on the ground.1273 In this regard, Omar Al 
Bashir was not the only man who could be seen through the interpretation of the said 
resolution of the Security Council. The obligation to cooperate equally applies to Sudan with 
respect to prosecutions against any of its nationals, including those who are not entitled to the 
immunity regime under international law, like army military commanders. Accordingly, it is 
illogical to argue that Omar Al Bashir’s right to enjoy personal immunity would render 
senseless the duty of Sudan to cooperate with the Court, whereas this duty remains totally 
meaningful concerning investigations and prosecutions against other Sudanese nationals. That 
cannot be the intent of the Security Council. It is even doubtful that this political body 
possesses that power to remove personal immunity that officials of third states may enjoy 
before the Court. 
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c) The Power of the Security Council to Lift Applicable Personal Immunity in Question 
The Pre-Trail Chamber II failed to consider the question whether the Security Council was 
allowed, in the legal framework in which the ICC operates, to remove personal immunity of 
an incumbent head of a state not party to the Statute. It perhaps took a positive answer for 
granted. Some scholars often justify this answer by the recourse to exorbitant powers of the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.1274 However, the view is based on an 
unjustified analogy with the authority of the Security Council upon ad hoc tribunals, which 
rather correspond to non-conventional legal regimes. It might be an error to pretend that this 
political body could do whatever it desires under Chapter VII through the mechanism of 
referral of situations to the Court, unless it is pushed above the law. Indeed, the power to refer 
a situation to the ICC does not imply the power to modify its Statute and create a special 
regime (of immunity) for a state not party. As Paula Gaeta has rightly underlined it, “a referral 
by the Security Council is simply a mechanism designed to trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC 
towards non-contracting states. It is nothing more than that”.1275 “It does not and cannot turn a 
state non-party to the Statute into a state party, and it has not turned Sudan into a state party to 
the Statute”.1276 William A. Schabas concludes that: 
The argument of implied removal of immunity also falters on the fact that as a general rule, the 
Security Council cannot alter the provisions of the Rome Statute when it makes a referral. 
Otherwise, the Security Council referral would create a different legal regime than that resulting 
from state party referral or proprio motu triggering by the Prosecutor. The Security Council 
cannot add new crimes, or alter the temporal jurisdiction of the Court, for example. Accordingly, 
its referral should not alter the general rule on immunities set out in paragraph 2 of article 27.1277  
In view of this legal framework, it cannot be presumed that the Security Council intended, by 
means of a bad interpretation of resolution 1593 (2005), to exercise illegal power towards the 
state of Sudan, concerning the removal of Omar Al Bashir’s personal immunity. It is time that 
the ICC considers that justice and accountability cannot be defended through violation of 
applicable law. As would say a Congolese francophone lawyer, in this context, “violer ou 
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enfreindre le droit pour défendre le droit ne vaut” (to violate or infringe law in order to 
defend the law is irrelevant).1278   
2.2.3.3. The Court’s Reversal of Previous Findings on Personal Immunity 
On 6 July 2017, the ICC delivered a new decision on Omar Al Bashir’s personal 
immunity.1279 The main question on which the Court wished to make a determination was 
whether South Africa failed to comply with its obligation to cooperate under the Rome Statute 
by not arresting and surrendering Omar Al-Bashir to the Court while he was on South African 
territory to attend the AU summit between 13 and 15 June 2015. Given the fact that South 
Africa invoked its duty to comply with heads of state’s personal immunity to justify its 
conduct, the question turned to be, for the Court’s determination, whether Omar Al Bashir 
enjoyed such immunity from arrest and surrender by South Africa? In this regard, the Court’s 
answer is again in the negative (a), but its ruling according to which immunity does not apply 
because Sudan is in a position similar to that of a state party to the Rome Statute remains to 
some extent unconvincing (b).   
a) The Decision of 6 July 2017 
To answer the question as to whether Omar Al Bashir enjoyed immunity when he was in 
South Africa, the Pre-Trial Chamber II reasoned in different ways and reversed the Court’s 
previous findings on the same issue. First of all, the Chamber observed that the Host 
Agreement of 8 June 2015 between South Africa and the AU did not grant any immunity to 
the Sudanese Head of State. However, it found that there was no evidence of a waiver of 
personal immunity of state officials before international criminal jurisdictions under 
customary international law,1280 thereby reversing the Court’s decisions of December 2011 
concerning the failure of Chad and Malawi to comply with the cooperation request to arrest 
and surrender Omar Al Bashir. Secondly, the Chamber disapproved the so-called implicit 
waiver of Omar Al Bashir’s personal immunity by the Security Council as held in the Court’s 
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decision of 9 April 2014. According to the Chamber, not only it does see no such waiver in 
the Security Council resolution 1593 (2005), but also this waiver –whether explicit or implicit 
–is not necessary because personal immunity does not apply in the present case.1281 In this 
vein, the Chamber held that “the necessary effect of Security Council resolution 1593 (2005) 
triggering the Court’s jurisdiction in the situation in Darfur and imposing on Sudan the 
obligation to cooperate fully with the Court is that, for the limited purpose of the situation in 
Darfur, Sudan has rights and duties analogous to those of states parties”.1282 The Security 
Council resolution in question arguably made the entire Rome Statute applicable to this 
country,1283 including article 27 (2) concerning the irrelevance of personal immunity before 
the Court.1284 Consequently, article 98 (1) of the Rome Statute, which requires that the Court 
obtains the waiver of personal immunity of nationals of third states before issuing any 
cooperation request for arrest and surrender of the accused, does not apply to Sudan because 
the Rome Statute does not confer any immunity on officials of states parties that needs to be 
lifted.1285 According to the Chamber, this finding is in line with the intent of the Security 
Council, which anticipated that by referring the situation in Darfur to the Court, Omar al 
Bashir’s immunity as Head of State would not be applicable.1286 The Chamber argued that this 
was an expansion of a treaty to a third state pursuant to the UN Charter, which permits the 
Security Council to impose obligations on states.1287 However, the Chamber emphasised that 
this was a sui generis legal regime.1288 It is limited to the particular situation in Darfur, while 
Sudan does have no obligation or right in other situation, such as voting in the ASP or paying 
contribution to the Court’s budget.1289  Therefore, all states parties to the Rome Statute are 
under the obligation, upon request, to arrest and surrender Omar Al Bashir to the Court. By 
not having done that, South Africa violated its duty to cooperate under the Rome Statute.1290    
  
                                                 
1281 Ibid., para.96. 
1282 Ibid., para.88. 
1283 Ibid., para.85. 
1284 Ibid., para.91. 
1285 Ibid., para.93. 
1286 Ibid., para.95. 
1287 Ibid., para.89. 
1288 Ibid., para.83. 
1289 Ibid., para.90. 
1290 Ibid., para.126. 
252 
b) The Discussion of the New Finding of the Court on Personal Immunity  
By rejecting Omar Al Bashir’s immunity on the ground that Sudan has rights and obligations 
analogous to those of a state party to the Rome Statute, the ICC upheld the submission made 
by the prosecution. Originally, this submission is from Dapo Akande who posited: 
(…) the Statute, including Article 27, must be regarded as binding on Sudan. The Security 
Council’s decision to confer jurisdiction on the ICC, being (implicitly) a decision to confer 
jurisdiction in accordance with the Statute, must be taken to include every provision of the 
Statute that defines how the exercise of such jurisdiction is to take place. Article 27 is a 
provision that defines the exercise of such jurisdiction (…). The fact that Sudan is bound by 
Article 25 of the UN Charter and implicitly by SC Resolution 1593 to accept the decisions of 
the ICC puts Sudan in an analogous position to a party to the Statute. The only difference is 
that Sudan’s obligations to accept the provisions of the Statute are derived not from the Statute 
directly, but from a UN Security Council resolution and the Charter.1291 
However, South Africa objected to the Prosecutor’s submission in the following words: 
Sudan is not, as is suggested by the Office of the Prosecutor, comparable to a State Party. It 
does not have the right to decide or to vote in the ASP. It does not pay membership fees. The 
only thing that Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute does or, rather, a UN Security Council 
pursuant to Article 13(b) does, is to confer jurisdiction on the Court. […] And yes, it is also to 
ensure that the whole Statute applies. But the whole Statute […] includes also Article 98. But it 
does nothing more than this. […] UN Security Council resolution operative paragraph 2 places 
an obligation on Sudan. This would not be necessary if Sudan was in a position comparable to 
that of a State Party, because then Part 9 of the Statute would already apply, and there would 
already be a duty on Sudan […] to cooperate.1292 
The irrenconciliable character of these submissions shows why the Court’s finding is itself 
weak to be convincing. This justifies the dissenting opinion by Judge De Brichambaut who 
rightly underscores that the state of the law is ambiguous.1293 He concludes that “given the 
current state of the law, it cannot be determined, exclusively on the basis of the legal effects 
generated by UN Security Council Resolution 1593, whether, in general, either article 27(2) 
                                                 
1291 Akande, above note 1260, at 342. 
1292 Transcript of Hearing, 7 April 2017, ICC-02/05-01/09-T-2-ENG, at 86 <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Transcripts/CR2017_02211.PDF> accessed 30 August 2017. 
1293 Minority Opinion of Judge Marc Perrin De Brichambaut, Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Decision under 
article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the 
arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 6 July 2017, paras.48-57. 
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of the Statute or article 98(1) of the Statute applies between the Court, South Africa, and 
Sudan in relation to the request to arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court”.1294 
However, he thinks that the Court could have rejected Omar Al Bashir’s immunity in 
application of the Genocide Convention because “Sudan must be regarded to have 
relinquished the immunities of its “constitutionally responsible rulers” when acceding to the 
Convention”.1295 It has to be noted that this position was itself rightly rejected by the Chamber 
on the ground that “the Genocide Convention, unlike the Statute in article 27(2), does not 
mention immunities based on official capacity, and the majority does not see a convincing 
basis for a constructive interpretation of the provisions in the Convention such that would 
give rise to an implicit exclusion of immunities”.1296  
In the end, the ICC has lost some of its support in Africa because of its own conflicting 
interpretations and bad application of the Rome Statute concerning Heads of State’s personal 
immunity. Some commentators have suggested the idea to request an advisory opinion to the 
ICJ on the issue.1297 But, as far as the Rome Statute is concerned, there is a need to promote 
explicit legal reforms in order to ensure confidence in the system of justice it has put in place. 
States must adhere to the same rules. Otherwise, the Court could be destroyed by a lack of 
sufficient international legitimacy.  
  
                                                 
1294 Ibid., para.58. 
1295 Ibid., para.38. 
1296 Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), above note 1279, para.109. 
1297 M. Du Plessis and D. Tladi, ‘The ICC’s Immunity Debate –the Need for Finality’, EJIL: Talk (11 August 
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3. The Claims for Legal Reforms by Member States of the African Union 
Very often, the time of crisis constitutes an opportunity to advance reforms within a legal 
order.1298 The history of international law has examples of such reforms after violence and 
numerous losses caused to mankind. This observation particularly applies to major changes 
within the international legal system during the 20th century which gave birth to the League of 
Nations in 1919 and the United Nations in 1945. In both cases, World Wars I and II 
respectively played a crucial role in the establishement of post-crisis international law. The 
development of international human rights law has followed the same dynamic.1299 On the 
whole, crises and violence shape international law and deconstruct it. But, this time, reforms 
of the system of international criminal justice are pacifically demanded by member states of 
the AU. There is no need to go to another war for that. Pacifist changes have the advantage 
that no one among the contenders in the legal crisis would theoretically impose his views on 
the other sides. Rather, the entire process of reforming the system aims at finding a fresh legal 
consensus which balances and satisfies the interests of everybody. In such conditions, the 
language of war is replaced by the power of proposals, exchanges and concessions. 
Everything is characterised by the logic of international negotiations (3.1), even though 
confrontation persists via the opposition of narratives and strategies to advance or to block the 
requested legal reforms (3.2).  
3.1. The Logic of International Negotiations  
AU member states which desire to reform the system of international criminal justice resort to 
multilateral forums of negotiations in order to find a solution with other stakeholders around 
the world on several contentious legal issues. It is important to revisit these forums (3.1.1) 
before examining the proposals for reforms emanating from Africa (3.1.2).  
3.1.1. The Mobilisation of Multilateral Forums       
Two main forums of negotiations have been mobilised by African states, depending on the 
issue at stake. These forums are the UN General Assembly regarding the question of universal 
                                                 
1298 W. van Genugten and M. Bulterman, ‘Crises: Concern and Fuel for International Law and International 
Lawyers’, 44 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (2013) 3-18, at 10. See also O. Gross and F. Ní Aoláin, 
Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
1299 B. Authers and H. Charlesworth, ‘The Crisis and the Quotidian in International Human Rights Law’, 44 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (2013) 19-39, at 24-25. 
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jurisdiction (3.1.1.1) and the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) for the reform of the ICC 
justice system (3.1.1.2). 
3.1.1.1. The United Nations General Assembly 
In its decisions of July 2008 and 2010, the AU Assembly mandated the chairperson of the 
Union to follow up on the matter of the abuse of universal jurisdiction by some non-African 
states with a view to ensuring that it is exhaustively discussed for a durable solution at the UN 
level.1300 This procedure was initiated in parallel with the discussion of the issue in the 
context of the relationship between the AU and the EU.1301 The discussion at the UN level can 
be justified by two principal reasons.  
First, the discussion between the AU and the EU placed itself in a very narrow perspective. 
Both regional organisations convened to establish a technical ad hoc expert group in order “to 
clarify the respective understanding on the African and EU side on the principle of universal 
jurisdiction”,1302 given the fact that the matter was one which endangered the relationship 
between both parties. However, the AU-EU Expert Group had no mandate to study possible 
reforms of the principle. Rather, its mission of clarification led to several recommendations to 
the effect that the exercise of universal jurisdiction should be in line with international 
courtesy and relevant rules of international law. This is the case with the duty to comply with 
immunities of state officials before foreign criminal courts and the necessity to leave primary 
jurisdiction to the territorial state willing and capable to prosecute the alleged perpetrators 
(subsidiarity).1303 
Second, the UN General Assembly appeared to be the best multilateral forum to discuss the 
issue, to advance the law or to reform it. Established as one of the UN principal organs,1304 the 
General Assembly is competent to “initiate studies and make recommendations for the 
                                                 
1300 Assembly/AU/Dec.199 (XI), above note 221, para.6; Assembly/AU/Dec.292(XV), above note 864, para.11.  
1301 See Executive Council of the African Union, ‘Progress Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the 
Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’, EX.CL/540 (XVI), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 25-29 January 2010, para.3. 
1302 African Union and European Union, above note 671, para.2. 
1303 Ibid., para.6-8. 
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purpose (…) of promoting international cooperation in the political field and encouraging the 
progressive development of international law and its codification”.1305 The progressive 
development of international law implies that the General Assembly may prepare drafts 
conventions “on subjects which have not yet been regulated by international law or in regard 
to which the law has not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of states”.1306 Instead, 
the codification of international law refers to “the more precise formulation and 
systematisation of rules of international law in fields where there already has been extensive 
state practice, precedent and doctrine”.1307 Normally, codification can be achieved through the 
adoption of international treaties (opened to state ratification) or mere resolutions or 
declarations enunciating the rules, principles or guidelines that are formulated and 
systematised. The discussion of the principle of universal jurisdiction can lead to the same 
outcome. The legitimacy of such a codification and progressive development of international 
law is deemed to be high since the General Assembly consists of all UN member states, 
involved in its work and discussion. 
The African concerns were raised to the level of the United Nations by the Permanent 
Representative of Tanzania. On 21 January 2009, he requested the UN Secretary General that 
an additional item on the “abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction” be included in the 
agenda of the 63rd session of the General Assembly.1308 Tanzania which was chairing the AU 
Assembly at that time acted on behalf of the group of African states. But, on 18 February 
2009, several delegations disagreed with the title of the proposed item which was considered 
to have a pejorative connotation.1309 Accordingly, Tanzania requested the suspension of the 
discussion to allow extensive consultations on its proposal.  On 29 June 2009, it requested 
that the proposed item be included in the agenda of the 64th session of the General Assembly 
under the title “the scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction”.1310 Annex 
                                                 
1305 Ibid., Article 13 (1) (a). 
1306 Statute of the International Law Commission (21 November 1947), Article 15. 
1307 Ibid. 
1308 Z. Lijiang, ‘Universal Jurisdiction before the United Nations General Assembly: Seeking Common 
Understanding under International Law’, in M. Bergsmo and L. Yan (eds), State Sovereignty and International 
Criminal Law (Beijing: Torkel Opsahl Academic Epublisher, 2012) 191-222, at 198. 
1309 Ibid., at 199. 
1310 UN General Assembly, ‘Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the Sixty-Third 
Session: the Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction - Letter Dated 29 June 2009 from 
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to this request was an explanatory memorandum detailing the reasons of the Tanzanian 
submission. This memorandum indicates: 
While the African Union fully subscribes to and supports the principle of universal jurisdiction 
within the context of fighting impunity as well as the need to punish perpetrators of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, it is, however, concerned about its ad hoc and arbitrary 
application, particularly towards African leaders. The application of this principle has to be 
consistent with international law and the conduct of international relations.1311 
Furthermore, the memorandum points out that “the extent of the application of this important 
principle has never been discussed at the level of the United Nations”1312 and that “there is no 
widespread state practice”.1313 Accordingly, Tanzania declared that the purpose of referring to 
the United Nations the issue of the principle of universal jurisdiction for discussion in the 
General Assembly was the need to establish “regulatory provisions for its application”.1314     
At its 105th plenary meeting held on 14 September 2009, the General Assembly took note of 
the Tanzanian submission. It consequently decided to include in the draft agenda of its 64th 
session the proposed item and recommended that it be considered by the Sixth Committee at 
that session.1315 On 16 December 2009, this decision was reiterated for the inclusion of the 
same item in the agenda of the 65th session of the General Assembly.1316 Two organs were 
mandated to work on the issue. First, the Sixth Committee or the Legal Committee,1317 which 
is the main forum for discussion of legal questions within the General Assembly. Another 
appropriate forum is the ILC which is the appropriate technical subsidiary organ to which a 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations Addressed to the 
Secretary-General’ (23 July 2009) Sixty-third session (A/63/237/Rev.1). 
1311 Tanzania, ‘Explanatory Memorandum: Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’ (23 
July 2009) UN General Assembly Sixty-third session (A/63/237/Rev.1) Annexe I, para.5. 
1312 Ibid., para.4. 
1313 Ibid. 
1314 Ibid., para.6. 
1315 UN General Assembly, ‘Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its Sixty-third 
Session’ (25 December 2008 – 14 September 2009) Volume III -General Assembly Official Records Sixty-third 
Session Supplement No. 49 (A/63/49), at 148.  
1316 UNGA Res. 64/117, 16 December 2009. 
1317 This is one of the six main committees established as subsidiary organs of the General Assembly. The other 
five committees are the Disarmament and International Security Committee, the Economic and Financial 
Committee, the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee, the Special Political and Decolonisation 
Committee, as well as the Administrative and Budgetary Committee. 
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topic before the Sixth Committee may be referred, when it is of a high technical aspect, for a 
deep study.  But, through resolution 64/117, the General Assembly decided that the Sixth 
Committee should continue “its consideration of the scope and application of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction, without prejudice to the consideration of related issues in other forums 
of the United Nations”.1318 Second, the UN Secretary General was requested to invite member 
states (and that invitation was extended to relevant observers for the General Assembly, 
including intergovernmental organisations like the AU and the EU) to submit information and 
observations on the scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction, including 
information on the relevant applicable international treaties, their domestic legal rules and 
judicial practice, and to prepare and submit to the General Assembly a report based on such 
information and observations.1319 Since then, the Sixth Committee has worked hand in hand 
with the Secretary General. It has established a Working Group on the issue. This Working 
Group is opened to all UN member states and observers to the General Assembly. Each year, 
it works in consideration of annual reports submitted to the General Assembly by the 
Secretary General. The initial report on the scope and application of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction was delivered in 20101320 and the most recent ones in June 2017.1321 Any 
recommendation following the discussion of the issue within the Sixth Committee must be 
submitted to the plenary of the General Assembly for final adoption. How about the work of 
the ASP? 
3.1.1.2. The Assembly of States Parties 
The ASP is a political body outside the ICC’s judicial structure. It is a plenary organ 
established under article 112 (1) of the Rome Statute and therefore consists of all Court’s 
member states. States not parties, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations may 
be convened to its meetings. It is the avenue to discuss and adopt proposals for amendments 
to the ICC Statute and the main legal texts underpinning its justice system, notably the 
                                                 
1318UNGA Res. 64/117, above note 1316, para.2. 
1319 Ibid., para.1. See also UNGA Res.69/124, 10 December 2014, para.3-4.  
1320 UN General Assembly, ‘The Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction: Report of the 
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Elements of Crimes1322 and the Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence.1323 As such, it is a 
legislative body which meets at the seat of the Court in The Hague or at the UN headquarters 
in New York once a year and, if need be, may hold special sessions.1324 In this regard, the 
Rome Statute provides that the ASP is competent to adopt amendments to it1325 or to 
“convene a Review Conference if the issue involved so warrants”.1326 The ASP is assisted in 
the discharge of its functions by a Bureau consisting of a President, two Vice Presidents and 
18 members elected for three-year terms.1327 It can also create subsidiary bodies as may be 
necessary for accomplishing its mission.1328  
The initial submission of African proposals for amendments to the ICC Statute and its justice 
system to the ASP was made at its 8th session, held from 16 to 26 November 2009 in The 
Hague (Netherlands). The decision for this submission was adopted after two important 
meetings convened by the AU. First, in February 2009, the AU Commission was requested to 
convene, as early as possible, a meeting of the African states parties to the ICC Statute on the 
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1328 Ibid., Article 112 (4). 
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establishment of this Court in order to exchange views on its work in relation to Africa, 
especially in the light of the processes initiated against African personalities, and to submit 
recommendations thereon taking into consideration all pertinent elements.1329 This meeting 
took place in Addis Ababa, from 8th to 9th June 2009, and was attended by 25 out of 30 
African states who were parties to the ICC Statute at that time.1330 Second, in July 2009, the 
AU Assembly mandated the same Commission to convene a preparatory meeting of African 
states parties at expert and ministerial levels (foreign affairs and justice) but open to other 
member states at the end of 2009 to prepare fully for the Review Conference of states parties 
scheduled for Kampala (Uganda) in May 2010.1331 This meeting which prolonged the 
discussion undertaken in June 2009 was held in Addis Ababa on 6 November 2009.1332 
Among other outcomes, it recommended that African proposals for amendments be presented 
to the aforementioned 8th session of the ASP.1333 The procedure required that such proposals 
are deposited with the UN Secretary General who should circulate them to all ICC member 
states1334 before discussion and eventually adoption by the ASP or the Review Conference.   
As a consequence, a Working Group on Amendments (WGA) was established by the 8th 
session of the ASP pursuant to resolution ICC-ASP/8/Res.6 of 26 November 2009. According 
to this resolution, such a subsidiary body of the ASP was created for the following purpose:  
considering, as from its ninth session, amendments to the Rome Statute proposed in accordance 
with article 121, paragraph 1, of the Statute at its eighth session, as well as any other possible 
amendments to the Rome Statute and to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, with a view to 
identifying amendments to be adopted in accordance with the Rome Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Assembly of States Parties.1335   
Additional to the initial meetings of African states parties to the ICC Statute, the AU held an 
extraordinary summit to examine the relationship between the Court and Africa in October 
2013. The AU Assembly decided that African states should continue to propose amendments 
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to the Rome Statute for the consideration of the ASP.1336 In particular, it requested African 
states parties to the ICC Statute, especially the members of the Bureau of the ASP, to inscribe 
on the agenda of the forthcoming sessions of the ASP the issue of indictment of African 
sitting heads of state and government by the ICC and its consequences on peace, stability and 
reconciliation in AU member states.1337 It is therefore interesting to pinpoint which 
amendments they have articulated to this effect, compared with the reform they are 
demanding regarding the scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction. 
3.1.2. The Proposals for Reforms Emanating from Africa 
 These proposals pertains to the principle of universal jurisdiction (3.1.2.1) and to the reform 
of the ICC justice system (3.1.2.2). 
3.1.2.1. The Regulation of the Scope and Application of Universal Jurisdiction  
It must be recalled that the referral by African states of the issue of universal jurisdiction to 
the UN General Assembly is based on the allegation of its abusive application outside the 
continent. To put an end to such an abuse, the proposal to reform emanating from Africa is 
made up of two different dynamics. The first one is the development of a number of legal 
options by the AU (a) and the second relates to the course of discussion within the Sixth 
Committee of the UN General Assembly (b). 
a) The Legal Options of the African Union 
It is a fact that the AU has developed a common African position on the issue of universal 
jurisdiction. This position is expressed through those various decisions against the abusive 
application of this principle by non-African states. The position is also found in the AU 
Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes, which is a non-
binding instrument, adopted in July 2012 at the 21st session of the AU Executive Council. The 
main objective and expectation of its adoption is that AU member states would legislate with 
regard to the legal standards provided for therein, in accordance with their specific 
constitutional arrangements and procedures.1338 But, the AU Model National Law on 
Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes is also expected to achieve another goal. In 
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fact, one may observe that the AU has not only drawn the attention of the Sixth Committee on 
its content but also sent the text to the UN as document containing African information and 
observations for the purpose of the discussion within the General Assembly.1339 In essence, 
the legal options made by the AU for the regulation of the scope and application of the 
principle of universal jurisdiction are linked to two basic problems, i.e. the approach to states’ 
criminal power to be adopted and the choice of a theory of reform of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction. 
Concerning the approach to states’ criminal jurisdiction, a distinction has already been made 
between the sovereign state-oriented conception and the constitutional approach. It is a fact 
that the AU espouses the latter conception, meaning that universal jurisdiction is allocated to 
states over certain offenses by international law. This approach was already contained in the 
Tanzanian explanatory memorandum submitted to the UN General Assembly in 2009, which 
indicated: 
The principle of universal jurisdiction is well established in international law. Universal 
jurisdiction does not apply to all international crimes, but rather to a very limited category of 
offences. It allows a State to exercise its domestic jurisdiction to indict and prosecute 
perpetrators of serious offences such as piracy, slavery, torture, genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity occurring outside its territory irrespective of the nationality of the 
perpetrators. The African Union respects this principle, which is enshrined in article 4(h) of the 
Constitutive Act.1340    
However, the exploration of a number of national legislation of African states has shown that 
these countries exercise a wider liberty by granting to their courts universal jurisdiction over 
certain crimes, including domestic offenses, outside any allocation of such power by a rule of 
international law.1341 This practice, which is not particular to Africa, is based on the opposite 
sovereign state-oriented conception of state criminal powers. This means that the 
constitutionalisation of universal jurisdiction over serious offenses that is sought at the UN 
level would continue to coexist with the sovereign state-oriented conception as legal practice 
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of states. Therefore, the work of the Sixth Committee is likely to provide a partial solution to 
the problem of abusive application of the principle of universal jurisdiction insofar as other 
offenses over which states ascertain their universal criminal power would continue to be fixed 
on the basis of each one’s sovereignty, freedom and active cooperation in the fight against 
impunity. Yet, it could be possible to elaborate regulatory provisions on universal jurisdiction, 
for instance by imposing some restrictions common to all states, regardless of these diverging 
and conflicting conceptions on criminal jurisdictional powers. 
On the other hand, there are three theories concerning the reform of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction. The first one refers to the abandonment of universal jurisdiction. This theory is 
based on the idea that the principle of universal jurisdiction is so hard to apply, due to various 
obstacles, risks of fragmentation (of laws and case-law)1342 and diplomatic costs that it turns 
to be, in the end, ineffective or inefficient. The theory contains two separate aspects. The first 
one is defended by Dalida V. Hoover who thinks that universal jurisdiction should be 
removed from the states and conferred on the ICC so that international crimes are punished 
fairly and according to uniform laws.1343  
But, this position is weak in that the ICC is a treaty-based court, whose jurisdiction is not 
accepted worldwide. In addition, even if one may hardly conceive that the ICC can be 
empowered to try all and any kind of international crimes, it remains that states may still 
exercise universal jurisdiction on domestic or even transnational offenses, meaning that the 
problem to be addressed would have been solved only in part.   
The second aspect of the theory of abandonment was defended by Henry A. Kissinger.1344 He 
proposed the prosecution of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity under the 
authority of the UN Security Council. According to him, the mechanism could operate as 
follows: 
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First, the U.N. Security Council would create a Human Rights Commission or a special 
subcommittee to report whenever systematic human rights violations seem to warrant judicial 
action. Second, when the government under which the alleged crime occurred is not 
authentically representative, or where the domestic judicial system is incapable of sitting in 
judgment on the crime, the Security Council would set up an ad hoc international tribunal on 
the model of those of the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda. And third, the procedures for these 
international tribunals as well as the scope of the prosecution should be precisely defined by 
the Security Council, and the accused should be entitled to the due process safeguards accorded 
in common jurisdiction.1345 
However, the problem with his proposal is triple. It subordinates prosecutions to the approval 
of a political body which, depending on diplomatic and political factors, may be reluctant to 
act. It also establishes a regime of inequality between permanent members of the Security 
Council, one of them being capable to veto a collective decision approving international 
prosecutions, and other UN member states.1346 It is finally constitutive of a duplication of the 
ICC, whose creation was also motivated by the intention to avoid the creation of costly ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals.  
The second theory is based on monitoring the exercise of universal jurisdiction by a 
designated state. The mechanism, suggested by Ariel Zemach, implies that universal 
jurisdiction recognised to any state over serious international crimes should be exercised in 
respect of the principle of equality before the law, regardless of whether suspects to prosecute 
and to try are nationals of powerful or weak countries.1347 According to this theory, it should 
be up to the ICC Prosecutor to designate a state which can exercise, in a particular situation or 
in respect of a particular case, its criminal universal jurisdiction.1348 Moreover, this exercise 
should be monitored by the ICC to the effect that, in case of abuse duly noted upon reports or 
information provided by the designated state, its jurisdiction is revoked and the matter be 
transferred to another country.1349 
                                                 
1345 Ibid. See also Coombes, above note 883, at 458.  
1346 K. Roth, ‘The Case for Universal Jurisdiction’, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2001), at 5 
<http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/hpschmitz/PSC354/PSC354Readings/RothUniversalJurisdiction.pdf> accessed 
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1347 A. Zemach, ‘Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with Equality before the Law’, 47 (1) Texas International 
Law Journal (2011) 143-199, at 143. 
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The limit of this theory is that it is founded on a false premise. First of all, not all states may 
be in a position to exercise universal jurisdiction. Even when it is imposed by virtue of 
international law, it is still required that that jurisdiction is concretely conferred on courts and 
tribunals in the domestic legal system. Second, as already indicated, the ICC jurisdiction will 
not necessarily be accepted by all states. The ICC Prosecutor may not therefore act in every 
situation and case. Moreover, the theory does not indicate who should request the ICC 
Prosecutor’s intervention when he does not act on his own initiative. In this regard, it is 
obvious that any state would not be entitled to submit the issue to the ICC with its limited 
scope of jurisdiction. Likewise, the possibility of referral by the Security Council is not 
warranted due to the politicisation of its actions or the blockage of its decision by a veto.     
The third and last theory relies on the necessity to adopt restrictions on the use of universal 
jurisdiction. There is apparently a need to “curb enthusiasm for universal jurisdiction”1350 so 
that its exercise becomes very exceptional, with fewer risks of abuse and impairing 
international relations. The principle is to be deemed a measure of last resort.1351 This is the 
option espoused by the AU. Its advantage is that it does not deprive states of their jurisdiction. 
This is because the universality principle is useful for the fight against impunity to which each 
state and the international community are expected to contribute. Therefore the need to 
identify those restrictions that would constitute the regulatory provisions of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction that the AU and its member states are demanding at the UN level.   
b) The Search for Restrictions on the Use of Universal Jurisdiction 
The discussion of the principle of universal jurisdiction within the Sixth Committee and its 
Working Group is based on different sources. In addition to the AU Model National Law on 
Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes which summarises the common position of 
African states on various contentious issues, there are information and observations provided 
by UN member states, which are notably founded on their domestic legislation and case-law, 
and so reported to the General Assembly by the UN Secretary General. Rwanda, which is one 
of the leading states in the contestation of the abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction 
                                                 
1350 D. Morrison and J. R. Weiner, ‘Curbing Enthusiasm for Universal Jurisdiction’, 4 Berkeley Journal of 
International Law Publicist (2010) 1-11, at 11. 
1351 UN General Assembly, ‘The Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction (Agenda item 
86)’ (12 October- 20 November 2015) Legal - Sixth Committee - Seventieth Session (A/C.6/70/SR.12, 13, 27 
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in Africa, has also mentioned the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction and pleaded 
for their incorporation into the discussion.1352 In the light of these available sources, one may 
try to identify those contentious issues as they appear to be under discussion within the Sixth 
Committee (i) before focusing on the particular question of subsidiarity (ii). 
i) The Identification of Issues under Discussion within the Sixth Committee 
The discussion on the principle of universal jurisdiction encompasses two main parts. First, its 
scope, which means the question as to which crimes may justify its exercise.1353 The second 
part is about the application of the principle. In this regard, states would like to define and 
harmonise their views on six different issues, namely the (pre) conditions for application of 
universal jurisdiction, the jurisdictional criteria (i.e. whether mandatory or discretionary 
universal jurisdiction), the procedural aspects to observe (i.e. international due process 
guarantees), the role of national judicial systems (i.e. the complementary role that courts 
exercising universal jurisdiction should play in contrast to courts exercising other forms of 
jurisdictional powers), the problem of international assistance and cooperation in the conduct 
of criminal matters (including extradition), as well as questions of state responsibility for 
wrongful acts in its exercise, including, if appropriate, its abuse.1354  
Neither of these issues is already settled. The divergence of views is still important. 
Regarding the scope of universal jurisdiction, the AU Model National Law on Universal 
Jurisdiction over International Crimes has determined a list of six crimes subject to the 
principle, i.e. genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, piracy, trafficking in drugs and 
terrorism.1355 It is remarkable that distinct crimes such as slavery, torture and crimes against 
peace (aggression) which are listed by the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction1356 
                                                 
1352 Rwanda, ‘The Government of Rwanda's Report on Information and Observations on the Scope and 
Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’ (2010), at 5 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Rwanda.pdf> accessed 30 October 2016.  
1353 UN General Assembly, ‘The Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction: Oral Report of 
the Chairman of the Working Group)’ (7 November 2014) Legal - Sixth Committee - Sixty-ninth session 
(Agenda item 83), para.10.  
1354 Ibid., para.12-18. See also International Justice Resource Center, ‘UNGA Sixth Committee Advances 
Discussion of Universal Jurisdiction’ (17 November 2014) <http://www.ijrcenter.org/2014/11/17/unga-sixth-
committee-advances-discussion-of-universal-jurisdiction/> accessed 09 June 2015. 
1355 African Union Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes, Article 8. 
1356 Principle 2 (1). See Macedo, above note 633, at 29.  
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are not covered by that instrument. However, the Princeton Principles are not exhaustive 
either. Other international crimes such as apartheid and enforced disappearances are outside 
its scope. That is why, for the purpose of facilitating further discussion at the UN level, the 
chair of the Working Group of the Sixth Committee has elaborated a preliminary list of 
twelve crimes that may be subject to universal jurisdiction, including corruption and 
transnational organised crime.1357 But, the major question stressed by several states is whether 
the establishment of such a list is even relevant. It has been argued that a general reference to 
customary and treaty international law would be preferable since crimes under universal 
jurisdiction should proceed on that basis.1358 Arguably, an unwarranted expansion of the list 
of crimes under universal jurisdiction should be avoided.1359  
Concerning the application of universal jurisdiction, South Africa, speaking on behalf of the 
group of African states during the Sixth Committee’s meeting of 20 October 2015, recalled 
that it must be consistent with applicable international law.1360 This exigency includes the 
respect for the UN Charter, other norms and principles of international law, including the 
sovereign equality of states, the territorial jurisdiction, the good faith, the fair trial and the 
immunity of officials existing under customary international law.1361 Among other issues that 
are under consideration there is the principle of double jeopardy (ne bis in idem), the 
subordination of prosecutions to the discretion of the state prosecutor and the possibility for 
the suspect to challenge or to appeal against the decision to prosecute under universal 
jurisdiction.  
                                                 
1357 UN General Assembly, above note 1353, para.10; UN General Assembly, ‘Sixth Committee: Informal 
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1359 UN General Assembly, above note 1351. 
1360 UN General Assembly, ‘Sixth Committee: Summary Record of the 12th Meeting of 20 October 2015’ (5 
November 2015) General Assembly Seventieth Session Official Records (A/C.6/70/SR.12), para.8. 
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The condition regarding the presence of the accused in the territory of the prosecuting or 
trying state is also still challenged.1362 In previous developments, it was demonstrated that this 
condition was primarily a requirement for the principle of sovereign equality of states. 
However, its persistent challenge seems to relate to the continuing confusion between the 
prohibition of universal jurisdiction in absentia and the ban of trials in absentia which is not 
absolute.1363 Even Rwanda made this confusion in its observations when it contended: 
(…) it remains unclear whether or not the prosecution of the accused in absentia is allowed. 
The experience of international tribunals and domestic courts would be helpful to clarify this 
issue. The general rule is that in criminal proceedings the presence of the accused is 
mandatory. However, this is not absolute. The rationale for this rule is to secure the fair trial 
requirement stipulated to, not only in international instruments, but also probably in the 
criminal statutes of almost every state. Particularly, Article 14 of International Covenant on 
Civil and political Rights, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
relevant statutory articles of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), all encapsulate this norm. (…) States are reluctant to exercise universal jurisdiction in 
absentia. Such a strict requirement may preclude the effective exercise of universal 
jurisdiction. The position of Rwanda on this issue is that there should be a fair balance and "the 
meaning of this right to fair trial is not to be interpreted too literally." In this regard, we support 
the position of ICTR in Barayagwiza case, where the ICTR Chamber concluded that neither the 
refusal of the accused to attend his trial nor the absence of his council might preclude the 
proceedings against him provided that they were "duly informed of his on-going trial." Thus, 
whenever a state seeking to utilize universal jurisdiction duly informs the accused, or a state 
that is anticipated to provide 'secure heaven' to the perpetrator of the crime falling under the 
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domain of universal jurisdiction, may warrant criminal proceedings without violating the 
above-mentioned light to fair trial.1364 
Surely, if a state is forbidden to exercise universal jurisdiction in absentia, that amounts a 
fortiori to the proposition that it cannot organise, in this particular circumstance, a trial in 
absentia. This is how the prohibition of such trials under the Princeton Principles on 
Universal Jurisdiction should also be understood as the text does not explicitly envisage, 
contrast to the AU Model National Law,1365 the ban of universal jurisdiction in absentia.1366  
But, even when the accused is present in the territory of the prosecuting state, there are further 
procedural steps to accomplish in order to ensure that he appears before the competent court. 
In this context, a trial in absentia (different from universal jurisdiction in absentia which 
refers to the legality of the exercise of criminal powers between states) is a procedural 
prohibition under human rights law, in particular because the judicial appearance is a 
guarantee of a fair trial. The accused person would have been given the possibility to bring his 
means of defence into the proceedings before the competent court decides to proceed by 
default. Likewise, if he anyhow escapes the proceedings after his initial appearance, it is 
thinkable that the trial would normally continue in his absence. These kinds of defaults may 
be minimised at best, should the state having closer connection with the crime at stake (by 
commission or nationality) be given priority for its repression. This possibility gives rise to 
another debate concerning the principle of subsidiarity. 
ii) The Question of Subsidiarity   
Subsidiarity is a concept of jurisdiction which means that the principle of universality is a 
default mechanism, meaning that it should be exercised only “to substitute for other countries 
that would be in a better position to prosecute the offender”.1367 These countries are those 
                                                 
1364 Rwanda, above note 1352, at 3-4. Emphasis is mine. 
1365 Article 4 (a) of the African Union Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes 
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law, regardless of whether such a crime is alleged to have been committed in the territory of the State or abroad 
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1366 Principle 1 (2) states : Universal jurisdiction may be exercised by a competent and ordinary judicial body of 
any state in order to try a person duly accused of committing serious crimes under international law as specified 
in Principle 2(1), provided the person is present before such judicial body’. 
1367 Cassese, above note 604, at 593. 
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which have closer connection with the crime (territorial state), the offender (active 
personality) or even the victim (passive personality). But, even though subsidiarity may be 
provided for in some domestic legal systems, it is difficult to say that it is a positive rule of 
international law, simply because the sovereign equality of states implies that there is no 
hierarchy between states that are in a position to exercise any type of criminal jurisdiction 
over the crime at stake.1368 This lack of hierarchy, from which it can be departed through 
particular arrangements, may be in turn a source of conflicts between national jurisdictions. 
The plea for ascertaining the principle of subsidiarity as a condition for the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction under international law aims to solve such conflicts between states. 
Subsidiarity would give the country which is the best qualified to exercise jurisdiction the 
opportunity to prosecute the crime by means of its own legal system.1369 In this regard, the 
state which is in a position to exercise universal jurisdiction would intervene only when 
neither state that may be considered as the best forum conveniens is willing and able to 
prosecute. That could bring the exercise of universal jurisdiction to the level of conditions 
established for the application of the ICC complementarity principle.1370  
The principle of subsidiarity has been incorporated in the AU Model National Law on 
Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes. This text provides that “in exercising 
jurisdiction under this law, a court shall accord priority to the court of the state in whose 
territory the crime is alleged to have been committed, provided that the state is willing and 
able to prosecute”.1371 But, one may observe that the AU Model National Law on Universal 
Jurisdiction over International Crimes inaccurately restricts the best forum conveniens to 
prosecute to the territorial state, while the state of nationality of the offender or the victim 
may also claim for their primary jurisdiction. This possibility is explicitly stipulated by the IIL 
resolution of 26 August 2005 on universal jurisdiction with regard to genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, which reads as follows: 
Any State having custody over an alleged offender, to the extent that it relies solely on universal 
jurisdiction, should carefully consider and, as appropriate, grant any extradition request 
addressed to it by a State having a significant link, such as primarily territoriality or nationality, 
                                                 
1368 Lafontaine, above note 609, at 139. 
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1370 ICC Statute, Article 17. 
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with the crime, the offender, or the victim, provided such State is clearly able and willing to 
prosecute the alleged offender.1372 
The same resolution envisages an obligation for the state relying on universal jurisdiction to 
ask, before commencing any trial,1373 the state having a proximate connection with the crime 
(territoriality) or the offender (nationality) whether it can prosecute or not. There is even a 
sort of double subsidiarity since that state is also obligated to consider the competent 
international criminal tribunal. The relevant operative paragraph in the said resolution reads as 
follows: 
Any State having custody over an alleged offender should, before commencing a trial on the 
basis of universal jurisdiction, ask the State where the crime was committed or the State of 
nationality of the person concerned whether it is prepared to prosecute that person, unless these 
States are manifestly unwilling or unable to do so. It shall also take into account the jurisdiction 
of international criminal courts.1374 
Despite these two gaps of the AU Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over 
International Crimes, it appears to be a better instrument than the Princeton Principles which 
do not normally establish a hierarchy between the state which has no ground for jurisdiction 
other than the principle of universality and other states. In this respect, principle 8 precisely 
provides for an aggregate balance of criteria on which the state of custody which is in a 
position to exercise universal jurisdiction shall, in deciding whether to prosecute or to 
extradite, base its decision.1375 These criteria are: i) the existence of multilateral or bilateral 
treaty obligations; ii) the place of commission of the crime; iii) the nationality connection of 
the alleged perpetrator to the requesting state; iv) the nationality connection of the victim to 
the requesting state; v) any other connection between the requesting state and the alleged 
perpetrator, the crime or the victim; vi) the likelihood, good faith, and effectiveness of the 
prosecution in the requesting state; vii) the fairness and impartiality of the proceedings in the 
requesting state; viii) convenience to the parties and witnesses, as well as the availability of 
evidence in the requesting state; ix) the interests of justice.1376 They can be equally used for 
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the determination of the best forum conveniens to prosecute in the event of competing 
jurisdictions between the territorial state, the state of nationality of the offender or the victim.  
In addition, the AU Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes 
establishes for the state of custody relying on universal jurisdiction an obligation, rather than 
discretion, to give priority to the best forum conveniens to prosecute. But, it is hard to predict 
which option (obligatory or optional and discretionary subsidiarity) will be adopted at the UN 
level. Obligatory subsidiarity implies that the state relying on the principle of universality has 
a duty to decline its jurisdiction should a state with a proximate connection with the case be 
willing and able to prosecute. Conversely, optional and discretionary subsidiarity means that 
the said state would have to choose between according priority to the primary jurisdiction of 
the best qualified forum conveniens and prosecuting by itself. In this regard, one may uphold 
the choice of the mandatory subsidiarity as an appropriate judicial policy in order to avoid at 
maximum any manipulation of justice for political ends and so to safeguard stable relations 
between states. The decline of universal jurisdiction should be refused only for exceptional 
reasons, such as those which can justify the refusal of extradition for international crimes: risk 
of torture, denial of fair trial guarantees, application of the death penalty, risk of summary 
execution or enforced disappearance, etc.1377  
A close related problem has arisen as to whether it is appropriate to leave to the country of 
custody relying on the principle of universality the power to decide if the state (or which one 
among countries in competition) claiming for a different basis of jurisdiction is genuinely 
willing and able to prosecute. This question is based on the concern that leaving such power 
in the hand of the custodial state may result in unfair, partial and arbitrary decisions vis-à-vis 
the requesting countries. Basically, the custodial state would be adjudicating its own case in 
which it is opposed to the state claiming for its primary jurisdiction. It would also be a way to 
giving a foreign state the authority to scrutinise the proper functioning of the legal system of 
another country in a manner which is at odds with the sovereign equality of states. That is 
why proposals to confer that power on an international institution have been formulated. In 
2006, Claus Kreβ made the suggestion that “an international judicial organ rather than the 
state concerned, should be entrusted with the power to make the decision as to whether 
another state was or is unwilling or unable to conduct the criminal proceedings in a given case 
where such a decision is necessary to apply the subsidiarity or the ne bis in idem 
                                                 
1377Lafontaine, above note 609, at 142.  
273 
principle”.1378 It must be noted that the proposition is without prejudice to a different 
procedure whereby the suspect may himself have the right to challenge the admissibility of 
his case in the prosecuting state on the basis of universal jurisdiction. It has been suggested 
that such an international judicial organ to make that decision can be the ICC,1379 meaning 
that it would decide on issues of complementarity of its own jurisdiction and subsidiarity 
between states with the potential to unite the jurisprudence. But, according to Jo Stigen, an 
alternative could be that “the state contesting the exercise of jurisdiction could always turn to 
the ICJ, arguing that the forum state has violated the (subsidiarity) principle”.1380 That is also 
the view of European states within the Sixth Committee1381 and the suggestion of the 
Princeton Principles.1382 But, again, the two proposals encompass some weaknesses. First, the 
ICC as well as the ICJ jurisdictions may not be necessarily accepted by all the litigating states. 
Second, the ICC jurisdiction is limited to a number of international crimes which may not 
constitute the entire list of crimes over which states can exercise universal jurisdiction. As a 
result, the Court’s Statute requires a deep reform for the discharge of that expanded mandate.  
Alternatively, the AU has suggested that “there is need for establishment of an international 
regulatory body with competence to review and/or handle complaints or appeals arising out of 
abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction by individual States”.1383 This is a broad 
proposal as it goes beyond the sole issue of subsidiarity and recalls what was already 
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suggested by Susane Walter in 2005, i.e. the establishment of an international system of 
accreditation allowing to monitor the correct application of universal jurisdiction.1384 But, the 
project is also challenged on the ground that it would jeopardise the independence of the 
national judiciaries.1385 It also seems to be a bureaucratic proposition adding itself to the 
existing mechanisms of the system of international justice which all states have not yet 
accepted.1386 In this respect, Paula Gaeta finally notes that the project “would create a useless 
burden, which would discourage –instead of encouraging –domestic prosecutions of 
international crimes”,1387 while they are “a central component for the international community 
to become that which it ostensibly claims to be –a true community”.1388 The debates are thus 
very opened at the UN level as they seem to be regarding the reform of the ICC justice 
system. 
3.1.2.2. The Proposed Reform of the ICC Justice System 
Apart from searching for regulatory provisions for the application of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction, African states also express a strong need to reform the ICC justice system. It is 
not just about amending one or several provisions of this treaty, but to change fundamentally 
its configuration compared with the provisions on which states agreed at the United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries in Rome. Earlier initiatives were triggered by the 
AU (a), but proposals for amendments were submitted to the ASP by South Africa and Kenya 
(b). 
a) The Earlier Initiatives of the African Union  
The impetus to the reform of the ICC justice system was given by the AU which convened 
several meetings of African states in order to discuss the work of this Court in the continent. It 
was in July 2009 that the AU Assembly decided, on the basis of issues highlighted by the 
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earlier meeting of June 2009,1389 to fix a list of items that deserved to be addressed by the 
meeting of African states parties or not to the ICC Statute that took place in November 2009. 
African proposals for amendments to this treaty were expected to be formulated after the 
discussion of the following six legal issues: i) article 13 of the ICC Statute granting power to 
the UN Security Council to refer cases to the ICC; ii) article 16 of the same Statute granting 
power to the UN Security Council to defer investigations or prosecutions for one (1) year; iii) 
procedures of the ICC; iv) clarification on the immunities of officials whose states are not 
party to the Statute; v) comparative analysis of the implications of the practical application of 
articles 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute; vi) the possibility of obtaining regional inputs in the 
process of assessing the evidence collected and in determining whether or not to proceed with 
prosecution, particularly against senior state officials.1390 But, the list was not exhaustive. It 
was opened to evolution because the AU Assembly decided to reserve “any other areas of 
concern to African States Parties”.1391 The AU Commission, which prepared the concept note 
for this meeting reduced these items to five issues, namely the development of guidelines for 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the power of the Security Council to refer cases to the 
ICC, the power of the Security Council to defer cases for one year, the immunities of officials 
whose states are not parties to the Rome Statute, and proposals relating to the crime of 
aggression.1392 
The meeting of 6 November 2009 reached several recommendations after deliberations under 
the chair of South Africa. First of all, African states called for a review of the regulations and 
the policy paper regarding “the guidelines and code of conduct of the exercise of 
(discretionary) prosecutorial powers to include factors of promoting peace (…)”.1393 Second, 
they gave up the possibility to amend the power of the Security Council to refer situations to 
the ICC in view of the fact that it was the organ responsible for the maintenance of 
international peace and security and it had the power to set up ad hoc criminal tribunals.1394 
Third, instead, a consensus was found that article 16 of the Court’s Statute conferring the 
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power on the Security Council to defer investigations or prosecutions for one year should be 
amended. That power should be shared with the General Assembly.1395 Fourth, concerning the 
problem of immunities, the meeting recommended that articles 27 and 98 of the ICC Statute 
should be discussed by the ASP in order to obtain clarification on their application 
particularly with regard to states not parties.1396 In fact, “there is a need to clarify whether 
immunities enjoyed by officials of non states parties under international law have been 
removed by the Rome Statute or not”.1397 This means that an amendment to the immunity 
regime was not yet at issue. The misunderstanding of its scope and application should have 
been settled before envisaging any proposal to amend it in view of the proper interpretation of 
the AU. Fifth, regarding the crime of aggression whose discussion was scheduled during the 
Review Conference which took place in Kampala (Uganda) in 2010, it was recommended that 
“the Security Council should not be granted exclusive powers to make a determination on 
whether aggression has been committed or not before the ICC can exercise jurisdiction with 
respect to crime of aggression”.1398 According to the AU and its member states, 
considerations could have been paid to granting the same power to other UN organs, namely 
the ICJ and the General Assembly.1399   
It follows that apart from the option for amending article 16 of the ICC Statute, the AU and its 
member states were, at this stage, very far from a profound reform of the ICC justice system. 
Proposals were still very modest. Thus, the above mentioned recommendation one was 
expected to be dealt with through a mere resolution of the ASP calling the OTP to review the 
prosecutorial guidelines.1400 In contrast, the remaining recommendations could be handled 
and discussed thoroughly by the ASP.1401 All these options were endorsed by the AU 
Assembly in its decision of January 2010.1402 It is likely that because of the judicial escalation 
                                                 
1395 Ibid., para.13 (R.3). 
1396 Ibid., para.13 (R.4). 
1397 Ibid. 
1398 Ibid., para.13 (R.6). 
1399 Ibid. 
1400 Ibid., para.14 (ii). 
1401 Ibid., para.14 (iii). 
1402 Assembly/AU/DEC.270 (XIV), Decision on the Report of the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Rome 
Statute on the International Criminal Court (ICC) (DOC. Assembly/AU/8(XIV)), 14th Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 31 January-2 February 2010, para.2. 
277 
of African situations before the ICC, notably the Kenyan situation, the AU and its member 
states expanded the proposals for amendments to the Court’s justice system. 
b) The African Proposals for Amendments to the ICC Statute  
It is the right of each state party, not an intergovernmental organisation or a non-contracting 
state, to submit proposals for amendments to the ICC Statute. In this respect, the Rome 
Statute provides that “after the expiry of seven years from the entry into force of this Statute, 
any State Party may propose amendments thereto”.1403 Accordingly, the amendments 
promoted by the AU had to be backed up by willing African states parties. Thus, South Africa 
took on its part the proposal to amend article 16 concerning the power of the Security Council 
to defer investigation or prosecution and submitted it, on behalf of the African states parties, 
to the 8th session of the ASP, held from 16 to 26 November 2009. Kenya, on its side, 
formulated further proposals for amendments which were not discussed during the meetings 
of African states parties. It notified its proposals to the UN Secretary General on 22 
November 2013 and submitted them for the first time to the 14th session of the ASP, held 
from 8 to 17 December 2014. All these proposals can be highlighted (i) before analysing a 
number of legal obstacles which they could face for their adoption or to get in force (ii).      
i) The Submissions of South Africa and Kenya 
Overall, South Africa submitted its amendment proposal to the ASP in the context of an 
institutional tension between the AU, the Security Council and the Court owing to the manner 
in which the latter was dealing with several African situations.1404 The main contention turns 
around the power of the Security Council to refer situations to or defer cases from the 
Court.1405 In the past, there was profound problems of politicised justice with a selective 
application of articles 13 (b) and 16 of the Rome Statute. With respect to article 13 (b), the 
Security Council referred the situations in Sudan and Libya to the ICC, but failed to do so in 
respect of other countries (Palestine and Syria).1406 Likewise, the Security Council several 
                                                 
1403 ICC Statute, Article 121 (1). 
1404 See B. C. Olugbuo, ‘The African Union, the United Nations Security Council and the Politicization of 
International Justice in Africa’, 7 African Journal of Legal Studies (2014) 351-379, at 354. 
1405 Ibid., at 351. 
1406 About Palestine, the main opposition has come from the United States of America, while Russia has resorted 
to its veto power concerning the situation in Syria. 
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times resorted to article 16 of the ICC Statute,1407 on the request of the Unites States of 
America,1408 but failed to do so for the situations in Kenya and in Sudan, on the AU request. 
Concerning the Kenyan situation, the deferral request of investigations and prosecutions 
against President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto for a period of 12 
months did not get a majority vote in support. True, none of the Security Council members 
voted against the draft deferral resolution. Azerbaijan, China, Morocco, Pakistan, Russian 
Federation, Rwanda and Togo voted in favour. But, other members, particularly all the 
Western powers, abstained.1409 Instead, the Security Council simply failed to consider the 
deferral request regarding the situation in Sudan. The AU Assembly expressed its deep 
disappointment that the request to the Security Council to defer the proceedings initiated 
against the President of Sudan was acted upon.1410 It has qualified the Security Council’s 
failure as being tantamount to a “lack of consideration of a whole continent”.1411 
It is under these circumstances that the need to frame differently the relationship between the 
ICC and the Security Council has appeared in order to avoid a sort of double standard in the 
application of the Court’s Statute. While the AU has renounced to the amendment of article 
13 (b) concerning the power of the Security Council to refer situations to the ICC Prosecutor, 
it has endorsed the proposal to amend article 16 of the Rome Statute, thereby adding to it 
paragraphs 2 and 3. In essence, South Africa has submitted the proposal in the following 
terms: 
Deferral of Investigation or Prosecution 
1) No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a 
period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under the Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect, that request may be 
renewed by the Council under the same conditions. 2) A State with jurisdiction over a situation 
before the Court may request the UN Security Council to defer the matter before the Court as 
                                                 
1407 SC Res. 4222 (2002), 12 July 2002, para.1; SC Res.1487 (2013), 12 June 2013, para.1.  
1408 See Abass, above note 1236, at 263-264. 
1409 SC 7060th meeting, S.PV/7060, above note 1040, at 2. Abstention was made by Argentina, Australia, France, 
Guatemala, Luxembourg, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United 
States of America.  
1410 Assembly/AU/DEC.296 (XV), above note 1029, para.4. 
1411 Assembly/AU/Dec.493(XXII), Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation 
of the Decisions on the International Criminal Court (Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XXII)), 22nd Ordinary Session of 
the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 30-31 January 2014, para.8. 
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provided for in (1) above. 3) Where the UN Security Council fails to decide on the request by the 
state concerned within six (6) months of receipt of the request, the requesting Party may request 
the UN General Assembly to assume the Security Council’s responsibility under paragraph 1 
consistent with Resolution 377 (v) of the UN General Assembly.1412 
On its side, Kenya has submitted five proposals for amendments. Three of them pertain to the 
institution of trial in the absence of the accused for exceptional circumstances under article 
63,1413 the inclusion of offenses against the administration of justice committed by the Court’s 
officials under article 701414 and the establishment of an independent oversight mechanism 
enjoying the power to carry out inspection, evaluation and investigations of all the organs of 
the Court.1415 But, the most important proposals which deserve some specific comments relate 
to the principle of complementarity and the immunity regime applicable before the Court. 
                                                 
1412 Secretariat of the Assembly of the States Parties, ‘Informal Compilation of Proposals to Amend the Rome 
Statute’ (23 January 2015), at 8-9 <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Publications/WGA-Inf-Comp-RS-
amendments-ENG.pdf > accessed 29 September 2015.  
1413 Ibid., at 9.  The proposal is articulated as follows: ‘Article 63 - Trial in the Presence of the accused. Under 
the Rome Statute, article 63(2) envisages a trial in absence of the Accused in exceptional circumstances. The 
Rome Statute does not define the term exceptional circumstances and neither are there case laws to guide the 
Court on the same. Article 63(2) further provides other caveats in granting such trials in circumstances where 
other reasonable alternatives have provided to be inadequate and for a strictly required duration. From the above, 
it is our humble opinion that an amendment to article 63(2) may be considered along the following lines: 
“Notwithstanding article 63(1), an accused may be excused from continuous presence in the Court after the 
Chamber satisfies itself that exceptional circumstances exists, alternative measures have been put in place and 
considered, including but not limited to changes to the trial schedule or temporary adjournment or attendance 
through the use of communications technology or through representation of Counsel. (2) Any such absence shall 
be considered on a case-by-case basis and be limited to that which is strictly necessary. (3) The Trial Chamber 
shall only grant the request if it determines that such exceptional circumstances exist and if the rights of the 
accused are fully ensured in his or her absence, in particular through representation by counsel and that the 
accused has explicitly waived his right to be present at the trial”. 
1414 Ibid., at 10. The proposal is articulated as follows: ‘This particular article presumes that such offences save 
for 70(1) (f) can be committed only against the Court. Noting the current situation in the Kenyan cases especially 
Trial Chamber V (b). This article should be amended to include offences by the Court Officials so that it's clear 
that either party to the proceedings can approach the Court when 2 such offences are committed. It is proposed 
that paragraph 1 be amended as follows: “The Court shall have jurisdiction over the following offences against 
its administration of justice when committed intentionally by any person:”’ 
1415Ibid. The proposal is articulated as follows: ‘Article 112 -Implementation of IOM. Article 112 (4) Assembly 
of States Parties shall establish such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary including Independent Oversight 
mechanism for inspection, evaluation and investigation of the Court ,in order to enhance its efficiency and 
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Regarding the principle of complementarity, the idea is that regions (starting with Africa) may 
continue to claim more control over the prosecution of international crimes to the detriment of 
the universal level. There is need to create “new geographies of justice”1416 at the regional 
level that the ICC Statute should explicitly take into account.1417 This perspective could 
promote the ownership of international criminal justice and reduce the perception of 
politicisation of ICC’s prosecutions at the convenience of big powers. In this regard, Kenya 
has proposed to amend the preamble of the Rome Statute which states that the ICC “shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”.1418 The Kenyan proposal intends to ensure 
that the Court is also “complementary to national and regional criminal jurisdictions”.1419 But, 
one may wonder how this proposal could be operationalised if it is not followed by a proposal 
of amendment to article 17 on issues of admissibility before the Court. Vertical relationships 
between the ICC and any emerging regional criminal court should be anticipated and 
harmonised in advance. This would not be a loss for the ICC. On the contrary, the 
diversification of enforcement mechanisms of law may strengthen the quest for justice and the 
fight against impunity. The international community in a whole should accept and support the 
idea of the regionalisation of international criminal justice,1420 because, as Heike Krieger has 
rightly put it, “there is a strong presumption that effective enforcement requires a multilevel 
                                                                                                                                                        
economy. This includes the conduct of officers/procedure/code of ethics in the office of the prosecutor. The 
Office of the Prosecutor has historically opposed the scope of authority of the IOM. Under Article 42 (1) and (2) 
the Prosecutor has power to act independently as a separate organ of the Court with full authority over the 
management and administration of the office. There is a conflict of powers between the OTP and the IOM that is 
continuously present in the ASP. It is proposed that IOM be operationalized and empowered to carry out 
inspection, evaluation and investigations of all the organs of the Court’. 
1416 T. McNamee, ‘The ICC and Africa. Between Aspiration and Reality: Making International Justice Work 
Better for Africa. Reflections on a High-Level Roundtable, Co-hosted by the Brenthurst Foundation and the 
Africa Centre for Strategic Studies’, Discussion Paper 2/2014 (18-19 March 2014), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), at 
14. 
1417 See J. de Hemptinne, ‘The Future of International Criminal Justice: a Blueprint for Action’, in A. Cassese 
(ed.), Realizing Utopia: the Future of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 585-595, at 
587-592.  
1418 ICC Statute, Preamble, para.10. 
1419 Secretariat of the Assembly of the States Parties, above note 1412, at 11. 
1420 See A. Soma, ‘L’africanisation du droit international pénal’, in Société africaine pour le Droit international 
(SADI), L’Afrique et le droit international pénal (Paris : Pedone, 2015) 7-36, at 12.  
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system”.1421 Therefore, the regionalisation process should not be perceived as a negation of 
the existing system of (global) international criminal law.1422  
Concerning the immunity regime for sitting senior states officials, particularly heads of states, 
the state of the ICC-Africa relationship shows that the rules borne by articles 27 and 98 of the 
Rome Statute is prone to a lot of misunderstandings. The controversial decisions of the ICC 
Pre-Trial Chamber affirming an exceptional waiver of immunity for sitting heads of state has 
not put an end to the debate. Rather, in October 2013, the AU adopted the decision precluding 
any charges to be commenced or continued before any international court or tribunal against 
any serving AU head of state or government or anybody acting or entitled to act in such 
capacity during their tenure of office.1423 Later, the AU Amendments Protocol on the Statute 
of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (AfCJHR) even added to the list of 
beneficiaries of personal immunities “other senior states officials”1424 in case of charges 
brought before the criminal section of the African Court. These officials could be determined 
by the African Court on a case-by-case basis.1425  
The Kenyan proposal of amendment is a bit weaker than the AU position on personal 
immunities before international criminal courts. It intends to provide for a possibility for the 
ICC to exempt some state officials from prosecutions on a case-by-case basis. This would be 
provided for in an additional paragraph 3 to article 27 of the ICC Statute which reads as 
follows: “Notwithstanding paragraph 1 and 2 above, serving Heads of State, their deputies 
                                                 
1421 H. Krieger, ‘A Turn to Non-State Actors: Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law in 
War-Torn Areas of Limited Statehood’, 62 SFB-Governance Working Paper Series (June 2013) 1-46, at 27; H. 
Krieger (ed.), Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law -Lessons from the African Great 
Lakes Region (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), at 539. 
1422 Soma, above note 1420, at 12. 
1423 Ext/Assembly/AU/DEC.1 (Oct.2013), above note 1039, para.10 (i). 
1424 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 
Article 46A bis. This Article stipulates: ‘No charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against 
any serving AU Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other 
senior state officials based on their functions, during their tenure of office’. 
1425 African Union, ‘Report of the First Ministerial Meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Justice 
and Legal Affairs’, STC/Legal/Min/Rpt., Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 15 and 16 May 2014, para.26. See also 
Executive Council of the African Union, ‘The Report, the Draft Legal Instruments and Recommendations of the 
Specialized Technical Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs’, EX.CL/846(XXV), Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), 
20-24 June 2014.  
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and anybody acting or is entitled to act as such may be exempt from prosecution during their 
current term of office. Such an exemption may be renewed by the Court under the same 
conditions”. It follows that the category of “other senior states officials” included in the AU 
amendments Protocol would not be formally covered before the ICC. In addition, it is clear 
that the Kenyan proposal of amendment could not solve the initial problem raised by the AU 
suggesting that officials of states not parties to the ICC Statute are immune from its 
jurisdiction. Given all these contradictory languages on the immunity regime (personal, but 
not functional) before international tribunals, a better course could be to put the issue on the 
table of negotiation and to elaborate a comprehensive clarification and reform.  
This recommendation also finds support in the fact that the problem of immunity is not 
particular to the AU and African states. To some extent, it has also been raised at the global 
level in the resolutions of the Security Council excusing nationals of some third states from 
the ICC jurisdiction. The United States of America went even farther and used the strategy of 
the so-called “Bilateral Immunities Agreements (BIA)” concluded with other states (parties 
and not parties) in order to defeat the potential ICC jurisdiction over American citizens.1426 
There has to be found a balance between the struggle against impunity and the interests of 
weak countries to which any exception to the rules on personal immunity would be applicable 
in de facto exclusion of leaders of big powers. It is now a presumption that the extreme treaty 
rule making official capacities irrelevant as provided for by the ICC Statute clashes with state 
sovereignty and the complexity of international relations. Even if a reform is much needed, 
there are several obstacles to amend the ICC justice system as expected.  
ii) The Potential Obstacles against the Proposed African Amendments  
Apart from the proposal to establish an independent oversight mechanism of the organs of the 
Court, which does not require the modification of its Statute but the exercise of the power of 
control conferred on the ASP, the proposed African amendments are likely to face a number 
of legal obstacles. This is beforehand due to the nature of these proposals. The Rome Statute 
distinguishes between amendments to provisions of an institutional nature and others. The 
interest of such a distinction lies in the applicable procedure which is to lead to their adoption 
and entry into force.  
                                                 
1426 Jeu, above note 962, at 431-441. 
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Amendments to provisions of an institutional nature are those which are provided for under 
article 122 (1) of the ICC Statute which stipulates: 
Amendments to provisions of this Statute which are of an exclusively institutional nature, 
namely, article 35, article 36, paragraphs 8 and 9, article 37, article 38, article 39, paragraphs 1 
(first two sentences), 2 and 4, article 42, paragraphs 4 to 9, article 43, paragraphs 2 and 3, and 
articles 44, 46, 47 and 49, may be proposed at any time, notwithstanding article 121, paragraph 
1, by any State Party. 
The conditions for the adoption and entry into force of these amendments are less stringent 
than those provided for the others of procedural or substantive nature. The ICC Statute 
specifies that the amendments of an institutional nature “on which consensus cannot be 
reached shall be adopted by the Assembly of States Parties or by a Review Conference, by a 
two thirds majority of States Parties”.1427 Furthermore, “such amendments shall enter into 
force for all States Parties six months after their adoption by the Assembly or, as the case may 
be, by the Conference”.1428 
Instead, even though the category of amendments of procedural or substantive nature shall be 
adopted by a two thirds majority if consensus is not found, their entry into force for all states 
parties is made dependent on two conditions. First, any of such amendments must be ratified 
by seven-eighths of states parties.1429 Second, the entry into force becomes effective only one 
year after “instruments of ratification or acceptance have been deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations”.1430 The sole exception to this provision relates to 
amendments to the substantive jurisdiction (the list of crimes at stake and their constituent 
elements) of the Court and reads: 
Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for those States 
Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of 
ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the 
Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when 
committed by that State Party's nationals or on its territory.1431  
                                                 
1427 ICC Statute, Article 122 (2). 
1428 Ibid. 
1429 Ibid., Article 121 (4). 
1430 Ibid. 
1431 Ibid., Article 121 (5). 
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It follows that the African proposals of amendments which are not of an institutional nature or 
do not relate to the crimes within the ICC jurisdiction require almost a unanimous ratification 
or acceptance by states parties. It is likely very difficult to reach this threshold and the 
amendments, if adopted, would take many years to come into force. 
Several other obstacles are specific to the amendment submitted by South Africa.  The first 
one is the potential objection to the legality of the proposal to confer on the General Assembly 
the power that it does not directly have under the UN Charter.1432 In fact, this political body is 
deprived of coercive powers such as those provided for in Chapter VII and on the basis of 
which the Security Council can adopt a resolution to defer investigations or prosecutions for 
the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. The allocation of powers between 
these two UN principal organs cannot be changed or modified by an amendment to the ICC 
Statute,1433 which is a distinct treaty from the UN Charter. Maybe, this is why the South 
African proposal has made reference to the resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950, the so-
called “Uniting for Peace Resolution”, which says: 
(…) if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to 
exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any 
case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the 
General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate 
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the 
peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security (…).1434 
Despite the fact that the consistency of this resolution with the UN Charter may be 
controversial, it is argued that it does not explicitly confer on the General Assembly the power 
to take binding decisions, whereas a deferral resolution must bind the ICC organs, such as the 
OTP and the chambers.1435 According to Dapo Akande, Max Du Plessis and Charles C. 
Jallow, it is however possible to confer on the General Assembly the power to request 
deferrals.1436 In their view, “this is because the power to make a request for deferrals is 
                                                 
1432 D. Akande, M. Du Plessis and C. C. Jalloh, ‘An African Expert Study on the African Union Concerns about 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC’, Institute for Security Studies Position Paper (2010), at 13. 
1433 Ibid. 
1434 UNGA Res. 377 (V) A, above note 360, para.1 
1435 Akande, Du Plessis and Jalloh, above note 1432, at 13. 
1436 Ibid. 
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nothing more than that: a request – as far as the requesting body is concerned. However, that 
request is made binding on the ICC by the Rome Statute under article 16”.1437  
Of course this would not be the first time that a separate treaty contains an obligation to the 
effect that its addressees must have regard to a non-binding act of an organ of an 
intergovernmental organisation.1438 However, this suggestion is unnecessary simply because, 
as demonstrated earlier, even if the General Assembly is deprived of coercive powers, some 
of its recommendations may qualify as binding decisions. The only limitation is that it shall 
not decide on a question which is at the same time actively examined by the Security Council. 
As a consequence, the true problem with the reference to the Uniting for Peace Resolution in 
the South African amendment proposal is to reduce the possibility for the General Assembly 
to be requested to act. In fact, this reference may suggest that the General Assembly is unable 
to decide “if the reason for which an unsuccessful request for deferral is anything other than 
the use of the veto by a permanent member of the UNSC”.1439 Obviously, other possible 
options are not covered such as the lack of a majority vote for a deferral resolution of the 
Security Council or the failure even to consider the issue as illustrated by the freezing of the 
AU request to defer investigations and prosecutions in regard to the situation in Sudan. 
Therefore, it would be better to remove that reference from the South African proposal.1440 
Such a removal would not be at odds with the UN Charter.      
The second specific obstacle will remain at the diplomatic level. It has to be reminded that 
many states (including Africans) had attempted to oppose the granting of deferral power to 
the Security Council during the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries in Rome. Even if 
this power could be politically well justified if it had been conferred on the General 
Assembly, due to its wider representativeness and its legitimacy, it is improbable that many 
                                                 
1437 Ibid. 
1438 Kahombo, above note 1193, at 439-440. The example provided by this author is the Convention on the 
Privileges and the Immunities of the United Nations (13 February 1946) with respect to the advisory opinion of 
the ICJ. Under section 30 of its Article VIII, it is stipulated: ‘All differences arising out of the interpretation or 
application of the present convention shall be referred to the International Court of Justice, unless in any case it 
is agreed by the parties to have recourse to another mode of settlement. If a difference arises between the United 
Nations on the one hand and a Member on the other hand, a request shall be made for an advisory opinion on any 
legal question involved in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute of the Court. 
The opinion given by the Court shall be accepted as decisive by the parties’.  
1439 Akande, Du Plessis and Jalloh, above note 1432, at 16.  
1440 Ibid. 
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states would now accept that another political body, next to the Security Council, is allowed 
to interfere with ICC’s proceedings.1441 This is because the proposal is likely to increase the 
politicisation of the Court and undermine its independence. The same reason seems to have 
captured the attention of states parties at the Review Conference of Kampala (Uganda) in 
2010. Whereas the AU and its member states suggested that the exercise of the Court’s 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression should depend on the prior determination of an act of 
aggression not only by the Security Council, but also by other UN organs, notably the General 
Assembly, the suggestion did not find support from other states. The Kampala compromise on 
this issue only provides for the power of the Security Council to make such a 
determination.1442 But, there is one exception in the following terms:  
Where no such determination is made within six months after the date of notification (of a 
situation before the Court by the Prosecutor to the Secretary General of the United Nations), the 
Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, provided that 
the Pre-Trial Division has authorized the commencement of the investigation in respect of a 
crime of aggression in accordance with the procedure contained in article 15, and the Security 
Council has not decided otherwise in accordance with article16.1443       
This diplomatic obstacle may provoke another kind of crisis within the ICC justice system. 
The logic of negotiations which is based on discussing the proposed amendments to the 
Court’s Statute could be replaced by the logic of confrontation between states in favour of the 
African proposals and those opposing their adoption. The reform of the scope and application 
of the principle of universal jurisdiction runs the same risk. 
3.2. The Logic of International Confrontation 
The claims for legal reforms of the system of international criminal justice seem to generate 
oppositions between states and other actors of international relations (ICC, EU, NGOs, etc.). 
                                                 
1441 Ibid. 
1442 ICC Statute, Article 15 bis (6 and 7). These provisions are read as follows: “6.Where the Prosecutor 
concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, he 
or she shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has made a determination of an act of aggression 
committed by the State concerned. The Prosecutor shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of 
the situation before the Court, including any relevant information and documents. 7. Where the Security Council 
has made such a determination, the Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of 
aggression”. 
1443 Ibid., Article 15 bis (8). 
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None of the proposed reforms has been so far adopted. Strategies developed to block or to 
push for adoption of these reforms by each side are contradictory. The language of protective 
measures from the AU (3.2.1) constitutes a response to the apparent international resistance to 
the unheeded proposals to reform the system of international criminal justice (3.2.2).  
3.2.1. The Protective Measures of the African Union    
The AU has adopted two principal protective measures to defend its member states against the 
perceived bias of the system of international criminal justice. The first one consists of the 
creation of the obligation for member states not to cooperate in the execution of arrest 
warrants issued against African leaders (3.2.1.1). The second measure is the threat of a 
collective withdrawal of African states parties from the ICC (3.2.1.2). 
3.2.1.1. The Obligation not to Cooperate     
Two situations are under consideration here. In the first place, the UA has considered arrest 
warrants delivered by European states in application (or so presupposed) of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction. In this respect, earlier in July 2008, it decided that “those warrants shall 
not be executed in African Union Member States”.1444 A request was also made to all UN 
member states, particularly EU states, to impose a moratorium on the execution of those 
warrants.1445 These measures are expected to remain valid “until all the legal and political 
issues have been exhaustively discussed between the African Union, the European Union and 
the United Nations”.1446 In the second place, regarding ICC’s proceedings, the AU has 
decided that African states shall not cooperate in the arrest and surrender of President Omar 
Al-Bashir.1447 A similar decision has rejected the arrest warrant against the Libyan leader, 
Muhammar Kadhafi.1448 But, because of his death, the latter decision is of little practical 
usefulness.  
It follows that these measures have the effect to impair the operation of prominent 
mechanisms (arrest warrants) for effective prosecutions of international crimes, whether at the 
domestic or international levels. Legal debates have been particularly hot in relation to the 
                                                 
1444 Assembly/AU/Dec.199 (XI), above note 221, para.5 (iv). 
1445 Ibid., para.8. 
1446 Ibid. 
1447 Assembly/AU/Dec.245 (XIII) Rev.1, above note 1119, para.10. 
1448 Assembly/AU/Dec.366 (XVII), above note 1030, para.6.   
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ICC’s proceedings. Instead, any incident of refusal to comply with arrest warrants against any 
African state official has not occurred in the continent in relation to the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction. Likewise, none of the European states has raised a dispute relating to the 
compliance with such arrest warrants in Africa. This situation may be justified by the fact that 
cases of prosecutions on the basis of universal jurisdiction have sensibly diminished since the 
the AU protest in 2008.  
That is why the following developments exclusively focus on the refusal to cooperate in the 
arrest and surrender of President Omar Al Bashir. The goal is not to find a sound legal 
solution to the problem of competing obligations which has been the reason for that refusal of 
African states that are also ICC members. Rather, it is about explaining the predominant logic 
of confrontation between interested stakeholders as another manifestation of the Court’s 
crisis. The argumentation distinguishes the political context of the obligation for AU member 
states not to cooperate with the ICC (a) from its legal context (b). 
a) The Political Context 
The duty imposed by the AU on its member states not to cooperate and comply with ICC’s 
arrest warrants against the Sudanese President is above all in political defiance of the Court in 
Africa. This defiance can be linked to three other close examples.  
First of all, it is not the first time that the African region defies and disobeys decisions of a 
universal organisation. In 1998, the OAU adopted a similar position in relation to the historic 
Lockerbie case.1449 It decided that its members should no longer comply with the regime of 
sanctions,1450 including the denial of transport and communications links, imposed by the 
Security Council on Libya pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.1451 The OAU decision 
was based on the fact that these sanctions had become bias and unfair against the Libyan 
people. They simply lacked a sound justification because Libya had consented to justice by 
accepting that its nationals suspected of having committed the Lockerbie terrorist attack be 
                                                 
1449 See T. Kalala, ‘La décision de l’O.U.A. de ne plus respecter les sanctions décrétées par l’O.N.U. contre la 
Libye : désobéissance civile des Etats africains à l’égard de l’O.N.U.’, 2 Revue belge de droit international 
(1999) 545-576, at 553-559.  
1450 SC Res.748 (1992), above note 542, para.3-6; SC Res. 883 (1993), above note 550, para.2-7. 
1451 AHG/Dec.127 (XXXIV), The Crisis between the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the 
United States of America and the United Kingdom, 34th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the Organisation of African Unity, Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), 8-10 June, 1998, para.2-3. 
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tried in a third neutral state, therefore not in the USA or the United Kingdom as imposed by 
the same Security Council and wanted by the two latter states.1452 Obviously, the language of 
politics prevailed over the concern about the legality of the OAU decision under the UN 
Charter.1453 
Secondly, it also appears that the African defiance against the ICC is not the only example in 
this regard. The USA was the first country to challenge the Court through the conclusion of 
bilateral immunity agreements with other states, parties or not to the Rome Statute, stipulating 
non-surrender of American citizens to the ICC even where a request for such surrender is 
made by the Court.1454 In reciprocity, the USA has committed to refuse the surrender of the 
other states’ persons to the Court. The only difference with the African defiance is that the 
latter occurs in a concrete pending case while the USA strategy envisages potential situations 
in which one of its nationals may be sought by the ICC. For both sides, the goal is identical. 
They deliberately create legal conflicts in order to impair the ICC’s work. This is something 
which Surabhi Ranganathan has correctly described as “strategically created treaty 
conflicts”1455 that precisely consist of the use of a legal form to limit the operation of 
another.1456 In the present situation, a treaty or treaty-based decisions are used to defeat the 
application of the Rome Statute. Beyond its legal perspective, this kind of defiance against the 
ICC is beforehand a political problem. It brings the legal dissatisfaction of states, either after 
the negotiation of the ICC Statute (USA) or as a consequence of the conflicting interpretation 
of its provisions by the Court itself (Africa), in the field of international politics. 
Thirdly and last, the AU decision not to cooperate with the ICC is a political rejection of its 
related judicial decisions in contravention of the requirement of the rule of law. This rejection 
is not the only example in history of non-execution of judicial decisions of international 
                                                 
1452 Ibid., para.2. 
1453 This is because obligations owed pursuant to resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter have a prevalence effect over any other obligations to the contrary. See UN Charter, Article 
103.   
1454 See L. Burgorgue-Larsen, ‘Les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et la justice internationale : entre l'utilisation et 
l'instrumentalisation du droit international’, in R. Ben Achour and S. Laghmani (ed.), Le droit international à la 
croisée des chemins : force du droit et droit de la force (Paris : Pedone, 2004) 233-269 ; Fernandez, above note 
960. 
1455 S. Ranganathan, Strategically Created Treaty Conflicts and the Politics of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
1456 Ibid., at 6. 
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courts, even though such a disobedience is still a minority phenomenon.1457 The reasons 
underpinning such a defiance have been previously indicated, in particular the duty to respect 
personal immunity to which President Omar Al Bashir is entitled under international law, the 
misuse of indictments against African leaders and the need to safeguard peace and security in 
Sudan. Politically, there seems to be a lack of confidence in the impartiality of the Court. 
African states have just created a legal conflict in order to find a technical justification or alibi 
to disobey the Court’s decisions willingly. Of course the Court may report cases of non-
cooperation to the ASP or/and to the Security Council (which has referred the Sudanese 
situation to the Court) for consideration.1458 Accordingly, this procedure has the potential to 
displace the issue from the judicial arena to the table of political organs external to the Court. 
It is up to the latter organs to find a suitable solution to the matter, the Court having no other 
mean to impose its decisions on states that are determined to challenge its authority. In such 
conditions, the legal context of the refusal to cooperate is of a secondary importance in this 
crisis. 
b) The Legal Context 
The creation of a duty not to cooperate with the ICC has given rise to competing obligations 
vis-à-vis African states parties to the Court’s Statute. The basis of this intricate issue is 
presented (i) before looking at the battle of legal solutions to a problem which deserves a 
political treatment through dialogue (ii).  
i)  The Rise of Competing Obligations    
The ICC Statute imposes the duty to cooperate with the Court on all state parties. This is the 
object of part 9 on “international cooperation and judicial assistance”. The general obligation 
in this respect specifies that “states Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court”.1459 But, there are different aspects of cooperation under the 
Rome Statute. These include cooperation in the arrest and surrender of the accused person to 
                                                 
1457 See M. M. Al-Qahtani, ‘Enforcement of International Judicial Decisions of the International Court of Justice 
in Public International Law’ (PhD Thesis, University of Glasgow 2003), at 181; E. L. Abdelgawad, ‘L’exécution 
des décisions des juridictions internationales des droits de l’homme: vers une harmonisation des systèmes 
régionaux’, 3 Anuaro Colombiano de Derecho Internacional (2010) 9-55, at 36-42.  
1458 ICC Statute, Article 87. 
1459 Ibid., Article 86. 
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the Court,1460 his provisional arrest,1461 the removal of his otherwise applicable immunity1462 
and other forms of judicial cooperation.1463 In the present context, the type of cooperation 
requested to African states parties to the Rome Statute is only their compliance with the 
request for the arrest and surrender of President Omar Al Bashir to the Court. Another 
possible obligation for states parties to cooperate with the Court can be envisaged on the basis 
of the genocide Convention because the ICC is also prosecuting the accused for genocidal 
acts allegedly committed in Darfur.1464  
The problem of competing obligations arises from the time when the AU, relying on its 
Constitutive Act of 2000, imposes on its member states the obligation not to cooperate with 
the ICC to that effect. The AU Assembly has reminded that its decision is binding pursuant to 
article 23 (2) of the Constitutive Act.1465 Reacting against the decisions on the alleged failure 
by Chad and Malawi to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court in 2011, the 
AU Commission expressed its total disagreement with the decisions of the PTC I “which did 
not take cognisance whatsoever of the obligations of AU Member states arising from Article 
23 (2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, to which Chad and Malawi are State 
Parties, and which obligate all AU Member States “to comply with the decisions and policies 
of the Union””.1466 
Of Course, the AU decisions not to cooperate with the ICC have been adopted by the 
Assembly which is the supreme organ of the Union.1467 It is competent to take such decisions 
on issues of interest to the continent and its people.1468 The insistence on the applicability of 
the aforementioned article 23 (2) should also confirm, in addition to the language used in 
those decisions, their binding character. In this respect, the position of a commentator 
                                                 
1460 Ibid., Article 89. 
1461 Ibid., Article 92. 
1462 Ibid., Article 98. 
1463 Ibid., Article 93. 
1464 See M. Du Plessis and C. Gevers, ‘Balancing Competing Obligations: the Rome Statute and AU Decisions’, 
Institute for Security Studies Paper No. 225 (2010), at 10-11. 
1465 Assembly/AU/DEC.547 (XXIV), above note 1032, para.19. 
1466 African Union Commission, above note 1047, at 2. 
1467 AU Constitutive Act, Article 6(2). 
1468 Ibid., Articles 3 (d), 7 (1) and 9 (a). 
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suggesting that the AU decisions are non-binding directives is mistaken.1469 In case of non-
compliance with such “decisions and policies of the Union”, sanctions can be imposed on the 
state, “such as the denial of transport and communications links with other Member States, 
and other measures of a political and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly”.1470 
The dilemma therefore appears. Either African states parties to the Rome Statute disobey the 
AU in order to comply with the ICC request or they violate the Court’s Statute in order to 
obey the AU decisions. This justifies the difficulties of legal interpretation for the purpose of 
finding an acceptable solution to the competing obligations at stake.  
ii) The Battle of Legal Solutions             
The problem of competing obligations in the context of ICC’s proceedings with respect to the 
Sudanese President interrogates the relationship between universalism and regional 
international law. The problem is intricate because it is not a dispute opposing a state against 
another, but a conflict between two intergovernmental organisations with transversal effects 
on the relationship with each other’s member states. Several approaches have been suggested 
to put an end to the issue. 
In the first place, there is the ICC own finding. The position has already been explained in 
regard to the contention over the irrelevance of state officials’ personal immunity before the 
Court. The ICC’s central idea is that the situation in Sudan has been referred to the Prosecutor 
by a resolution of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This 
resolution, which implies the removal of President Omar Al Bashir’s personal immunity 
under international law, trumps the AU decisions pursuant to article 103 of the UN Charter. 
But, the flaw of this finding is that it creates a conflict which does not truly exist between the 
UN resolution and the AU decisions. The reason is that the Security Council did not create for 
UN members any obligation to cooperate with the ICC under Chapter VII in a manner that it 
could override the contrary obligation arising from the AU decisions. 
Secondly, Max Du Plessis and Christopher Gevers suggest the theory of effective 
construction,1471 which requires to “avoid interpretations which would leave any part of the 
                                                 
1469 See N.J. Udombana, ‘‘Can These Dry Bones Live?’: In Search of a Lasting Therapy for AU and ICC Toxic 
Relationship’, 1 (1) African Journal of International Criminal Justice (2014) 57-76, at 67. 
1470 AU Constitutive Act, Article 23 (2). 
1471 Du Plessis and Gevers, above note 1464, at 18-19.  
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provision to be interpreted without effect”,1472 while “an interpretation which would make the 
text ineffective to achieve the object in view is prima facie suspect”.1473 Therefore, according 
to these authors, the AU decisions do not displace the obligation to cooperate owed by its 
member states that are parties to the ICC Statute.1474 They also conclude that African states’ 
duty under their domestic laws might be of great help for balancing the competing 
obligations. In this regard, they argue that everything would depend on each legal system. It 
means that where one of the competing obligations is domesticated (automatically for monist 
countries and by transformation for dualist ones), then that obligation will prevail. As a result, 
the state concerned will cooperate or refuse to cooperate depending on what is provided for by 
its domestic law.  
But, the critique is that the first part of this solution equally renders meaningless the 
obligation not to cooperate arising from AU decisions under the Constitutive Act. Truly, it 
does not say anything more than giving the impression to support a sort of institutional 
prevalence of the ICC over the AU. Concerning the second part of the solution, it is obvious 
that it contradicts the customary rule, codified by the VCLT, prescribing that national law 
cannot be invoked as justification for failing to perform a treaty.1475 It is very doubtful that 
that was the kind of demand to member states when the AU Assembly requested them “to 
balance, where applicable, their obligations to the AU with their obligations to the ICC”.1476 
Therefore the need for a more cautious balancing approach to competing obligations which 
indicates: 
(…) while there still exists a conflict of obligation in this matter, African states should not ignore 
their obligations under the Rome Statute but should balance the two. This is to be taken to mean 
that, at the very least, these states should take measures to ensure that persons accused of such 
heinous crimes under the Rome Statute do not enter their territory.1477  
                                                 
1472 Ibid., at 19. The authors refer to C. F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International 
Organizations (2end. Rev., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), at 46. 
1473 Ibid. 
1474 Ibid., at 19. 
1475 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 27. 
1476Assembly/AU/DEC.296 (XV), above note 1029, para.6.  
1477 E. Wakesho Ngolo, ‘Analysing the Future of International Criminal Justice in Africa: A Focus on the ICC’, 
Strathmore Law Review (2016) 99-122, at 121. 
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Another approach relying on norms of conflict has been proposed by James Mouangue 
Kobila.1478 In his view, the Rome Statute and the AU Constitutive Act are constitutive of lex 
specialis compared with the UN Charter,1479 notwithstanding its article 103. However, 
between the ICC Statute and the AU Constitutive Act, the speciality is in favour of the 
African regional organisation.1480 But, the problem remains unsolved because he does not 
suggest the way to decide on this position. It is thinkable that the ICC may not adopt this 
approach which undermines the application of its basic treaty. In the meantime, the AU would 
unlikely be ready to accept further pronouncements of the Court on this issue if the latter does 
not support a position which it finds to be favourable. This is because the Court which is 
competent to settle any dispute concerning the exercise of its judicial functions1481 is 
considered to be part of the problem, and the AU is not anyway a party to its Statute. 
The last approach was proposed by Mba Chidi NMaju, who thinks that the problem of 
competing obligations in the present context should be solved with reference to the legal 
regime applicable to intergovernmental organisations.1482 The premises of his position read: 
Disputes between the organisation and its members or between members would be resolved 
using the provisions of the constituent instrument. However, disputes between two international 
organisations may not be settled using the constituent of one of them; rather it must be resolved 
by applying the general principles common to international organisations.1483 
For this purpose, he proposes a central argument based on the competences of each 
organisation. He then observes that the AU may have the powers to adopt decisions that are 
                                                 
1478 J. M. Kobila, ‘L’Afrique et les juridictions internationales pénales’, Cahier Thycydide n°10, Etude (2012), at 
49-51.    
1479 Ibid., at 49. 
1480 Ibid. 
1481 ICC Statute, Article 119 (1): ‘Any dispute concerning the judicial functions of the Court shall be settled by 
the decision of the Court’. In paragraph 2, the same Article provides: ‘Any other dispute between two or more 
States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Statute which is not settled through negotiations 
within three months of their commencement shall be referred to the Assembly of States Parties. The Assembly 
may itself seek to settle the dispute or may make recommendations on further means of settlement of the dispute, 
including referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of that Court’.   
1482 M. C. Nmaju, ‘Relevance of the Law of International Organisations in Resolving International Disputes: a 
Review of the AU/ICC Impasse’, 14 (14) African Journal on Conflict Resolution (2014) 155-185, at 183.  
1483 Ibid., at 166. 
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binding on its member states.1484 But, he recommends that this organisation should refrain 
from encouraging its members to violate other treaties.1485 Turning back to the ICC, he 
suggests that the Court has violated the rules on immunity.1486 So, with respect to President 
Omar Al Bashir, the Court has gone beyond its powers to actively require its members to 
violate the law in arresting and surrendering the suspect.1487 Consequently, he concludes that 
the ICC should change its approach to the issue of Omar Al Bashir’s immunity.1488 The 
reason is that “few states will be willing to take the gamble of arresting a foreign official due 
to the high political and legal risks that it poses”,1489 notably cause of war, state responsibility 
and other diplomatic and economic risks.  
The critique against this approach is that it appears inapplicable to a true problem of 
competing obligations. The latter presupposes that one valid obligation is concurrent for 
application with another valid obligation. But, as far as the author relies on the rules 
governing the powers of the two organisations, it is implicit that when an obligation is 
established outside the legal framework of such powers, it is invalid in law and cannot be 
regarded as being in competition with another. In short, this kind of legal competition can 
only exist between two or more valid obligations. 
All these approaches show the limits of legal solutions to a problem which may be efficiently 
settled through dialogue. The same applies to the threat of collective withdrawal of African 
states from the ICC Statute. 
3.2.1.2. The Threat of Collective Withdrawal of African States from the ICC 
At outset, it is important to note that withdrawing from a treaty like the ICC Statute is a 
sovereign decision of a state. In this respect, the VCLT provides that the state concerned 
which wishes to pull out should comply with the provisions set out in the treaty in 
question.1490 Article 127 of the ICC Statute provides: 
                                                 
1484 Ibid., at 176. 
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1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of 
receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies a later date. 2. A State shall not be 
discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this Statute while it 
was a Party to the Statute, including any financial obligations which may have accrued. Its 
withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal 
investigations and proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to 
cooperate and which were commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal became 
effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which was 
already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the withdrawal became 
effective. 
Pursuant to this article, withdrawing from the ICC Statute is a prerogative of any state party. 
The notification of a withdrwal decision should be signed by the national authority enjoying 
full power to bind that state party internationally. But, by analogy to the process of joining a 
treaty, the observation of national constitutional arrangements of political power is not of 
great legal importance to the effectiveness of the withdrawal at the international level, except 
if the violation of these arrangements was manifest and constituted a breach of a fundamental 
domestic norm.1491 A violation is manifest if it “would be objectively evident to any State 
conducting itself in a matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith”.1492  
The issue of withdrawal of African states from the ICC Statute was initially invoked by the 
AU during the first meeting of African states parties that took place in Addis Ababa, in June 
2009.1493 But, it was only at the AU summit which was held in January 2016 that the 
recommendation to develop a comprehensive strategy of collective withdrawal from the ICC 
was decided.1494 But, such a strategy should be submitted to an extraordinary session of the 
AU Executive Council for adoption.1495 The reasons of promoting this strategy of collective 
withdrawal move have not changed. They turn around all the concerns (including reforms) of 
African states about the judicial work of the ICC that have been raised over the years and are 
not yet taken into account. In January 2017, the AU adopted the ICC Withdrawal Strategy 
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Document, which acknowledges the sovereign right of AU member states parties to the Rome 
Statute to pull out of the Court.1496 Rather than constituting a real withdrawal strategy with a 
collective plan of retreat, the Document simply provides those member states with “a holistic 
approach, analysis and implications of initiating the withdrawal provisions under the Rome 
Statute in accordance with the constitutional provisions of individual African states 
parties”.1497 Hence, one must speak of the threat of massive withdrawal from the ICC Statute 
as the concept of collective retreat is unknown in international law.   
In practice, the continent has already known the first countries that have declared their 
intention to pull out of the ICC Statute, namely Burundi, South Africa and The Gambia. 
Burundi and South Africa have even notified their will to withdraw to the UN Secretary 
General. A domino effect on other African states parties is feared.1498 However, in March 
2017, South Africa revoked its decision to withdraw from the ICC in order to comply with a 
domestic judicial decision which found that its withdrawal without the approval of the South 
African Parliament was unconstitutional and invalid.1499 On its part, The Gambia does no 
longer consider to retreat from the ICC after the election of a new President in December 
2016.   
The potential impact of a massive retreat of African states from the ICC is differently 
perceived. For example, a commentator who tries to minimise the phenomenon states: 
The ICC is a court. It will continue to carry out its legally assigned mandate: to deal with cases 
within its jurisdiction. Even if more African states withdraw, the Court will still have more 
work than it can handle. The Court will move on to other situations, of less extreme gravity but 
                                                 
1496 African Union, ‘Draft 2: Withdrawal Strategy Document’ (12 January 2017), para.8 
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/icc_withdrawal_strategy_jan._2017.pdf > 
accessed 22 April 2017. 
1497 Ibid., para.9. 
1498 D. Akande, ‘South African Withdrawal from the International Criminal Court – Does the ICC Statute Lead 
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still quite grave enough to warrant action. Situations of more moderate scale and gravity may 
prove much more manageable for investigation and prosecution. Greater regional diversity of 
selected situation will result. The Court will continue to serve states, the United Nations, and 
ultimately to human beings within its jurisdiction. And if withdrawing states decide someday 
to rejoin the Statute, then their people will once again have the ICC backstopping national 
courts in responding to atrocities.1500 
True, international criminal justice is a project to envisage in a longue durée. It could not 
collapse at once because of just the African withdrawals. However, it seems evident that these 
retreats may seriously undermine the legitimacy of the ICC, which already misses sufficient 
membership from a large part of Asia, beginning by the Arabic world, and three permanent 
members of the UN Security Council. The most devastating impact would be African 
withdrawals without bringing into operation an alternative mechanism of international 
criminal justice at the regional level. According to the AU Withdrawal Stragety Document, 
African states should ratify the Malabo Protocol on the AU Criminal Court “in order to 
enhance principle of complementarity in order to reduce the defeference to the ICC, which 
futhers the mantra of African solution to African problems”.1501 Otherwise, victims of 
international crimes on the continent could be left to the mercy of their oppressors, so 
powerful to avoid justice at the domestic level. Even the establishment of such a regional 
judicial institution might not be sufficient to deal with all potential offenders in Africa. The 
fight against impunity for international crimes will be more efficient with the contribution of 
the ICC in a multi-level system of criminal accountability. Cautiousness is thus necessary in 
order not to succumb to the massive withdrawals that could be avoided through dialogue on 
every aspect of the ICC Statute on which states parties appear to be in disagreement. This 
dialogue was underlined by the 15th session of the ASP, held in November 2016. In fact, 
“there was ample satisfaction that an open process of dialogue had been started in order to 
address the concerns of African States. It was agreed that this dialogue should continue and 
develop further, focusing also on possible practical measures for the future of the Rome 
Statute system and the International Criminal Court”.1502 For its efficacy, dialogue requires 
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1501 African Union, above note 1496, para.35. 
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some political will, openness to reforms and no resistance to change of the current state of 
international criminal law.    
3.2.2. The International Resistance against the Claims for Legal Reforms 
There is a standoff with the proposed reforms of the system of international criminal justice. 
At the UN level, the question of the scope and application of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction is still on the table of discussion within the Sixth Committee of the General 
Assembly. The issue might even be displaced from the Sixth Committee to the ILC as a 
number of state delegates are demanding that the latter subsidiary body of the General 
Assembly undertake a study on such a technical legal issue.1503 Predictably, that could take 
some years again. 
Concerning the ICC justice system, the situation is worse. Since the adoption of the Common 
African Position on the ICC, almost nothing has moved in the direction of reforms demanded 
by Africa. The reason lies in the attitude of African states parties themselves. Despite several 
AU calls that they should speak with one voice and demonstrate a unity of action to ensure 
that African proposals for amendments to the Rome Statute are considered by the ASP,1504 a 
common strategy to this effect has missed at several occasions.1505 On their sides, the ICC’s 
defenders (ICC’s employees, western great powers, EU, international NGOs, pro universalism 
international lawyers, etc.) have opposed a fierce resistance to these proposals. The AU itself 
acknowledged the limited influence that the African group of states parties to the Court’s 
Statute had in the decision process of the ASP during the 2009 and 2010 sessions.1506 In 
general, only few states supported the African proposals.1507 Hence, with respect to 
amendment of article 16 submitted to the ASP during the 2009 session, the AU observed: 
“only two African states namely Namibia and Senegal took the floor to support the proposal 
while thirteen (13) non-African states took the floor against the proposal”.1508 Likewise, the 
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AU has expressed its concern over “the failure by the ASP to consider the concerns and 
proposals for amendments by African Union of the Rome Statute of the ICC during the 13th 
Session of the ASP held in New York from 8 to 17 December, 2014”.1509  
How to justify such a strong opposition to amend the Rome Statute and therefore to reform 
the ICC justice system? Three hypotheses can be envisaged,1510 namely the protection of 
professionalism (ICC’s employees and NGOs), the refusal of any power sharing between 
universal and regional levels to preserve an instrument for a (geo-) political agenda (great 
powers), the alignment with an ideology (pro universalism lawyers and NGOs). It is in the 
name of this ideology that the ICC justice system is generally said to be equivalent to the 
efficient struggle against impunity, while regional contestations of the misuse of universal 
mechanisms are viewed as an attempt to protect leaders from criminal accountability, notably 
in regard to the issue of immunity.1511  
Therefore, instead of dealing with all the African proposals for amendments, the ASP has 
forwarded two principal responses to criticisms against the Court. First, the allocation of more 
personnel originating from Africa to the ICC. It is obvious that this kind of response is 
unconvincing since it does not match with the merits of criticisms raised against the ICC’s 
work. However, it aligns with certain professionalism, as stated above, with the expectation to 
smoothen the attitude of those who have presented the ICC as the “Europe’s Court for 
Africa”.1512 Secund, some amendments to the Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence have 
been adopted by the ASP on 27 November 2013. Among other innovations, “an accused 
subject to a summons to appear who is mandated to fulfill extraordinary public duties at the 
highest national level may submit a written request to the Trial Chamber to be excused (from 
presence at trial) and to be represented by counsel only (…)”.1513 However, the most 
important African proposals to amend the Court’s Statute remained unsolved. They continue 
to be under discussion within the Working Group on Amendments, which was established by 
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1510 See also S. Moyn, ‘Towards Instrumentalism at the International Criminal Court’, 39 The Yale Journal of 
International Law Online (2014) 55-65, at 56-63. 
1511 Tladi, above note 1237, at 7-10; G. Abraham, ‘Africa’s Evolving Continental Court Structures: at the 
Crossroad?’, SAIIA Occasional Paper 209 (January 2015), at 14-15  <http://www.saiia.org.za/doc_view/669-
africa-s-evolving-continental-court-structures-at-the-crossroads> accessed 6 July 2015. 
1512 McNamee, above note 1416, at 6; Hoile, above note 920, at 35. 
1513 ASP Res. ICC-ASP/12/Res.7, 27 November 2013, Rule 134 quarter, para.1. Emphasis is mine.  
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the ASP in 2009.1514  Resistance to legal reforms seems to be to date the most important threat 
to the maintenance of a well-balanced system of international criminal justice. Yet, such a 
system is needed to ensure that justice is equally delivered for states and individuals from all 
the regions. It is a requirement for a more efficient fight against impunity around the world. 
  
                                                 
1514 See Assembly of the States Parties, ‘Report of the Working Group on Amendments’, Thirteenth Session 
(New-York, 8-17 December 2014), ICC-ASP/13/31, 7 December 2014; ‘Report of the Working Group on 
Amendments’, ICC –Fourteenth Session (The Hague, 18-26 November 2015).   
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4. Conclusion of Part I 
This part has placed the question of jurisdictional criminal power within the international 
legal system in the heart of the crisis of global international criminal law as it manifests itself 
in relation to Africa. On the one hand, it appears that, outside the realm of domestic 
jurisdictions, that power is concentrated at the universal level at the expense of states and their 
respective regions. It is a fact that the ICC which constitutes the greatest symbol of such 
universalism in criminal matters is a politicised Court in which powerful states that are 
permanent members of the Security Council play an important role. This is the case because 
of the power conferred on the Security Council to trigger ICC jurisdiction or to suspend its 
proceedings for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. The functioning 
of the ICC demonstrates that the influence of powerful countries has even increased beyond 
what the Rome Statute allows them to do. The ICC proves to be deferential to the Security 
Council and the latter’s permanent members have succeeded in getting control of its 
operations in part, either by preventing its action (situation in Syria) or by interfering with its 
proceedings (situation in Libya). Yet, some permanent Security Council members are not 
parties to the Rome Statute (China, Russia and USA) whilst they participate in the decision-
making in situations concerning states parties that are among the powerless ones in the world. 
Moreover, it is symptomatic to note that, as at August 2017, all the cases brought before the 
ICC have come from African states. 
On the other hand, this part has shown that in practical terms, weak states are not better placed 
to apply the principle of universal jurisdiction due to the costs of its enforcement: diplomatic 
frictions, deficient capabilities of the judiciary and financial constraints. This contrasts with 
the massive use of the same principle by strong states, such as EU member states. In a number 
of cases relating to officials of some African countries (DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda, 
etc.), universal jurisdiction was exercised inconsistently with international law. Either the 
accused person was not present in the territory of the prosecuting state or arrest warrants were 
issued in such circumstances and circulated through media, and sometimes in violation of 
immunities of foreign state officials. 
Both uses of international criminal law at the universal and domestic levels have increased the 
number of judicial interventions in foreign states, especially in powerless countries, in the 
name of the fight against impunity. However, powerful countries, while intervening or 
supporting such interventions in other states, are not de facto subordinated to the same 
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institutions and rules of international criminal law. The weight of international criminal law is 
much felt by weak states at the expense of their sovereignty, not because they are the only 
places where international crimes are perpetrated or whose nationals may be suspected of 
having committed such crimes, but owing to the fact that the system of international criminal 
law is indeed unbalanced and in favour of those states which most influence the functioning 
of the international legal system. 
International criminal law is furthermore less flexible for states. The latter have to exercise 
their jurisdiction if they want to avoid external judicial interventions. The margin of choice 
between prosecutions and alternatives of non-prosecution, such as inaction, statutes of 
limitation, amnesties and sequencing of justice for reasons of peace promotion, which may 
well be dictated by the state national policy, has become extremely reduced. International 
criminal law is for them a sort of anti-state law. That is why a permanent tension does exist 
between the objective to ensure criminal accountability and the preservation of states’ 
national interests, including self-determination and democratic aspirations of peoples.   
It is the combination of all these factors concerning the distribution of jurisdictional criminal 
power within the international legal system which stands behind the current crisis of global 
international criminal law. Confidence in law and justice which reach the concerns of all 
states and regions is eroding. There are perceptions of manipulations of law and justice for 
political ends, selectivity of crimes, situations and cases to bring to justice, as well as double 
standards and neo-colonialism. This perception is found in the African objection to the 
abusive application of the principle of universal jurisdiction, the criticisms against the ICC’s 
work in Africa and the contestation of the rules on state officials’ personal immunity. Thus, a 
number of reforms are requested by the AU member states in order to stop the current crisis: 
the need to adopt some regulatory provisions for the application of universal jurisdiction and 
to amend some provisions of the ICC Statute, including the rules on personal immunity and 
the deferral power conferred on the Security Council. However, the most important reform to 
carry out could be the regionalisation of international criminal law: regionalisation of the ICC 
which may be connected to regional criminal tribunals, if they exist, and extension of the list 
of crimes to be brought before international courts to other offences, including those crimes of 
particular concern to Africa, such as the illicit exploitation of natural resources and 
unconstitutional change of government. The trend towards the regionalisation of international 
criminal law is the next premise of the current development of African international criminal 
law, which will be analysed in the second part of this study.                         
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Part II. The Pillars of African International Criminal Law 
African international criminal law does exist. It emerges out of the process of regionalisation 
of international law in Africa. Two principal drivers stand behind its development. On the one 
hand, there is the crisis of general international criminal law, which is criticised for its alleged 
injustices or biases,1515 particularly towards weak states. The process of regionalisation has to 
some extent a legal and political response to it, with the will to ensure a balanced future for 
the international legal system.1516 This is because, on the other hand, there are other 
problematic issues specific to the continent that demand appropriate African answers in terms 
of law making and enforcement. Arguably, such development in law can promote or 
undermine the prosecution of international crimes in Africa.1517 There is an impression that 
African international criminal law might be a replacement of universal international criminal 
law on the continent, undermine its progress or establish enforcement mechanisms competing 
with global institutions of criminal accountability.1518 However, the development of African 
international criminal law can be also cherished. While universalism accords with a 
cosmopolitan aspiration of states, regionalism is for them a natural and even a practical 
orientation,1519 given the proximity of ties between states and their common problems in their 
region, the challenge of regional ownership of the fight against impunity and the potential of 
the process of regionalisation to reduce the risk of politicisation of justice or the cost of 
sovereignty for states against judicial globalisation. In this regard, the process of 
regionalisation implies an African conception of international criminal law. Since 
regionalisation promotes the development of international law,1520 it should not be seen as a 
                                                 
1515 See S. Kaba, Justice universelle en question : justice de blancs contre les autres ? (Paris : L’Harmattan, 
2010) ;  D. Lagot, Justice ou injustice internationale ? (Paris : L’harmattan, 2009) ; M. Gallois and J. Verges, 
L’apartheid judiciaire : le Tribunal pénal international, une arme de guerre (Paris : L’Âge d’Homme, 2002).  
1516 V. O. Nmehielle, ‘Conclusion: Ensuring a Balanced Future for International Criminal Justice’, in V.O. 
Nmehielle (ed.), Africa and the Future of International Criminal Justice (The Hague: Eleven International 
Publishing, 2012) 405-414. 
1517 S.H. Adem and M. Yankson, ‘The African Criminal Court: Promoting or Undermining the Prosecution of 
International Crimes in Africa? Symposium on 29th and 30th June 2015 at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin’, 
Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (2015) 567-571. 
1518 Udombana, above note 1469, at 69. 
1519 R. Burchill, ‘International Criminal Tribunal at the Regional Level: Lessons from International Human 
Rights Law’, New Zealand Yearbook of International Law (2007) 25-44, at 26. 
1520 S. Freeland, ‘Internationalization of Justice –A Case for the Universal Application of International Criminal 
Norms’, 4 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law (2007) 45-65, at 45.  
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competing process with universalism. Interactions, mutual enrichment and some types of 
cooperation between the regions and the global level will be inevitable in the future. A 
multilevel system of international criminal law is likely to emerge and needs to be inter-
connected and integrated.   
This part of the study aims to examine the specific pillars of African international criminal 
law, that is to say, the regional bases for its development. Both lex lata and lex ferenda are 
taken into account because African international criminal law is still in its prime infancy 
towards maturation.1521 The AU Criminal Court itself has not yet become operational. 
Therefore, the issue at stake is not about providing full details on every aspect of the content 
of African international criminal law, with respect to its sources, the punishable crimes, the 
forms of criminal responsibility, jurisdiction and procedures, and the sentencing system. 
Rather, while illustrating this content, the study will focus on three main regional pillars of 
African international criminal law, namely, the emerging notion of African regional public 
order to the protection of which this law will contribute (1), the development of a system of 
African regional criminal justice (2) and the principles governing its relationship with the 
global system of international criminal justice (3).          
1. The Emergence of African Regional Public Order 
The concept of public order, ordre public in French or öffentliche Ordnung in German, is not 
easy to define and to develop.1522 It is adaptable to every kind of law, whether national or 
international, and changes its scope according to the specificities of each legal branch (public 
law, private law, economic law or international law). Just in domestic law and private 
international law, where its existence is quite widespread, the concept has many 
understandings. For example, Didier Boden has found that it refers at least to 104 legal 
notions.1523 In public international law, the matter is more complicated because the notion 
does not have a prescriptive positive content.1524 While the existence of public order is not 
                                                 
1521 Soma, above note 206, at 520. 
1522 Bouchet-Saulnier, above note 537, at 535. 
1523 D. Boden, ‘L’ordre public : limite et condition de la tolérance –Recherches sur le pluralisme juridique’ (PhD 
Thesis, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne Paris 2002). 
1524 J. Kokott and F. Hoffmeister, ‘International Public Order’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public law and International: Heidelberg and Oxford 
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disputed as such, the concept appears to be mainly doctrinal.1525 It is referred to as 
international public order or the public order of the international community.1526 The doctrine 
of public order is necessary for the identification of certain rules –as well as their 
consequences –that are deemed essential for the security and the stability of a given society or 
for the protection of its fundamental interests or the dignity of human beings who are under its 
jurisdiction.1527 The concept is central to criminal law.1528 This is because criminal law 
usually intervenes as a means of last (or even severe) resort (ultima ratio) in order to 
safeguard the community against serious violations of its fundamental values that derive from 
different branches of law, whose legal force is thereby reinforced.1529 In this regard, criminal 
law deals with behaviours which are contrary to such essential rules by imposing criminal 
punishment on their perpetrators.  
In the context of African international law, it is preferable to talk about African regional 
public order or simply Pan-African public order if one refers to the ideology of African unity 
which underpins its conception. Analogously, the notion is affected by the same lack of a 
prescriptive content as at the global level. The problem seems to be even worse because the 
very existence of a regional (international) community, on behalf of which the concept of 
Pan-African public order evolves, may not be accepted. However, as in global international 
law, there are signs of the existence of such an order in African international law. This may be 
seen in the definition of the concept (1.1) and the extent to which it is particularly enriching in 
criminal matters with the codification of crimes against peace and security in Africa (1.2). 
1.1. The Definition of the Concept  
The debate about public order in international law is linked to the question whether there are 
legal norms of a higher status than ordinary rules, which states cannot dispose of at their 
                                                                                                                                                        
University Press, 2010) 1-11, at 7 <http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1430?prd=EPIL> accessed 20 December 2016. 
1525 Ibid. 
1526 H. Mosler, The International Society as a Legal Community (Sijthoff & Noordhoff: Alpena an den Rijn, 
1980), at 17. 
1527 S. Santos, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Construction of International Public Order’, 5 (2) 
JANUS.NET e-Journal of International Relations (2014-2015) 16-44, at 17. 
1528 Ibid. See also R. C. Keith and Z. Lin, New Crime in China: Public Order and Human Rights (London/New-
York, Routledge, 2006), at 1. 
1529 R. Nyabirungu mwene Songo, Traité de droit pénal congolais (2th end., Kinshasa : Editions Universitaires 
Africaines, 2007), at 18, 20 and 21. 
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will.1530 The transformation of the international legal system with the advent of the UN 
Charter and the increasing emphasis on the protection of human rights have crystallised new 
rules binding on states without their consent in the interest of mankind.1531 Nowadays, 
international law promotes and protects community interests,1532 i.e. those interests which are 
not “to be left to the free disposition of states individually or inter se”,1533 but are “recognised 
and sanctioned by international law”1534 as matter of concern to all the community. In this 
regard, to uphold the existence of African regional public order, there must be a community 
which is given appropriate means, procedures and institutions, to defend itself or its members 
against violations of regional norms of such a high legal status in order to maintain security 
and stability as well as the dignity of peoples. Thus, it is important to interrogate the existence 
of these norms which form an order of protection of Africa (1.1.1) before discussing their 
enforcement in the framework of an order of defence against security threats, such as 
international crimes, occurring in Africa (1.1.2). 
1.1.1. The Order of Protection by Regional Rules of Fundemental Importance for Africa  
There are different kinds of protective rules in African international law. Even if these rules 
do not constitute a sort of regional jus cogens (1.1.1.1), the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights possesses some specific features regarding the issue of their normative 
hierarchy (1.1.1.2). 
1.1.1.1. The Question of Regional Jus Cogens  
The question which arises is to know whether the African regional public order does exist 
without an African regional jus cogens. The answer is in the affirmative. Norms of different 
legal nature relate to the notion of international public order. Some are part of jus cogens and 
                                                 
1530 H. Rolin, ‘Vers un ordre public réellement international’, in Hommage d’une génération de juristes au 
professeur Basdevant (Paris : Pedone, 1960) 441-462, at 451. 
1531 See Tomuschat, above note 45; J. A. Frowein, ‘Reactions by Not Directly Affected States to Breaches of 
Public International Law’, 248 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International (1994) 345-438. 
1532 H. Krieger, ‘Rights and Obligations of Third Parties in Armed Conflicts’, KFG Working Paper Series, No.5, 
Berlin Potsdam Research Group‘The International Rule of Law –Rise or Decline?’ (Berlin: December 2016), at 
5. 
1533 Simma, above note 50, at 233. The author has relied on P.C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (New York: 
Macmillan, 1949), at 2. 
1534 Ibid. 
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others not (jus dispositivum). Literally, jus cogens simply means compelling law,1535 i.e. the 
law consisting of peremptory norms from which no derogation is possible. This coexistence 
of rules of different legal nature is also found in African international law. In fact, norms of 
jus cogens from general international law coexist with a number of specific African regional 
rules. Even if the latter do not constitute regional peremptory norms protecting the African 
regional public order (a), they possess a high legal status in the hierarchy of norms in African 
international law (b). 
a) The Relationship with the Notion of Public Order  
At the outset, the concept of public order in general international law referred to the notion of 
jus cogens.1536 The link is evident in Jean Salmon’s Dictionnaire de droit international 
public.1537 Article 53 of the VCLT defines the notion of jus cogens as follows: 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general 
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States 
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only 
by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. 
It appears that the VCLT envisages peremptory norms only in relation to treaty law-making as 
well as the invalidity which sanctions their violation. The VCLT adds that “if a new 
peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict 
with that norm becomes void and terminates”.1538 One of the most important examples of a 
norm of jus cogens is the prohibition of the use of armed force between independent states.  
But, norms of jus cogens also exist outside the field of international treaty law-making. A 
typical example is provided by international human rights law. In this regard, the International 
                                                 
1535 K. Hossain, ‘The Concept of Jus Cogens and the obligation under the UN Charter’, 3 (1) Santa Clara 
Journal of International Law (2005) 72-98, at 74. 
1536 A. Verdross, ‘Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law”, 60 American Journal of International 
Law (1960) 55-63, at 58. 
1537 Salmon, above note 149, at 788-789. International public is here defined as consisting of ‘rules of 
fundamental importance for the international community as whole from which states shall not derogate, under 
penalty of invalidity, by contrary conventions’. The original French version defines international public order as 
the ‘règles d’importance fondamentale pour la communauté internationale dans son ensemble auxquelles les 
Etats ne pourraient, à peine de nullité, déroger par des conventions contraires’. The translation is mine. 
1538 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 64. 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights precludes state unilateral acts or conducts responding 
to a situation of public emergency which derogate from some fundamental rights, such as the 
right to life, the prohibition of torture, slavery and the retroactive application of penal 
laws.1539 Violations of norms having this character may constitute an international crime in 
the sense of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility of 1996. In the latter instrument, 
the ILC also specifies that any other internationally wrongful act, that is to say any conduct 
constituting a breach of an international obligation of the state, which does not constitute an 
international crime, amounts to an international delict.1540 The difference between a crime and 
a delict was based on the notion of gravity. In particular, an international crime was 
characterised as the violation of an international obligation of an essential importance for the 
protection of fundamental interests of the international community as a whole.1541 Although 
this categorisation –crime and delict –was relinquished in the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility in 2001,1542 owing probably to its lack of legal pertinence,1543 the notion of 
gravity survived in relation to particular consequences of “serious breaches of obligations 
under peremptory norms of general international law”.1544  
The relationship between the notion of international public order and jus cogens might raise 
some doubts concerning the existence of the African regional public order for two main 
                                                 
1539 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966), Article 4. It reads as follows: ‘1. 
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially 
proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations 
under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such 
measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve 
discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. 2. No derogation 
from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision. 3. Any State 
party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of derogation shall immediately inform the other States 
Parties to the present Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the 
provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A further communication 
shall be made, through the same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such derogation’. 
1540 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility with Commentaries (1996), Article 19 (4).  
1541 Ibid., Article 19 (2). 
1542 See M. Arcari, ‘Responsabilité de l’Etat pour violations graves du droit international et système collective 
des Nations unies’,  21 Anuario de Derecho Internacional (2005) 415–447.   
1543 State responsibility is implied, be it for a breach of its international obligation constituting a crime or a delict. 
The categorisation –crime and delict- does not change its nature. Still, states are not criminally responsible. 
1544 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Articles 40-41. 
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reasons. First, the VCLT deals with jus cogens only in relation to general international law. 
By nature, norms of jus cogens are not constitutive of a different source of law but they are 
embodied in customary international law or codified in universal multilateral conventions.1545 
This means that if there is no regional jus cogens, the African regional public order would not 
exist either. Secondly, there would not be any international crime at the regional level, 
constituting an attempt to this order, if it does not originate from general international law.       
However, international public order is not today limited to jus cogens.1546 There are “other 
principles and rules of general international law which –irrespective of whether or not they 
qualify as jus cogens – are regarded as fundamental because they serve common interests of 
the international community of States”.1547 These rules and principles include the principles 
on friendly relations between states,1548 such as sovereign equality, non-intervention, good 
faith in the performance of international obligations, self-determination and peaceful 
settlement of disputes.1549 Other areas of general international law are also concerned. But, it 
is quite impossible to identify therefrom all kinds of rules that relate to the notion of 
international public order. One may just mention the law of the sea with respect to the 
principle of freedom of navigation in the high seas, the prohibition of piracy or the right of 
foreign vessels to innocent passage in the territorial sea of the coastal states.1550   
Regarding the high legal status of such rules and principles in international law, Pierre-Marie 
Dupuy writes that an importance may be in fact attached to certain norms, which may even 
have a higher rank to other rules, without necessarily having a peremptory character, that is to 
say non-derogable.1551 In particular, article 103 of the UN Charter provides such a rank for 
obligations of member states under the Charter because, in the event of conflict, they shall 
                                                 
1545 M.E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Leiden/Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publisher, 2009), at 670. 
1546 Mosler, above note 1526, at 19. 
1547 G. Jaenicke, ‘International Public Order’, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (Amsterdam/ New York/ Oxford: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., 1984) 314-318, at 315.  
1548 See UN Charter, Article 2; Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970). 
1549 Ibid. See also Jaenicke, above note 1547, at 316-317. 
1550 M. A. Becker, ‘The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation and the Interdiction of 
Ships at Sea’, 46 (1) Harvard International Law Journal (2005) 131-230. 
1551 Dupuy, above note 48, at 72.  
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prevail over their obligations deriving from any other international agreement.1552 This is why 
the obligation to respect Security Council resolutions, adopted under Chapter VII and 
pursuant to article 25 of the UN Charter,1553 is reflective of the international public order, 
although it is not a rule pertaining to jus cogens. Other norms of international public order 
derive from erga omnes obligations, as recognised several times by the ICJ,1554 insofar as they 
are not obligations owed by a state to another, but by every state to all the others and the 
international community as a whole. Therefore, each of the states concerned possesses an 
interest to have these obligations observed or even enforced in case of violation.  
On the whole, the notion of public order of the international community can be defined with 
respect to principles and rules which are deemed fundamental for the stability of the 
international community as a whole or the protection of human rights, and whose enforcement 
is of such a vital importance for all its members that any unilateral act or any agreement 
which breaches the said principles and rules is either void or simply deprived of legal effect. 
Some specific consequences that are attached to violations of the international public order 
differ from one field of law to another. For example, in collective security, the illegal use of 
force by a state normally engenders a situation of international public emergency which 
justifies the Security Council to resort to its exhorbitant powers under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.1555 In international criminal law, perpetrators of international crimes may face 
prosecutions and trials, and eventually national or international penal sanctions. 
In the light of these developments, there is no need to have norms of regional jus cogens as a 
condition for the existence of the African regional public order. The latter coincides with 
general international law wherever universal norms have been regionalised. But, there are also 
a number of rules and principles that are peculiar to Africa and possess a high legal status in 
African international law. These regional rules and principles constitute a sort of erga omnes 
partes obligations, established in the interest of the community of states and peoples 
belonging to the African continent. Such obligations are the heart of the African regional 
                                                 
1552 Rolin, above note 1530, at 456. 
1553 This Article provides: ‘The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter’. 
1554 Barcelona Traction, above note 46, para.33; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, above note 54, para.31. 
1555 T. Tzimas, ‘International Public Emergency and Collective Security ‘, 20(3) Journal of Conflict and Security 
Law (2015) 335-358, at 354.  
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public order because they determine its specificity. This order may be defined as a set of rules 
and principles having a high legal status in Africa –even a peremptory character as regards 
those universal norms which are regionalised –and a fundamental importance for the 
protection of peace, stability and human rights on the continent or any other interest essential 
for the African community of states and peoples as a whole. To be concrete, it is now 
necessary to examine the content of this order through the discussion of the issue of the 
existence of a legal and institutional hierarchy in African international law. 
b) The Existence of a Regional Legal and Institutional Hierarchy  
African regional public order is based on different legal instruments. For their identification, 
one may rely on the report of the President of the AU Commission on ending conflicts and 
sustaining peace in Africa, submitted to the AU Assembly in 2009.1556 The report indicates 
that these instruments “represent a consolidated framework of commonly accepted norms and 
principles, whose observance would reduce considerably the risk of conflict and violence on 
the continent and consolidate peace where it has been achieved”.1557 The instruments referred 
to cover various domains relating to “human rights; governance and the fight against 
corruption; on-going democratisation processes on the continent; disarmament; terrorism; and 
the prevention and reduction of interstate conflicts”.1558 In this regard, numerous continental 
treaties are taken into account: the AU Constitutive Act, the African Nuclear Weapon-Free 
Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty),1559 the OAU Convention on the prevention and combating of 
terrorism,1560 the Protocol to the OAU Convention on the prevention and combating of 
terrorism,1561 the OAU Convention for the elimination of mercenarism in Africa,1562 the OAU 
Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa,1563 the Protocol 
relating to the establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council,1564 the AU Convention on 
                                                 
1556 Assembly of the African Union, ‘Report of the Chairperson of the Commission: Enhancing Africa’s Resolve 
and Effectiveness in Ending Conflict and Sustaining Peace’, SP/ASSEMBLY/PS/RPT(I), Tripoli (Libya), 30-31 
August 2009. 
1557 Ibid., para.26.  
1558 Ibid., para.27. 
1559 Adopted on 11 April 1996 and entered into force on 15 July 2009. 
1560 Adopted on 1 July 1999 and entered into force on 6 December 2002. 
1561 Adopted on 1 July 2004 (not yet into force as of 31 December 2016).  
1562 Adopted on 3 July 1977 and entered into force on 22 April 1985. 
1563 Adopted on 10 September 1969 and entered into force on 20 January 1974. 
1564 Adopted on 9 July 2002 and entered into force on 26 December 2003. 
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the prevention and combating of corruption,1565 the AU non-aggression and common defence 
Pact,1566 the African Charter on democracy, elections and governance,1567 the AU Convention 
for the protection and assistance of internally displaced persons in Africa (Kampala 
Convention),1568 etc. There are also many OAU/UA unilateral acts such as the Declaration on 
unconstitutional changes of government,1569 the Solemn Declaration on the CSSDCA 
(2000)1570 and the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security 
Policy.1571  
This order of protection of Africa possesses a hierarchical character. Institutionally, it is 
linked to the articulation of the African system of integration. The AU places itself at the 
summit, while the centre is occupied by the RECs and S/RECs. As a consequence, the system 
is based on the coexistence of legal mechanisms at the continental and (sub-) regional levels. 
Likewise, there is an overlapping of institutions. For instance, the AU Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) coexists with the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa 
(COPAX)1572 or the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council.1573 On its side, the AfCJHR 
coexists with (sub-) regional courts and tribunals. Cooperation between these different levels 
of the system is inevitable. But, in order to avoid disorder, and even anarchy, the AU has the 
power to coordinate the system. For example, the Constitutive Act provides that the AU 
“coordinate and harmonise the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic 
Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union”.1574 The power of 
coordination can be understood as the authority to put together several distinct institutions in 
order to establish a coherent whole for the achievement of a given objective. In other words, 
                                                 
1565 Adopted on 1 July 2003 and entered into force on 5 August 2006. 
1566 Adopted on 1 January 2005 and entered into force on 18 December 2009. 
1567 Adopted on 30 January 2007 and entered into force on 15 February 2012. 
1568 Adopted on 22 October 2009 and entered into force on 6 December 2012. 
1569 AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI), Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of 
Government, 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of 
African Unity, Lomé (Togo), 10-12 July 2000.  
1570 AHG/Decl.4 (XXXVI), above note 982. 
1571 Ext/Assembly/AU/1-2/(II), above note 208. 
1572 Protocol Relating to the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (24 February 2000), Articles 2 and 
5-6. 
1573 Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and 
Security (10 December 1999), Articles 7-10. 
1574 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 3(l). 
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this power consists of organising different parts of the African system of integration in order 
to make a whole which is coherent and in harmony with the Union. In this respect, 
harmonisation seems to be a high degree of coordination, but both tend to the accomplishment 
of the same objectives of the Union. Accordingly, the AU has the power to determine 
principles for the creation of regional and sub-regional groupings. These principles are 
contained in the OAU resolution of 19631575 and complemented by the Abuja Treaty 
instituting the AEC,1576 which is part of the AU.1577 Furthermore, “Regional Mechanisms”, 
that is to say mechanisms established by the REC in the field of conflict prevention, 
management and resolution, are integrated into the African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA),1578 on the top of which stands the AU PSC.1579 The activities of these Regional 
Mechanisms must be “consistent with the objectives and principles of the Union”.1580 
Therefore, the AU has the power to recognise or not regional or sub-regional groupings. Its 
relationships with these groupings are governed by several principles and legal 
instruments.1581 For instance, Regional Mechanisms must keep the PSC “fully and 
                                                 
1575 CM/Res. 5 (I), Regional Groupings, 1st Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organisation of 
the African Unity, Dakar (Senegal), 2-11 August 1963, paras.2-5. In particular, in paragraph 2, the Council of 
Ministers recommends that ‘any regional grouping or sub-regional groupings be in keeping with the Charter of 
the OAU and meet the following criteria: (a) geographical realities and economic, social and cultural factors 
common to the States; (b) co-ordinating of economic, social and cultural activities peculiar to the States 
concerned’.  
1576 Treaty of Abuja Establishing the African Economic Community, Article 2 (d) and (e). This Treaty specifies 
hereby the status of regions and sub-regions in which such regional and sub-regional groupings should be 
created. 
1577 However, Article 33 (2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union stipulates that ‘this Act shall take 
precedence over and supersede any inconsistent or contrary provisions of the Treaty establishing the African 
Economic Community’.  
1578 See L. M. Fisher, A.S. Bah, A. Mniema, H.N. Okome, M. Tamba, J. Frederiksen, A. Abdelaziz and R. 
Reeve, ‘African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): 2010 Assessment Study’, Commission of the African 
Union (2010).  
1579 D. Lecoutre, ‘Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine, clé d’une nouvelle architecture de 
stabilité en Afrique ?’, Afrique contemporaine (2004) 131-162. 
1580 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article 16 
(1) (a). See also M. Gueuyou, ‘Articulation normative des systèmes africains de maintien de la paix et de la 
sécurité’, in D. Bangoura (ed.), L’Union africaine face aux enjeux de paix, de sécurité et de défense (Paris : 
L’Harmattan, 2003) 133-144.  
1581 See Constitutive Act of the African Union; Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security 
Council of the African Union; Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security 
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continuously informed of their activities and ensure that these activities are closely 
harmonised and coordinated with the activities of Peace and Security Council”.1582 Likewise, 
the PSC must “keep the Regional Mechanisms fully and continuously informed of its 
activities”.1583 This legal framework would be reinforced by the Protocol on Amendments on 
the AU Constitutive Act of 2003 once it comes into force. The Protocol provides that AU 
member states must “restraint (…) from entering into any treaty or alliance that is 
incompatible with the principles and objectives of the Union”.1584 The violation of this 
provision could entail the application of AU’s sanctions for non-observation of its policy.  
What are the common values and interests whose protection is sought through this order? To 
answer this question, it is important to recall the AU’s objectives. The Constitutive Act 
provides that the Union aims, among others, to promote peace, security and stability on the 
continent, to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its members, to 
promote and protect human and peoples’ rights, democratic principles and institutions, to 
accelerate the political and socio-economical integration of the continent, and to achieve 
greater unity and solidarity between African countries and the peoples of Africa.1585. Even 
though some of these objectives have to be understood in a long-term perspective, they 
constitute the basis for a number of principles which stand, in addition to those which are 
provided for under the UN Charter,1586 in the heart of the African regional public order. This 
is the case with the duty to respect borders existing on achievement of independence; the 
prohibition of destabilisation; the respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and 
rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities; 
the condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments; the ban of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the 
Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa (2008); Protocol on Relations Between the 
African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Communities (2007), Protocol on Relations Between the 
Regional Economic Communities and the African Economic Community (25 February 1998); EX.CL/Dec.331 
(X), Decision on the Relationship Between the African Union Commission and the Regional Economic 
Communities (RECS) (DOC. EX.CL/308 (X)), 10th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the African 
Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 25-26 January 2007. 
1582 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article 16 
(3). 
1583 Ibid. 
1584 Protocol on Amendments on the Constitutive Act of the African Union (11 July 2003), Article 4(q). 
1585 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 3. 
1586 UN Charter, Article 2. 
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nuclear weapons in all its forms (production, detention or use); and the right of the Union to 
intervene in a member state in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide 
and crimes against humanity.1587 It would not be an exaggeration to assume that these 
principles have acquired the status of African regional customary law given their wide 
recognition and acceptance by African states. As a reminder, these principles coexist with 
norms of jus cogens in the region. Other specific rules relating to this order of protection of 
Africa are stipulated by the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR). 
1.1.1.2. The Specificity of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
The ACHPR constitute an expression of public order. This order is based on several legal 
specificities as acknowledged in the jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACmHPR). These specificities include the non-derogation character of the 
Charter (a) and the consequences that it implies for the application and the enforcement of 
human rights in Africa (b). 
a) The Absence of Derogation from the Minimum Standards of the Charter  
Human rights are inherent to every human being and protected by the law. Each society has 
its own experience regarding their assertion, promotion and adjudicative protection.1588 
However, the contemporary expansion of human rights in international law came with the 
creation of the United Nations. The objective of the United Nations is, among others, “to 
achieve international cooperation in (…) promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion”.1589 At the regional level, Europe and Americas were the first continents to establish 
their systems of human rights protection. Whilst the European system is mainly based on the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
adopted in the framework of the Council of Europe on 4 November 1950, the American 
                                                 
1587 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4. 
1588 K. Vasak, ‘Avant-propos du rédacteur général’, in K. Vasak (ed.), Les dimensions internationales des droits 
de l’homme –Manuel destiné à l’enseignement des droits de l’homme dans les universités (Paris : Unesco, 1978) 
vii-xii, at vii-viii. 
1589 UN Charter, Article 1(3). 
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system chiefly relies on the American Convention on Human Rights of 22 November 
1969.1590  
In Africa, the regionalisation of human rights dates back to the beginning of Pan-Africanism 
(since the 19th century). The latter was a movement which started to claim for the recognition 
of the dignity of black peoples, in the diaspora and in Africa, after centuries of slave trade and 
colonisation. This explains in part why African regional human rights are founded on the 
recognition of both the rights of individuals and those of the peoples. In 1961, a Pan-African 
Conference on the Rule of Law in Africa was held in Lagos (Nigeria).1591 The Conference 
issued a declaration, known as the “Law of Lagos”, which recommended the adoption of an 
African charter on human rights and the creation of an appropriate court to protect them.1592 
However, the Conference of Independent States of Africa, which adopted the OAU Charter in 
May 1963, did not uphold this recommendation for two main reasons. First of all, African 
countries were divided during the Cold War to the extent that an agreement on regional 
standards of human rights was impossible to find. Rather, the OAU Charter simply endorsed 
“a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs”.1593 This policy was in line with the 
outcome of the Bandung Conference (18-24 April 1955) where twenty-nine Asian and 
African countries (China, Ethiopia, India, Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Egypt, Philippines, Syria, 
Sudan, etc.) had decided to launch the movement of non-alignment. Secondly, many states 
seem to have preferred to safeguard and consolidate their sovereignty,1594 before agreeing on 
a deep regionalisation of human rights. In this context, only a short reference was made to the 
UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.1595 The OAU Charter also 
provided that all forms of colonialism should be eradicated from Africa.1596 This insufficient 
                                                 
1590 The American Convention was preceded by the American Declaration of the Rights and the Duties of Man, 
adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States, on 2 May 1948, in Bogota (Colombia). 
1591 F. Viljoen, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights/The Travaux Préparatoires in the Light of 
Subsequent Practice’, 25 (9-12) Human Rights Law Journal (2004) 313-326, at 316. 
1592 Ibid. 
1593 Ibid., Article III (7). 
1594 See J. Mfoulou, L’OUA : triomphe de l’unité ou des nationalités ? Essai d’une sociologie politique de 
l’Organisation de l’Unité Africaine (Paris : L’Harmattan, 1986).  
1595 OAU Charter, Preambule, para.9. The OAU Heads of States hereby said that they were ‘persuaded that the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the Principles of which we 
reaffirm our adherence, provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive cooperation among States’. See also 
Sepúlveda, Banning, Gudmundsdottir, Chamoun and Genugten, above note 572, at 159.  
1596 OAU Charter, Article II (1) (d). 
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regulation on human rights significantly changed when the ACHPR was adopted in 1981, 
followed by the establishment of the ACmHPR in 1987. The conception of human rights 
borne by this new legal framework takes into account the historical and traditional virtues of 
OAU member states as well as “the values of African civilisation”.1597 The ACHPR codifies 
not only individual human rights, but also peoples’ rights and the duties of every man/woman 
towards “his family and society, the State and other legally recognised communities and the 
international community”.1598 It follows that the content of the ACHPR goes beyond the 
liberal conception of human rights –which is individual-oriented –because the Charter 
contains a communitarian dimension based on African social solidarity.1599     
Another specificity of the ACHPR is the lack of a derogation provision, unlike the European 
and American conventions on human rights. Pursuant to the latter conventions, a state can 
derogate from human rights in the event of public emergency such as war or other 
circumstances which threaten the life of the nation, with the exception of those rules which 
are clearly specified as insusceptible to derogation or suspension.1600 This lack of a derogation 
                                                 
1597 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Preamble, para.5.  
1598 Ibid., Articles 27 (1). 
1599 O. Ndeshyo, ‘La problématique des droits de l’homme et des peuples en Afrique’, in Philosophie et droits de 
l’homme : actes de la 5ème semaine philosophique de Kinshasa du 26 avril au 1er mai 1981 (Kinshasa : Faculté de 
Théologie catholique, 1982) 139-157, at 143-146. 
1600 Article 15 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 
November 1950) provides: ‘1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any 
High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other 
obligations under international law. 2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from 
lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision. 3. Any High 
Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefore. It shall also inform the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the 
Convention are again being fully executed’. On its side, Article 27 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights (22 November 1969) stipulates: ‘1. In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the 
independence or security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating from its obligations under the present 
Convention to the extent and for the period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided 
that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law and do not involve 
discrimination on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion, or social origin. 2. The foregoing provision 
does not authorise any suspension of the following articles: Article 3 (Right to Juridical Personality), Article 4 
(Right to Life), Article 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), Article 6 (Freedom from Slavery), Article 9 (Freedom 
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provision from the ACHPR could be interpreted as a permission for states parties to adopt 
derogatory measures in exceptional circumstances under their domestic laws, regardless of the 
rights at stake.1601 However, the ACmHPR has taken a different position. In the 
communication No.74/92 against Chad, it states that “the African Charter, unlike other human 
rights instruments, does not allow for stated parties to derogate from their treaty obligations 
during emergency situations”.1602 Accordingly, “even a civil war (…) cannot be used as an 
excuse by the state violating or permitting violations of rights in the African Charter”.1603 In 
another communication No.101/93 against Nigeria, the ACmHPR held that competent 
authorities should not enact provisions which limit the exercise of rights under the 
ACHPR.1604 This position is of course without prejudice to internal restrictions that the 
ACHPR provides for regarding a number of rights, such as those stipulated by articles 6 and 
8.1605 But, for a state party to avail the plea for any limitation of human rights on the basis of 
its national law, “it must show that it is consistent with its obligations under the (African) 
Charter”.1606 According to the ACmHPR, the Charter “represents the minimum on which the 
                                                                                                                                                        
from Ex Post Facto laws), Article 12 (Freedom of Conscience and Religion), Article 17 (Rights of the Family), 
Article 18 (Right to a Name), Article 19 (Rights of the Child), Article 20 (Right to Nationality), and Article 23 
(Right to Participate in Government), or of the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights. 3. 
Any State Party availing itself of the right of suspension shall immediately inform the other States Parties, 
through the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, of the provisions the application of which 
it has suspended, the reasons that gave rise to the suspension, and the date set for the termination of such 
suspension’.   
1601 R. Murray, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and International Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2000), at 123. 
1602 Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v. Chad, ACmHPR, Comm.74/92, 9 Activity 
Report (1995-1996), para.21.  
1603 Ibid. 
1604 Civil Liberties Organisation (in respect of Bar Association) v. Nigeria, ACmHPR, Comm.101/93, 8th 
Activity Report (1994-1995), para.15. 
1605 Article 6 provides: ‘Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person. No one 
may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no 
one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained’. Article 14 stipulates: ‘The right to property shall be guaranteed. It 
may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in 
accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws’. Emphasis is mine.  
1606 Sir Dawda K. Jawara v. The Gambia, ACmHPR, Comm. 147/95 and 149/96, 13th Activity Report (1999-
2000), paras.43, 59  and 68.  The brackets are mine. 
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States Parties agreed to guarantee fundamental human freedoms”.1607 Thus, “the only 
legitimate reasons for limitations to the rights and freedoms of the African Charter are found 
in Article 27.2, that is that the rights of the Charter ‘shall be exercised with due regard to the 
rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest’”.1608  
The prohibition of derogation from the ACHPR and the obligation for states parties not to 
adopt national measures which limit the minimum rights which it guarantees may imply that 
the ACmHPR sees in this treaty the reflection of African regional public order. In this respect, 
its position is comparable to the jurisprudence of both the European Commission on Human 
Rights (EComHR) in Austria v. Italy1609 and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 
Loizidou v. Turkey.1610 In both cases, the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
                                                 
1607 Malawi African Association and others v. Mauritania, ACmHPR, Comm.54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 to 
196/97 and 210/98, 13th Activity Report (1999-2000), para.84. 
1608 Media Rights Agenda, Constitutional Rights Project, Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project 
v. Nigeria, ACmHPR, Comm.105/93, 128/94, 130/94 and 152/96, 12th Activity Report (998-1999), para.68. 
1609 Austria  v. Italy, EComHR, Decision of 11 January 1961, Application No. 788/60, 4  Yearbook of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (1961), at 138 and 140. In this case, the European Commission has declared ‘that 
the purpose of the High Contracting Parties in concluding the Convention was not to concede to each other 
reciprocal rights and obligations in pursuance of their individual national interests but to realize the aims and 
ideals of the Council of Europe...and to establish a common public order of the free democracies of Europe with 
the object of safeguarding their common heritage of political traditions, ideas, freedom and the rule of law’ (at 
138). In addition,  ‘the obligations undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the European Convention are 
essentially of an objective character, being designed rather to protect the fundamental rights of individual human 
beings from infringements by any of the High Contracting Parties than to create subjective and reciprocal rights 
for the High Contracting Parties themselves’ (at 140). Emphasis is mine.  
1610Loizidou c. Turkey, ECHR, Preliminary Exceptions, Judgment of du 23 mars 1995, série A, n° 310, para.75. 
Under the latter paragraph, the European Court of Human Rights has stated: ‘If, as contended by the respondent 
Government, substantive or territorial restrictions were permissible under these provisions, Contracting Parties 
would be free to subscribe to separate regimes of enforcement of Convention obligations depending on the scope 
of their acceptances. Such a system, which would enable States to qualify their  consent under the optional 
clauses, would not only seriously weaken the  role of the Commission and Court in the discharge of their 
functions  but would also diminish the effectiveness of the Convention as a constitutional instrument of 
European public order (ordre public).  Moreover, where the Convention permits States to limit their acceptance  
under Article 25 (art. 25), there is an express stipulation to this  effect (see, in this regard, Article 6 para. 2 of 
Protocol No. 4 and Article 7 para. 2 of Protocol No. 7) (P4-6-2, P7-7-2).  In the Court's view, having regard to 
the object and purpose of  the Convention system as set out above, the consequences for the  enforcement of the 
Convention and the achievement of its aims would be  so far-reaching that a power to this effect should have 
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Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was recognised as an instrument of “European public 
order”.1611 Relying on this European jurisprudence, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights espoused the same position in its Advisory Opinion on the Effect of Reservations on 
the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights.1612 However, it is 
submitted that African regional public order offers, at least in theory, more protection of 
human rights than its European and American counterparts. This is because of the lack of a 
derogation provision from the ACHPR. In terms of norm differentiation, one may therefore 
say that any provision insusceptible to derogation is certainly part of public order. In contrast, 
the prohibition of derogation does not affect all norms of public order. Furthermore, if the 
notion of jus cogens refers to peremptory norms from which no derogation is permitted, there 
are other rules insusceptible to derogation, which are not part of it.1613 Likewise, peremptory 
norms are narrower in extension than the notion of rules of public order. Some consequences 
necessarily stem from this particular scope of the ACHPR. 
                                                                                                                                                        
been expressly  provided for. However no such provision exists in either Article 25 or Article 46 (art. 25, art. 
46)’. Emphasis is mine.   
1611 See G. Lebreton, ‘Ordre public’, in J. Andriantsimba Zovina, H. Gaudin, J.-P. Marguénaud, S. Rials and F. 
Sudre (eds), Dictionnaire des droits de l’homme (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2008) 717-719, at 718-
719 ; E. De Wet, ‘The Emergence of International Regional Values Systems as a Manifestation of the Emerging 
International Constitutional Order’, 19 Leiden Journal of International Law (2006) 611-632 ; B. Moutel, 
‘L’"effet horizontal" de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme en droit privé français. Essai sur la 
diffusion de la CEDH dans les rapports entre personnes privées’ (PhD Thesis, Université de Limoges 2006), at 
305-306 ; G. Cohen-Jonathan, ‘L’affaire Loizidou devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme : quelques 
observations’, CII (1) Revue générale de droit international public (1998) 123-144 ; F. Sudre, ‘Existe-t-il un 
ordre public européen ?’, in T. Tavernier (ed.), Quelle Europe pour les droits de l’Homme ? La Cour de 
Strasbourg et la réalisation d’une « Union plus étroite », 35 années de jurisprudence (1959-1994) (Bruxelles : 
Bruylant, 1996) 39-80. 
1612 The Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (Arts. 74 
and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, September 24, 1982, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.A) No. 2 (1982), para.29. In 
particular, the Court emphasises that ‘modern human rights treaties in general, and the American Convention in 
particular, are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of 
rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting States. Their object and purpose is the protection of the basic 
rights of individual human beings irrespective of their nationality, both against the State of their nationality and 
all other contracting States. In concluding these human rights treaties, the States can be deemed to submit 
themselves to a legal order within which they, for the common good, assume various obligations, not in relation 
to other States, but towards all individuals within their jurisdiction’. Emphasis is mine.  
1613 Villiger, above note 1545, at 669. 
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b) The Possible Consequences for the Safeguard of Regional Public Order       
Admitting the existence of a regional public order in the field of human rights in Africa 
implies some specific legal consequences. Five of these consequences can be listed with 
respect to the application of the ACHPR.  
First, the ACHPR does not contain any provision prohibiting reservations to it. This fact must 
be understood in the sense that reservations are permitted pursuant to article 19 of the VCLT. 
However, given the interpretation of the ACHPR by the AComHPR acknowledging African 
regional public order, it is submitted that a reservation that amounts to a derogation from the 
minimum standards of human rights protected by the Charter is prohibited. In fact, only Egypt 
and Zambia entered some reservations to this treaty. The Egyptian reservations are about the 
application of articles 8 and 18 (3) as well as the interpretation of article 9(1).1614 On its part, 
Zambia entered reservations on the formulation of articles 13 (3) and 37.1615 However, these 
reservations do not constitute a rejection of the relevant provisions of the Charter. They 
simply seek to interprete them in a certain way without derogating from the substance.  
                                                 
1614Executive Council of the African Union, ‘Report on the Status of OAU/AU Treaties (As at11July 2012)’, 
EX.CL/728(XXI) Rev.1, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 9-13 July 2012, para.54. Article 8 of the Charter provides: 
‘Freedom of conscience, the profession and free practice of religion shall be guaranteed. No one may, subject to 
law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise of these freedoms’. Article 9(1) stipulates: Every 
individual shall have the right to receive information”. Article 18(3) states: ‘The State shall ensure the 
elimination of every discrimination against women and also censure the protection of the rights of the woman 
and the child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions’. The Egyptian reservations then read as 
follows: ‘Article 8 and Article 18(3) - Application of Article 8 and Article 18 (3) of the Charter should be in the 
light of Islamic Sharia Law and not to its demerit; Article 9(1)- Egypt shall interpret this paragraph as being 
applicable only to information, the obtaining of which is authorized by Egyptian laws and regulations’. 
1615 Ibid. Article 13 (3) provides: ‘Every individual shall have the right of access to public property and services 
in strict equality of all persons before the law’. Article 37 stipulates: ‘Immediately after the first election, the 
Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity shall draw 
lots to decide the names of those members referred to in Article 36’. The Zambian reservations then read as 
follows: ‘Article 13(3) -should be amended such that every individual has the right of access to any place, 
services or public property intended for use by the general public; Article 37- the Secretary-General of the 
Organisation, rather than the Chairman of the Assembly, should draw lots to determine the terms of office of 
members of the Commission; and non-State Parties to the Charter should also submit reports to the 
Commission’.  
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Second, there is no reciprocity in the application of the ACHPR by states parties. This is also 
the option of the VCLT, which apparently excludes reciprocity between states concerning the 
protection of human rights.1616 
Third, inter-state communications may be referred to the ACmHPR owing not only to 
violations of human rights which have occurred on the defendant or the applicant state’s 
territory, but also in the territory of any other state party by any contracting country. The 
general terms used in the ACHPR does not seem to preclude this possibility as the Charter 
stipulates: “(…) if a State party to the present Charter considers that another State party has 
violated the provisions of the Charter, it may refer the matter directly to the Commission”,1617 
by addressing a communication to the Chairman, the OAU Secretary General (today the 
President of the AU Commission) and the state concerned.1618 Up to now, all AU member 
states have ratified the ACHPR.1619 The right of a state to address a communication to the 
ACmHPR implies the right to lodge a complaint with the African Court of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR),1620 provided that the defendant state before the ACmHPR is a 
party –like the applicant state –to the Court’s founding Protocol. This entitlement is important 
since the ACmHPR issues recommendations while the Court delivers binding judgments. 
Moreover, in the communication No.227/ 1999 against Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, the 
ACmHPR held that the requirement to exhaust local remedies does not apply when a state 
party refers a matter to it in relation to violation of human rights perpetrated on its 
territory.1621 The same jurisprudence should logically apply to communications relating to 
situations in states parties other than the defendant country. This position is consistent with 
the rationale of the requirement to exhaust local remedies since the principle aims to leave the 
primary right to the defendant state, whose national public order was broken, to deal in good 
faith with violations of human rights perpetrated on its territory through the laws and 
procedures available within its domestic order. In case of violations committed outside its 
                                                 
1616 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 60 (5). 
1617 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 49. 
1618 Ibid. 
1619 See List of ratifications (3 June 2016) <https://au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7770-sl-
african_charter_on_human_and_peoples_rights_0.pdf> accessed 9 January 2017. 
1620 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples' Rights (10 June 1998), Article 5(1) (b). 
1621 Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, ACmHPR, Comm. 227/ 1999, 20 Activity 
Report (2006), para.63. 
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territory and for which it might bear responsibility, it becomes incompatible with the 
protection of the regional public order to wait for the very same state to make use of its law as 
a judge and a party.    
Fourth, violations of the rights of a people, for example oppression, colonisation or the denial 
of participation in government, may justify the right to secession from the mother state. This 
is not forbidden by international law as it does not protect a state from internal separatism but 
only external violations of its territorial integrity, mainly by another state.1622 In the context of 
Africa, the concept “people” means either the people of the continent as a whole, the entire 
population of a state, an ethnic group or minority or any other homogenous population with a 
common identity.1623 In this respect, the ACmHPR regarded the Katangese (from the Katanga 
province in the South-East of the DRC) as a people but refused to accede to their claim for 
secession and independence from the defendant country since none of their rights had been 
violated.1624 They should rather exercise a variant of self-determination that is compatible 
with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, that is to say “self-government, local 
government, federalism, confederalism, unitarism or any other form of relations that accords 
with the wishes of the people”.1625     
Fifth, and last, certain violations of the values protected by the ACHPR, while being threats 
against Pan-African public order per se, can also constitute regional crimes. This is the case 
with the crime of illicit exploitation of natural resources,1626 which derives from the 
criminalisation of violations of the right of all peoples to dispose of their wealth and natural 
resources.1627 The list of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the AU Criminal Court will 
further illustrate the issue. Thus, the order of protection of Africa has developed in parallel 
with a regional order of defence against such security threats that undermine the rules and 
principles laid down.  
                                                 
1622 A. Vahlas, ‘Les séparations d’Etats : l’Organisation des Nations Unies, la sécession des peuples et l’unité 
des Etats’ (PhD Thesis, Université Pathéon-Assas (II) 2000), at 508-509. 
1623 See also Murray, above note 1601, at 105. 
1624 Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire, ACmHPR, Comm.75/92, 8 Activity Report (1994-1995), paras.2 and 
6. Zaire is the former name of the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
1625 Ibid., paras.4 and 6. 
1626 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Article 28L Bis. 
1627 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 21. 
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1.1.2. The Order of Defence Against Regional Security Threats  
There is no African regional public order without establishing institutions of security and 
defence, whose function is to enforce the rules and principles laid down in the interest of the 
African community. The issue raises a conceptual problem. From the OAU to the AU, the 
African conception of security and defence has radically evolved. It now covers a wide range 
of threats against African regional public order, including threats against the continent, the 
states, the individuals and African peoples as a whole. This evolution (1.1.2.1) entails a re-
organisation of African institutions of security and defence, and criminal jurisdictions in 
particular (1.1.2.2.). 
1.1.2.1. The Evolution from the OAU to the African Union 
This evolution is the result of the will to correct the weaknesses of the OAU security system 
(a) and to replace it by the Common African Defence and Security Policy (b).   
a) The Weaknesses of the OAU System  
The OAU, the AU’s predecessor, was almost unable to protect the African regional public 
order or to find solutions for African human rights crises by its own means. Statistically, the 
AU Commission declared that 186 coups d’état had occurred on the continent between 1956 
and 2001, half of which having been committed between 1980 and 1990.1628 It also indicated 
that 26 armed conflicts happened between 1963 and 2000, causing seven million dead people, 
three million refugees and 20 million internally displaced persons (IDP).1629 Many of these 
conflicts were non-international conflicts and together they affected 61% of the population of 
Africa.1630 The matter is so serious that the AU Commission emphasised: 
(…) wars did not spare any geographic region of the Continent: the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, The 
Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia), Southern Africa (12 conflicts) and West Africa, (some 10 wars) have 
been the theatre of conflicts. Only North Africa with the exception of Algeria remained relatively 
conflict-free. Some of these wars lasted for quite long periods. For instance, the war in Chad 
                                                 
1628 African Union Commission, Strategic Plan of the African Union Commission -Volume 1: Vision and Mission 
of the African Union (Addis Ababa, May 2004), at 14. 
1629 Ibid., at 14 and 15. 
1630 Ibid., at 15. See also See J. Cilliers, ‘Future (im) Perfect? Mapping Conflict, Violence and Extremism in 
Africa’, Institute of Security Studies Paper No.287 (October 2015), at 3-4 and 9-10.  
326 
persisted for 40 years; in South Sudan, the war lasted 37 years; in Eritrea, 30 years; and in Angola, 
27 years, etc.1631 
The most critical situations happened in the 1990s. They include a number of fratricidal wars 
in Liberia (1990), Somalia (1992) and Sierra Leona (1995), Burundi (1993), the genocide in 
Rwanda (1994), the massacres of Rwandan refugees (1996) and the persistent armed conflicts 
(since 1993) in the DRC. The latter reached their peak in 1998 with the direct involvement of 
eight African countries.1632 Some commentators even argued that the Congo war of 1998 
constituted the true first “African world war”.1633 
The OAU was crippled by a number of deficiencies to raise all these challenges. The 
Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA) which was the OAU 
principal organ in charge of peaceful settlement of interstate disputes,1634 had never become 
operational. States preferred to stick on their sovereignty rather than subjecting themselves to 
a continental quasi-jurisdictional institution.1635 Even if the Protocol organising the CMCA 
was adopted on 21 July 1964, the mechanism failed and the OAU Assembly proceeded to its 
abolition in 1977.1636 State disputes could be submitted to ad hoc political committees, which 
had little to do with human right protection. Concerning military (humanitarian) intervention, 
the Cairo Declaration of 30 June 1993 on the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution limited any African troop deployment to an observer mission, 
devoid of a mandate to use force for the protection of civilians, except in case of self-
defence.1637 The consent of interested belligerent parties was also required, in accordance with 
                                                 
1631 Ibid. 
1632 Angola, Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe.  
1633 C. Braeckman, L’enjeu congolais. L’Afrique centrale après Mobutu (Paris : Fayard, 1999), at 11 ; B. 
Kabamba et O. Lanotte, ‘Guerres au Congo-zaïre (1996-1999). Acteurs et scénarios’,  in P. Mathieu and J.-C. 
Willame (eds), Conflits et guerres au Kivu et dans la région des Grands Lacs. Entre tentions locales et escalade 
régionale (Paris : L’Harmattan,  1999) 99-159, at 99 ; L. Sindjoun, Les relations internationales africaines : 
entre Etats en crise et flux transnationaux (Dakar : CODESRIA, 2002), at 58.  
1634 OAU Charter, Article XIX. 
1635 L. D. Kassabo, ‘Le système africain de sécurité collective régionale à l’ère de l’Union africaine’ 
(Unpublished PhD Thesis, Università degli studi di Padova 2010), at 140. 
1636 Ibid. 
1637 AHG/Decl.3 (XXIX),  Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment 
within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, 29 th Ordinary Session of 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, Cairo (Egypt), 28-30 
June 1993, paras.14-15. In paragraph 14, it is stated: ‘The Mechanism will be guided by the objectives and 
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the OAU’s obligation not to interfere with the internal affairs of member states.1638 From a 
political angle, the continental organisation suffered from a lack of state cooperation. Its 
observer missions on the ground neither received sufficient personnel, nor appropriate 
financial and logistical means to implement their powerless mandates.1639 For the same 
reason, the OAU was not able to take judicial criminal measures. It had no legal power, like 
the one with which the Security Council is vested under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to 
create an ad hoc tribunal. The ACmHPR, which was created by the ACHPR,1640 engendered a 
new expectation in human rights protection.1641 However, this body is not a court of justice. 
The AfCHPR was established by the Ouagadougou Protocol in June 1998 to fill this gap. But, 
it has no criminal jurisdiction, while the Ouagadougou Protocol has entered into force only on 
10 January 2004.  
Criticised for its inability to deal efficiently with African crises, the OAU had to be replaced 
by the AU. The process towards this replacement started in Sirte (Libya) in 1999. The Sirte 
Declaration announced the decision of African Heads of state and government to create the 
AU pursuant to fundamental objectives of the OAU Charter and the Abuja Treaty instituting 
                                                                                                                                                        
principles of the OAU Charter; in particular, the sovereign equality of Member States, noninterference in the 
internal affairs of States, the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States, their 
inalienable right to independent existence, the peaceful settlement of disputes as well as the inviolability of 
borders inherited from colonialism. It will also function on the basis of the consent and the co-operation of the 
parties to a conflict’. In paragraph 15, the Declaration provides: ‘The Mechanism will have as a primary 
objective, the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, it will be 
its responsibility to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions in order to facilitate the resolution of 
these conflicts. In this respect, civilian and military missions of observation and monitoring of limited scope and 
duration may be mounted and deployed. In setting these objectives, we are fully convinced that prompt and 
decisive action in these spheres will, in the first instance, prevent the emergence of conflicts, and where they do 
inevitably occur, stop them from degenerating into intense or generalised conflicts. Emphasis on anticipatory and 
preventive measures, and concerted action in peace-making and peace-building will obviate the need to resort to 
the complex and resource-demanding peacekeeping operations, which our countries will find difficult to 
finance’. Emphasis is mine.   
1638 See M.C. Djiena Wembou, ‘A propos du nouveau mécanisme de l’OUA sur les conflits’, XCVIII Revue 
générale de droit international public (1994) 377-386.  
1639 J. D. Biyogue-Bi-Ntougou, Les politiques africaines de paix et de sécurité (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2010), at 21.   
1640 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 30. 
1641 G. J. Naldi, ‘Future Trends in Human Rights in Africa: the Increased Role of the OAU’, in M. D. Evans and 
R. Murray (eds), The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: the System in Practice, 1986-2000 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)1-35, at 10.  
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the AEC.1642 The AU Constitutive Act, which was adopted in July 2000, entered into force on 
26 May 2001. The new organisation was officially launched in Durban (South Africa) in July 
2002. It contains an important institutional reform and a new security paradigm for the 
continent.  
b) The Advent of the Common African Defence and Security Policy    
Compared to the OAU’s security paradigm, the Common African Defence and Security 
Policy (CADSP) expands the conception of threats to the African regional public order and 
relies on new institutions of security and defence. Historically, the establishment of a common 
defence policy for the African continent was on the agenda of the Union of African States 
(Ghana, Mali and Guinea) in 1961.1643  The Union’s vision derived from the African Charter 
of Casablanca (Morocco)1644 and the doctrine of President Kwame N’krumah on African 
unity.1645 But, the system of common defence policy which it established through the 
Constitutive Charter of 29 April 1961 was very embryonic insofar as it only dealt with 
external threats to African peace and security, in particular the crime of aggression against 
member states.1646 In the end, this system failed given the fact that the Union did not survive 
after the creation of the OAU in 1963.  
The AU continued to promote the same agenda. The Constitutive Act provides that the Union 
shall establish “a common defence policy for the African continent”.1647 This policy is to be 
adopted by the AU Assembly which is the comptent organ to “determine the common policies 
of the Union”.1648 However, the PSC is also permitted to “develop a common defence policy 
                                                 
1642 EAHG/Decl. (IV) Rev.1, Sirte Declaration, 4th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the Organisation of African Unity, Sirte (Libya), 8-9 September 2009, para.8(i).  
1643 Charter of the Union of African States (29 April 1961), Article 4 and Title IV. 
1644 This Charter was adopted by the Casablanca Conference held in Casablanca (Morocco) from 3 to 7 January 
1961, gathering African states belonging to the so-called group of progressist countries (Ghana, Guinea Conakry, 
Mali, Libya, Egypt et Morocco) as opposed to the so-called group of moderate states, which were in favour of a 
close cooperation with the former colonial powers and the West in general and gathered in Monrovia (Liberia) in 
May 1961. It must be noted that this division between the group of Casablanca and the group of Monrovia was 
aggravated by the climate of the Cold War in Africa.    
1645 N’krumah, above note 97. 
1646 Charter of the Union of African States, Article 7. 
1647 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4(d). 
1648 Ibid., Article 9 (a). 
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for the Union, in accordance with article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act”.1649 Despite an apparent 
conflict between these provisions, the contradiction should disappear because the PSC acts in 
the name of the AU Assembly of which it is a subsidiary organ. In addition, the PSC has the 
power to “implement the common defence policy of the Union”.1650 According to the AU 
Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact, the PSC shall be assisted in the implementation 
of its mandate by “any organ of the Union, pending the setting up of mechanisms and 
institutions for common defence and security”.1651 The expression “Common African Defence 
and Security Policy” is explicitly used as such in other important decisions of the AU 
Assembly in 2002 and 2003. The Durban Decision was a call on the AU Chairperson and 
South African President, Thabo Mbeki, to establish a group of experts to examine all aspects 
related to the establishment of such policy and to submit recommendations to the AU 
Assembly.1652 The Maputo Decision commended the efforts of the AU Chairperson for the 
implementation of his mission after presenting the “Draft Framework for a Common African 
Defence and Security Policy”.1653 This document constitutes the basis on which the Solemn 
Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy was adopted in February 
2004.  
The CADSP contributes to the process of African integration and is therefore limitative of 
state sovereignty as the AU itself.1654  But, the notion of “common policies of the Union” and 
the CADSP must be distinguished from the concept of AU’s “common positions”.1655 These 
positions are adopted in order to ensure that African states present collectively African claims 
and concerns on issues of “interest to the continent and its peoples”1656 at the global level. The 
most striking example is the common African position on the ICC. In terms of definition, one 
                                                 
1649 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article 3(e). 
1650 Ibid., Article 7 (h). 
1651 African Union Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact, Article 9. Emphasis is mine. 
1652 ASS/AU/Dec. 8 (I), Decision on a Common African Defence and Security, 1st Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of the African Union, Durban (South Africa), 9-10 July 2002, para.2. 
1653 Assembly/AU/Dec.13 (II), Decision on the African Defence and Security Policy (Doc. Assembly/AU/6 (II)), 
2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Maputo (Mozambique), 10-12 July 2003, paras.1 
and 4. 
1654 L.J. Farmer, ‘Sovereignty and the African Union’, 4 (10) Journal of Pan-African Studies (2012)93-105, at 
98-99.  
1655 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 3 (d). 
1656 Ibid. 
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may say that a common policy implies a clear determination of objectives to achieve in any 
domain in which the AU is competent to exercise its functions and appropriate means to be 
used for their realisation. The CADSP focuses on security issues. It pursues three objectives, 
which are interconnected and mutually dependent.  
First, the CADSP aims to preserve national security, i.e. the security of the state. Second, it 
aims to protect human security, which turns around the individual. According the AU Non-
aggression and Common Defence Pact, human security must be understood in terms of 
satisfaction of basic needs of the individual.1657 However, human security also includes “the 
creation of social, economic, political, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the 
survival and dignity of the individual, the protection of and respect for human rights, good 
governance and the guarantee for each individual of opportunities and choices for his/her full 
development”.1658 As far as African regional criminal law is concerned, this is an important 
distinctive feature from the project for the global system of international criminal justice. The 
latter pays little attention to economic crimes as threats to human security. A conflict may 
arise between these two objectives. In fact, human security can be protected against the state 
or the state against the individual. For example, the crime of unconstitutional change of 
government is a threat to the state security and political organisation, whereas the commission 
of war crimes by state officials violates the rights of individuals or peoples. The CADSP does 
not seem to prioritise human security over the security of the state. This conception of 
security is likely one of the justifications for the relevance of personal immunity for state 
officials before the AU Criminal Court. Third, the CADSP aims to establish peace and 
security in the African continent. In this regard, the AU Constitutive Act provides that the 
scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes “a major impediment to the socio-economic 
development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a 
prerequisite for the implementation of (the) development and integration agenda”.1659 
Likewise, the AU Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact aims “to deal with threats to 
peace, security and stability in the continent and to ensure the well being of the African 
peoples”.1660 This third goal is transversal because it can be attained only if human security 
                                                 
1657 African Union Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact, Article 1 (k).  
1658 Ibid. 
1659 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Preamble, para.9. The brackets are mine. 
1660 African Union Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact, Preamble, para.9. 
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and state security are guaranteed. Put it differently, there will not be peace, security and 
stability in Africa if individuals, peoples and states are not secured. 
Against this backdrop, the notion of threats to the African regional public order has shifted 
from a narrow to a broad conception. It consists of both military and non-military threats.1661 
Their origin may be political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and humanitarian. 
But, in Africa, some scholars suggest that security threats are beforehand due to economic and 
social problems,1662 while others argue in favour of the primacy of political violence over 
other factors.1663 The CADSP embraces both approaches and deals with any threat regardless 
of its origin: aggression, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, subversion, political 
assassinations, unconstitutional change of government, corruption, trafficking in human 
beings or drugs, etc. This expansion of the notion of threats to African regional public order 
justifies the reinforcement of the AU’s operational abilities. The AU may now use force even 
without the consent of the state concerned.1664 It is submitted that the CADSP deals only with 
security threats that take place in Africa. Thus, as a matter of principle, the AU’s institutions 
of security and defence would be territorially incompetent to exercise their functions in 
situations or in cases of crimes that endanger African regional public order occurring outside 
the continent. 
1.1.2.2. The Reorganisation of Institutions of Security and Defence 
Which institutions of security and defence can protect African regional public order? The 
answer to this question depends on the resolution of two correlative issues: whether the AU 
                                                 
1661 L.K.H Goma, ‘Some reflections on African security’, in The Fourth Conference of Pan-African Pugwash on 
African Security and Namibia (Cairo, November 1984) (Cairo: Egyptian State Information Service, 1986) 8-16.  
1662 J. Y. Ewusie, ‘African Security : Implication of Socio-Economic Constraints and Political Instability’, The 
Fourth Conference of Pan-African Pugwash on African Security and Namibia (Cairo, November 1984) (Cairo: 
Egyptian State Information Service, 1986) 133-140; L. Buur, S. Jensen and F. Stepputat, ‘The Security-
Development Nexus’, in L. Buur, S. Jensen and F. Stepputat (eds), The Security-Development Nexus: 
Expressions of Sovereignty and Securization in Southern Africa (Cap Town: HSRC Press, 2007) 9-33.   
1663 M. Tshiyembe, ‘Nature et dynamique de la conflictualité africaine’, in D. Bangoura and E. Fidieck A. Bidias 
(eds), L’Union africaine et les acteurs sociaux dans la gestion des crises et des conflits armés (Paris : 
L’Harmattan, 2006) 33-42 ; P.F. Ngayap, ‘Le monopole et le partage du pouvoir à l’origine des conflits en 
Afrique’, in P. Ango Ela (ed.), La prévention des conflits en Afrique centrale. Prospective pour une culture de la 
paix (Paris: Karthala, 2001)59-66.   
1664 Y.A. Chouala, ‘Puissance, résolution des conflits et sécurité collective à l’ère de l’Union africaine. Théorie et 
pratique’, VI Annuaire français de relations internationales (2005) 287-306. 
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was instituionalised as a community in the name of which this order is to be protected (a) and 
how, for this purpose, it can exercise its right to intervene in a member state (b).   
a) The African Union as a Community of States and Peoples 
Created in 2000 and officially launched in 2002, the AU can be regarded as a community. 
Pursuant to the AU Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact, it is “a community of 
member states”.1665 The Sirte Declaration of 1999 on the establishment of the Union also 
specifies that the AU is “a larger community of peoples”,1666 the aspirations of which it aims 
to rekindle for “stronger unity, solidarity and cohesion”.1667 The states and peoples can 
organise themselves in different ways within their community. States can adhere to the AU 
and any other intergovernmental organisation, such as RECs, while peoples and individuals 
may create civil society organisations, such as non-governmental organisations. 
This approach to a community was initially upheld by the African Conference of African 
Peoples, held in Accra (Ghana) from 3 to 5 December 1958, in its final resolution on borders, 
territorial limits and federations.1668 But, the process towards the establishment of the African 
community has been in an impasse since the OAU creation until the adoption of the Abuja 
Treaty instituting the AEC in 1991. The Abuja Treaty transformed the OAU into the 
OAU/AEC to which the AU succeeded.1669 It also provides the creation of the entire African 
community in a period of 34 years from the date of its entry into force on 12 May 1994.1670 In 
any case, this term should not be longer than 40 years.1671 Likewise, the UA Non-aggression 
and Common Defence Pact stipulates that “as part of the vision of building a strong and 
united Africa, State Parties undertake to establish an African Army at the final stage of the 
political and economic integration of the Continent (…)”.1672 In this context, the UA was 
created in abbreviation of the implementation periods of the Abuja Treaty.1673 A number of 
                                                 
1665 African Union Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact, Preamble, para.9.  
1666 EAHG/Decl. (IV) Rev.1, above note 1642, para.5. 
1667 Ibid. 
1668 Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, above note 684, at 283. 
1669 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 33. 
1670 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, Article 6 (1). 
1671 Ibid., Article 6 (5). 
1672 African Union Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact, Article 4 (d). 
1673 EAHG/Decl. (IV) Rev.1, above note 1642, para.8 (ii). In the paragraph, the OAU Assembly stated following 
the Libyan proposals:  ‘Having discussed frankly and extensively on how to proceed with the strengthening of 
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community institutions, such as the Pan-African Parliament and the AU Court of Justice, were 
put in place earlier than expected.  
The new African institutions of defence and security implies different stakes. The first one 
relates to the aspiration to solidarity within the African community. At the global level, 
solidarity serves to distinguish the notion of international society of sovereign states, based on 
self-interests, from the international community as a whole.1674 Christian Tomuschat has 
defined the international community as “a kind of authority that closely follows world events 
and bears responsibility for maintaining an orderly and peaceful international environment 
and for ensuring decent conditions of existence to every human being”.1675 However, it is 
formally more a fiction than a concrete authority. States may even divert its actions in the 
pursuit of their ego-centric interests by other means. Theoretically, the international 
community protects its own interests (such as world peace, security and environment) or 
mankind (humanity) against fundamental and existential threats (such as pandemic diseases 
and egregious crimes). In this regard, “mankind is for the international community what is a 
people for a state”.1676 The solidarity which arguably exists within a community is stronger 
where a process of integration of states, and therefore the establishment of a community, is 
undertaken. The Malabo Protocol clearly refers to this link between integration and 
                                                                                                                                                        
the unity of our continent and its peoples,  in the light of those proposals, and hearing in mind the current 
situation on the Continent, we DECIDE TO: (i) Establish an African Union, in conformity with the ultimate 
objectives of the Charter of our Continental Organisation and the provisions of the Treaty establishing the 
African Economic Community. (ii) Accelerate the process of implementing the Treaty establishing the African 
Economic Community, in particular: (a) Shorten the implementation periods of the Abuja Treaty, (b) Ensure the 
speedy establishment of all the institutions provided for in the Abuja Treaty; such as the African Central Bank, 
the African Monetary Union, the African Court of Justice and in particular, the Pan-African Parliament. We aim 
to establish that Parliament by the year 2000, to provide a common platform for our peoples and their grass-root 
organizations to be more involved in discussions and decision-making on the problems and challenges facing our 
continent. (c) Strengthening and consolidating the Regional Economic Communities as the pillars for achieving 
the objectives of the African Economic Community and realising the envisaged Union’. 
1674 R. Kolb, ‘Société internationale ! Communauté internationale ?’, in J.F. Akandji-Kombé, L’homme dans la 
société internationale –Mélanges P. Tavernier (Bruylant : Bruxelles, 2013) 57-89, at 59-60 ; E. Jouanet, ‘La 
communauté internationale vue par les juristes’, VI Annuaire français de relations internationales (2005) 3-26, 
at 5.  
1675 Tomuschat, above note 45, at 222. 
1676 I. Ivanovich Lukashuk, ‘The Law of the International Community’, in United Nations, International law on 
the eve of the twenty-first century. Views from the International Law Commission (New York: United Nations, 
1997) 51-68, at 56. 
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community. Its preamble states that the AU Criminal Court is among the efforts “to promote 
the objectives of the political and socio-economic integration and development of the 
continent with a view to realising the ultimate objective of a United States of Africa”.1677 The 
AU Criminal Court will exercise its jurisdiction and deliver justice on behalf of the African 
community of states and peoples.    
The second stake derives from a close different question: apart from the AU Criminal Court 
and the Pan-African Parliament, which institutions of security and defence can precisely act 
on behalf of this community? The PSC is certainly one of these institutions. It has replaced 
the OAU Central Organ, based on the Cairo Declaration of 1993.1678 The process of its 
establishment began in 2001 when the decision was taken to incorporate the OAU Central 
Organ into the AU with a review of its structures, procedures and working methods, including 
the change of its name.1679 In July 2002, the AU Assembly finally adopted the Protocol 
establishing the PSC. The latter is therefore its subsidiary organ pursuant to article 5(2) of the 
Constitutive Act. Compared to the OAU Central Organ, the PSC is relatively a robust 
institution which is likely the most important innovation of the AU system.1680 Like the UN 
Security Council, it consists of 15 member states, but none of them has a veto power. The 
PSC meets at the level of ambassadors, ministers of foreign affairs or heads of state and 
government. For the better performance of its functions, the PSC has an administrative 
secretariat and is supported by the AU Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental 
Early Warning System, the African Standby Force and the Special Fund.1681 Its extensive 
                                                 
1677 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 
Preamble, para.13. 
1678 AHG/Decl.3 (XXIX), above note 1637, para.13.  
1679 AHG/Dec.1 (XXXVII), Decision on the Implementation of the Sirte Summit Decision on the African Union, 
37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, 
Lusaka (Zambia), 9-11 July 2002, para.8 (a) and (b). 
1680 S. A. Dersso, Annual Review of the Peace and Security Council 2012/2013 (Pretoria: Institute for Security 
Studies, 2013), at 1. 
1681 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article 1 (2). 
The AU Commission plays a similar role to the UN Secretariat in relation with the Security Council, including 
drawing the attention of the PSC on situations which deserves its actions and reporting on the activities of AU 
peace support operations across the continent. The Panel of the Wise is an organ composed of five highly 
respected personalities, appointed by the AU Assembly for a period of three years, and is mandated to advise the 
PSC or the Chairperson of the AU Commission on all issues pertaining to the promotion, and maintenance of 
peace, security and stability in Africa. The Continental Early Warning System is like the security intelligence 
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powers include the authorisation of the mounting and deployment of AU peace support 
operations, the examination and adoption of appropriate actions within its mandate in 
situations where a member state is threatened by acts of aggression, the imposition of sanction 
in cases of unconstitutional changes of government, and the power to decide on any other 
issue relating to the maintenance of peace in Africa.1682 Thus, the PSC appears to be “the 
main authority on matters of peace and security on the continent”1683 and the principal 
institution of the APSA. 
As a subsidiary organ, the PSC is accountable to the AU Assembly, which is “the supreme 
organ of the Union”.1684 The AU Assembly can approve, modify or even disapprove any 
decision taken by it. Moreover, there are decisions that the PSC cannot take without an 
express delegation of power by the AU Assembly. This is the case of the imposition of 
sanctions against states, for example, in response to an unconstitutional change of 
government. The PSC can only sanction individuals or non-state actors.1685 In addition, it 
cannot take any decision to intervene in a member state in the event of war crimes, genocide 
and crimes against humanity. But, it can recommend such an intervention to the AU 
Assembly which has the exclusive power to decide on the matter.1686 This distribution of 
powers between the PSC and the AU Assembly may negatively affect the efficacy of the 
Union’s right to intervene. Yet, it is one of the most important mechanisms for the protection 
of African regional public order.   
                                                                                                                                                        
service of the African Union. It collects information about situations which deserve the action of the PSC in 
order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflict in Africa. The African Standby Force is the military 
branch of the AU, pending the establishment of the African Army at the final stage of the continental integration. 
Whereas it is not yet operational, the African Standby Force is notably designed for the deployment of peace 
support operations or other AU military interventions. The Special Fund has been created in order to secure the 
necessary financial resources for the activities related to peace and security on the continent.   
1682 Ibid., Article 7 (1) (c), (g), (o) and (r). 
1683 Dersso, above note 1680, at 5. 
1684 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 6 (2). 
1685 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, Article 25 (6). In this paragraph, the Charter 
provides: ‘The Assembly shall impose sanctions on any Member State that is proved to have instigated or 
supported unconstitutional change of government in another state in conformity with Article 23 of the 
Constitutive Act’. 
1686 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article 7 (1) 
(e). 
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b) The Right of the African Union to Intervene in a Member State  
The will to curb the OAU inertia when faced with African crises is the reason for the broad 
ambitions of the AU. But, the modification of the law is not of itself sufficient for the 
effective realisation of these ambitions if no action is undertaken on the ground to ensure 
order, peace and security.1687 The will to deal with African crises is reflected in the right to 
intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the AU Assembly. 
The mechanism contains two different coexisting conceptions in the AU Constitutive Act. 
The first one is an intervention “in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity”.1688 This is the first time that such a right is provided 
for in an international treaty in favour of an intergovernmental organisation in international 
law. The UN Charter prohibits the interference with the domestic affairs of member states, 
except for measures that decided pursuant to Chapter VII for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.1689 Instead, the right to intervene in a member state is one of the principles 
governing the AU functioning. The mechanism aims to protect human security. It is also 
provided for in other AU’s legal instruments, such as the AU Convention for the Protection 
and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention).1690  
The second conception is brought in by the Protocol on Amendments on the AU Constitutive 
Act of 2003. This Protocol adds to the list of grave circumstances a new situation as follows: 
“the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly 
in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity 
as well as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the Member 
State of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council”.1691 If the 
amendment comes into force, it will put on a balance the protection of human security with 
the right to intervene for the protection of the legitimate order established and contested in a 
                                                 
1687 N.J. Udombana, ‘Can the Leopard Change its Spots? The African Union Treaty and Human Rights’, 17 
American University International Law Review (2002) 1177-1261, at 1256-1257. 
1688 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4 (h). 
1689 UN Charter, Article 2 (7). 
1690 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 
(Kampala Convention) (22 October 2009), Article 8 (1). 
1691 Protocol on Amendments on the Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4(d). Emphasis is mine. 
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state.1692 The AU’s choice might be difficult between these two conflicting conceptions: 
protecting human and peoples’ rights or saving a bloody or a dictatorial government? The 
ambiguity is such that there is not even a definition of what could be “a serious threat to 
legitimate order”, contrary to serious crimes which have well established definitions under 
international law. The risk of misusing one conception against another cannot be excluded. 
Perhaps, given the rejection of unconstitutional changes of government, the AU could 
intervene only where it has to protect, without prejudice to individual criminal responsibility, 
a democratically elected government, which may not be legally perceived as illegitimate 
before the termination of its constitutional term or of which inauguration is thwarted by an 
outgoing regime.   
But, there is no definition of the forms in which the AU could exercise its right to intervene in 
a member state. In practice, the AU may decide a military intervention to stop gross violations 
of human rights or humanitarian international law. The possibility was invoked as such by the 
PSC as a measure of last resort in Burundi, following the constitutional and electoral crisis 
which began in 2015, should this country not accept the deployment of a peace support 
operation, called the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU).1693 
The AU’s right to intervene also implies a criminal dimension. On this basis, the AU took the 
decision to try the former Chadian President,1694 Hissène Habré, for acts of torture, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. This practice shows that the AU can establish even a special 
regional criminal tribunal with the mandate to prosecute crimes that would normally fall 
within the primary jurisdiction of one or more member state(s).  
The AU’s right to intervene in a member state must be distinguished from “the right of 
Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and 
security”,1695 for example in the event of aggression or non-international armed conflict. This 
                                                 
1692 E. Baimu and K. Sturman, ‘Amendments to the African Union’s Right to Intervene: a Shift from Human 
Security to Regime Security’, 12 (2) African Security Review (2003) 37-45.      
1693 PSC/PR/COMM (DLXV), 17 December 2015, para.13 (c) (iv).  
1694Assembly/AU/Dec.127 (VII), Decision on the Hissène Habré Case and the African Union 
(Doc.Assembly/AU/3 (VII)), 7th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Banjul (The Gambia), 
1-2 July 2006, para.3. In this paragraph, ‘the Assembly observes that, according to the terms of Articles 3 (h), 4 
(h) and 4 (o) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the crimes of which Hissène Habré is accused fall 
within the competence of the African Union’. 
1695 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4 (j). 
338 
request would imply that the intervention is accepted by the territorial state. However, it is not 
clear whether any other country may demand the AU’s intervention in the territory of a non-
requesting state. There is not yet a sufficient practice to support a trend in this direction.     
On the other hand, the AU has just a right to be exercised. This does imply that there is a 
political will to intervene, if the necessary resources (financial, military or others) are made 
available to carry out an intervention.1696 Nothing indicates that the AU has a duty to 
intervene. However, the Kampala Convention seems to give rise to a duty insofar as it 
reaffirms the Union’s right to intervene in a member state as part of its obligations to protect 
and assist internally displaced persons (IDPs). Given the fact that the AU cannot access this 
treaty, the enforcement of its obligation becomes problematic. In the Femi Falana case, the 
AfCHPR declined its jurisdiction to examine a judicial claim against the AU concerning 
violations of a treaty to which it was not a party.1697  
Another problem with the AU’s right to intervene in a member state is the lack of an 
anticipatory or preventive authority.1698 The intervention can be decided only if one of the 
grave circumstances has occurred or is ongoing. The mechanism is also very difficult to 
activate. As a matter of procedure, the AU Constitutive Act is “incomplete on how to decide 
when to intervene”.1699 In fact, “it is unclear whether the AU Assembly may first conduct an 
investigation before determining if an intervention is necessary, or whether it needs to first 
decide to intervene before finding out if indeed international crimes were committed in a 
member state”.1700 But, looking at the MAPROBU case, it is clear that the PSC invoked the 
AU’s right to intervene after taking note of the preliminary findings of the fact-finding 
mission dispatched in Burundi by the ACmHPR pursuant to the Communiqué of 13 
                                                 
1696 N. Dyani-Mhango, ‘Reflections on the African Union’s Right to Intervene’, 38(1) Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law (2012) 1-48, at 13. 
1697 Femi Falana v. The African Union, Judgment of 26 June 2012, AfCHPR, Application No.001/2011, 
paras.71-72. See A. Kilangi, ‘Legal Personality, Responsibility and Immunity of the African Union: Reflection 
on the Decision of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the Femi Falana Case’, 1 AUCIL Journal 
of International Law (2013) 95-139. 
1698 S. Dujardin, ‘L’Union africaine : objectifs et moyens de gestion des crises politiques et des conflits armés’, 
in D. Bangoura and E. Fidieck A. Bidias (eds), L’Union africaine et les acteurs sociaux dans la gestion des 
crises et des conflits armés (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2006)51-82, at 61. 
1699 D. Kuwali, ‘The Conundrum of Conditions for Intervention under Article 4(h) of the African Union Act’, 17 
African Security Review (2008) 90-111, at 93. 
1700 Dyani-Mhango, above note 1696, at 14-15. 
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November 2015.1701 Moreover, the decision to intervene must be taken by the AU Assembly 
which is not a permanent body, whereas the issue likely requires celerity. Yet, an 
extraordinary session of the AU Assembly is made dependent on drastic conditions. For 
instance, any request by a member state for an extraordinary session of the AU Assembly 
must be approved by a two-thirds majority of all the members in order to be convened.1702 
Meanwhile, the matter on the ground could be exacerbating. Therefore, as a matter of good 
policy, it might be wise to confer the competence to take the decision to intervene on the PSC, 
which is a permanent body working under the authority of the AU Assembly.  
Finally, the decision to intervene in a member state is a regional enforcement action in the 
meaning of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on regional arrangements of collective security. 
The authorisation of the Security Council is therefore necessary pursuant to article 53(1) of 
the UN Charter.1703 However, the AU Constitutive Act does not make any express reference 
to this procedure. In practice, the Security Council’s authorisation can be given a priori or 
after adopting the decision to intervene, or even after its implementation, in terms of an 
approval resolution. This a requirement for practical flexibility because of the urgent character 
of the right to intervene. It must be kept in mind that the authorisation or approval in question 
guarantees that the AU’s right to intervene is not to be perceived, contrary to what some 
commentators have argued,1704 as a challenge to the authority of the UN Security Council. 
Rather, the AU’s right to intervene is a power aiming to ensure that Africa takes its political 
responsibility in dealing with African situations and problems, even when there is not any 
timely action decided at the global level. This understanding is consistent with the view of the 
AU itself, as expressed in “the Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the 
United Nations”, famously known as “The Ezulwini Consensus”. This Position was adopted 
                                                 
1701 PSC/PR/COMM.(DLVII), 13 November 2015, paras.9 (iii) and 10 ; PSC/PR/COMM (DLXV), above note 
1693, para.5. 
1702 Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the African Union (9 July 2002), Rule 11 (1). 
1703  Article 53 (1) of the UN Charter provides: ‘The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such 
regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be 
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council 
(…)’. 
1704 Y. Gapasi Muhire, ‘The African Union’s Right of Intervention and the UN System of Collective Security’ 
(PhD Thesis, Utrecht University 2013), at 231-236; A. Abass and M.A. Baderin, ‘Towards Effective Collective 
Security and Human Rights Protection in Africa: An Assessment of the Constitutive Act of the New African 
Union’, 49 (1) Netherlands International Law Review (2002) 1-38, at 23.   
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by the AU Executive Council in March 2005 in reaction to the report of the UN Secretary-
General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, issued in the context of the 
emerging doctrine of the responsibility to protect in 2004.1705 The Ezulwini Consensus 
indicates:  
Since the General Assembly and the Security Council are often far from the scenes of conflicts and 
may not be in a position to undertake effectively a proper appreciation of the nature and 
development of conflict situations, it is imperative that Regional Organisations, in areas of 
proximity to conflicts, are empowered to take actions in this regard. The African Union agrees 
with the Panel that the intervention of Regional Organisations should be with the approval of the 
Security Council; although in certain situations, such approval could be granted “after the fact” in 
circumstances requiring urgent action (...).1706 
This order of protection and defence of the African continent is enriched in criminal matters 
with the codification of crimes against peace and security in Africa. 
1.2. The Codification of Crimes against Peace and Security in Africa    
The notion of “crimes against peace and security in Africa” is reminiscent of the ILC’s list of 
“crimes against the peace and the security of mankind”1707 at the universal level. The 
expression is found in the OAU Convention of 1977 for the elimination of mercenarism, 
which provides that “any person, natural or juridical who commits the crime of mercenarism 
as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article commits an offence considered as a crime against 
peace and security in Africa and shall be punished as such”. 1708 However, the list of crimes 
against peace and security in Africa is much broader. As preliminary remarks, the notion has 
to be clarified. The analysis of the codification of these regional crimes will facilitate the 
understanding of the extent to which their definitions have been influenced by universal legal 
standards or depart from them. The peak of this codification was reached with the adoption of 
the Malabo Protocol on the AU Criminal Court, the drafting process of which is examined at a 
                                                 
1705 United Nations, above note 346, paras.185 and 203. 
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later stage, in the chapter relating to the development of a system of African regional criminal 
justice. Keeping in mind that the notion of crimes against peace and security in Africa covers 
crimes of both international and transnational character by nature (1.2.1), it is necessary to 
distinguish between the regionalisation of ICC crimes (1.2.2) and the codification of other 
offences of specific concern to the continent (1.2.3). 
1.2.1. The Combination of International and Transnational Crimes 
International criminal law, be it regional or universal, is not normally designed to deal with 
transnational crimes. But, the difference between transnational and international crimes is not 
a truism. Authors do not conceive the notion of international crimes in the same way. The 
distinction is important due to its legal implications. In principle, international crimes are not 
subject to statutes of limitation, blanket amnesty or pardon. They may attract states to exercise 
universal jurisdiction, justify the launch of prosecutions before an international court or the 
rejection of state officials’ immunities. 
In the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility of 1996, the notion of international crimes 
was linked to that of the crimes of states.1709 The commission of such crimes is in principle a 
manifestation of political violence to maintain power and may entail individual criminal 
responsibility of officials who act on behalf of the state under international law.1710 Even 
individuals who may have acted outside the state umbrella can also be held criminally 
responsible. This is the case of members of armed groups. In this regard, some commentators 
define the notion of international crimes as “those offences over which international courts 
and tribunals have been given jurisdiction under general international law”.1711 However, this 
definition seems to conceive the notion of international crimes only in relation to global 
international criminal law. This was also the position of the American Tribunal at Nuremberg 
in 1948 which held that an international crime was “such act universally recognised as 
criminal, which is considered a grave matter of international concern and for some valid 
reason cannot be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state that would have control over 
                                                 
1709 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility (1996), Article 19 (2) and (3). See also A. Cassese, ‘Remarks on 
the Present Legal Regulation of Crimes of States’, in P. Gaeta and S. Zappala (eds), The Human Dimension of 
International Law :Selected Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 403-415, at 403-404;  
1710 A. Smeulers and F. Grünfeld, International Crimes and other Gross Human Rights Violations: A Multi- and 
Interdisciplinary Textbook (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), at 20-21. 
1711 Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst, above note 207, at 2. 
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it under ordinary circumstances (…)”.1712 This universal recognition to qualify a behaviour as 
an international crime seems to be justified by the fact that such crime amounts to a gross or 
serious violation of universal values protected by international law. This is the case of the 
prohibition of the use of armed force between states, the violation of which can constitute an 
act of aggression. Accordingly, international crimes have been indentified in respect of gross 
violations of (universal) international law which entail international criminal responsibility1713 
and constitute a matter of concern to the entire world community.1714 It is arguably this 
universal concern which justifies the intervention of international courts, expressing the will 
of the whole international community.1715  
However, the above definitions do not provide any indication as to why jurisdiction may not 
be conferred on international crimes on regional criminal courts. Likewise, these definitions 
do not tell anything about the possible existence of regional crimes, that is to say international 
crimes under regional international criminal law. Furthermore, it is known that even mixed 
criminal courts and tribunals, i.e. those jurisdictions combining both domestic and 
international characters, have been given jurisdiction not only over international crimes but 
also ordinary offences, without the latter being transformed into international crimes. 
Additionnaly, the ICC Statute implies a gradation between international crimes. It applies to 
the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. This may 
suggest that there are other crimes which do not constitute the most serious international 
crimes and a matter of concern to the international community as a whole. Therefore, outside 
ICC crimes, other crimes against peace and security in Africa may be considered as 
international crimes constituting a matter of concern to the entire community of African states 
and peoples. 
This suggestion is without prejudice to the notion of transnational crimes. The AU Non-
aggression and Common Defence Pact refers to transnational crimes in the definition of 
“Trans-national Organised Criminal Group” in the following terms: 
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Trans-national Organised Criminal Group means a structured group of three or more persons, 
existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious 
crimes which are transnational in scope, or offences established in accordance with international 
law, including the United Nations Convention Against Trans-national Organised Crime and its 
Protocols thereto, the purpose being which to obtain, directly or indirectly financial and other 
material benefits.1716 
Beside the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo Convention) of 
15 November 2000,1717 two other treaties can be referred to: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children,1718 and the Protocol 
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.1719 The Palermo Convention clearly 
defines the notion of transnational organised crimes.1720 
First of all, there must be a group of three or more persons who act in concert with the aim of 
committing a crime.1721 This group shall be structured, meaning that “it is not randomly 
formed for the immediate commission of an offence”,1722 irrespective of whether there are 
“formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed 
structure” .1723 Secondly, the Palermo Convention requires an international dimension to 
qualify a crime as transnational by nature in four different situations, namely if: (a) it is 
committed in more than one state; (b) it is committed in one state but a substantial part of its 
preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another state; (c) it is committed in 
one state but involves an organised criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more 
than one state; or (d) it is committed in one state but has substantial effects in another 
state.1724 Thirdly, a transnational organised crime must fulfill the condition of gravity and be 
among those offences which are referred to by the Palermo Convention or its additional 
protocols. A serious crime means a “conduct constituting an offence punishable by a 
                                                 
1716 African Union Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact, Article 1 (x). Emphasis is mine. 
1717 It has entered into force on 29 September 2003. 
1718 Adopted on 15 November 2000 and entered into force on 25 December 2003.  
1719 Adopted on 15 November 2000 and entered into force on 28 January 2004. 
1720 See N. Boister, An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), at 
3-4. 
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maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty”.1725 This is 
the case of participation in an organised criminal group,1726 corruption,1727 trafficking in 
persons, especially women and children,1728 the laundering of proceeds of crime,1729 including 
money laundering,1730 and related obstructions to justice.1731 
Unlike international crimes, transnational crimes are not in principle state crimes in the sense 
of political violence to maintain power or mass atrocities. Rather, they are mostly criminal 
conducts of individuals (private or official) and constitute offences against a certain decency 
or morality that should reign within a community.1732 Some of these offenses are on the list of 
crimes against peace and security in Africa, such as corruption, money laundering and 
trafficking in persons. They must be distinguished from “trans-border crimes” of which they 
may form a category. The definition of trans-border crimes can be borrowed from the 
ECOWAS Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security: 
“Trans-border crime” refers to all crimes organised or perpetrated by individuals, organisations or 
networks of local and/or foreign criminals operating beyond the national boundaries of a Member 
State, or acting in complicity with associates based on one or several States adjoining the country 
where the crimes are actually committed or having any connection with any Member State.1733 
These crimes are in principle subject to prosecutions in domestic legal orders. But, if some 
crimes against peace and security in Africa are transnational by nature, it is submitted that 
they have been conventionally raised by the Malabo Protocol to an independent status of 
regional international crimes, entailing individual and corporate criminal responsibility. Their 
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1726 Ibid., Article 5. 
1727 Ibid., Article 8. 
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commission does not therefore necessarily require anymore the “structured group” element or 
the condition of perpetration in more than one state as provided for by the UN Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime. In order to establish these regional crimes, it would 
be sufficient to prove the only constituent elements which are contained in their independent 
definitions enshrined in the Malabo Protocol instituting the AU Criminal Court. This is 
obviously the case of corruption committed within one state by public agents. This change of 
nature from transnational to regional international crimes reflects the necessity for solidarity 
with which the impunity of these crimes particularly dangerous for the states or the entire 
African community should be combated.1734 The need of solidarity in the prosecution of these 
crimes justifies the whole process of their regional codification.  
1.2.2. The Regionalisation of ICC Crimes   
The regionalisation of ICC crimes means their incorporation into African regional legal 
instruments. This can happen in two ways. First, it can simply be referred to the crimes in 
question in terms of prohibition, obligation for states to prevent or to punish their perpetrators, 
or in relation to the expression of a need for a regional action to protect human and peoples’ 
rights. The second way relates to the definition of these crimes in the context of the region. 
While a mere reference to these crimes does not raise any particular problem as far as regional 
codification is concerned, their distinct definition in an African regional instrument may have 
a drawback and an advantage. As drawback, regionalisation may lead to contradictions with 
universal legal standards or bring ambiguities in law. As advantage, it can result in the 
expansion of the scope of the definition of ICC crimes in Africa, thereby contributing to the 
progressive development of international criminal law. If some states not parties to universal 
treaties ratify the regional instrument, the range of addressees of the definition in question 
would be widened. 
This part does not aim to analyse in detail the definitions of these crimes, which can be found 
in appropriate monographies and commentary books, but to underline and describe their 
potential regional specificity. It is therefore important to focus on genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes (1.2.2.1) before examining the specificity of the codification of the 
crime of aggression (1.2.2.2).  
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1.2.2.1 The Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes 
Before adopting the Malabo Protocol, these ICC crimes were defined by two other African 
regional instruments in 2012: the AU Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over 
International Crimes and the Agreement between the AU and Senegal establishing the 
Extraordinary African Chambers for the purpose of the trial of Hissène Habré. At the sub-
regional level, some efforts were made by the International Conference on the Great Lakes 
Region (ICGLR) with two protocols additional to the Pact on Security, Stability and 
Development of the Great Lakes of 30 November 2006, namely the Protocol on the 
Prevention and Suppression of Sexual Violence against Women and Children, and the 
Protocol for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes and 
Crimes against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination.1735 The drafters of the Malabo 
Protocol seem to have mainly based their work on the ICC Statute and the AU Model 
National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes. They have not paid 
sufficient attention to other African treaties and to national legislation of AU member states in 
their efforts to domesticate ICC crimes. Accordingly, the Malabo Protocol would inherit the 
merits and the limits of the Rome Statute and the AU Model National Law on Universal 
Jurisdiction over International Crimes regarding the definitions genocide (a), crimes against 
humanity (b) and war crimes (c). 
a) The Failure to Expand the Ambit of the Crime of Genocide 
Genocide is defined by the Malabo Protocol in article 28B of its Annex on the Statute of the 
AU Criminal Court. This article is a copy of the definition provided for by the ICC Statute, 
with the exception of subparagraph (f) which extends genocide to “acts of rape or any other 
form of sexual violence”. The Malabo Protocol (Annex) differs from the Agreement between 
the AU and Senegal establishing the Extraordinary African Chambers which defines genocide 
in similar words to those of the ICC Statute1736 and the ICGLR’s Protocol of 30 November 
2006.1737 The substance of article 28B (f) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) is even 
problematic. Of course, the ICTR held that acts of sexual abuse could “constitute genocide in 
                                                 
1735 These two protocols entered into force on the same date as the Pact on Security, Stability and Development 
for the Great Lakes Region, of which they form a part, on 21 June 2008.   
1736 Agreement on the Establishment of the Extraordinary African Chambers (Annexe), Article 5. 
1737 Protocol for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against 
Humanity and all forms of Discrimination (30 November 2006), Article 1 (a). 
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the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such”.1738 However, these acts 
were covered by the existing definition under article 28B (b) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) 
when it specifies the crime of “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group” which must be interpreted to include sexual violence, notably rape.1739 According to 
the ICTR, “rape and sexual violence certainly constitute infliction of serious bodily and 
mental harm on the victims and are even (…) one of the worst ways of inflicting harm on the 
victim as he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm”.1740 In addition, article 28B (d) of the 
Malabo Protocol (Annex) concerning the imposition of measures intended to prevent births 
within the group was construed to include “sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilisation, 
forced birth control, separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages”.1741  The Malabo 
Protocol (Annex) could innovate if it had reproduced the provision of the AU Model National 
Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes concerning “acts of rape that are 
intended to change the identity of a particular group”.1742. Even if this might have been 
perceived as a separate positive expansion of acts of genocide, it does not seem to be entirely 
the case. The ICTR has held that in patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is 
determined by the identity of the father, “an example of a measure intended to prevent births 
within a group is the case where, during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately 
impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to have her give birth to a child who 
will consequently not belong to its mother’s group”.1743 In matriarchal societies, the problem 
of qualification disappears. This is because children born out of the underlying acts of rape 
will remain the babies of their mothers and do not therefore change in cultural identity. This 
view is in line with the position of the ICJ,1744 in the case concerning the Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.1745 Therefore, it is 
                                                 
1738 Akayesu (ICTR-96–4-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber I, 2 September 1998, para.731. See also Kayishema and 
Ruzindana (ICTR-95–1-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber II, 21 May 1999, para.95.  
1739 Akayesu (ICTR-96–4-T), para.734.  
1740 Ibid., para.731. 
1741 Ibid., para.507. 
1742 African Union Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes, Article 9 (f). 
1743 Akayesu (ICTR-96–4-T), above note 1738, para.507. 
1744 W.A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: the Crime of the Crimes (2 edn., Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), at 206. 
1745 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, I.C.J. Reports 2007, paras.366-367. 
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understandable that “acts of rape that are intended to change the identity of a particular 
group”, which were incorporated into the draft Malabo Protocol (Annex) in 2012, were 
removed from the final version.1746   
A further observation relates to the list of protected groups against genocide. The Malabo 
Protocol (Annex) missed the opportunity to develop the law with respect to political groups. It 
reproduces the provision of the ICC Statute, which is based on the Genocide Convention.1747 
Yet, there are examples of African domestic laws including political groups in the definition 
of genocide. This is the case of the Ethiopian Penal Code of 2004.1748 The reason why the 
Malabo Protocol failed to take into account the development of African national legislation 
was not specified. Regarding the Genocide Convention, the exclusion of political groups was 
motivated by political reasons relating to the Cold War and its ideological division between 
states. States from the communist bloc would not have voted for this Convention without such 
exclusion,1749 even though political and other groups were already included in the resolution 
of 11 December 1946 of the UN General Assembly,1750 calling upon member states to adopt 
necessary legislation to prevent and punish genocide and to adopt an appropriate international 
treaty. If the ICC Statute relies on the Genocide Convention, the exclusion of political groups, 
or others (social, sexual, linguistic or geographical groups), is now arbitrary. This is because 
such an exclusion does not find support in state practice, even outside Africa.1751 In this 
regard, John Quigley notes that “to date, no controversy has arisen as a result of such 
                                                 
1746 Executive Council of the African Union, ‘The Report, the Legal Instruments and Recommendations of the 
Ministers of Justice/Attorneys General - Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights: Revisions up to Tuesday 15th May 2012 (Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7)’, 
EX.CL/731(XXI), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 9-13 July 2012, at 16.  
1747 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 2,. 
1748 Article 269 of the Ethiopian Penal Code of 2004 reads as follows: ‘Whosoever, with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, religious or political group, organizes, orders or engaged in, be it in 
time of war or in time of peace: (a) Killings, bodily harm or serious injury to the physical or mental health of 
members of the group, in any way whatsoever; or (b) measures to prevent the propagation or continued survival 
of its members or their progeny; or (c) the compulsory movement or dispersion of peoples or children, or their 
placing under living conditions calculated to result in their death or disappearance, is punishable with rigorous 
imprisonment from five years to life, or, in cases of exceptional gravity, with death.’ (emphasis is mine) 
1749 J. Verhoeven, ‘Le crime de génocide: originalité et ambigüité’, 1 Revue belge de droit international (1991) 
5-26, at 21.  
1750 UNGA Res.96 (I), 11 December 1946, Preamble, para.2.  
1751 Quigley, above note 784, at 16-17. 
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variances. The most common variances have been the addition of additional acts committed 
against members of a group, and the addition of more types of protected groups”.1752 
Moreover, the ideological reason, which led to the restrictive wording of the Genocide 
Convention in 1948, disappeared with the end of the Cold War in 1990.  
It is submitted that the list of groups protected against genocide could be expanded for policy 
reasons. There are other suggestions in this direction.1753  Rather than being exhaustive, the 
list could even be left open so as to potentially include protection for other groups.1754 In the 
view of Joe Verhoeven, there is no technical obstacle in law for such an expansion.1755 In 
contrast, it has the advantage of widening the protection of human beings.1756 Accordingly, in 
many African states where political oppression is often a mode of governance, the retention of 
genocide against political groups could be an expansion in human rights protection and serve 
as a deterrent for potential offenders.   
b) The Ambiguity of Crimes against Humanity 
Crimes against humanity are provided for by the Malabo Protocol under article 28C of its 
Annex on the Statute of the AU Criminal Court. This article is a copy of article 10 of the AU 
Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes. It differs from the 
definitions provided for by ICGLR’s instruments which either refer to the ICC Statute1757 or 
reproduce its provisions with the exception of article 7 (2) and (3) of the latter Statute.1758 The 
Malabo Protocol (Annex) is different from the ICC Statute in three respects.  
                                                 
1752 Ibid., at 16. 
1753 W.A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: the Crime of the Crimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), at 102-103. 
1754 T.W. Simon, The Laws of Genocide: Prescription for a Just World (London: Praeger Security International, 
2007), at 96. 
1755 Verhoeven, above note 1749, at 23. 
1756 Ibid. 
1757 Protocol for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against 
Humanity and all forms of Discrimination (30 November 2006), Article 1 (h). 
1758 Protocol on the Prevention and Suppression of Sexual Violence against Women and Children, Article 1 (2). 
It must be noted that these flaw and difference in the wording of the ICGLR’s treaties show the lightness with 
which they were drafted. Worse, there are no available travaux préparatoires which may help explain the 
reasons behind such wording problems. 
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First of all, article 28C (1) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) defines crimes against humanity 
as “any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack or 
enterprise directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack or 
enterprise”. It adds to the chapeau of these crimes the concept of “enterprise”, but without 
defining it in subsequent paragraph 2 on the definitions of concepts. It has to be noted that the 
ICTR expanded the concept “attack” to non-violent acts, such as imposing a system of 
apartheid or exerting pressure on the population to act in a particular manner.1759 According to 
Kai Ambos, the term has “the potential to capture almost any kind of criminal 
undertaking”.1760 Thus, the concept “enterprise” does not technically add anything new to the 
chapeau of the definition of crimes against humanity. Furthermore, the drafters of the Malabo 
Protocol did not specify the reason for its inclusion in the definition of crimes against 
humanity. While an “enterprise” may imply the conduct of legal persons of which criminal 
liability is admitted by the Malabo Protocol (Annex),1761 Kai Ambos rightly underscores: “In 
any rate, Article 28C in its current form does not make legal persons possible agents of the 
crime but puts the term “enterprise directly after attack, thereby making clear that it 
complements the context element of crimes against humanity captured by the systematic 
widespread and systematic “attack””.1762 The AU Criminal Court should determine, in 
practical cases, the extent to which the scope of an “enterprise” is different from that of an 
“attack” which is widespread or systematic.  
Secondly, article 28C (1) (f) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) adds to the crime of torture 
“cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment”, but without giving any definition 
whatsoever in paragraph 2. According to the ECHR, the difference between these two 
categories of acts lies in the intensity of the suffering inflicted, because “torture constitutes an 
aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.1763  
But, “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment” could be also covered by article 
28C (1) (k) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) which bears on “other inhumane acts of a similar 
character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or mental or physical 
                                                 
1759 Akayesu (ICTR-96–4-T), above note 1738, para.581. 
1760 K. Ambos, ‘Genocide (Article 28B), Crimes Against Humanity (Article 28C), War Crimes (Article 28D) and 
the Crime of Aggression (Article 28M)’, in G. Werle and M. Vormbaum (eds), The African Criminal Court: A 
Commentary on the Malabo Protocol (Berlin: Springer, 2017) 31-55, at 41. 
1761 Ibid. 
1762 Ibid. 
1763 Irland v. United Kingdom, ECHR, Judgment of 18 January 1978, Application No.5310/71, para.167. 
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health”. These acts should be determined on a case-by-case basis, with regard to their nature 
and gravity, and must include none of the acts which already qualify as crime against 
humanity.1764 This is the case of food deprivation to detainees1765 or acts of sexual violence 
whereby, for instance, it is imposed on victims to undress in public or to circulate as such for 
the purpose of humiliating them and attempting to their dignity. However, not every “cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment” may constitute a crime against humanity. 
To be qualified as such, these acts must reflect some gravity as provided for in article 28C (1) 
(k) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex). This gravity threshold is missing in article 28 (1) (f).   
Thirdly, article 28C (1) (h) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) omits the definition of gender 
provided for by the ICC Statute in relation to the crime of persecution.1766 It also omits the 
connection which exists under the Rome Statute between the crime of persecution and “any 
act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court”. These 
omissions leave unclear the crime of persecution which is rather “a kind of umbrella crime 
that needs to be fleshed out by the underlying acts”.1767  
c) The Scope of War Crimes between Progress and Omissions  
War Crimes are defined by the Malabo Protocol in article 28D of its Annex on the Statute of 
the AU Criminal Court. This is the most expansive article among all the definitions of ICC 
crimes incorporated into the Malabo Protocol (Annex). It is a restatement of article 11 of the 
AU Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes. This article 
largely differs from the provision of the ICGLR’s Protocol on the Prevention and Suppression 
of Sexual Violence against Women and Children, which wrongly restricts the definition of 
war crimes to graves breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.1768 Compared to the ICC 
Statute, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) is a progressive development of international law (i) but 
at the same time contains some omissions (ii). 
                                                 
1764 C. K. Hall and C. Stahn, ‘Article 7: Crimes against Humanity’, in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos (eds), The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (3rd edn., München/Oxford/Baden Baden: 
C.H. Beck/Hart/ Nomos, 2016) 235-242, at 237-238. 
1765 Ibid.,at 238. 
1766 See ICC Statute, Article 7(3). It is hereby stipulated: ‘For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the 
term "gender" refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term "gender" does not 
indicate any meaning different from the above’. 
1767 Ambos, above note 1760, at 42. 
1768 Protocol on the Prevention and Suppression of Sexual Violence against Women and Children, Article 1(7). 
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i) The Progressive Definition of the Malabo Protocol   
The Malabo Protocol (Annex) develops international criminal law on various aspects. The 
starting point is the improvement of the age of children victims of conscription or enlistment 
into armed forces or groups or their use to participate actively in hostilities. The ICC Statute 
which relies on both Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions (1949)1769 takes 
into account the yardstick of 15 years old.1770 Instead, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) 
incriminates such acts for children under 18 years old.1771 This age limit comes from the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which defines such person as “every 
human being below the age of 18 years”.1772 The Charter does not permit any derogation from 
this definition.1773  All children within this age limit and not just a category of them must be 
protected. The ICC Statute contradicts itself on this issue. It does not prohibit the practice of 
child soldiers over the age of 15 years, while excluding them from the Court’s jurisdiction if 
they commit crimes when they are less than 18 years old.1774 The Malabo Protocol (Annex) 
has corrected this incoherence. It also incorporates a total number of 15 new crimes. One may 
first have a look at the criminalisation of the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass 
destruction before discussing the relevance of other additional crimes. 
  
                                                 
1769 GP I, Article 77(2); GPII, Article 4(3)(c).  
1770 ICC Statute, Article 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) and (e) (vii). 
1771 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Article 28D (b) (xxvii) and (e) (vii). The bracket and emphasis are mine.  
1772 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1 July 1990), Article 2. 
1773 See Institute for Human Right and Development in Africa v. The Government of Malawi, ACERWC Comm. 
No. 004/Com/001/2014, Report on Consideration of an Amicable Settlement under the Auspices of the 
Committee (27 October 2016), paras.6-7 <http://www.acerwc.org/download/decision-on-the-amicable-
settlement-between-irhda-and-the-government-of-malawi/?wpdmdl=9845> accessed 24 November 2016. In this 
case, the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) has decided to adopt 
the Amicable Settlement on Communication No.004/Com/001/2014 opposing the Institute for Human Right and 
Development in Africa (IHRDA) to the Republic of Malawi, in which the latter state commits itself to conform 
its Constitution (as amended in 2010), Article 23(5) of which defines children as persons under 16 years old, to 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child by 31 December 2018. 
1774 Article 26 of the ICC Statute provides: ‘The Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who was under 
the age of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of a crime’. 
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1°) The Criminalisation of the Use of Nuclear Weapons or Other Weapons of Mass Destruction   
The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is not prohibited or authorised under general 
international law. In its Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, the ICJ even stated that it could not 
“conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or 
unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a state 
would be at stake”.1775 International efforts rather focused on nuclear weapons disarmament. 
In Africa, the denuclearisation policy dates back to the UN General Assembly resolution of 24 
November 1961 on “consideration of Africa as a denuclearised zone”.1776 This policy was 
endorsed by African states during the first ordinary session of the OAU Assembly in July 
1964.1777 It resulted in the adoption of the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty 
(Pelindaba Treaty) in 1996,1778 which includes “the territory of the continent of Africa, islands 
states members of OAU and all islands considered by the Organisation of African Unity in its 
resolutions to be part of Africa”.1779 States parties are forbidden to possess, to develop, to 
manufacture, to test, to allow transit or stationning of any nuclear weapons or explosive 
devises within this zone. Only peaceful nuclear activities for non-military purposes are 
permitted.  
However, the Pelindaba Treaty does not prohibit as such the use of nuclear weapons in 
African conflicts, irrespective of whether they are international or of non-international 
character. It is the Malabo Protocol (Annex) which makes a step in this direction through the 
war crime of “using nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction”,1780 regardless of 
the type of armed conflict. Despite the lack of a clear definition of the expression “other 
weapons of mass destruction”, it appears that the African continent is taking the lead on a 
controversial issue on which states have not yet found a compromise at the global level. The 
                                                 
1775 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, above note 291, para.105. 
1776 UNGA Res.1652 (XVI), 24 November 1961, para.6. In this paragraph, the General Assembly ‘calls upon 
member states: a) to refrain from carrying out or continuing to carry out in Africa nuclear tests in any form; b) to 
refrain from using the territory, the territorial waters or air space of Africa for testing, storing or transporting 
nuclear weapons; c) to consider and to respect the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone’. 
1777 AHG/Res.11(I), Denuclearization of Africa, 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the Organisation of African Unity, Cairo (Egypt), 17-21 July 1964, paras.1-4.  
1778 It was adopted on 11 April 1996 and entered into force on 15 July 2001), Preamble, para.14. 
1779 African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty), Article 1 (a). 
1780 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Article 28D (g).  
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use of nuclear weapons is not criminalised under the ICC Statute despite the will of several 
states from the south world, including India.1781. In this regard, a proposal of amendment to 
the ICC Statute was introduced by Mexico,1782 even though it seems to have little chance to be 
accepted by other military nuclear powers. The fact that these powers and the states which 
benefit from the American nuclear umbrella or protection within NATO –such as Germany 
and The Netherlands – were opposed to the adoption of the UN Treaty on the prohibition of 
nuclear weapons on 7 July 2017 is a clear indication in this regard. If they reject complete 
nuclear weapons disarmament, it is likely that they will not a fortiori adhere to the 
criminalisation of their use in the context of armed conflicts. 
2°) The Incorporation of Other Crimes  
Seven crimes among the remaining 14 new crimes that are incorporated into the Malabo 
Protocol (Annex) relate to international armed conflicts as stipulated in article 28D (b) (v), 
(xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxi), (xxxii) and (xxxiii): intentionally launching an attack against 
works or installations containing dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will 
cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects which will be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated; 
unjustifiably delaying the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians; willfully committing 
practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon 
personal dignity, based on racial discrimination; making non-defended localities and 
demilitarised zones the object of attack; slavery and deportation to slave labour; collective 
punishments; despoliation of the wounded, sick, shipwrecked or dead. Article 28D of the 
Malabo Protocol (Annex) incorporates seven other crimes in the context of armed conflicts of 
non-international character under paragraph (e) (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi) and 
(xxii): Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of 
objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies; utilising 
the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain points, areas or military 
forces immune from military operations; launching an indiscriminate attack resulting in death 
or injury to civilians, or an attack in the knowledge that it will cause excessive incidental 
civilian loss, injury or damage; making non-defended localities and demilitarised zones the 
object of attack; slavery; collective punishments; despoliation of the wounded, sick, 
                                                 
1781 Tiwari, above note 965.  
1782 Secretariat of the Assembly of the States Parties, above note 1412, at 4.  
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shipwrecked or dead. All of these new crimes find their original source in international 
humanitarian law in terms of prohibitions.1783 But, there are two principal criticisms.  
First, the relevance of the crime of “intentionally launching an attack against works or 
installations containing dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects which will be excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated” is contested. In 
fact, the crimes derives from the prohibition under article 56 of the Additional Protocol I to 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949. It is argued that this prohibition is not absolute because the 
works or installations in question could be attacked if they were used for military purposes by 
the adverse party.1784 Of course, this is true. However, the argument is inaccurate. On the one 
hand, to criminalise the prohibition of individual conducts, there is no legal need for an 
“absolute prohibition” under international humanitarian law, which means a prohibition 
insusceptible to derogation. On the other hand, there is a possible and contrary argument in 
favour of this criminalisation. Indeed, the attack against those works or installations would 
imply criminal responsibility if it was not justified by military necessity.     
                                                 
1783 Ambos, above note 1760, at 43 and 46-47.  In the context of international armed conflicts, the crime of 
‘intentionally launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces in the knowledge 
that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects which will be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated’ is based on Article 56 of 
the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. For other new crimes, Kai Ambos reports: ‘If one 
examines the sources of international humanitarian law (The Hague and Geneva law) to identify the legal bases 
of these crimes, one finds that the six further crimes of international armed conflict introduced in para (b) are 
based on the Geneva Conventions I–IV, The Hague Conventions and the Additional Protocol I. More precisely, 
subpara (b)(xxviii) is based on Article 118 of the Geneva Convention III and Article 85(4)(b) of the Additional 
Protocol I; subparas (b) (xxix) and (xxx) likewise find a basis in international humanitarian law. With regard to 
subpara (b)(xxxi), the general maxim of the humane treatment of prisoners and the rule of fair remuneration of 
their work apply. Collective punishment in the sense of subpara (b)(xxxii) is prohibited by Article 87 of the 
Geneva Convention III. Finally, subpara (b)(xxxiii) is covered by the property provision of Article 51 of the 
Geneva Convention II. The seven crimes of non-international armed conflict also rely on several primary 
provisions of international humanitarian law. Subparagraph (e) (xvi) is based on Article 14 of the Additional 
Protocol II. Subparagraphs (e)(xvii) and (xviii) find a legal basis in the Geneva Conventions I, IV and the 
Additional Protocol II. The legal basis of subparas (e) (xix), (xx), (xxi) and (xxii) is identical to that of the 
prohibitions mentioned above with reference to international armed conflict’ (ibid.). 
1784 Ibid., at 43. 
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Secondly, it is suggested that the passage from prohibition to criminalisation is not 
automatic.1785 It must be based on a special justification: the wrongfulness and the gravity of 
the prohibition.1786 It is curious to observe that this argument does not specify to which extent 
the aforementioned war crimes do not fulfill this requirement. In any case, there is no legal 
obstacle for a group of states to expand the protection of humanitarian standards through 
international criminal law. States are sovereign and free to adopt the laws that fit better with 
the preservation of their collective interests or those of their peoples. The only difference is 
that the new war crimes will not be universal because of their treaty-based character between 
states parties to the Malabo Protocol. A similar expansion can even be made by one state in its 
domestic order as in the case of extensive definitions of genocide. However, the principle of 
legality would be breached in respect of the exercise of adjudicative powers if the war crime 
to be prosecuted against aliens (in case of universal jurisdiction, passive personality and 
protective principle) were not committed on the territory of a state party to the Malabo 
Protocol or another state which has adopted the same definition under its domestic legislation. 
The Malabo Protocol (Annex) should be applied in light of the same principle.  
ii) The Omissions of the Malabo Protocol          
The definition of war crimes contains four main omissions. The first omission is the list of 
prohibited weapons, which are referred to in an annex to the ICC Statute, in article 28D (b) 
(xxi) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex): employing weapons, projectiles and material and 
methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering 
or which are inherently indiscriminate in violation of the international law of armed conflict. 
This omission undermines legal certainty.1787 Secondly, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) failed 
to improve the criminalisation of the conscription or enlistment of children in the context of 
international armed conflicts. The ICC Statute criminalises the conscription or enlistment of 
children “into the national armed forces”,1788 and in the context of armed conflicts of non-
international character, the conscription or enlistment of children “into armed groups”.1789 
What should appear if the conscription or enlistment of children “into armed groups” is 
committed in the context of an international armed conflict? The Malabo Protocol (Annex) 
                                                 
1785 Ibid., at 43 and 47. 
1786 Ibid., at 48. 
1787 Ibid., at 44. 
1788 ICC Statute, Article 7 (2) (b) (xxvi). Emphasis is mine. 
1789 Ibid., Article 7 (2) (e) (vii). 
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missed the opportunity to expressly correct this legal gap. Such a correction would have 
avoided the risk of an extensive interpretation of the words “national armed forces” in order to 
include “armed groups” in contradiction with the principle of strict interpretation of penal 
laws.1790 Thirdly, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) omits paragraph 3 of article 7 of the ICC 
Statute: “Nothing in paragraph 2 (c) and (e) shall affect the responsibility of a Government to 
maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the unity and territorial 
integrity of the State, by all legitimate means”. Fourthly, the Malabo Protocol could 
incorporate the crime of arbitrary displacement of persons in time any armed conflict. 
The “arbitrary displacement of persons” is prohibited by the Kampala Convention of 2009 on 
the protection of IDPs.1791 The notion includes any of the following acts: i) the displacement 
based on policies of racial discrimination or other similar practices aimed at/or resulting in 
altering the ethnic, religious or racial composition of the population; ii) the individual or mass 
displacement of civilians in situations of armed conflict, unless the security of the civilians 
involved or imperative military reasons so demand, in accordance with international 
humanitarian law; iii) the displacement intentionally used as a method of warfare or due to 
other violations of international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict; iv) the 
displacement caused by generalised violence or violations of human rights; v) the 
displacement as a result of harmful practices; vi) forced evacuations in cases of natural or 
human made disasters or other causes if the evacuations are not required by the safety and 
health of those affected; vii) the displacement used as a collective punishment; viii) the 
displacement caused by any act, event, factor, or phenomenon of comparable gravity to all of 
the above and which is not justified under international law, including human rights and 
international humanitarian law.1792 States parties have agreed to enforce individual 
responsibility of perpetrators of these acts in accordance with applicable domestic and 
                                                 
1790 Ambos, above note 1760, at 45. See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN), Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trail Chamber I, 29 January 2007, para.277. In this paragraph, the Chamber noted: 
‘First, the ordinary meaning of the adjective "national" does not necessarily lead to an interpretation of the term 
as meaning governmental armed forces. 1n this regard, the Chamber notes that the Appeals Chamber of the 
ICTY defined the term "national" within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention for the 
purpose of determining who can be considered a "protected person" under the Convention’. 
1791 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 
(Kampala Convention), Articles 1 (d) and 4 (4) (a) to (h). 
1792 Ibid. 
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international criminal law.1793 The incorporation of these acts into the Malabo Protocol 
(Annex) was necessary. True, some of them can be reached through existing provisions. 
Regarding war crimes, punishable behaviours related to arbitrary displacement of persons 
include the crime of “ordering the displacement of civilian population for reasons related to 
the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so 
demand”1794 during a non-international armed conflict, or “the transfer, directly or indirectly, 
by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, 
or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within 
or outside this territory”1795 in the context of an international armed conflict. Concerning 
crimes against humanity, another act of arbitrary displacement of persons can be prosecuted 
as a “deportation or forcible transfer of population”.1796 However, the state of international 
criminal law remains lower than what is actually required by the Kampala Convention during 
all types of armed conflicts. Thus, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) failed, in this respect, to 
develop international criminal law.   
1.2.2.2. The Specificity of the Crime of Aggression 
The crime of aggression is defined by the Malabo Protocol in article 28M of its Annex on the 
Statute of the AU Criminal Court. Previously, various initiatives were undertaken to codify 
rules on aggression in Africa. The most important treaties were concluded in western1797 and 
central Africa.1798 The reason why aggression captured so earlier the attention of states, 
contrary to the other ICC crimes, is the discourse on decolonisation and the consolidation of 
state sovereignty. Human rights protection was not a priority. The AU adopted its own Non-
aggression and Common Defence Pact in 2005 and inspired other initiatives at the sub-
                                                 
1793 Ibid., Article 3 (1) (g). 
1794 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Article 28D (e) (viii). 
1795 Ibid., Article 28D (b) (ix). 
1796 Ibid., Article 28C (1) (d). 
1797 See Agreement on Non-Aggression and Defence Assistance (ANAD) between Member States of the 
Western African Economic Community (CEAO) and Togo (9 June 1977); Amended Protocol on Non-
Aggression between Member States of the Economic Community of West African States (22 April 1978).  
1798 Non-Aggression Pact between Member States of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on 
Security Questions in Central Africa (08 July 1996); Mutual Assistance Pact between Member States of the 
Economic Community of Central African States (2000).  See M. Mubiala, Coopérer pour la paix en Afrique 
centrale (Geneva : UNIDIR, 2003), at 35-37 and 65-69. 
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regional level such as the ICGLR in 2006.1799 The AU Non-aggression and Common Defence 
Pact also inspired the Malabo Protocol (Annex), regarding at least the list of constitutive acts 
of aggression1800 and the status of potential perpetrators. The UN General Assembly 
resolution 3314 of 14 December 1974 on aggression, which has influenced the definition of 
this crime under the ICC Statute, was not referred to. This is because the said resolution limits 
the crime of aggression to state acts, while the AU Non-aggression and Common Defence 
Pact extends its definition to acts of “a State, a group of States, an organisation of States or 
non-State actor(s) or (…) any foreign or external entity”.1801 This is a substantial departure 
from general international law and may have implications with respect to the exercise of the 
right of a state to self-defence (against non-state actors). As a consequence, the definition of 
aggression in the Malabo Protocol (Annex) differs from the one which is provided for in the 
ICC Statute, with the exception of the nature of acts of individuals who may be held 
criminally responsible. Both treaties criminalise “the planning, preparation, initiation or 
execution” of acts of aggression. It has to be noted the criminalisation of preparatory acts 
which should in principle fall out of the ambit of criminal law. Such criminalisation of 
preparatory acts seems to be the acknowledgment of the gravity of aggression as the “supreme 
international crime”1802 from which other crimes can be committed.   
Furthermore, the definition of aggression in the Malabo Protocol (Annex) includes acts that 
constitute violations of the UN Charter or the AU Constitutive Act “and with regard to the 
territorial integrity and human security of the population of a State Party”.1803 The phrase 
                                                 
1799 Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region (30 November 2006). In Article 
1 (2) and (3), it copies the definition of aggression provided for by the African Union Non-aggression and 
Common Defence Pact under Article 1 (c) (i) to (xi).  
1800 With the exception of Article (1) (ix), (x) and (xi) of African Union Non-aggression and Common Defence 
Pact: ix) the acts of espionage which could be used for military aggression against a Member State; x) 
technological assistance of any kind, intelligence and training to another State for use in committing acts of 
aggression against another Member State; xi) the encouragement, support, harbouring or provision of any 
assistance for the commission of terrorist acts and other violent trans-national organised crimes against a 
Member State. These acts do not constitute any use of force and do not reach the threshold of gravity which is 
required for the commission of aggression implying criminal responsibility.  
1801 African Union Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact, Article 1 (c). 
1802 C. Kress, “The Crime of Aggression before the First Review of the ICC Statute”, 20 Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2007) 851–865, at 852.  
1803 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Article 28M (A). 
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“with regard to the territorial integrity and human security of the population of a State Party” 
looks at first sight ambiguous. The travaux préparatoires of the Malabo Protocol provide no 
indication in order to clarify its meaning. However, given that the UN Charter prohibits the 
use of armed force between states, one may suggest that the phrase is connected to acts of 
aggression by non-state actors, the prosecution of which might be relevant if only they have 
infringed the territorial integrity of the state party or human security of its population. As a 
consequence, simple threats of aggressive acts against a state would not be sufficient for the 
commission of this crime. Likewise, fears of a state to be a victim of such acts could not 
justify the use of armed force against a non-state actor on the territory of another state without 
the latter’s consent. Such a use of armed force without the consent of the territorial state 
would be constitutive of the crime of aggression.  In addition, the definition of the Malabo 
Protocol (Annex) contains a number of acts that cannot be committed by non-state actors. 
Only states are able to perpetrate acts that are listed in article 28M (B) (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g): 
the bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the 
use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State; the blockade of the ports, 
coasts or airspace of a State by the armed forces of another State; the attack by the armed 
forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and fleets of another State; the use of 
the armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the 
agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the AU 
Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact or any extension of their presence in such 
territory beyond the termination of the agreement; the action of a State in allowing its 
territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State to be used by another State for 
perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State. 
The deficiency of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) relates to the inclusion of the general 
definition of aggression under article 28M (B) (a), that is, “the use of armed forces against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of any state, or any other act 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Charter 
of the United Nations”, in the list of constitutive acts of this crime. It is a non-sense insofar as 
every act of aggression proceeds from the use of armed force, meaning that such use cannot 
per se constitute a crime. The general definition also extends to violations of the AU 
Constitutive Act and the UN Charter, whereas article 28M (A) already defines aggression 
with respect to “a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations or the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union (…)”. 
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Finally, the nature of some perpetrators of aggression is subject to misinterpretation. For the 
state or non-state actor, everything is clear. It does not seem the case for “an organisation of 
states or any foreign entity”. Maybe, such an organisation of state could include not only 
interstate organisations having legal personality and de facto military alliances. But, the 
hypothesis may turn out to be an aggression by a state because such organisations are 
constituted by individual countries. Concerning “any foreign entity”, the AU Non-aggression 
and Common Defence Pact refers to “any external entity”. The adjective “external’ apparently 
alludes to “out of the African continent”. But, the term “entity” remains very ambiguous. 
Even the travaux préparatoires are silent on the issue. Arguably, “given the criminal 
responsibility of corporations, the phrase may refer to legal entities in the sense of legal 
persons, but such “entities” would certainly need military assistance to perform acts of 
aggression”.1804 It will belong to the AU Criminal Court to clarify the text in case-law.  
1.2.3. The Codification of Other Crimes    
There are 11 other crimes which are codified in African international law. They can be 
examined in two groups: the crimes against the security of the state (1.2.3.1) and the crimes 
against human security (1.2.3.2). 
1.2.3.1. The Crimes against the Security of the State    
In this category, a distinction may be drawn between political assassination and 
subversion (a), mercenarism (b) and unconstitutional change of government (c).  
a) The Crime of Political Assassination and Subversion  
Political assassination and subversion do not constitute autonomous crimes. Rather, they must 
be seen as constitutive acts of a different crime such as the unconstitutional change of 
government.1805 As a reminder, one of the principles enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act is 
the condemnation and rejection of political assassination and subversive activities. It is a 
heritage of the OAU Charter which stipulated an “unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, 
of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States 
                                                 
1804 Ambos, above note 1760, at 50. 
1805 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Articles 28E (1) (a) and (c). 
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or any other States”.1806 However, neither the AU Constitutive Act nor the OAU Charter 
defined political assassination and subversion. 
Regarding political assassination, its condemnation under the OAU Charter was influenced by 
two prominent events: the regime changes in the DRC and Togo, respectively after the killing 
of the Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice-Emery Lumumba, on 17 January 1961,1807 and the 
assassination of the Togolese President, Sylvanus Olympio, on 13 January 1963.1808 It follows 
that the assassination envisaged by the OAU Charter as well as the AU Constitutive Act is 
one which is committed for political purposes of regime change and not just the killing of a 
political leader for other reasons or the assassination of any citizen whom a government may 
have wanted to get rid of. Both treaties do not envisage an assassination of any kind. 
According to Joseph-Marie Bipoun-Woum, the assassination in question must have 
diplomatic implications either by its origin or through the victim, or even the political 
functions exercised by the latter.1809 This is because the perpetrator of a political assassination 
actually aims to target the organisation and the functioning of the state and its political 
organisation.1810  
This conception of political assassination is connected to the condemnation of subversive 
activities. The initial declaration in this respect was issued in Brazzaville (Congo) on 29 
December 1960. It stated that each African independent country should prohibit in its territory 
the undertaking of subversive activities against any other African country.1811 Another formal 
condemnation of subversive activities was made in Monrovia (Liberia) in 1961.1812 In 1965, 
the OAU Assembly met in Accra (Ghana) and adopted the Declaration on the Problem of 
Subversion in Africa.1813 This process of codification continued with the adoption of the AU 
                                                 
1806 OAU Charter, Article III (5). 
1807 See G. Zongola-Ntalaja, ‘Patrice Lumumba: the Most Important Assassination of the 20th Century’, The 
Guardian (17 January 2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-
matters/2011/jan/17/patrice-lumumba-50th-anniversary-assassination?CMP=share_btn_fb> accessed 20 
December 2016.   
1808 See J. Morel, ‘Calendrier des crimes de la France outre-mer’, at 11-12 <http://jacques.morel67.pagesperso-
orange.fr/ccfo/crimcol.pdf> accessed 27 January 2017. 
1809 Bipoun-Woum, above note 197, at 215.  
1810 Ibid.  
1811 E. Jouve, L’Organisation de l’unité africaine (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1984), at 163. 
1812 Ibid. 
1813 AHG/Res. 27 (II), above note 196.   
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Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact in 2005. There is no contradiction between these 
two African instruments. The AU succeeded to the Accra Declaration which codified eight 
principles on the rejection of subversive activities on the continent.1814 In particular, two of 
these principles commit African states not to tolerate the use of their territories for any 
subversive activity directed from outside Africa against any OAU member state and to oppose 
collectively and firmly by every means at their disposal any form of subversion conceived, 
organised or financed by foreign powers against Africa, OAU or its member states 
individually.1815 The originality of the AU Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact is to 
be a treaty and to provide a conventional definition of subversion, binding on states parties, in 
the following terms: 
“Acts of Subversion” means any act that incites, aggravates or creates dissension within or among 
Member States with the intention or purpose to destabilise or overthrow the existing regime or 
political order by, among other means, fomenting racial, religious, linguistic, ethnic and other 
differences, in a manner inconsistent with the Constitutive Act, the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Lome Declaration (on unconstitutional changes of government).1816  
This definition should be read in the light of the Accra Declaration. The rationale of the 
rejection of subversive activities is the weaknesses of African political regimes and a sort of 
paranoia and permanent suspicion of foreign interferences against incumbent governments. In 
this regard, the OAU Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations of 1994 
clearly recalled: “We are determined to cooperate in the defence of the institution of our 
respective States against hegemony and all other activities carried out in violation of the 
independence, unity, sovereign equality or territorial integrity of Member States”.1817 In 
another Resolution on the Right of States to Decide on their Political Options without Foreign 
Interference, the OAU Council of Ministers called on “extra-African Powers to refrain from 
interfering in the internal affairs of African countries”.1818  
                                                 
1814 Ibid. 
1815 Ibid., paras.2-3. 
1816 African Union Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact, Article 1(a). The brackets are mine. 
1817 AHG/Decl.2 (XXX), Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations, 30th Ordinary Session of 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, Tunis (Tunisia), 13-15 
June 1994, para.9.  
1818 CM/Res.1389 (LVI) Rev.1, Resolution on the Right of States to Decide on their Political Options without 
Foreign Interference, 56th  Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity, 
Dakar (Senegal), 22- 28 June 1992, paras.1-2. 
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Subversion can be committed by foreign states, including African countries between 
themselves, or by individuals residing in their territories. The ACHPR further provides that 
acts of subversion are contrary to the right of “all peoples (…) to national and international 
peace and security”.1819 Therefore, for the purpose of strengthening peace, solidarity and 
friendly relations, states parties must ensure that “any individual enjoying the right of asylum 
(…) shall not engage in subversive activities against his country of origin or any other state 
party (…)”.1820 The host state must respect the principles of international law,1821 especially 
the principle that political refugees must remain apolitical.  
b) The Crime of Mercenarism   
Mercenarism is defined by the Malabo Protocol in article 28H of its Annex on the Statute of 
the AU Criminal Court. Unlike political assassination and subversion, it is not only an 
autonomous crime but also a constituent element of the crime of unconstitutional change of 
government and aggression.1822 Historically, mercenarism, or the state of being a mercenary, 
has been a severe long time sore for African international relations. While the use of 
mercenaries during armed conflicts was still quite a normal phenomenon around the time 
African states were being decolonised,1823 the legality of their recruitment, use, financing and 
training became problematic this time. Former colonial powers were suspected of resorting to 
the use of mercenaries since it had become politically difficult to use their regular armed 
forces in order to hinder the process of decolonisation or, at least, of self-determination after 
independence.1824 Mercenaries were used during the Katanga secession in the DRC (1960-
                                                 
1819 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 23 (1). 
1820 Ibid., Article 23 (2) (a). 
1821 AHG/Res. 27 (II), above note 196, para.6. 
1822 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Articles 28E (1) (b) and 28M (B) (h); UNGA Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 November 1974, Article 3 (g).   
1823 S.J.G. Clarke, The Congo Mercenary: a History and Analysis, (Johannesburg: South African Institute of 
International Affairs, 1968), at 9-10; J. Tercinet, ‘Les mercenaires et le droit international’, 23 Annuaire français 
de droit international (1977) 269-293, at 270. See also C. C. Bayley, Mercenaries for the Crimea: The German, 
Swiss and Italian Legions in British Service, 1854–1856, (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1977). 
1824 L.S. Sunga, The Emerging System of International Criminal Law: Developments in Codification and 
Implementation (1st edn., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Kluwer Law International, 1997), at 184; J. Riley and M. 
Gambone, ‘Men with Guns’, 28 (1) Wisconsin International Law Journal (2010)39-73, at 56; J. C. Zarate, ‘The 
Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law and the New 
World Disorder’, 34 (1) Stanford Journal of International Law (1998) 75-162, at 86-90. 
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1962), the Biafra secession in Nigeria (1968-1969), the civil wars in Soudan (1970) and 
Angola (1975-1976) and the liberation war in Zimbabwe (1970).1825 Mercenaries were also 
used in almost all contemporary African armed conflicts, including in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Ivory Coast, Central African Republic and the DRC.1826 Outside the realm of armed conflicts, 
mercenaries have been involved in many military coups d’état across the continent, notably in 
Benin and Comoros.  
Several United Nations resolutions, adopted by the Security Council or the General 
Assembly, have condemned mercenarism or held that mercenaries are criminals to be 
prosecuted and tried as such under domestic law.1827 However, these United Nations 
resolutions are problematic for several reasons. First, some are contextualised to specific 
cases (e.g. Katanga or Biafra sessions) and can not be relied upon to imply a general 
prohibition against mercenarism during any armed conflict. Second, these resolutions have 
been drafted as non-binding recommendations to member states. Thirdly, and more important, 
they have not provided any definition of the term ‘mercenary’.      
This justifies why African states, Nigeria taking the lead,1828 raised the matter at the 
diplomatic conferences dedicated to the adoption of the Additional Protocols (to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949) of 7 June 1977. However, due to a lack of consensus among negotiating 
states, no general prohibition against mercenarism was reached.1829 Only a minor compromise 
was found within the framework of article 47 of Additional Protocol I in four ways. First, this 
treaty does not prohibit as such the recourse by states to use of mercenaries as a wrongful act 
under international law. Second, article 47 stipulates that a mercenary shall not enjoy the right 
to be a combatant or a prisoner of war. This means that he could be prosecuted, if caught by 
the adverse party, solely on the ground of being a mercenary, without having committed any 
                                                 
1825 See E. David, ‘Les mercenaires en droit international (développements récents)’, 13 Revue belge de droit 
international (1977)197-237, at 200-201 ; Clarke, above note 1823. 
1826 J.-P. Segihobe, Le Congo en droit international: essai d’histoire agonistique d’un Etat multinational 
(Bruxelles : Presses universitaires Ryckmans, 2011), at 208 ; K. Pech, ‘The Hand of War : Mercenaries in the 
Former Zaïre 1996-97’, in A.-F. Musah and J. K. Fayeni (eds), Mercenaries : an African Dilemma 
(London :Sterling/Virginia : Pluto Press, 2000) 117-154.  
1827 See UNSC Res.169 (1961), 24 November 1961, para.4.  
1828 David, above note 1825, at 204. 
1829 S. Nourou Tall, ‘Théories et réalités du droit international humanitaire: contribution à l’étude de l’application 
du droit des conflits armés en Afrique noire contemporaine’ (PhD Thesis, University Cheik Anta Diop 2001), at 
89-90.  
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other crime, provided that the incrimination does exist under domestic law as required by the 
principle of legality. This denial of the status of combatant to mercenaries was strategic in 
order to advance the cause of peace. In fact, putting a mercenary in a position whereby he 
could be “less tempted to shoot his way out of a situation in order to avoid capture”,1830 must 
be avoided, because “he is more likely to abide by his obligations as a combatant if he can 
also expect to benefit from the rights attaching to the status”.1831 Third, article 47 defines a 
mercenary as being “any person who: a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to 
fight in an armed conflict; b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; c) is motivated 
to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, 
by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that 
promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that 
party; d) is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by 
a party to the conflict; e) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and (f) 
has not been sent by a state which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of 
its armed forces”. Fourth, article 47 applies only to international armed conflicts. 
This deficiency of Additional Protocol I strengthened the necessity for the adoption of the 
OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa on 3 July 1977. The drafting 
process was boosted by three African precedents, namely: i) the OAU Convention governing 
the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa which had excluded any mercenary from 
enjoying refugee status in African states since 1969 inasmuch as he was guilty of acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the OAU, now the AU;1832 ii) the OAU Committee 
of Experts which had proposed the first draft convention on mercenarism in Rabat (Morocco) 
in June 1972; and iii) the Luanda (Angola) trial,1833 conducted from 11 to 19 June 1976, 
whereby 13 individuals (nine British, three Americans and one Irish) who were caught by the 
Angola government’s forces during the civil war were prosecuted “for the crime of being 
                                                 
1830 F.J. Hampson, ‘Mercenaries: Diagnosis before Prescription’, 22 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 
(1991) 3-38, at 15–16. 
1831 Ibid. 
1832 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Article 1 (5) (c). See also 
M. Mubiala, ‘La protection des réfugiés et des personnes déplacés en Afrique’, in O. Ndeshyo (ed.), Mélanges 
Célestin Nguya-Ndila –La République démocratique du Congo : les défis récurrents de décolonisation, de l’Etat 
de droit et de développement économique et social (Kinshasa : CEDESURK, 2012)699-730, at 705. 
1833 David, above note 1825, at 203-204; Nourou Tall, above note 1829, at 272. 
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mercenaries and for crimes against peace (…) in a mercenary war of aggression”.1834 They 
were all convicted of mercenarism: four were sentenced to death penalty and nine to 
prison.1835 Following this event, the International Commission of Enquiry on Mercenaries 
(ICEM), which was convened by Angola to observe the trial and to make recommendations 
for an international action to deal with such problem in the future, produced a new draft 
convention on mercenarism.1836 This second draft treaty together with the one which was 
proposed by the OAU Committee of Experts in 1972, constituted the principal materials upon 
which the OAU Convention for the elimination of mercenarism in Africa was elaborated.       
The OAU Convention differs from Additional Protocol I on three major points. First, it 
applies to armed conflicts of any kind. Second, the OAU Convention criminalises 
mercenarism and considers that it is a crime against peace and security in Africa. Third, the 
crime of mercenarism may be committed by any person, natural (individual) or legal/juridical 
(corporation or association, or representative of a state or the state itself).1837 This is likely the 
first time that corporate criminal liability was ascertained under African international law, far 
before the adoption of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo 
Convention) of 15 November 2000 and the ICGLR’s Protocol against Illegal Exploitation of 
Natural Resources of 30 November 2006. Fourth, the OAU Convention indicates that the 
crime of mercenarism is committed by any of the following acts when the offender : a) 
shelters, organises, finances, assists, equips, trains, promotes, supports or in any manner 
employs bands of mercenaries; b) enlists, enrolls or tries to enroll in the said bands; c) allows 
the activities mentioned in paragraph (a) to be carried out in any territory under its jurisdiction 
or in any place under its control or affords facilities for transit, transport or other operations of 
the above mentioned forces.1838  
In terms of legal impact, most of the provisions of the OAU Convention were introduced into 
the United Nations Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries whose adoption followed on 4 December 1989. Further, this universal 
convention extended the definition of mercenarism to mercenaries used to perpetrate military 
                                                 
1834 M. J. Hoover, ‘The Laws of War and the Angolan Trial of Mercenaries: Death to the Dogs of War’, 9 Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law (1977)323-406, at 327 and 353. 
1835 Ibid., at 323. 
1836 David, above note 1825, at 204; Segihobe, above note 1826, at 206. 
1837 OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, Article 1 (2). 
1838 Ibid. 
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coups in other independent states.1839 Both treaties have lead to the consolidation of the 
definition of the crime of mercenarism as enshrined in the Malabo Protocol (Annex).1840 On 
the one hand, article 28H (1) (b) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) is taken from the UN 
Convention. On the other hand, article 28H (1) (a) derives from article 1 (1) of the OAU 
Convention, with the exception of subparagraph (b) regarding the definition of mercenary as a 
person who “does in fact take a direct part in hostilities”. This omission might be justified 
since it could be redundant with article 28H (3) which provides that “a mercenary (…) who 
participates directly in hostilities or in a concerted act of violence, as the case may be, 
commits an offence”. Hence, the mere status of mercenary is not apparently sufficient for the 
accused to be held criminally responsible under the Malabo Protocol (Annex). There must be 
direct participation in hostilities or in a concerted act of violence. It will belong to the AU 
Criminal Court to precise the meaning of each expression in concrete cases. In any event, 
“any person who recruits, uses, finances or trains mercenaries”1841 is criminally responsible.  
c) The Crime of Unconstitutional Change of Government 
The crime of unconstitutional change of government is defined by the Malabo Protocol in 
article 28E of its Annex on the Statute of the AU Criminal Court. The origin of the 
prohibition of unconstitutional changes of government may be dated back to the theory of 
non-recognition of governments coming to power through coups d’état in Latino-America.1842 
The rejection of unconstitutional governments is now widespread in practice.1843 International 
law is no longer insensible to the political organisation of states and the democratic legitimacy 
                                                 
1839 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (4 December 
1989), Article 1 (1). 
1840 It must be noted that the UN Commission on International Law drafted a Code of crimes against peace and 
security of the humanity containing the crime of mercenarism in 1991. However, disagreements appeared upon 
the universal relevance of the inclusion of mercenarism to the extent that the crime was removed in the Draft 
Code of 1996.  
1841Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Article 28H (2).  
1842 S. Bula-Bula, ‘Mise hors-la-loi ou mise en quarantaine des gouvernements anticonstitutionnels par l’Union 
africaine ?’, 11 African Yearbook of International Law (2003) 23-78, at 30-31.  
1843 See R. Ben Achour, ‘Changements anticonstitutionnels de gouvernement’, 379 Recueil des Cours de 
l’Académie de Droit International (2016) 397-548. 
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of their rulers.1844 But, it is the first time that unconstitutional changes of government are 
criminalised under international law.1845 Thus, it is important to examine how Africa evolved 
from the mere prohibition of such changes of government to regional criminalisation (i) and 
the status of potential perpetrators of the crime in question (ii). 
i) The Passage from Prohibition to Criminalisation 
The formal prohibition of unconstitutional changes of government began with the OAU,1846 
following the revival of democratisation in Africa in the 1990s. The term unconstitutional 
change of government was used as such in the Declaration of Grand Bay (Mauritius) in April 
1999 as one of the causes of human rights violations on the continent.1847 It was again referred 
to in two decisions of the OAU Assembly, adopted in Alger (Algeria) in July 1999.1848 The 
term also gained a lot of support from RECs. This is the case of ECOWAS which decided to 
use force, with the OAU support through the Declaration of Harare (Zimbabwe) of 4 June 
1997,  in order to re-establish in power elected President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah (Sierra Leone) 
after the coup d’état of 25 May 1997, perpetrated by Johnny Paul Koroma.1849 In December 
1999, it was formally agreed that ECOWAS would intervene in a member state, without its 
consent, in situations of serious and massive violations of human rights and the rule of law or 
“in the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected 
                                                 
1844 D. Kokoroko, ‘Souveraineté étatique et principe de légitimité démocratique’, 16 (1) Revue québécoise de 
droit international (2003) 37-59, at 38. 
1845 B. Tchikaya, ‘Le crime international de changement anticonstitutionnel de gouvernement : quelques 
questions’, in R. Ben Achour (ed.), Les changements anticonstitutionnels de gouvernement : approches de droit 
constitutionnel et de droit international (Marseille : Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseilles, 2014) 141-147.  
1846 K. Oteng Kufuor, ‘The OAU and the Recognition of Governments in Africa: Analyzing Its Practice and 
Proposals for the Future’, 17 (2) American University International Law Review (2002) 369-401, at 390-393. 
1847 CONF/HRA/DECL (I), Declaration and Plan of Action, 1st OAU Ministerial Conference on Human Rights, 
Grand Bay (Mauritius), 12-16 April 1999, para.8 (p).  
1848 AHG/Dec.141 (XXXV),  Decision, 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the Organisation of African Unity, Alger (Algeria), 12-14 July 1999, para.4; AHG/Dec. 142 
(XXXV), Decision, 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the 
Organisation of African Unity, Alger (Algeria), 12-14 July 1999, para.1. 
1849 J. Kazadi Mpiana, ‘L’Union africaine face à la gestion des changements anticonstitutionnels de 
gouvernement’, 25 (2) Revue québécoise de droit international (212)101-141, at 103-104 ; D. Bangoura, ‘Les 
modalités d’intervention : deux cas de maintien de la paix (Liberia et Centrafrique)’, in P. Ango Ela (ed.), La 
prévention des conflits en Afrique centrale. Prospective pour une culture de la paix (Paris : Karthala, 2001) 99-
112, at 102-104. 
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government”.1850 This legal development was previous to the ECOWAS policy of “zero 
tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”.1851 What is at stake is 
the protection of African democracies as political regimes in which “authority to exercise 
power derives from the will of the people”.1852 
The codification of unconstitutional changes of government has been improved at the 
continental level. The Lomé Declaration of July 2000 is the first legal instrument to have 
defined the content of the prohibition and set out procedures and sanctions of the OAU in 
reaction to its violation.1853 The AU inherited this OAU’s legal framework. The notion of 
unconstitutional change of government was conventionalised in the AU Constitutive Act of 
2000, the Protocol on the AU PSC of 2002 and the ACDEG of 2007.1854 In terms of 
comparison, subparagraphs (a) to (d) of article 28 E (1) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) are 
almost a copy of the Lomé Declaration. Under this article, the crime of unconstitutional 
change of government means committing or ordering to be committed any of the following 
acts with the aim of illegally accessing or maintaining power: a) a putsch or coup d’état 
against a democratically elected government; b) an intervention by mercenaries to replace a 
democratically elected government; c) any replacement of a democratically elected 
government by the use of armed dissidents or rebels or through political assassination; d) any 
refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party or candidate 
after free, fair and regular elections. In addition, article 28E (1) (e) of the Malabo Protocol 
(Annex), which criminalises “any amendment or revision of the Constitution or legal 
instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government 
or is inconsistent with the Constitution”, derives from the ACDEG.1855 But, the Malabo 
                                                 
1850 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and 
Security, Article 25.  
1851 Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the 
Mechanism For Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (21 December 2001), 
Article 1 (c). 
1852 B. Costantinos, ‘Unconstitutional Regime Change: Trend Perspective and Political Requisite for Stricter Law 
Enforcement’, 1 Pan-African Yearbook of Law (2012) 1-18, at 16. 
1853 AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI), above note 1569, at 4.  
1854 B. Tchikaya, ‘La Charte africaine de la démocratie, des élections et de la gouvernance’, LIV Annuaire 
français de droit international (2008) 515-528, at 525 ; E.Y. Omorogbe, ‘A Club of Incumbents? The African 
Union and Coups d’État’, 44 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2011) 123-154, at 134-135. 
1855 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, Article 23 (5). 
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Protocol (Annex) also innovates. On the one hand, as may be observed from the chapeau of 
article 28 E (1), it adds to the mental element of the crime of unconstitutional change of 
government the special intent of accessing or maintaining power, beside the illegal aim to 
perpetrate such acts. On the other hand, it includes two further material elements into the 
definition. This is the case of unconstitutional change of government through “political 
assassination” under article 28E (1) (c), which was not included in the Lome Declaration, and 
the entire subparagraph (f) of the same article which incriminates “any substantial 
modification to the electoral laws in the last six (6) months before the elections without the 
consent of the majority of the political actors”.  
However, the process of criminalisation is prior to the Malabo Protocol (Annex). The crime of 
unconstitutional change of government is part of lex lata at least after the entry into force of 
the ACDEG in 2012, obligating states parties to “(…) bring to justice the perpetrators of 
unconstitutional change of government or take necessary steps to effect their extradition”.1856 
The states parties have agreed to do so in accordance with article 23 of the ACDEG, which 
defines unconstitutional change of government in reference to a non-exhaustive list of 
constituent material acts. Apart from a number of substantive innovations, the Malabo 
Protocol (Annex) rather creates, in accordance with the ACDEG,1857 a system of criminal 
justice overlapping domestic judicial apparatus.      
This passage from prohibition to criminalisation of unconstitutional change of government is 
a further step in the protection democracy as part of a public international policy.1858 The 
crime is exactly directed against “a democratically elected government”, whose meaning is to 
be established pursuant to AU instruments.1859 In other words, AU member states shall no 
longer enjoy the right to choose freely a political regime other than democracy. The policy is 
apparently part of a wide process towards the regionalisation of constitutional law, the 
                                                 
1856 Ibid., Article 25 (9). 
1857 Ibid., Article 25 (5). 
1858 M. Gounelle, ‘La démocratisation, politique publique internationale’, in Mélanges Hubert Thierry (Paris : 
Pedone, 1998) 201-213. 
1859 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Article 28E (2).  
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creation of a Pan-African Constitutional Court1860 and the United States of Africa. This is an 
important limitation of state sovereignty. But, which democratic values and principles are 
protected? The Lomé Declaration particularly mentions the adoption of a constitution of 
which preparation, content and method of revision should be in conformity with generally 
acceptable principles of democracy; the respect for the Constitution and adherence to the 
provisions of the law adopted by Parliament; the principle of democratic change and 
recognition of a role for the opposition; and the organisation of free and regular elections.1861 
The application of all these principles is also likely to protect security and political stability 
within African states without which no integration of the entire continent is possible. The 
insistence on the commission of the crime of unconstitutional change of government through 
the intervention of mercenaries, rebellions or political assassinations is a rejection of any 
subversive activity that may be fomented from abroad in violation of state sovereignty and the 
self-determination of African peoples. Many unconstitutional changes of government have 
occurred in the way since 1960 (Togo, Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Ghana, DRC, Comoros, 
CAR, Burkina Faso and Benin).  
Still, the shift towards criminalisation is justified since violations of the prohibition of 
unconstitutional change of government have dramatically increased since 2000. The AU itself 
deplored “the resurgence of the scourge of coups d’état in Africa”.1862 Between 2002 and 
2016, there have been at least 13 cases of successful unconstitutional changes of government: 
Madagascar (2002), CAR (2003), Togo (2005), Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Guinea Conakry 
(2008), Madagascar (2009), Niger (2010), Ivory Coast (2010), Mali (2012), Guinea Bissau 
(2012), CAR (2013), Egypt (2013). The means of reaction to these situations (mainly 
                                                 
1860 Assembly/AU/Dec.458 (XX), Decision on the Establishment of an “International Constitutional Court” (Doc 
Assembly/AU/12(XX) Add.1)’, 20th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa 
(Ethiopia), 27-28 January 2013, paras.2-3. 
1861 AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI), above note 1569, at 3-4. See also AHG/Decl. 1 (XXXVIII), OAU/AU Declaration 
on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, 38th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, Durban (South Africa), 8 July 2002, para.2 (4). 
Among these principles, this Declaration indicates: ‘Democratic elections should be conducted: a) freely and 
fairly; b) under democratic constitutions and in compliance with supportive legal instruments; c) under a system 
of separation of powers that ensures in particular, the independence of the judiciary; d) at regular intervals, as 
provided for in National Constitutions; e) by impartial, all-inclusive competent accountable electoral institutions 
staffed by well-trained personnel and equipped with adequate logistics’. 
1862 Assembly/AU/Dec.220 (XII), Decision on the Resurgence of the Scourge of Coups d’état in Africa, 12 th 
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 1-3 February 2009, paras.1-2. 
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sanctions against member states for non-compliance with AU decisions and policies, 
suspension of participation of unconstitutional government in the AU’s activities and targeted 
individual sanctions such as the ban of visas)1863 have yielded little success. The perpetrators 
of the crime often remain unpunished; they regain legitimacy after organising (fraudulent) 
elections and their governments ultimately reintegrate the AU. Accordingly, there was a need 
to reinforce the AU’s means of reaction to such situations. Hence, the adoption of the historic 
Decision of 2010,1864 in which the AU Assembly imposed the principle of non-participation 
of perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government in the elections held in order to 
restore constitutional order.1865 The process of criminalisation intervenes as a measure of last 
resort. African states now have not only the duty to prosecute the perpetrators of the crime in 
question, but also not to recognise their governments or conduct foreign relations with their 
states until the constitutional order is re-established.1866. 
ii) The Potential Perpetrators of the Crime   
Unconstitutional change of government constitutes a pluralistic crime. As it may be implied 
from its constituent elements, this crime can be committed only by more than one person. It 
can also be committed by omission. Everything depends on the form of participation in the 
perpetration of the crime: direct offender, accomplice or superior acting in shadow. One of the 
perpetrators can be a statesman who, knowing that a coup d’état is being executed, omits to 
discharge his duty to defend the state institutions under his protection in order to facilitate the 
success of the operation of an armed group in which he takes part. The perpetrators of 
unconstitutional change of government are de jure or de facto rulers because this is essentially 
a leadership crime.1867 But, this characterisation is not entirely tenable. In fact, outside those 
                                                 
1863 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 30; Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and 
Security Council of the African Union, Article 7 (1) (g). See also F. Tabala Kitene, ‘Le statut des sanctions 
contre les changements anticonstitutionnels de gouvernement dans les textes et la pratique de l’Union africaine : 
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Universiteit Gent, 2013), at 123-135. 
1864 Assembly/AU/Dec.269(XIV), Decision on the Prevention of Unconstitutional Changes of Government and 
Strengthening the Capacities of the African Union to Manage such Situations (Doc.Assembly/AU/4(XIV)), 14th 
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 31 January-2 February 2010. 
1865 Ibid., para.6 (i) (b) (a). 
1866 Ibid., para.6 (i) (c). 
1867 A. Soma, ‘Le crime international de changement anticonstitutionnel de gouvernement’, 26 (3) Swiss Review 
of International and European Law (2016) 417-442. 
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persons who have “the aim of illegally accessing or maintaining power”, there are also 
accomplices, devoid of such a special intent, who may have with knowledge supported the 
coup. Accomplices might not necessarily be rulers. This is the case of mercenaries. Nothing 
explains why they should not be subjected to this incrimination, in addition to the crime of 
mercenarism, even though they do not themselves accede to power. Accomplices may also be 
members of a band constituted or used to capture the power or even a scientist who may have 
been recruited to support and facilitate the manipulation of a Constitution to prevent a 
democratic change of government. Even if these perpetrators are not rulers, the struggle 
against impunity would not be served if they were not subjected to the crime. The same 
applies to corporations which organise or finance unconstitutional changes of government as 
the Malabo Protocol (Annex) admits criminal liability of legal persons, with the exception of 
states.1868     
Finally, unlike the ACDEG, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) provides an exhaustive 
enumeration of constitutive acts of unconstitutional change of government. A situation 
whereby an incumbent government deliberately refuses, at the end of the constitutional term, 
to organise elections, as in the DRC (2016), and sticks on power, by maliciously alleging 
technical or financial problems, is not covered. A problem arises here in conjuction with the 
concurrent power which is confers on the PSC to qualify situations of unconstitutional change 
of government under the ACDEG. The PSC would qualify and condemn other situations of 
unconstitutional change of government of which perpetrators could not be tried before the AU 
Criminal Court. This is an unjust legal treatment. Maybe, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) 
should include “any other act of comparable gravity which is a breach of democratic change 
of government, resulting from the non-observation of laws in order to maintain power, 
inconsistently with the Constitution”. The formulation is in line with the principle of legality. 
It would enable to prosecute rulers who rely on their own bad governance, like in the DRC’s 
case in 2016, in order to illegally cling to power. Reversely, it would deter other citizens to 
resort to violence as an ultimate mean to come to power. True, bad governance does not 
justify an unconstitutional change of government. The proposed formulation would help to 
equally outlaw the case on the part of both the citizens and the rulers. Otherwise, the Malabo 
Protocol (Annex) should incorporate the initial proposition that “any acts of a sovereign 
people peacefully exercising their inherent right which results in a change of government shall 
                                                 
1868 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Article 46 C (1). 
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not constitute an offence under this Article”.1869 If waiting for these changes in law a 
government is all the same overthrown by the citizens, bad governance could perhaps 
influence the quantum of the penalty to apply under article 43A (2) of the Malabo Protocol 
(Annex). In any case, the AU is of the view that popular uprising against oppressive political 
systems does not amount to unconstitutional change of government.1870  
1.2.3.2. The Crimes against Human Security  
These crimes protect the security of individuals (and even peoples), either in their physical 
integrity, their property or socio-economic welfare. If an attachment to the state sometimes 
appears in criminal definitions, it may only be in the course of better ensuring the ultimate end 
of human security. This end can be successively seen through prosecuting piracy and 
terrorism (a), illicit exploitation of natural resources (b), corruption and money laundering (c), 
and trafficking in persons, drugs or hazardous wastes in Africa (d). 
a) The Crimes of Piracy and Terrorism 
At first sight, the difference between pirate and terrorist acts is not obvious. But, the legal 
demarcation is clear in the definitions of piracy (i) and terrorism (ii) in the Malabo Protocol 
(Annex). 
i) The Definition of Piracy   
Piracy is defined by the Malabo Protocol in article 28F of its Annex on the Statute of the AU 
Criminal Court. Historically, piracy is a crime which is as old as humanity on the seas. A 
pirate is perceived as the enemy of mankind. The revival of pirate activities is however very 
recent. The most important criminal activities have been committed in the Gulf of Aden, off 
the coast of Somalia, in the Horn of Africa, since 2008. Pirate attacks escalated to hostage-
taking for ransom, thereby jeopardising international trade trafficking and fishing activities in 
the Indian Ocean.1871 One observer noted: 
Piracy off the coast of Somalia had more than doubled by 2008; pirates had attacked over sixty 
ships and regularly demanded and received million-dollar ransom payments. The international 
                                                 
1869 Executive Council of the African Union, above note 1746, at 24.  
1870 Assembly/AU/Decl.3/(XXI), Solemn Declaration on the 50th Anniversary of the OAU/AU, 21st Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 26-27 May 2013, para. F (ii); 
PSC/PR/BR.(CDXXXII), 29 April 2014, at 2. 
1871 D. Guilfoyle, ‘The Laws of War and the Fight against Somali Piracy: Combatants or Criminals?’, 11 
Melbourne Journal of International Law (2010)1-13, at 2.  
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community expressed fears that money from ransoms was helping to pay for the war in Somalia, 
including funding to the U.S. terror-listed Al-Shabaab. Aid deliveries to the then drought-stricken 
Somalia became more difficult and costly. By November 2009, 104 pirate attacks had been 
reported in the Gulf of Aden for that year alone, with fifty-four attacks in the Indian Ocean during 
the same period.1872 
The increasing concern over pirate attacks in this region justified the launch of several anti-
piracy operations,1873 pursuant to various resolutions of the Security Council authorising 
cooperating states to use all necessary means for the fight against acts of piracy and armed 
robbery at sea or to enter the territorial waters of Somalia for this purpose.1874 Meanwhile, 
criminal measures had to be taken. But, on the part of Africa, many states were not yet 
equipped with adequate legislation to prosecute pirates, notably owing to the non-
incorporation of the relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 into domestic orders.1875 It is in view of this legal gap that the AU 
included piracy in its Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International 
Crimes in order to suggest a harmonised definition to its member states.1876 The definition 
contained in the Malabo Protocol (Annex) is its copy. In these two African instruments, the 
definition provided for is a copy of article 101 of the UNCLOS. 
Piracy is different from terrorism since it is limited to illegal acts that occur in the high seas or 
in other places outside the jurisdiction of any state. Article 28F (a) of the Malabo Protocol 
(Annex) provides that these acts must be committed for private ends, meaning that those 
committed for political, religious, racial or other reasons or acts of states are outside the scope 
of the definition of piracy. Shall be punished not only those who directly perpetrate these acts, 
but also those who may be guilty of “any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a 
boat, ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate boat, ship or aircraft”.1877 
Both the knowledge of facts and the free will of a participant must be established. Moreover, 
                                                 
1872 S. Beekarry, ‘Assessing Current Trends and Efforts to Combat Piracy’, 46 (1-2) Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law (2013) 161-175, at 163.  
1873 See R. Geiß and A. Petrig, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: the Legal Framework for Counter-Piracy 
Operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), at 17-36. 
1874 SC Res.1816 (2008), 2 June 2008, para.7; SC Res.1838 (2008), 7 October 2008, para. 4; SC Res.1846 
(2008), 2 December 2008, para. 10; SC Res.1851 (2008), 16 December 2008, para.6.  
1875 Beekarry, above note 1872, at 162. 
1876 African Union Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes, Article 8 and 12. 
1877 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
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criminalisation extends to incitement and facilitation of the commission of direct or 
participation acts. This criminalisation of piracy is intended to protect the interests of 
individuals who are affected by pirate acts (life, physical integrity and property), the safety of 
sea and air trafficking on the high seas to allow international trade and mobility.1878   
ii) The Definition of Terrorism 
Terrorism is set out by the Malabo Protocol under article 28G of its Annex on the Statute of 
the AU Criminal Court. African regional efforts to prevent and fight terrorism in Africa 
started in 1992 when the OAU Assembly adopted a resolution in which it declared its 
objective to enhance cooperation and coordination of efforts of member states in order to 
suppress the phenomenon of extremism and terrorism on the continent.1879 In 1994, the OAU 
Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations unequivocally rejected as criminal all terrorist 
acts, methods and practices, fanaticism and extremism or the use of religion to commit acts of 
violence.1880 Four years later, the African continent was shaken by the terrorist attacks against 
the American embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar-es-Salam (Tanzania) on 7 August 1998. 
These events boosted the process of adoption of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism in 1999 or the Alger Convention.1881  In 2000, the AU Constitutive 
Act reiterated the condemnation and rejection of terrorist acts. On 14 September 2002, a 
continental plan of action against terrorism was adoted and envisaged the creation of the 
African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) with seat in Alger 
(Algeria). This legal and institutional framework was reinforced in 2004 by the adoption of 
the Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. The 
main purpose of this Protocol is to enhance the effective implementation of the Convention 
and to give effect to article 3(d) of the Protocol concerning the mandate of the PSC1882 to 
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1882 Peace and Security Council of the African Union, ‘Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on 
Measures to Strengthen Cooperation in the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism’, PSC/PR/2(CCXLIX), 
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 22 November 2010, paras.11 and 17. 
378 
coordinate and harmonise continental strategies against international terrorism in all its 
aspects.1883 Further efforts were criminal initiatives owing to the intensification of terrorism 
and the increase of terrorist groups across the continent, particularly after the dismantlement 
of Muhammar Kadhafi’s government in Libya in 2011. The AU included terrorism in its 
Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes.1884 It also adopted 
the African Model Anti-Terrorism Law in July 2011, which aims to harmonise domestic 
legislation as regards some specific terrorist acts, such as offence of financing of terrorism, 
hijacking of aircraft, acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation, offences 
against internationally protected persons and hostage taking.1885  
While there is not yet any comprehensive definition of terrorism reached at the global level, 
the Malabo Protocol (Annex) provides for one which is a copy of article 14 of the AU Model 
National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes. Originally, the definition is 
taken from articles 1 (3) and 3 (2) of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating 
of Terrorism, with two exceptions.  
On the one hand, if the unlawfulness of terrorist acts envisaged in article 28G (A) of the 
Malabo Protocol (Annex) must be a violation of the criminal laws of a state party, it could 
also be a violation of either “the laws of the African Union or a regional economic community 
recognised by the African Union, or (…) international law”.1886 In contrast to the OAU 
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, this definition places terrorism in 
                                                 
1883 In this respect, Article 4 of the Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
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a broad approach owing to the diversity of its legal framework.1887 However, this approach 
seems to be inconsistent with the principle of legality. In this regard, Amnesty International 
has rightly noted: 
(…) many governments across the world invoke broad definitions of terrorism in order to repress 
political opposition, target human rights defenders, and harass and intimidate “suspect” religious 
and/or ethnic groups, and clamp down on legitimate exercise freedom of expression, association, 
assembly and other human rights. The definition in the Malabo Protocol may be used for similar 
purposes as it is overly broad. This challenge is compounded by the fact that Article 28G (A) 
partly defines the crime in question by referring to an open-ended list of offences contained in a 
series of international, regional and domestic legal frameworks, including where such offences are 
themselves ill or vaguely defined, thus adding to the confusion and likely overbroad nature of the 
crime and its arbitrary application. This raises serious concerns as to compliance with the principle 
of legality, a core general principle of law, enshrined, inter alia, in Article 15 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which requires laws to be clear and accessible 
and for their application in practice to be sufficiently foreseeable.1888 
On the other hand, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) provides that “acts covered by international 
humanitarian law, committed in the course of an international or non-international armed 
conflict by government forces or members of organised armed groups, shall not be considered 
as terrorist acts”.1889 This provision may have two different implications. First of all, it could 
mean that acts covered by international humanitarian law are not acts of terrorism. The 
clarification is worthy of concern given the danger of confusion at the domestic level. For 
example, in its judgment of 29 October 2014, a local court in the DRC unconvincingly held 
that the killing of the commander of the national army in operation in the region of Beni 
(North Kivu Province) by rebels amounted to the crime of terrorism.1890 Second, this 
provision could mean that acts of terrorism that are covered by other qualifications under 
international humanitarian law, that is to say war crimes, are not to be dealth with as terrorism 
                                                 
1887 For example, at the universal level, treaty law on terrorism has been developed sector by sector. There is no 
treaty on the issue, but various treaties addressing specific types of violence as terrorism.   
1888 Amnesty International, ‘Malabo Protocol: Legal and Institutional Implications of the Merged and Expanded 
African Court’ (London: Amnesty International Ltd, 2016), at 17. 
1889 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Article 28G (D).  
1890 Public Prosecutor and Civil Parties v. Atanaserose Nabini Bijou and Others, Judgment of 29 October 2014, 
Mobile Military Court of the Noth Kivu Province, Colonel Mamadou Ndala case, RP n°015, 017 and 018/014 
(not published). The judgment was delivered in application of articles 6, 157 and 158 of the DRC’s Military 
Penal Code (2002).  
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under the Malabo Protocol (Annex). This understanding is relevant because the OAU 
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism provides that nothing therein 
should be interpreted as “derogating from the general principles of international law, in 
particular the principles of international humanitarian law (…)”.1891  
In the end, terrorism requires the establishment of a special intent under article 28G (A) of the 
Malabo Protocol (Annex). In fact, a terrorist act must be one which “is calculated or intended 
to” one of the objectives listed in article 28G (A) (1), (2) and (3). Article 28G (B) specifies 
that shall be punished “any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, 
encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organising, or procurement of any person” to 
commit terrorism. There is no excuse at all based on political, philosophical, ideological, 
racial, ethnic, religious or other motives.1892 Finally, there is no terrorism when peoples 
struggle in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-
determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and 
domination by foreign forces.1893 
b) The Crime of Illicit Exploitation of Natural Resources 
The Malabo Protocol criminalises the illicit exploitation of natural resources under article 
28Lbis of its Annex on the Statute of the AU Criminal Court in regard to the following acts: 
a) concluding an agreement to exploit resources, in violation of the principle of peoples’ 
sovereignty over their natural resources; b) concluding with state authorities an agreement to 
exploit natural resources, in violation of the legal and regulatory procedures of the State 
concerned; c) concluding an agreement to exploit natural resources through corrupt practices; 
d) concluding an agreement to exploit natural resources that is clearly one-sided; e) exploiting 
natural resources without any agreement with the State concerned; f) exploiting natural 
resources without complying with norms relating to the protection of the environment and the 
security of the people and the staff; and g) violating the norms and standards established by 
the relevant natural resource certification mechanism.  
This definition is founded on the paradox between the existence of numerous natural 
resources in Africa and the continuing extreme poverty of African peoples. The soil of the 
                                                 
1891 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, article 22 (1). 
1892 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Article 28G (E). 
1893 Ibid., Article 28G (C). 
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African continent contains precious metals and stones like gold, diamonds, and minerals such 
as copper, cobalt, uranium and coltan, which are used in high technology for the production of 
electricity, laptops, cell phones, vehicles, aircrafts and weaponry. However, since most of the 
least developed countries are in Africa, it is obvious that these resources do not benefit to 
African peoples. One of the reasons for this situation is the illicit exploitation of natural 
resources. The resources of African states further constitute a source of misfortune for African 
peoples because they have often nourished armed conflicts in many countries, such as Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, the DRC and Angola.1894 The illicit exploitation of natural resources is a 
breach of the sovereign right of all peoples to “freely dispose of their wealth and natural 
resources”1895 and undermines their “right to socio-economic development”.1896 It also 
violates the “permanent sovereignty of African countries over their natural resources”.1897 The 
illicit exploitation of natural resources is a threat to peace and security in Africa as a means of 
financing of wars, thereby affecting the stability of states and the wellbeing of African 
peoples. 
The strategy to put an end to this kind of exploitation has been developed over the time. 
Concerns were initially addressed with respect to international trade of natural resources by 
armed groups in countries affected by conflicts. This effort led to the establishment of 
mechanisms of certification to prevent foreign consumers to buy resources which they know 
are illegally exploited or nourish armed conflicts in the countries of origin. The most known 
of these mechanisms of certification is the Kimberley Process Certificate Scheme which 
applies to diamonds.1898 It was created in November 2002 on the basis of a non-binding 
document, of which negotiations began in May 2000 in Kimberly (South Africa). The 
Kimberley Process Certificate Scheme came into operation in 2003.1899 However, beyond 
non-state actor’s trade activities, it has appeared that even foreign states may directly be 
                                                 
1894 T. B. Van Solinge, ‘The Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources’, in L. Paoli (ed.), The Oxford Handbook 
of Organized Crime (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) 500-526, at 507. 
1895 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 21(1). 
1896 Ibid., Article 22 (1). 
1897 CM/Res. 245 (XVII), Resolution on the Permanent Sovereignty of African Countries over their Natural 
Resources, 17th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity, Addis Ababa 
(Ethiopia), 15-19 June 1971, paras.1-2.  
1898 J.-P. Segihobe, ‘Traçabilité des minerais en droit positif congolais’, Annales de la Faculté de Droit de 
l’Université de Kinshasa (2013)38-60, at 51-52.  
1899 See Kimberley Process Certificate Scheme (5 November 2002) 
<https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/kpcs-core-document-version-2016-0> accessed 3 February 2017. 
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involved in the illicit exploitation of natural resources of another country. For instance, the 
ICJ held that Uganda was responsible for “acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of 
Congolese natural resources”1900 in the territory of the DRC during the war of aggression 
between 1998 and 2002. The UN Security Council took an ad hoc initiative in this regard. It 
created the Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and other Forms of 
Wealth in the DRC in 2001.1901 This Panel particularly reports on the link between the 
continuation of armed conflicts in this country and the exploitation of its natural resources.1902 
However, the Security Council remains free to give effect to recommendations issued by it.  
In general international criminal law, there is not a specific rule that explicitly targets the 
illicit exploitation of natural resources as such. Arguably, the criminal behaviour could be 
prosecuted as war crime under the ICC Statute,1903 only in the context of an international 
armed conflict.1904 The Malabo Protocol (Annex) solves this deficient legal framework in 
Africa, regardless of the type of armed conflict and even in time of peace. Article 28Lbis of 
the Malabo Protocol (Annex) criminalises the same constituent acts as those provided for in 
article 12 of the ICGLR’s Protocol against illegal exploitation of natural resources of 30 
November 2006. 
One can observe that article 28Lbis of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) incorporates not only 
unlawful direct acts of exploitation of nature resources, but also the mere conclusion of an 
agreement for this purpose if such an agreement does not meet some specific legal standards, 
such as non-corrupt practices, legal and regulatory procedures of the state of exploitation. The 
criminalisation of the mere conclusion of an agreement for the illicit exploitation of natural 
resources amounts to the penalisation of preparatory acts of exploitation; which implies the 
great concern with which the crime is considered by African states. In any event, article 
28Lbis of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) imposes that such acts of illicit exploitation of natural 
resources meet the jurisdictional criterion according to which they must be of “a serious 
                                                 
1900 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), above note 
739, para.345(4). 
1901 Kahombo, above note 796, at 173. 
1902 UNSC Res.1457 (2003), 24 January 2003, para.8. 
1903 ICC Statute, Article 8 (2) (a) (iv). This provision incriminates the ‘extensive destruction and appropriation of 
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly’. 
1904 P. Kambale Mahuka, ‘L’exploitation illicite des ressources naturelles d’un Etat étranger en cas de conflit 
armé : étude sur la responsabilité des Etats et de leurs dirigeants’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Université 
Catholique de Louvain 2014), at 392.  
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nature affecting the stability of a state, region or the Union”. This jurisdictional restriction 
makes the Malabo Protocol (Annex) distinct from the aforementioned ICGLR’s Protocol 
against illegal exploitation of natural resources. The conclusion of a convention which is not 
yet implemented on the ground would not therefore reach this gravity threshold, unless it is 
part of a serie of acts of exploitation of natural resources which has commenced in accordance 
with previous arrangements or not. The same jurisdictional restriction is valid for attempts to 
commit such acts of exploitation.  
c) The Crimes of Corruption and Money Laundering    
Corruption and money laundering are two other economic crimes having devastating 
consequences on the development of African states. In fact, public officials and leaders in the 
private sector illicitly enrich themselves or those who are close to them at the expense of 
public goods and the populations. These crimes affect the human security, the life and the 
dignity of African peoples due to the volatilisation of funds that are necessary to cover the 
expenditure relating to economic, social or public services, namely health, education, 
agriculture, payment of appropriate salaries to servants and transport. The two crimes are 
interconnected. The Malabo Protocol (Annex) targets grand corruption (i) which 
problematically proves to be the exclusive offence on which the commission of money 
laundering is predicated (ii). 
i) The Malabo Protocol against Grand Corruption  
Corruption is defined by the Malabo Protocol in article 28I of its Annex on the Statute of the 
AU Criminal Court. African efforts to fight corruption started at the level of RECs, especially 
within SADC1905 and ECOWAS,1906 in 2001. The AU embarked on the issue in 2003 with the 
adoption of the Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.1907 The definition 
contained in article 28I (1) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) is a copy of acts of corruption set 
out in the AU Convention of 2003.1908 However, article 28I (1) of the Malabo Protocol 
                                                 
1905 Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption (14 August 2001). 
1906 Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight against Corruption (21 December 2001). 
See also S. M. Atuobi, ‘Corruption and State Instability in West Africa: An Examination of Policy Options’, 
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) Occasional Paper No. 21 (December 2007), 
at <3http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/9BD8A1F729CEB5B8C125746C0049D740-kaiptc-
dec2007.pdf> accessed 2 February 2017. 
1907 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (11 July 2003). 
1908 Ibid., Article 4 (1) (a)-(h). 
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(Annex) restricts the jurisdiction of the AU Criminal Court as regards acts of corruption to 
acts that are of “a serious nature affecting the stability of a state, region or the Union”.1909  
This gravity theshold is to be clarified by the AU Criminal Court. It shows that the Malabo 
Protocol (Annex) aims to tackle grand corruption which undermines the socio-economic 
conditions of peoples and causes instability within states.1910 This is the case of scandals of 
corruption or corruption accompanied by popular protests and demonstrations. By definition, 
the grand corruption is the opposite of the petty corruption. While the former implies acts of 
corruption committed by “individuals at a high level of government or in executive in the 
private sector and having a significant impact on society by distorting policies or the 
functioning of the state (…)”,1911 the latter is used in the context of small briberies.1912 In 
other words, petty corruption refers “only to the size of each transaction and not to its total 
impact on government income or policy”.1913 This is why it implies in principle everyday’s 
acts of corruption by “low- and mid-level public officials in their interaction with ordinary 
citizens, who often are trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, 
schools, police department and other agencies”.1914 But, nothing excludes that high ranking 
officials perpetrate petty corruption.    
It is important to note that the act of corruption listed under article 28I (1) (h) of the Malabo 
Protocol (Annex) is “the use or concealment of proceeds derived from any of the acts referred 
to in this Article”. But, something seems to be missing that could have improved the wording 
of this provision, that is, the moral element consisting of the knowledge of the fact. This is 
because the mere use or concealment of the aforementioned proceeds would not suffice to 
                                                 
1909 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Article 28I (1). 
1910 L. D. Fernandez, ‘Corruption (Article 28I) and Money Laundering (Article 28I bis)’, in G. Werle and M. 
Vormbaum (eds), The African Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Malabo Protocol (Berlin: Springer, 2017) 
89-107, at 92.  
1911 Transparency International, ‘Fighting Grand Corruption: Challenges and Successes’ (2015), at 2 
<http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Fighting_grand_corruption_challenges_and_successes
_2015.pdf > accessed 3 February 2017. 
1912 A. Lambert-Mogiliansky, M. Majumdar and R. Radner, ‘Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption: 
Entrepreneurs and Bureaucrats’, 83 Journal of Development Economics (2007) 351–367, at 352. 
1913 Ibid. 
1914 Fernandez, above note 1910, at 92. 
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establish the crime if the alleged offender did not know that they derived from an act of 
corruption. The inclusion of this moral element is an exigency of the principle of legality. 
ii) The Dependency of Money Laundering on Corruption 
The definition of money laundering is set out by the Malabo Protocol in article 28I bis of its 
Annex on the Statute of the AU Criminal Court. In general, money laundering means the 
disguising of proceeds deriving from a crime in view of making everything look like being in 
conformity with the law. Its definition is taken from the AU Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption of 2003,1915 with the exception of article 28Ibis (1) (iv) which 
incriminates acts of participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempts to 
commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of money 
laundering. Furthermore, the definition of money laundering raises three main observations. 
First, money laundering is predicated on the disguising of proceeds of corruption or “related 
offences”. It is submitted that the said “related offences” derive from the nature of acts 
punishable as acts of participation in the commission of acts of corruption, pursuant to 
applicable modes of criminal responsibility. This limitation of money laundering to the 
disguising of proceeds of corruption is inherited from the AU Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption. But, there is no reason why the offences on which money laundering 
is predicated should not be extended to other crimes.1916 This extension could be consistent 
with the recommendation 3 of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),1917 according to 
which “countries should apply the crime of money laundering to all serious offences with a 
view to include the widest range of predicate offences”.1918  
Second, the drafters of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) seem to have left, under article 28I bis 
(2), a margin of appreciation to the AU Criminal Court to decide on the seriousness of any act 
of money laundering to be brought before it for trial. Unlike the crimes of corruption and 
                                                 
1915 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, Article 6. 
1916 Fernandez, above note 1910, at 102. 
1917 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an intergovernmental agency founded in 1989 on the initiative of 
the Group of 7 major powers (G7) in order to develop policies for the fight against money laundering around the 
world. Its function now extends to terrorism financing. The FATF Secretariat is located at the headquarters of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris (France).  
1918 Financial Action Task Force, ‘The FATF Recommendations: International Standards on Combating Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation’ (2012) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf> accessed 3 February 2017. 
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illicit exploitation of natural resources, this gravity threshold is not a mandatory criterion to 
establish the Court’s jurisdiction. It just implies that a case which lacks some seriousness can 
be dismissed by the Court. Everything will be decided on a case-by-case basis.  
Third, and last, there is a mental element which misses in article 28I bis (1) (ii) of the Malabo 
Protocol (Annex): concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement or ownership of or rights with respect to property which is the proceeds of 
corruption or related offences. The Malabo Protocol (Annex) must improve the copy of the 
AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption by imposing that the alleged 
perpetrator acts with knowledge of the fact that the property in question is the proceeds of 
corruption. This improvement is in line with the the principle of legality. Similar provisions 
are contained in other treaties, such as the ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption 
which criminalises “the concealment of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement or ownership of or rights with respect to assets, knowing that such assets are the 
proceeds of crime”.1919 . 
d) The Crimes of Trafficking in Persons, Drugs or Hazardous Wastes in Africa 
Despite their apparent similar denominations, these three types of criminal trafficking have 
not followed the same process of codification and have different meanings. The immediate 
interests protected by the Malabo Protocol (Annex) are also different. The crime of trafficking 
in persons aims to ensure respect for the dignity of human beings (i), the crime of trafficking 
in drugs the protection of public health and security (ii), whereas the crime of trafficking in 
hazardous wastes in Africa protects the environment against pollution which may affect the 
welfare of peoples (iii). 
i) The Trafficking in Persons     
The crime of trafficking in persons or human trafficking is defined by the Malabo Protocol in 
article 28J of its Annex on the Statute of the AU Criminal Court. The AU does not have any 
specific treaty on human trafficking. This crime has been however referred to implicitly in the 
ACHPR1920 and directly in two other instruments: the African Charter on the Rights and 
                                                 
1919 Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight against Corruption, Article 7 (1) (a) (ii). 
See also United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, Article 6 (1) (a) (ii).   
1920 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 5. This Article provides: ‘Every individual shall 
have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All 
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Welfare of the Child of 19901921 and the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa of 
2003.1922 The only African treaty which is entirely dedicated to the issue is the Multilateral 
Cooperation Agreement to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children 
in West and Central Africa, adopted on 6 June 2006. On its part, the AU issued some policy 
documents for its member states, the most important of which being the Migration Policy 
Framework for Africa which includes human trafficking among cases of irregular 
immigration1923 and the Ouagadougou Action Plan of 2006 calling for the ratification and the 
implementation of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
especially Women and Children of 2000.1924  
The definition set out by the Malabo Protocol (Annex) is copied from the said UN 
Protocol.1925 The crime of trafficking in persons consists of three different elements. First, the 
action of perpetrating human trafficking, that is to say the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons. The second element refers to the means with which such an 
action can be fulfilled: threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of 
fraud, of deception; abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability; or giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person. 
Third, the purpose element is the specific moral requirement to establish responsibility for the 
crime, meaning that this crime must be committed in order to achieve any of the following 
goals of human exploitation: prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, 
                                                                                                                                                        
forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman of 
degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited’. Emphasis is mine. 
1921 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Article 29 (a). This Article provides: ‘States Parties 
to the present Charter shall take appropriate measures to prevent the abduction, the sale of, or traffic of children 
for any purpose or in any form, by any person including parents or legal guardians of the child’. 
1922 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (11 July 
2003), Article 4 (2) (g). This provision stipulates: ‘States Parties shall take appropriate and effective measures to 
prevent and condemn trafficking in women, prosecute the perpetrators of such trafficking and protect those 
women most at risk’. 
1923 Executive Council of the African Union, ‘The Migration Policy Framework for Africa’, EX.CL/276 (IX), 
Banjul (The Gambia), 25-29 June 2006, at 16.  
1924 African Union and European Union, ‘Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, 
Especially Women and Children’, Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, Tripoli (Libya), 22-23 
November 2006, at 4 <https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/ouagadougou_action_plan_to_combat_trafficking_en_1.pdf> accessed 3 
February 2017.  
1925 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, Article 3. 
388 
forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs. The consent of the victim is irrelevant and must not exclude criminal responsibility, 
whilst the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose 
of exploitation is presumed to be a crime of trafficking in persons and so the means element 
need not to be anymore proven.  
ii) The Trafficking in Drugs 
This crime is set out by the Malabo Protocol under article 28K of its Annex on the Statute of 
the AU Criminal Court. The AU described the danger and challenge of drug trafficking on the 
continent in the following terms:  
(…) production, trafficking and use of illicit drugs continue to be a growing challenge in Africa. 
There has been an increase in the use of almost all types of drugs over the past few years. Whereas 
illicit drug production in Africa is mainly focused on cannabis, there is an emerging threat of 
locally manufactured Amphetamine Type Stimulants (ATS), trafficking in and consumption of 
diverted or counterfeited prescription drugs, and precursor chemicals containing controlled 
substances. Moreover, cannabis is widely trafficked across African countries, significant amounts 
of cocaine trafficked from South America to Europe via West Africa and indications that some 
West African Countries are being used to stock-pile cocaine which is later trans-shipped in small 
quantities to Europe. In addition, African Countries are increasingly being used to ship Afghan 
heroin to final destinations in Europe and other regions, with the East African region being the 
main target.1926  
However, the AU has not so far adopted any specific treaty on the issue. There are only some 
policy documents, the first one being the OAU Declaration and Plan of Action on Drug Abuse 
Control and Illicit Drug Trafficking in Africa of 1996, which calls African states to accede to 
existing international drug treaties as part of their commitment to effective international drug 
control efforts.1927 These treaties were adopted at the UN level, especially the 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, the 1971 Vienna Convention on Psychotropic 
                                                 
1926 African Union, ‘AU Plan of Action on Drug Control (2013-2017) Submitted for consideration by the 
5thSession of the Africa Union Conference of Ministers of Drug Control (CAMDC5)’ (CAMDC/EXP/2(V)), 
para.12 <http://www.sadrugpolicyweek.com/uploads/6/6/2/3/66238155/aupa_on_dc__2013-2017__-
_english.pdf > accessed 3 February 2017. 
1927 AHG/Decl.2 (XXXII), Declaration and Plan of Action on Drug Abuse Control and Illicit Drug Trafficking in 
Africa, 32nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African 
Unity, Yaoundé (Cameroun), 10 July 1996.  
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Substances and the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances of 1988.  
These are also the treaties to which the Malabo Protocol (Annex) refers regarding the 
meaning of the terms “drugs” and “precursors” for the identification of substances which fall 
in the definition of the crime.1928 The two terms are the cornerstones of the distinction 
between different criminal activities that are prohibited under article 28K (1) of the Malabo 
Protocol (Annex). In fact, the mere cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant is 
criminalised. However, the possession or purchase of drugs is a crime only it the alleged 
perpetrator meets the special goal which consists of conducting one of the criminal activities 
listed in 28K (1)(a): production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, offering, offering for 
sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in 
transit, transport, importation or exportation of drugs. Concerning the manufacture, transport 
or distribution of precursors, the knowledge of the fact that these substances are to be used in 
or for the illicit production or manufacture of drugs is required as mental element. In any case, 
article 28K (2) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) provides that drug trafficking for personal 
consumption is not a crime. This is quite logical because trafficking in drugs has been 
criminalised to ensure the protection of public health and security, but not the personal 
security and health of an individual.   
iii) The Trafficking in Hazardous Wastes in Africa 
This crime is set out by the Malabo Protocol under article 28L of its Annex on the Statute of 
the AU Criminal Court. Contrary to the two other crimes of trafficking above, there is a 
continental treaty on the issue: the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa 
and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within 
Africa of 30 January 1991.  African states wanted to improve the legal framework of the 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
                                                 
1928 For example, Article 1 (1) (j) of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 
Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 stipulates: ‘“Drug” means any of the 
substances in Schedules I and II, whether natural or synthetic’.  Article 12 (1) of the 1971 Vienna Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances and the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances of 1988 also provides: ‘The Parties shall take the measures they deem appropriate to prevent 
diversion of substances in Table I and Table II used for the purpose of illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or 
psychotropic substances, and shall co-operate with one another to this end’. 
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their Disposal of 22 March 1989.1929 The fact is that the continent became the place where 
industrialised nations used to get rid of their nuclear and industrial wastes, thereby using 
Africa as their dustbin.  
The Basel Convention did not entirely meet the expectations of African states because it did 
not prohibit as such trafficking in hazardous wastes.1930 This was contrary to the OAU’s 
policy contained in various instruments, especially the Resolution on Dumping of Nuclear and 
Industrial Wastes in Africa of 1988 which declared such activity “a crime against Africa and 
the African people”.1931 This position was recalled in another resolution of 1989, stating the 
concern of African states that “the draft Global Convention for the Control of Transboundary 
Movement of Hazardous Wastes is merely aimed at the regulation or control, rather than the 
prohibition, of transboundary movement of hazardous wastes, contrary to the spirit of Council 
Resolution CM/Res.1153 (XLVIII) (…)”.1932 The Bamako Convention rather imposed a total 
import ban of hazardous wastes in Africa.1933 Export of the same wastes from Africa is not 
covered.1934 The Bamako Convention also regulates the management and control of wastes 
generated in Africa.1935  
The definition of the crime of trafficking in hazardous wastes in Africa in the Malabo 
Protocol (Annex) is taken from the Bamako Convention. First of all, hazardous wastes that 
are covered by this crime refer to those wastes which are prohibited and listed in annexes I 
                                                 
1929 C. N. Eze, ‘The Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of the 
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa: A Milestone in Environmental 
Protection?’, 15 African Journal of International and Comparative Law (2007) 208-229, at 214-218. 
1930 According to Article 4 (1) of this Convention, such prohibition is the right of each state party and it is up to 
the latter to exercise it under the obligation of informing other parties of the decision taken in this respect 
pursuant to Article 13.  Furthermore, Article 4 (3) provides: ‘The Parties consider that illegal traffic in hazardous 
wastes or other wastes is criminal’. 
1931 CM/Res.1153 (XLVIII), Dumping of Nuclear and Industrial Wastes in Africa, 48 th Ordinary Session of the 
Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 19-23 May 1988, para.1.  
1932 CM/Res.1199 (XLIX), Resolution on Global Convention for the Control of Transboundary Movement of 
Hazardous Wastes, 49th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity, 
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 20-25 February 1989, Preamble, para.8. 
1933 Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and 
Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa (30 January 1991), Article 4 (1). 
1934 Eze, above note 1929, at 217. 
1935 Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and 
Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, Article 4(3). 
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and II of the Bamako Convention. However, other types of hazardous wastes may be 
determined by domestic law in accordance with article 28L (2) (b) and (d) of the Malabo 
Protocol (Annex). Secondly, the Bamako Convention is referred to in respect of criminal 
activities that are punishable under 28L (1) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex), that is to say 
“any import or failure to re-import, transboundary movement, or export of hazardous wastes 
proscribed by the Bamako Convention”. There are also cases in which criminalisation does 
not apply. This is the case of “the export of hazardous wastes into an AU member state for the 
purpose of rendering it safe”.1936 The special goal to render the wastes safe must be proven. It 
is also the case of “wastes which derive from the normal operations of a ship, the discharge of 
which is covered by another international instrument”.1937  
It is clear that trafficking in hazardous wastes in Africa is one of the crimes against peace and 
security in Africa whose codification has undergone less global influence. The same goes for 
the illicit exploitation of natural resources, the crimes of political assassination and subversion 
as well as unconstitutional change of government. The manner in which this codification was 
realised in the Malabo Protocol (Annex) through the mere copying of provisions of previous 
treaties, which were not primarily dedicated to international criminalisation, would likely 
have a negative impact on the exercise of the jurisdiction of the AU Criminal Court as will be 
demonstrated in the next chapter. The gap in the definition of crimes is one of the challenges 
to the existence of a viable system of African regional criminal justice.    
  
  
                                                 
1936 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Article 28L (6). Emphasis is mine. 
1937 Ibid., Article 28L (4).  
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2. The Promotion of the System of African Regional Criminal Justice 
At this stage, international criminal justice is conceived as a tool, but not the only one, 
designed for the protection and the defence of Africa against violations of regional public 
order. The emerging system of regional criminal justice complements the two traditional 
levels of international criminal justice, that is, universal and municipal administration of 
justice. It implies the existence of what may be termed “regional criminal power”,1938 which 
means the power conferred on the AU to prescribe penal rules, to investigate, to prosecute and 
to eventually try crimes against peace and security in Africa. There is a will on the part of 
African states to overcome judicial inertia against the scourge of impunity on the continent. 
Ensuring international criminal justice is therefore part of what Roland Adjovi calls “African 
international criminal policy”,1939 the objective of which being to place the AU in the centre 
of the fight against impunity of crimes that are of collective concern to the community of 
African states and peoples.  
This chapter intends to explain how the AU can play that central role, solely and/or in 
cooperation with its member states. Various questions can be raised with regard to the 
authority of the continental organisation to exercise criminal jurisdiction in Africa. In 
particular, what are the legal bases which entitle the AU to act or which judicial options are 
available in order to undertake an action? The pivotal question seeks to know whether the 
emerging system of African regional criminal justice is or at least may be viable to deal with 
crimes against peace and security in Africa. 
 It will be shown that the AU has at its disposal various judicial options to exercise regional 
criminal jurisdiction, either directly by itself, jointly with an African state or through 
delegating jurisdiction to a member state. Each option has its own specific legal context. 
These options are also subject to different theoretical and practical challenges. The AU 
Criminal Court may become the principal mechanism to deliver regional criminal justice in 
                                                 
1938 M. Mubiala, ‘Chronique de droit pénal de l’Union africaine : vers une justice pénale régionale en Afrique’, 
83 Revue internationale de droit pénal (2012) 547-557, at 548. 
1939 R. Adjovi, ‘Introduction : l’Afrique dans le développement de la justice pénale internationale’, 14 African 
Yearbook of International Law (2006) 3-28, at 28. 
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Africa.1940 However, the viability of the AU Criminal Court seems to be problematic. In 
particular, the Court still has to become effective. Its efficacy could also be hampered by 
operational difficulties, such as financial constraints, deficient support from African states, 
including concern over the immunity of state officials, tension with alternative options to 
criminal prosecutions (such as amnesty and promotion of peace) and default of effective 
judicial cooperation. In the end, the success of the Court will depend very much on the will of 
AU member states to promote and support the rise of a system of independent regional 
criminal justice for Africa. In this regard, the judicial options available to the AU are 
examined (2.1) as well as the viability of the system of regional criminal justice which is put 
nd mainly embodied in the new Court (2.2).   
2.1. The Available Judicial Options to the African Union  
Like the UN, the AU is not an institution of criminal nature. However, it has three judicial 
options at its disposal. None of these options is about ad hoc tribunals such as those which 
were put in place by the UN Security Council in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In 
various occasions, the establishment of an ad hoc regional criminal tribunal was rejected 
because of financial constraints. Instead, the AU has preferred to resort to the technique of 
delegating jurisdiction to a member state (2.1.1) or to attempt to ensure justice through hybrid 
criminal tribunals (2.1.2). These two approaches to the exercise of regional criminal 
jurisdiction have contributed to the process towards the establishment of the AU Criminal 
Court (2.1.3).  
2.1.1. The Delegation of Jurisdiction to a Member State 
A delegation of jurisdiction is a conferral of power by a competent entity on another one 
which becomes entitled to exercise the delegated power in the interest of both parties. In 
international law, such a delegation of jurisdiction is possible between states or in their 
relationship with intergovernmental organisations.1941 The delegation of jurisdiction is a legal 
operation which is realised through the conclusion of an international treaty or in application 
of it. The operation aims to vest the delegated entity with the power of the delegating 
                                                 
1940 See B. Kahombo and J.-P. Segihobe, ‘L’Union africaine et le traitement des affaires Hissène Habré, Rose 
Kabuye et Omar Al Bashir : à la recherche des implications sur le droit international’, Annales de la Faculté de 
Droit de l’Université de Kinshasa (2014) 100-119.   
1941 D. Sarooshi, ‘Some Preliminary Remarks on the Conferral by States of Powers on International 
Organizations’ Jean Monnet Working Paper 4/03, New York University School of Law (2003), at 2. 
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authority without which it would have been incompetent to act or to proceed. Practices of 
delegation of jurisdiction are particularly widespread in international law as far as powers 
conferred on international tribunals are concerned.1942 The obvious example is the ICC 
jurisdiction over nationals of a state which is not a party to the Rome Statute.1943 This power 
derives from the jurisdiction that could be exercised over such nationals by a state party in the 
territory of which the crime has been committed. In other words, the ICC will be just doing 
the job in the place of the state concerned. Despite criticisms,1944 consent of the state not party 
is not necessary.1945    
The AU has delegated jurisdiction to one of its member states (Senegal) in order to try the 
former Chadian Head of State, Hissène Habré. But, this is a distinct regional practice from the 
conferral of jurisdiction on a court by treaty as in the case of the ICC or the creation an ad hoc 
international criminal tribunal by the UN Security Council. While the Senegalese precedent 
may be seen as a progressive development of regional criminal justice (2.1.1.1), it also raises 
several problems concerning its legality and implementation (2.1.1.2). 
2.1.1.1. The Novelty of the Senegalese Precedent 
The background to this precedent is the failure of Senegal to prosecute and try Hissène Habré 
for acts of torture, barbarity and crimes against humanity or to extradite him to Belgium. As a 
                                                 
1942 See K.J. Alter, ‘Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other-binding Delegation’ Working 
Paper No.07-004, Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies (July 2007) 
<http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1452&context=lcp> accessed 1 March 2017. 
1943 D. Akande, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis 
and Limits’, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003) 618-650, at 634-636. 
1944 M. Morris, ‘High Crimes and Misconceptions: the ICC and Non-party States’, 64 (1) Law and Contemporary 
Problems (2001) 13-66, at 15 and 21; R. Wedgwood, ‘The Irresolution of Rome’, 64 (1) Law and Contemporary 
Problems (2001) 193-214, at 199. For these authors, the consent of the state not party is necessary for the 
exercise of this jurisdiction if the accused persons have acted pursuant to its policy.  
1945 Ibid., at 635; F. Mégret, ‘Epilogue to an Endless Debate: The International Criminal Court’s Third Party 
Jurisdiction and the Looming Revolution of International Law’, 12 (2) European Journal of International Law 
(2001) 247-268, at 251-254.  These authors rightly suggest that the opposite position of Madeline Morris and 
Ruth Wedgwood is flawed. Besides the fact that the Court’s jurisdiction derives from the power of the state party 
to prosecute and to try, prosecuting individuals before an international criminal court is also different from 
implying state international responsibility. It can be added that there are also other persons who may have 
committed crimes outside the state apparatus to the extent that the latter would not be seen as official acts of the 
state not party. 
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reminder, Senegalese courts held that they lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Furthermore, 
on 27 November 2005, the Senegalese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cheikh Tidiane Gadio, 
indicated that the matter was referred to the AU.1946 He declared: “the State of Senegal, 
sensitive to the complaints of victims who are seeking justice, will abstain from any act which 
could permit Hissène Habré not to face justice. It therefore considers that it is up to the 
African Union summit to indicate the jurisdiction which is competent to try this matter”.1947 
As a consequence, the AU Assembly considered the issue during its 6th ordinary session, held 
in Khartoum (Sudan), in January 2006. It was briefed on the case by Presidents Abdoulaye 
Wade of Senegal and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, the outgoing Chairperson of the AU. 
Support was given to the collective commitment to fight impunity “in line with the relevant 
provisions of the Constitutive Act”.1948 After deliberations, the AU Assembly decided to 
establish a Committee of Eminent African Jurists,1949 with the following mandate: 
 (…) to consider all aspects and implications of the Hissène Habré case as well as the options 
available for his trial, taking into account the following benchmarks: a) Adherence to the 
principles of total rejection of impunity; b) Adherence to international fair trial standards including 
the independence of the judiciary and impartiality of proceedings; c) Jurisdiction over the alleged 
crimes for which Mr. Habré should be tried; d) Efficiency in terms of cost and time of trial; e) 
Accessibility to the trial by alleged victims as well as witnesses; f) Priority for an African 
mechanism.1950 
In its reports of July 2006, the Committee recommended three options for the trial of Hissène 
Habré.1951 The first option was national jurisdiction in Senegal or Chad. Senegal was chosen 
as the country of residence of the suspect, while Chad was the state where the alleged crimes 
                                                 
1946 Human Rights Watch, above note 557, at 7. 
1947 Ibid. 
1948 Assembly/AU/Dec.103 (VI), Decision on the Hissène Habré Case and the African Union 
(Doc.Assembly/AU/8 (VI)) Add.9, 6th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Khartoum 
(Sudan), 23-24 January 2006, para.1.  
1949 Seven (7) persons appointed by the Chairperson of the AU in their personal capacities to constitute the 
composition of the Committee of Eminent African Jurists: Juge Guibril Camara (Senegal), Professor Delphine 
Emmanuel born Adouki (Congo – Brazzaville), Professor Michael Ayodele Ajomo (Nigeria), Robert Dossou 
(Benin), Judge Joseph S. Warioba (Tanzania), Anil Kumarsingh Gayan (Mauritius), Professor Henrietta J.A.N. 
Mensa-Bonsu (Ghana). The Committee was chaired by Robert Dossou. 
1950Assembly/AU/Dec.103 (VI), above note 1948, para.3.  
1951 African Union, ‘Report of the Committee of Eminent African Jurists on the Case of Hissène Habré’ (2006), 
paras. 27-33 <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/justice/habre/CEJA_Repor0506.pdf> accessed 28 March 2015. 
396 
were committed against Chadian victims. But, the Committee argued that Senegal was the 
country best suited to conduct the trial because it was bound by international law to perform 
its obligations under the UN Convention against torture.1952 Another possible reason is the 
fact that the trial in Chad could not necessarily be consistent with one of the aforementioned 
benchmarks required by the AU Assembly, that is, the independence of the judiciary and 
impartiality of proceedings, insofar as President Idriss Déby, who had overthrown Hissène 
Habré in 1990, is still the incumbent Head of State and new dictator in the country.  
The second option was the creation of an ad hoc regional criminal tribunal, composed of 5 
judges.1953 In the Committee’s view, “the power of the Assembly to set up such an ad hoc 
regional criminal tribunal is based upon Article 3 (h) 4(h) and (o) 9(1) (d) and Article 5(2) of 
the Constitutive Act of the African Union”.1954 Article 3 (h) provides that the AU aims to 
promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the ACHPR and other 
relevant human rights instruments. Article 4 (h) confers on the AU the right to intervene in a 
member state in the event of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Article 4 (o) 
provides for the principle of respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection 
of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities. Article 5 
(2) states that the AU shall have organs that the Assembly may decide to establish in addition 
to those which are expressly determined by the Constitutive Act. Article 9 (1) (d) reiterates 
such power of the AU Assembly to establish any other organ of the Union. While these 
articles do not explicitly grant the power to the AU Assembly to create an ad hoc regional 
criminal tribunal, one may agree that objectives and principles which they provide for play a 
functional role, from which complementary rules can be adopted or implied.1955 In this regard, 
creating an ad hoc regional criminal tribunal as a subsidiary organ of the AU Assembly was 
not problematic. But, the Committee warned that “an ad hoc tribunal, in whatever form, 
would cost a lot of money and create further delay in the trial of Habré”,1956 even though 
“where there is a will, there is a way and the process could be expedited”.1957 
                                                 
1952 Ibid., paras.17 and 29. 
1953 Ibid., paras.24 and 31. 
1954 Ibid., para.23. 
1955 J.F. Wandji K, ‘L’Afrique dans la lutte contre l’impunité des crimes internationaux’, 11 Cahiers de la 
recherche sur les droits fondamentaux (2013) 89-103, at 97. 
1956 African Union, above note 1951, para.25. 
1957 Ibid. 
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The third option took into account the possibility for any African state to prosecute and 
exercise jurisdiction.1958 The criterion of availability of any African state to do so was simply 
the ratification by it of the UN Convention against torture. However, this option was more 
problematic than the previous ones for two main reasons. First, there was no evidence as to 
the existence of domestic legislation implementing the UN Convention against torture in any 
other African state. New delays before starting with the proceedings were therefore very high 
until such legislation was to be adopted. Second, the preparedness of the judiciary of any 
African third state to begin with the trail could be undertaken by zero, including the transfer 
of the existing judicial file from Senegal and the study of its various documents. Moreover, it 
was not sure that the request for extradition of Hissène Habré by Senegal to a designated 
country other than Chad would have received a different response from the rejection of the 
repetitive demands made by Belgium.   
Consequently, the AU Assembly rightly decided to confer jurisdiction on Senegal.1959 The 
motivation of this decision contains three considerations. First of all, the AU Assembly 
observed that “according to the terms of Articles 3 (h), 4 (h) and 4 (o) of the Constitutive Act 
of the African Union, the crimes of which Hissène Habré is accused fall within the 
competence of the African Union”.1960 Secondly, the AU Assembly acknowledged that “in its 
present state, the African Union has no legal organ competent to try Hissène Habré”.1961 
Thirdly, given that the Hissène Habré case was within the competence of the Union, the AU 
Assembly decided to mandate Senegal to prosecute and ensure that the suspect was tried, “on 
behalf of Africa, by a competent Senegalese court with guarantees for fair trial”.1962 All AU 
member states were requested to cooperate with Senegal on this matter,1963 while the 
Chairperson of the Union, in consultation with the Chairperson of the AU Commission, was 
mandated “to provide Senegal with the necessary assistance for the effective conduct of the 
trial”.1964 
                                                 
1958 Ibid., paras.21 and 33. 
1959 Assembly/AU/ Dec.127 (VII), Decision on the Hissène Habré Case and the African Union (DOC. 
ASSEMBLY/AU/3 (VII)), 7th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Banjul (The Gambia), 1-
2 July 2006. 
1960 Ibid., para.3. 
1961 Ibid., para.4. 
1962 Ibid., para.5 (ii). 
1963 Ibid., para.5 (iv). 
1964 Ibid., para.5 (iii). 
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It is submitted that this jurisdictional mandate conferred on Senegal implied that the latter was 
not going to exercise not its own jurisdiction but that of the AU. It is the first precedent in 
international criminal law whereby an intergovernmental organisation has decided to delegate 
criminal jurisdiction to one of its member states. The practice may inspire the Security 
Council which has meaningful experience in authorising member states to act in the name of 
the international community by using force for the purpose of enforcing collective security 
decisions, but has never delegated criminal jurisdiction to any UN member state. Rather, the 
Security Council has had the occasion to confer jurisdiction only on ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals, constituting its subsidiary organs.  
The benefits of this model of jurisdiction are not negligible. It appears that it fits better for 
trying a small number of specific individuals, such as high ranking state officials, in a 
particular situation and outside the territory of the state of commission of the crime or the 
state of nationality. The collective delegation of jurisdiction increases the legitimacy of 
proceedings on the part of the designated/delegated third state. The latter acts as a true agent 
of the international community, exercising its power. This is a significant departure from the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction by a state. Compared with prosecutions before ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals, state procedures are likely to take not too much time. These 
procedures may also cost less money due to a reduced internationalisation as regards staff 
composition and institutional building. However, there are also drawbacks. One of these could 
be the perception of an imperial jurisdiction when the state of nationality of the presumed 
offenders has not consented to such a delegation of power or when jurisdiction is not 
conferred on the country of its wish. Difficulties in the process of implementation can also 
arise if the content of the legal mandate is not clearly specified for the delegated state in 
advance. Interpretations on how this mandate has to be executed can create a number of 
complex legal problems to solve, thereby undermining the start of the trial in a reasonable 
time or even thwarting the effectiveness of prosecutions.       
2.1.1.2. The Problems of Legality and Implementation      
The AU’s delegation of jurisdiction to Senegal in the case of the trial of Hissène Habré raises 
two main legal problems. The first problem relates to the legality of this delegation of power 
and the second to legal issues of interpretation of the mandate in regard to how Senegal 
should have implemented it. 
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Concerning the legality of the delegation of jurisdiction, it has to be observed that power was 
given to Senegal to try Hissène Habré with respect to criminal events which had occurred in 
Chad prior to the creation of the AU, that is to say between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 
1990. Yet, the VCLT which codifies customary international law prohibits retroactive 
application of treaties1965 as follows: 
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do 
not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to 
exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.1966 
The party which falls within the meaning of this provision is either Chad (territorial state and 
state of nationality) or Senegal (state of residence). These two countries did not object to the 
AU’s delegation of jurisdiction. Rather, they consented to it. But, still, regarding the time of 
occurrence of the criminal events in question, given the fact that the OAU itself did not have 
the power to act in the same manner as its successor (the AU) did in July 2006, the AU 
Constitutive Act could not be applied retroactively.1967 The delegation of criminal jurisdiction 
to Senegal was therefore illegal in this particular context. State consent is irrelevant where 
there is no power for the AU to act retroactively.  
Furthermore, it has to be noted that when the AU is competent to act and state consent is 
provided to its action, the delegation of criminal jurisdiction based on the AU’s right to 
intervene in a member state does not need to be authorised by the UN Security Council. Such 
authorisation is only required when the AU decides to impose jurisdiction on a member state 
willing to prosecute without the consent of the state of residence and /or the state of 
nationality of the suspect. Given that Chad and Senegal were in favour of the AU’s decision 
of July 2006, the absence of the Security Council’s authorisation was not an issue in the case 
of the trial of Hissène Habré. The AU was in a position to act as it did in accordance with the 
Constitutive Act. 
                                                 
1965 T. Hillier, Sourcebook on Public International Law (London/Sydney: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1998), 
at 138; A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), at 142.  
1966 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 28. 
1967 In contrast, Article 33 (3) of the AU Constitutive Act lets think that retroactive application of this treaty was 
not even foreseen. It provides: ‘Upon the entry into force of this Act, all necessary measures shall be undertaken 
to implement its provisions and to ensure the establishment of the organs provided for under the Act in 
accordance with any directives or decisions which may be adopted in this regard by the Parties thereto within the 
transitional period stipulated above’. Emphasis is mine. 
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Concerning the implementation of the jurisdictional mandate conferred on the delegated state, 
problems of interpretation have arisen in relation to its content. Normally, when an 
intergovernmental organisation delegates criminal jurisdiction to an international court, it in 
the same time defines the applicable law in the court’s statute. But, the AU conferred 
jurisdiction on Senegal without determining exactly the law which had to be applied by the 
Senegalese competent court in the name of the African community of states and peoples. This 
legal deficiency pushed the delegated state to interpret the AU’s mandate in a way that it had 
to determine unilaterally the law applicable to the trial of Hissène Habré. As a result, it 
undertook initiatives to amend its domestic law and to adapt it to international law in order to 
allow the proceedings to commence.1968 The AU Committee of Eminent African Jurists 
understood in the same manner the mandate to be implemented by Senegal when it reported: 
The Committee was apprised of the decision of United Nations Committee on Convention Against 
Torture taken on 17th May, 2006 concerning Hissène Habré that Senegal’s conduct was in 
violation of Articles 5 (2) and 7 of the Convention Against Torture. It is therefore incumbent on 
Senegal in accordance with its international obligations, to take steps, not only to adapt its 
legislation, but also to bring Habré to trial. The Committee considered that in the event that 
Senegal proceeds with the trial of Habré, Senegal should confer special powers upon the court to 
proceed to Chad or to any other country to take evidence of witnesses and do whatever is 
necessary to achieve its mandate.1969 
However, one may argue that the said adaptation of national legislation to Senegal’s 
international obligations or the conferral of special powers on its court was not meaningful in 
this context because the delegated state was not mandated to exercise its own jurisdiction but 
the power conferred on it by the AU. The misinterpretation of this mandate resulted in 
contestations of the laws adopted by Senegal, arguably for they violated the principle of 
legality and particularly the prohibition of retroactive application of criminal laws.1970 What 
                                                 
1968 The Law No.2007-02 of 12 February 2007 Amending the Penal Code has domesticated international crimes, 
i.e. genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, in Senegal; the Law No.2007-05 of 12 February 2007 
Modifying the Code of Criminal Procedure Concerning the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court has provided universal jurisdiction over them, the crimes of terrorism and torture; 
the Constitutional Law No. 2008-33 of 7 August 2008 Amending Articles 9 and 95 and Complementing Articles 
62 and 92 of the Constitution has provided that criminal prosecutions do not violate the principle of non-
retroactive application of criminal laws if the conduct is criminal, at the time it takes place, pursuant to rules of 
international law with respect to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (Article 9 amended). 
1969 African Union, above note 1951, paras.18-19. Emphasis is mine. 
1970 Hissène Habré v. Republic of Senegal, above note 586, para.19.   
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was forgotten was that the AU intervened because of the Senegalese incapacity to use its 
proper adjudicative power (lack of universal jurisdiction) and substantive law (default of 
relevant offences in the domestic legal system) in order to try the accused person. The AU’s 
mandate was not meant to obliterate this incapacity but to serve just as an alternative option 
for the fight against impunity.   
A different interpretation was possible. As already seen, the Hissène Habré case had to be 
brought before a competent Senegalese court with guarantees for a fair trial. The initial 
question in this regard was for such a court to have been legally created. It was implicit that 
the court could apply the Senegalese criminal procedure. However, the question as to the 
court which was specifically competent over the case could be answered in accordance with 
Senegalese domestic law. The assessement could be made on the basis of a number of factors, 
such as the place of commission of the crime and residence of the suspect (ratione loci 
competence), the official status of the accused person (ratione personae competence), the 
offence at stake (ratione materiae competence) and the time of its commission (ratione 
temporis competence). The territorially competent court could be one which was established 
in Dakar where Hissène Habré resided. The personal competence of the court was 
unnecessary in view of the fact that the accused person was found in a foreign country as a 
former head of state. His status had no particular relevance as regards the rank of Senegalese 
tribunals. There was no problem with the ratione temporis jurisdiction because Senegal was 
given special power by the AU to try crimes committed in Chad during the relevant period of 
time. These crimes already existed under international law. There was in principle no breach 
of the prohibition of retroactive application of criminal laws. Problems would have arisen 
only about the ratione materiae competence insofar as the aforementioned crimes were not 
yet incorporated in the Senegalese domestic legal order. The ratione materiae competence 
was crucial to be determined for two main reasons. On the one hand, it was necessary for the 
precise identification of one of the courts sitting in Dakar as the competent jurisdicion to try 
the accused person. On the other hand, it was necessary for the determination of the 
susbstantive law applicable by that competent court. Given the fact Senegal could not rely on 
its contested municipal law, it is submitted that there was an alternative solution in accordance 
with international law: either to adopt a special statute in the name of Africa or to request for 
a binding decision of the AU Assembly specifying the rules and principles applicable to the 
trial of Hissène Habré. Accordingly, the AU would have decided in line with international 
practice according to which delegation of criminal jurisdiction is accompanied by the 
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determination of applicable law by the delegating authority. The designated competent court 
could have exercised its jurisdiction as a special mechanism within the Senegalese domestic 
legal order. If contestations were so avoided, this first experience of the AU’s delegation of 
criminal jurisdiction to a member state could have been successful and rendered the creation 
of a mixed tribunal between Senegal and the AU unnecessary.  
2.1.2. The Creation of Hybrid Criminal Tribunals  
A mixed, hybrid or internationalised criminal tribunal is a jurisdiction which combines 
national and international staff, and often involves both domestic and internationally 
recognised criminal justice procedures.1971 There are however different variants: either a 
national jurisdiction which is internationalised (e.g. the ECCC) or an international court 
which is nationalised (e.g. the SCSL).1972 Such a criminal tribunal may take the form of a 
mixed court which is autonomous from the domestic legal system or special mixed chambers 
that are integrated into the judicial system of the state concerned. A hybrid tribunal is 
designed to deliver justice in a particular context or special circumstances. Its jurisdiction is 
therefore limited in time, whereas its exercise is often expected to contribute to the promotion 
of stability in a post-conflict state. In practice, the AU in cooperation with Senegal resorted to 
a hybrid jurisdiction with the creation of the Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) in the 
Senegalese Courts in 2012 (2.1.2.1), while an analogous experience was recommended in 
relation to Sudan in 2009 (2.1.2.2).     
2.1.2.1. The Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalese Courts 
The EAC was created after the failure to implement the AU’s delegation of criminal 
jurisdiction to Senegal for the purpose of the trial of Hissène Habré. Contestations of this 
delegated jurisdiction were brought before several African courts. The most important case 
was dealt with by the ECOWAS Court of Justice, whose judgement of 18 November 2010 
constituted the main trigger event of the process of establishment of the EAC (a). These 
Chambers have some specific features and mix characteristics of both internationalised 
national and nationalised international courts (b). 
                                                 
1971 Mbeki, Abubakar, Buyoya, El Sayed, Mumba, Mohamed, Omaar, above note 1109, para.247. 
1972 Pazartzis, above note 367, at 643-644 and 646. See also C. P.R. Romano and T. Boutruche, ‘Tribunaux 
pénaux internationalisés : état des lieux d’une justice ‘hybride’’, CVII Revue générale de droit international 
public (2003) 109-124.  
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a) The Process of Establishment of the Chambers   
The creation of the EAC proceeds from a combination of factors which have led to the failure 
of the AU’s delegation of criminal jurisdiction to Senegal. From 2006 to 2012, the judicial 
impasse of the Hissène Habré case was total. Among other obstacles towards exercising this 
jurisdiction, there was the lack of funding of the trial. The Senegalese Government declined to 
fund it alone while none of the AU member states provided financial assistance. In July 2010, 
the AU Assembly explicitly made an appeal for all its members to contribute to the budget for 
the trial.1973 It convened a round table of donors (including the EU) in Dakar on 24 November 
2010.1974 At the end of that day, the budget for the trial was about a total amount of 8.570.000 
Euros.1975 However, donors agreed to mobilise some 8.600.000 Euros.1976 The AU itself 
pledged to contribute with 1 million USD.1977 The success of this meeting geared hopes to 
begin with the trial in reasonable time. But, judicial contestations of the AU’s jurisdictional 
mandate to Senegal had already taken another twist. It appeared that Senegal could no longer 
try the accused person in the way it wished to do in accordance with its domestic legislation. 
The initial contestation was made by a Chadian national, Michelot Yogogombaye, in his 
application of 11 August 2008 against Senegal before the AfCHPR.1978 The applicant 
contended that the amendments to the Senegalese laws and Constitution authorising 
retroactive application of criminal laws for the purpose of trying Hissène Habré violated 
article 7(2) of the ACHPR.1979 He also submitted that Senegal had violated the principle of 
                                                 
1973 Assembly/AU/Dec.297(XV), Decision on the Hissene Habre Case (Doc.Assembly/AU/11(XV)), 15th 
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No.001/2008, paras.20-21. Article 7 (2) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides: ‘No one 
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universal jurisdiction and committed an abuse of it for political and lucrative ends.1980 The 
applicant therefore requested the suspension of the Senegalese proceedings, pending an 
African solution through the establishment of a Truth, Justice, Reparations and Reconciliation 
Commission for all crimes committed in Chad between 1962 and 2008.1981 However, the 
AfCHPR held that it lacked jurisdiction to decide on the matter. The reason was that Senegal 
had not made the declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases instituted 
by individuals or NGOs.1982  
In another procedure Hissène Habré lodged an application with the ECOWAS Court of 
Justice on 1 October 2008, alleging the same violation by Senegal of the principle of non-
retroactivity of criminal laws and the authority of res judicata owed to its own courts’ 
decisions.1983 It must be recalled that these courts established that they had no jurisdiction to 
prosecute and try foreigners present in Senegal for alleged crimes committed against alien 
outside the Senegalese territory.  
Concerning the first allegation, the ECOWAS Court of Justice concluded that by amending its 
domestic legislation for the purpose of trying Hissène Habré, Senegal violated the principle 
non-retroactivity of penal laws.1984 Furthermore, the Court held that the AU’s delegation of 
jurisdiction conferred on Senegal the mandate to conceive and to suggest specific modalities 
for trying the accused person in the framework of an ad hoc special procedure of an 
international character as is practiced in international law by all civilised nations.1985 For the 
Court, this was the only procedure which would not breach the principle of non-retroactivity 
of criminal laws because it was consistent with article 15 (2) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,1986 which permits “the trial and punishment of any person for any 
act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the 
general principles of law recognised by the community of nations”. Regarding the second 
                                                 
1980 Ibid., para.23 (5) and (6). 
1981 Ibid., paras.1, 23 (2), (9) and (10). 
1982 Ibid., para.40 (1). See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of 
an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (10 June 1998), Article 34 (6). 
1983 Hissène Habré v. Republic of Senegal, above note 586, paras.19 and 28. 
1984 Ibid., paras.54 and 61. 
1985 Ibid., paras.58 and 61. 
1986 Ibid., para.58. 
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allegation, the Court decided that Senegal should respect decisions delivered by its own courts 
on this case.  
This judgment raised several criticisms.1987 Concerning the res judicata principle, Raphaël 
Tiwang Watio rightly argued that the Court ignored the principle of international law 
prohibiting any state to invoke its domestic law as justification not to perform its international 
obligations.1988 The Senegalese courts relied on the Code of Criminal Procedure to declare 
that they were incompetent to prosecute and try Hissène Habré. The ECOWAS Court of 
Justice should have decided that any allegation of violation of the authority of res judicata 
pursuant to Senegalese laws was irrelevant owing to the duty on Senegal to prosecute the 
Hissène Habré under the Convention against torture.    
Concerning the prohibition of retroactive penal laws, Valentina Spiga argued that the 
principle was not violated since changes within Senegalese domestic legislation did not create 
new crimes but simply incorporated those which already existed under international law: 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.1989 This line of argument was also 
followed by Senegal before the ECOWAS Court of Justice.1990 However, it is flawed for two 
principal reasons. First, Senegal incorporated these crimes from the ICC Statute. Apart from 
genocide and crimes against humanity, the incorporation of war crimes had something to do 
with the respect for the principle of legality. In fact, it was doubtful until the establishment of 
the ICTR and ICTY in the 1990s that serious violations of common article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and of Additional Protocol II of 1977 could entail criminal responsibility 
under customary international law.1991 In addition, it is doubtful that Senegal had a duty to 
prosecute these serious violations during the relevant period between 1982 and 1990. A 
problem of legality might arise when such violations are connected to the amendment to the 
                                                 
1987 Ibid., para.61. 
1988 R.T. Watio, ‘Affaire Hissène Habré: où en est la justice ?’, 17 African Yearbook of International Law (2011) 
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Senegalese Code of Criminal Procedure instituting universal jurisdiction.1992 It is submitted 
that where a state has no obligation to prosecute, it cannot confer on itself the power to 
exercise retroactive universal jurisdiction. Second, one must not overlook torture, the other 
crime among charges against Hissène Habré, which was incorporated in the Senegalese Penal 
Code only though the Law No.96-15 of 28 August 1996.1993 In the case concerning Questions 
relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, the ICJ held that torture for purposes of 
the Convention against torture could not apply to acts that had been committed before the 
entry into force of the Convention towards Senegal, that is, on 26 June 1987.1994 As a 
consequence, the principle of legality was breached by the fact that Senegal conferred on 
itself retroactive universal jurisdiction over acts of torture allegedly committed between 1982 
and 26 June 1987 which it had no obligation to prosecute under the Convention against 
torture. The contrary statement of the ICJ according to which the Convention against torture 
did not prevent Senegal from instituting criminal proceedings against these acts was not 
motivated and had no legal basis.1995  
Under these circumstances, the ECOWAS Court of Justice was right to find that Senegal 
violated the principle of non-retroactivity of penal laws even though without nuancing its 
decision. However, it was mistaken to hold that the same principle would not be violated if 
prosecutions against Hissène Habré were initiated before an ad hoc mechanism of an 
international character.1996 Every criminal tribunal, regardless of its form or nature, must 
ensure respect for this cardinal principle. The judgment of the ECOWAS Court of Justice 
even ran against the will of the AU which had delegated jurisdiction to Senegal in order to try 
the accused by a Senegalese competent court instead of an international criminal tribunal.1997 
Finally, by interpreting the AU’s mandate given to Senegal, the Court also acted out of its 
competence.1998   
                                                 
1992 Law No.2007-05 of 12 February 2007 Modifying the Code of Criminal Procedure Concerning the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 2. 
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1995 Ibid., para.102. 
1996 Spiga, above note 1989, at 23.  
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Finally, the AU Assembly took note of the judgment of the ECOWAS Court of Justice on 
Hissène Habré’s trial in spite of various legal flaws. In January 2011, it requested the AU 
Commission to “to undertake consultations with the Government of Senegal in order to 
finalise the modalities for the expeditious trial of Hissene Habre through a special tribunal 
with an international character consistent with the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) Court of Justice Decision”.1999 The creation of a special tribunal was 
another way for Senegal to discharge the mandate given to it. This time, the delegated state 
would not anymore use its domestic courts solely as it had to exercise jurisdiction jointly, in 
direct cooperation with the AU. But, negotiations between Senegal and the AU made no 
further progress until the announcement by the Government of President Abdoulaye Wade to 
give up the case and to send Hissène Habré back to Chad.2000 It was clear that there was little 
political will to prosecute the accused in Senegal. On the request of the UN High Commission 
on Human Rights, the Senegalese Government revoked its previous decision on 10 July 2011. 
In January 2012, the AU suggested that prosecutions in Rwanda could be an alternative option 
to proceedings in Senegal in order to ensure the expeditious trial of Hissène Habré.2001 With 
the advent of the new Senegalese Government of President Macky Sall in April 2012, 
negotiations with the AU were resumed. They resulted in the conclusion of the Agreement on 
the Establishment of the EAC on 22 August 2012. This Agreement was ratified by Senegal 
after parliamentary authorisation by virtue of the Law No.2012/25 of 28 December 2012.  
b) The Main Features of the Chambers: an Innovation? 
The Agreement of 22 August 2012 between Senegal and the AU created the EAC “to 
prosecute the person or persons responsible for the crimes and serious violations of 
international law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions 
                                                                                                                                                        
A/P.1/7/91 Relating to the Community Court of Justice and Article 4 Paragraph 1 of the English Version of the 
Said Protocol (19 January 2005), Article 3. Article 9 of the Protocol on the ECOWAS Court of Justice so 
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The ECOWAS Court of Justice had no power to interpret decisions adopted by the AU. 
1999 Assembly/AU/ Dec.340(XVI), above note 1977, para.9. 
2000 African Union, ‘Affaire Hissène Habré : le Tchad soutien les victimes et réclame un procès’ Press Release 
No.75/2011 (21 July 2011). See Kahombo, above note 11, at 82-83. 
2001 Assembly/AU/Dec.401(XVIII), Decision on the Hissene Habre Case (Doc. Assembly/AU/12(XVIII)), 18th 
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ratified by Chad and Senegal that were committed in Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 
December 1990”.2002 It was very clear herein that anybody, and not solely Hissène Habré, 
who was suspected of being responsible for such crimes during that period, would be 
prosecuted. The Agreement contained as an annex the Statute of the Chambers (hereafter the 
EAC Statute).2003 The EAC had jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes2004, the definitions of which were borrowed from the Statutes of ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals.2005 Torture was another separate crime,2006 in addition to being provided 
for as crime against humanity or war crime under the EAC Statute.2007 Immunities for the 
accused persons, statute of limitation and amnesty before the Chambers were irrelevant.2008 
Victims could participate in proceedings pursuant to the Senegalese criminal procedure and 
be awarded reparations for damages they had suffered, individually or collectively, as a 
consequence of the crimes and individual criminal responsibility.2009 The Chambers were not 
authorised to apply the death penalty. Rather, they could sentence any convicted person to 
imprisonment up to 30 years or life imprisonment. Additionally, a convicted person could be 
sentenced to a fine or forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly 
from the crime.2010  
The structure of the Chambers was based on the idea that these Chambers were integrated into 
the Senegalese judicial system.2011 A total number of four chambers were created.2012 For the 
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pre-trial phase, a distinction was made between the Investigative Chamber (first instance) 
within the Regional Tribunal of Dakar and the Indicting Chamber within the Dakar Court of 
Appeals. For the trial level, the Dakar Court of Appeals included a Trial Chamber and an 
Appeals Chamber. There were also the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and the Registry. The 
Office of the Defence Counsel was added in 2014.2013 The Chambers were designed to be 
automatically dismantled at the end of their mission.2014 
A controversy arose as to the nature of the EAC. For example, Emanuele Cimiotta wrote: 
“due to its establishment, location, jurisdiction and the function it carries out within the 
international legal system, the EAC is different than a mixed criminal tribunal. It could be 
considered as the first of its kind of a new criminal tribunal, reflecting a process of 
regionalisation of international criminal justice”.2015 To support his position, he advanced 
three arguments.2016 First of all, he argued that the EAC was created within a fully regional 
framework without the UN involvement. Second, the Chambers were not located in Chad, on 
the territory of which the crimes were committed. Third, the Chambers found its remote roots 
at the national level because their establishment was related to the obligation for Senegal to 
comply with the Convention against torture. Fourth, the EAC did not aim to contribute to a 
transitional process for peace building or national reconciliation in Chad or to reinforce the 
Chadian judicial system. Instead, the creation of the Chambers was a response to a particular 
circumstance of the struggle against impunity on the basis of universal jurisdiction. 
Consequently, Emanuele Cimiotta concluded that the EAC constituted a new type of judicial 
body in the field of international criminal law.2017  
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On her side, Sarah Williams thought that the EAC qualified as a mixed or hybrid tribunal,2018 
as they fulfilled the six criteria of this type of jurisdiction.2019 First, the EAC performed 
criminal functions. Second, concerning the duration of their existence, they were temporary 
institutions. Third, there was a minimum international participation in the functioning of the 
Chambers: the President of the Trial Chamber and the President of the Appeals Chamber were 
non-Senegalese judges, selected from another AU member state. Nevertheless, all other 
Senegalese judges were nominated by the Senegalese Minister of Justice but appointed by the 
Chairperson of the AU. Fourth, international assistance in the financing of the EAC was 
provided. Fifth, the applicable law combined both international law and Senegalese domestic 
legislation. Sixth, a party other than Chad was involved in the EAC, that is, the AU. 
According to Sarah Williams, the EAC constituted a new type of mixed tribunal because it 
was the first jurisdiction of the kind to apply universal jurisdiction (with the consent of Chad), 
so operating outside the state of commission and having a minimalist approach to judicial 
internationalisation, in order to address a particular situation of impunity in Africa.2020    
Sarah Williams’ position is particularly relevant because she considers that the involvement 
of the international community in the functioning of a hybrid tribunal may not come only 
from the UN.2021 The restriction of such an involvement to universal actors and particularly 
the UN had no justification. In fact, international law not only exists but may also be enforced 
at the regional level. Hence, Sarah Williams’s suggestion according to which the involvement 
of the international community could also come from a regional organisation or even other 
states.2022  
The EAC embryonic model of regional criminal justice2023 would perhaps be replicated and 
more developed in the future.2024 Its comparative advantages were summarised as follows: 
                                                 
2018 Williams, above note 1991, at 1140, 1147 and 159. 
2019 Ibid., at 1145-1146. 
2020 Ibid., at 1160. 
2021 Ibid., at 1145. 
2022 Ibid. 
2023 A. Nguefeu, ‘Les chambres africaines extraordinaires pour la répression des crimes internationaux : embryon 
d’une instance juridictionnelle pénale africaine ?’, in Société africaine pour le Droit international (SADI), 
L’Afrique et le droit international pénal (Paris : Pedone, 2015) 129-144, at 131. 
2024 S.A.E. Hogestol, ‘The Habré Judgment at the Extraordinary African Chambers: A Singular Victory in the 
Fight against Impunity’, 34 (3) Nordic Journal of Human rights (2016) 147-156, at 155. 
411 
(…) an EAC-style internationalised court could be set up by a regional body, within the 
domestic courts of another country in the region. This would bring the trial closer to victims; 
give regional bodies more ownership over their international justice mechanisms, while also 
ensuring that the prosecutions are conducted before well-functioning courts. Early analysis of 
the Habré trial have underscored that it seems to have been executed in a low cost, speedy 
manner, while still adhering to international fair trial rights. This is notable when compared to 
the very costly and time consuming trials that have become the norm at international criminal 
courts.2025    
In the end, the EAC were successful. Hissène Habré, the principal accused in the Chadian 
situation, was arrested and then indicted for crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture 
on 2 July 2013.2026 His trial started in July 2015. Even if the EAC did not try any other 
person, Hissène Habré was convicted at the first instance on 30 May 2016 and in appeal on 27 
April 2017, and sentenced to life imprisonment.2027 In addition, the Appeals Chamber ordered 
Hissène Habré to pay reparations to his 7,396 victims: a total sum of 82,290,000,000 CFA 
(more than 140 million USD).2028 An attempt to organise similar regionalised criminal 
proceedings in Sudan failed.  
2.1.2.2. The Call for the Creation of a Hybrid Court for Darfur 
The proposal to create a hybrid court for Darfur was made by the AU High-Level Panel on 
Darfur (AUPD) in its report of 2009. The proposed court could be located in Sudan and 
composed of Sudanese and international judges, prosecutors, investigators and defence 
lawyers.2029 It was expected to be given jurisdiction over international crimes that were 
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reportedly perpetrated during the armed conflict which began in Darfur region in 2003.2030 
The hybrid court could be an alternative option for the ICC’s intervention in Sudan,2031 in 
addition to local prosecutions undertaken by the Sudanese justice system. 
There are three reasons why the AUPD called for the establishment of the proposed hybrid 
court. First, as already indicated, justice through the ICC was contested, mainly by the 
Government of Sudan. The judicial impasse had to be overcome. Second, while Sudan 
undertook several initiatives to address the impunity gap domestically through the SCCED, its 
efforts failed to bring to trial those who appeared to bear the greatest responsibility for crimes 
committed in Darfur. The justification of this failure lay in the lack of political will to ensure 
justice, the lack of international support for domestic trials and the enjoyment of immunities 
by President Omar Al Bashir, his Deputy, and members of security forces, even though these 
immunities were subject to removal.2032 Instead, no immunity would have applied before the 
proposed hybrid court. Third, the AUPD reported that there was little trust in the Sudanese 
judicial system, including on the part of victims. For example, it noted that “Sudan’s 
unilateral actions, using existing mechanisms, have not commanded the broad confidence 
required to secure the cooperation of the people of Darfur, whose faith in Government 
institutions has been eroded”.2033 Moreover, the report indicated: 
Whilst it is not questioning the technical competence or integrity of the Sudanese judiciary or legal 
personnel, the Panel must nevertheless recognise that the victims of the conflict simply have no 
faith that the justice system of Sudan will be deployed fairly to address the crimes they have 
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suffered. Their grave concerns, which often manifested in the call for the establishment of a 
Hybrid Court for Darfur, cannot be ignored.2034   
It therefore appeared that the proposed hybrid court for Darfur was justified by the will to 
alleviate the weakness of Sudan’s justice system to deal with crimes committed in Darfur and 
to solve, through the promotion of positive complementarity, the judicial crisis related to the 
contestation of ICC’s proceedings in Sudan. This was the first time for the AU to envisage a 
hybrid court working in the state of commission of the alleged crimes. Initiatives of this kind 
were rather supported or suggested by the UN as evidenced by the establishment of the 
Special Criminal Court for CAR2035 and the proposed creation of hybrid judicial mechanisms 
for the DRC.2036 
The choice of a hybrid court rather than an ad hoc regional criminal tribunal was based on the 
following reason: 
Hybrids began to be the preferred model after the initial experience with the UN Ad Hoc 
Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, international courts that became associated with an 
expensive and slow pace of justice. It was more cost effective, more efficient and in some cases 
more acceptable in the domestic or regional context, to have courts operating in situ, but 
strengthened by external actors.2037 
However, this does not mean that a hybrid court does not have specific drawbacks.2038 First of 
all, this type of court requires an important diplomatic mobilisation and institutional building. 
So, the necessary preparation in order to start with prosecutions can be delayed in a matter 
which deserves swift action. Secondly, financial means must be available because this kind of 
court is expensive due to the internationalisation of personnel (judges, prosecutors or other 
staff members). Thirdly, like any special mechanism of criminal justice, a hybrid court cannot 
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try every presumed offender. It can only focus on those who allegedly bear the greatest 
responsibility. If there is not any other mechanism to prosecute and try the remaining 
presumed offenders, the result of a hybrid court would be a disparity of justice in the country 
concerned. This is why the AUPD recommended a division of work between the Sudanese 
justice system and the proposed hybrid court.2039    
While the AU was urged to support the urgent implementation of the Panel’s 
recommendation, it failed to do so.2040 However, the AU Commission welcomed the proposal 
as an aspect of the roadmap on how peace, justice and reconciliation could be addressed in 
Darfur.2041  One of the reasons for the failure to create the proposed hybrid court for Darfur is 
specific to the dynamic of Sudanese national politics. In fact, at the time of issuance of the 
AUPD’s report in 2009, Sudan was involved in a process of allowing the region of South 
Sudan to access independence after a long civil war which started in 1983 between 
governmental forces and rebels of the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM).2042 
Thus, the issue of criminal accountability in Darfur was overshadowed by the political 
process which led South Sudan to independence on 9 June 2011. The government of President 
Al Bashir was put in contribution as a partner to this process. Another and more convincing 
reason could be the lack of international support for the regional initiative. The AU found 
itself insolated, whereas exclusive deference was paid by the international community to the 
ICC’s prosecutions in Sudan. Not only the ICC should not be undermined through parallel 
regional initiatives, but also it was perceived as the best way to ensure criminal accountability 
for those persons who were supposed to bear the greatest responsibility for crimes committed 
in Darfur, beginning by President Omar Al Bashir.   
In spite of this failure in Sudan, another AU Commission of Inquiry recommended the 
creation of an ad hoc mechanism of criminal accountability for South Sudan in 2014. This 
recommendation was made following a report which found that war crimes and crimes against 
humanity had been committed in South Sudan since 15 December 2013, in the context of an 
armed conflict of non-international character opposing governmental forces to rebels, 
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respectively under the command of President Salva Kiir and his former Deputy, Riek 
Machar.2043 This recommendation could lead to the establishment of “an Africa-led, Africa-
owned, Africa-resourced legal mechanism under the aegis of the African Union supported by 
the international community, particularly the United Nations (…)”.2044 While it remains to be 
seen if the proposal would be followed, the logical conclusion from both situations in Sudan 
and South Sudan is the existence of a regional will to address crimes committed in Africa 
through African mechanisms of criminal accountability established in the continent. It is of 
course this will which also justifies the creation of a permanent AU Criminal Court.  
2.1.3. The Establishment of the Criminal Court of the African Union      
Two questions arise concerning the creation of the AU Criminal Court. The first one relates to 
the historical evolution (2.1.3.1) and the second question to the Court’s status within the AU 
institutional system (2.1.3.2). 
2.1.3.1. The Historical Evolution 
The project for the creation of the AU Criminal Court dates back to the time of the OAU. Its 
historical evolution can be divided into two main phases: the phase from emergence to 
maturation (a) and the drafting process of the Court’s Statute (b). 
a) From Emergence to Maturation of the Project  
The establishment of an African court of justice was recommended by the Pan-African 
Conference on the Rule of Law in Africa in 1961.2045 However, the creation of a criminal 
jurisdiction was invoked for the first time during the drafting process of the ACHPR in the 
late 1970s and the early 1980s.2046 In the end, the OAU Commission of Experts omitted to 
                                                 
2043 African Union, ‘Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Soudan’ (15 October 
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include a court in the proposed draft Charter.2047 Professor Keba Mbaye, the chair of this 
Commission, specified that it was still premature to establish a court with criminal 
jurisdiction.2048 Rather, if need be, such a jurisdiction could be created by way of a protocol to 
the Charter.2049 This proposal did not satisfy every state such as Guinea (Conakry), which was 
in favour of the establishment of a court vested with jurisdiction to try violations of human 
rights and international crimes in Africa, in particular the crime of apartheid.2050  
However, the Guinean proposal was rejected as inopportune. In fact, the majority of states 
chose to establish only a human right commission rather than a court.2051 One of the reasons 
for this choice was the sovereign-oriented approach of the OAU whose member states were 
not ready to accept a judicial institution taking binding decisions upon them.2052 The national 
political context of reigning dictatorship in most African countries was not in favour of the 
creation of such an institution.2053 It was also explained that creating an African criminal court 
was not a pressing concern because the UN Convention on the suppression and punishment of 
the crime of apartheid had already contemplated the establishment of an international penal 
court.2054 Moreover, there was an ongoing UN project to set up a criminal jurisdiction for the 
purpose of prosecuting and trying crimes against the peace and security of mankind.2055    
After more than a decade of oblivion, the project re-emerged in the late 1990s after the end of 
the cold war and the beginning of new processes of state democratisation after the failure of 
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initial experiences in the 1960s. Commentators continued to underline the necessity to create 
a regional criminal tribunal given the scourge of impunity for international crimes committed 
during various armed conflicts affecting the continent.2056 In June 1991, the Abuja Treaty 
instituting the AEC provided that a Court of Justice having jurisdiction to apply the African 
community law was created.2057 But, the Court was not operationalised because of several 
obstacles, including political will, although the Abuja Treaty came into force in 1994.  
In July 2000, the project to create an African court of justice came to maturation. The AU 
Constitutive Act instituted a Court of Justice as one of its principal judicial organs.2058 The 
Union then had two courts: the AU Court of Justice having jurisdiction over general interstate 
matters and the AfCHPR, created in 1998, vested with the mandate to protect human and 
peoples’ rights.2059 In 2004, while it was still to be seen if the new Protocol on the AU Court 
of Justice, adopted in 2003, would come into force, the AU Assembly decided that it should 
be merged with the AfCHPR2060 for reasons of rationalisation of the AU’s institutions and 
staff (organs, personnel and premises) and financial constraints.2061 Then, Olusegun Obasanjo, 
the Chairperson of the AU and Nigerian President, suggested to vest the new AU Court with 
criminal jurisdiction in the following terms: “Why shouldn’t the Court of Justice take along 
with it the Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights so that we have a Court of Justice which will 
have a division, if you like, for border issues, a division for human rights issues, a division for 
cross-border criminal issues or whatever”.2062 The same call for a court having criminal 
jurisdiction was made by the AU Committee of Eminent African Jurists which was mandated 
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to consider the options available for the trial of Hissène Habré and “to make concrete 
recommendations on the ways and means of dealing with issues of a similar nature in the 
future”.2063 In its reports, the Committee recommended that “the on-going process that should 
lead to the establishment of a single Court at the African Union level should confer criminal 
jurisdiction on that Court”.2064  It added: 
The Court must be allowed to operate as an independent institution free from all forms of pressure, 
so that it can be impartial, and be seen to be impartial. There should be a rapid response 
mechanism within the Court to ensure that Africa can act with dispatch in situations of gross 
violations and so give teeth to the notion of “total rejection of impunity”. There should be an ad 
hoc monitoring mechanism to ensure that the independence and impartiality of the institutions 
would exist both in theory and in fact. Such monitoring would affirm the credibility of the regional 
institutions and so offer credible regional options.2065 
In July 2008, the process of integration of the two previous Courts (the AfCHPR and the AU 
Court of Justice) into one single institution gave birth to the AfCJHR.2066 However, the 
drafters did not provide the Court with criminal jurisdiction, although this was still necessary 
for states affected by conflicts.2067 The Statute annexed to the Protocol of 2008 provides that 
the Court “shall have two (2) sections: a General Affairs Section composed of eight (8) 
Judges and a Human Rights Section composed of eight (8) Judges”.2068 Whilst the General 
Affairs Section “shall be competent to hear all cases submitted under (…) this Statute save 
those concerning human and/or peoples’ rights issues”,2069 the Human Rights Section “shall 
be competent to hear all cases relating to human and/or peoples’ rights”.2070 The reasons why 
criminal jurisdiction was not conferred on the Court in spite of all the previous calls to do so 
were not specified. But, one may argue in favour of the belief in the potential efficacy of the 
ICC jurisdiction on the continent. There were apparently some hesitations to duplicate its 
mandate to try international crimes. As a reminder, African states had already declined to 
                                                 
2063 Assembly/AU/Dec.103 (VI), above note 1948, para.4.  
2064 African Union, above note 1951, para.39. 
2065 Ibid., paras.40-42. 
2066 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (1 July 2008), Articles 1 and 2. 
2067 J. M. Isanga, ‘The Constitutive Act of the African Union, African Courts and the Protection of Human 
Rights: New Dispensation?’, 11 (2) Santa Clara Journal of International Law (2013) 267-302, at 296. 
2068 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Annex), Article 16. 
2069 Ibid., Article 17 (1). 
2070 Ibid., Article 17 (2). 
419 
create a regional criminal court in the 1980s to deal with international crimes in Africa given 
the fact that an international criminal tribunal was going to be established at the global level.   
Until July 2008, there was not any open crisis between Africa and the ICC. However, the 
process for the establishment of the AU Criminal Jurisdiction was re-launched as a 
consequence of African contestations against the so-called abusive application of the principle 
of universal jurisdiction and indictments of some African leaders in Europe. Everything 
started in February 2009 after Germany had executed a French arrest warrant against Rose 
Kabuye, the then Chief of Protocol to the President of the Republic of Rwanda, Paul 
Kagame.2071 The AU Assembly requested “the Commission, in consultation with the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, to examine the implications of the Court being empowered to try international crimes 
such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (…)”.2072 This request was later 
strengthened, but not triggered, by the deterioration of the relationships between Africa and 
the ICC. In fact, the ICC Prosecutor decided to indict President Omar Al Bashir on 14 July 
2008 and obtained an arrest warrant against him on 4 March 2009. These ICC’s proceedings 
were connected for the first time to the project for the creation of the AU Criminal Court only 
in July 2009.2073 Therefore, it does not appear to be accurate to assert that the project for an 
African regional criminal court intended to be simply “a conscious snub to the ICC by the 
AU”.2074 The project was rather previous to the ICC crisis both in context (contestation of 
abusive application of universal jurisdiction) and remote origin (the late 1960s, 1970s and 
early 1980s). 
There were also changes in the law on which the establishment of the AU Criminal Court 
could be based. The aforementioned sovereign-oriented approach of the OAU has been 
mitigated by new principles and objectives enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act relating to 
human rights protection and the fight against impunity. It suffices to recall the Union’s right 
to intervene in a member state in the event of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. Moreover, the ACDEG has provided that “perpetrators of unconstitutional change of 
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government may also be tried before the competent Court of the Union”.2075 The creation of 
this court could also be founded on article 5 of the Constitutive Act which permits the AU 
Assembly to establish other organs of the Union in addition to those which are explicitly 
provided by the Constitutive Act.2076 The establishment of the AU Criminal Court is 
consistent with the UN Charter which promotes regionalism under Chapter VIII concerning 
“regional arrangements”. Finally, it is a truism that states are sovereign and free to establish 
any court they want for the purpose of prosecuting and trying collectively crimes that they 
consider of concern to all of them within their specific community,2077 regardless of whether 
these crimes are cross-border, transnational or international by nature. 
b) The Drafting Process of the Court’s Statute   
It was in July 2009 that the AU Assembly renewed its request of February 2009 to the AU 
Commission to examine the implications of the AfCHPR being empowered to try 
international crimes. The drafting process of the Court’s Statute started in January 2010 when 
the AU Commission contacted the Pan-African Lawyers Union (PALU) “to produce a 
detailed study with comprehensive recommendations and a draft legal instrument amending 
the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights”.2078  
The mandate given to PALU implies three observations. First of all, it was no longer the 
AfCHPR which was going to be given criminal jurisdiction but rather the AfCJHR whose 
founding treaty was not yet in force. This choice between the two courts was quite logical 
because the AfCHPR was transitionally working until the AfCJHR would become 
operational. Secondly, the proposed AU Criminal Court was indeed a proposition to include a 
third section within the AfCJHR by means of amendments to its founding treaty of July 2008 
and Statute annexed to it. The General Affairs Section and the Human Rights Section should 
therefore coexist with the International Criminal Law Section. Thirdly, the AU Commission 
chose to mandate PALU to draft the Court’s legal instrument instead of resorting to the 
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AUCIL. Yet, the AUCIL was already created2079 and its Statute adopted in February 2009. Its 
eleven members were appointed in July 2009,2080 while its first session took place from 3 to 6 
May 2010 in Addis Ababa.2081 In terms of technical expertise, the AUCIL was the best 
institution to draft the amendments to the Protocol of the Statute of the AfCJHR due to the 
highest qualification of its members who should have “recognised competence in international 
law”.2082 Instead, PALU is simply a civil society organisation founded in 2002 and gathering 
African lawyers and bar associations in view of advancing law and the legal profession, rule 
of law and socio-economic development in Africa. The choice by the AU Commission to 
consult such a private organisation rather than the AUCIL was made in the implementation of 
the Memorandum of Understanding Establishing the Framework for Cooperation and 
Collaboration between the AU and PALU, adopted in May 2006.2083 But, there were also 
some drawbacks. On the one hand, the choice of PALU implied additional financial costs for 
the AU Commission that could not have been paid should the work have been done by the 
AUCIL as an organ of the Union. On the other hand, and more important, the draft legal 
instrument to propose was inclined to a deficit of technical quality.  
Unsurprisingly, the drafting process of the Court’s legal instrument was very short. PALU 
submitted its first draft report and draft legal instrument to the AU Commission in June 
2010,2084 only 5 months after being contacted. The second submission was made in August 
2010 after the incorporation of directives and suggestions of the Office of the Legal Counsel 
of the AU Commission. PALU’s work was validated during workshops hosted by the Pan-
African Parliament in August and November 2010 with the participation of representatives of 
the AU (including the AU Commission and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council 
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(ECOSOCC)),2085 the RECs and private institutions such as the Centre for Human Rights of 
Pretoria University.2086 States were involved in the drafting process during the meeting of 
governmental experts, held in March, May and November 2011 in Addis Ababa, to discuss 
PALU’s draft report and draft legal instrument.2087 Another meeting of these experts was held 
in Addis Ababa from 7 to 11 May 2012. It was followed by the meeting of Ministers of 
Justice/Attorneys General on Legal Matters, attended by some 39 AU member states from 14 
to 15 May 2012, in order to finalise the draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the 
Statute of the AfCJHR.2088  
However, the AU Assembly was not in a position to adopt the draft legal instrument during 
the session of July 2012. The reason was that states did not yet agree on the definition of the 
crime of unconstitutional change of government, whether to include or not peoples’ uprisings 
within its constituent elements.2089 The issue emerged after the events that occurred in North 
Africa, in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, in the context of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011 and 
2012.2090 This time, the AU Commission was requested to obtain inputs from the AUCIL and 
the ACmHPR.2091   
Thus, a workshop was convened in Arusha (Tanzania) from 19 to 20 December 2012, 
gathering these three AU organs, to consider the controversial definition in question. As a 
result, it was proposed that where the PSC determined that “the change of government 
through popular uprising is not an unconstitutional change of government the Court shall not 
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be seized of the matter”.2092 In the end, the proposal was not approved by states during the 
meetings of the Specialised Technical Committee (STC) on Justice and Legal Affairs, held in 
Addis Ababa from 6 to 14 May 2014 (experts), and from 15 to 16 May 2014 (ministerial 
level).2093 Due to the lack of consensus, the popular uprising was simply deleted in the final 
daft Protocol that was submitted to the AU Assembly and adopted by it in Malabo (Equatorial 
Guinea) on 27 June 2014.2094 It is this so-called Malabo Protocol which establishes what is 
generically referred to as the AU Criminal Court. The Malabo Protocol is not just a “protest 
treaty”2095 against the global system of international criminal justice. As a mechanism of 
judicial self-reliance, it could extend the reach of international criminal justice in Africa in 
view of the broader list of crimes included and in regard to contracting states that may not be 
parties to the ICC Statute; what is potentially a good thing. 
2.1.3.2. The Status of the Court 
In creating a judicial institution of an international character, there are preliminary issues 
relating to its status which must be carefully considered. Such issues include two main 
questions about the AU Criminal Court. First, what did inform the decision to establish a 
permanent rather than a non-permanent jurisdiction? Second, did the AU follow a maximalist 
approach in establishing a single court or a minimalist approach, implying that this 
jurisdiction would coexist with several other tribunals established and having primacy over it 
in the framework of the RECs? These two questions were not scrutinised during the drafting 
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process of the Malabo Protocol. The mere creation of the International Criminal Law Section 
of the AfCJHR has given birth to a giant and complex court’s system. This complexity relates 
to the default to opt for one single court for the African continent (a) and to the establishment 
of a permanent rather than a non-permanent criminal jurisdiction (b). 
a) The Case for a Single Regional Criminal Jurisdiction for Africa  
The starting point of the debate is the AU decision of July 2009 which indicated that the 
proposed AU Criminal Court “would be complementary to national jurisdiction and processes 
for fighting impunity”.2096 No reference was made to tribunals other than domestic courts. 
Surprisingly, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) provides: “The jurisdiction of the Court shall be 
complementary to that of the National Courts and to the Courts of the Regional Economic 
Communities where specifically provided for by the Communities”.2097 The reasons why the 
drafters have departed from the original will of the AU Assembly to include jurisdictions of 
RECs in the system of the AU Criminal Court are not specified in the travaux préparatoires. 
But, one may suppose that the Malabo Protocol (Annex) espouses the minimalist approach to 
Pan-Africanism and African regionalism.  
The meaning of the minimalist approach is closely related to controversies over the way in 
which African unity and so Pan-Africanism should be achieved. The Conference of African 
Independent States, held in Accra (Ghana) on 15 April 1958, had particularly insisted on 
uniting all African states in one continental organisation. In this organisation, African unity 
could have been based on three objectives according to President Kwame N’krumah: 
economic integration, common foreign policy, common defence and a united government of 
Africa.2098 This maximalist approach to Pan-Africanism suggested that multiplication of 
regional groupings was a factor of division of African states depending on geography, 
colonial history and so linguistic and economic ties. Instead, the Conference of African 
peoples, which took place in Accra from 5 to 13 December 1959, was reluctant to a policy of 
continentalisation. While agreeing with the necessity for African unity, the Conference 
concluded that states should first and foremost create specific groupings on the bases of their 
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location, economic, linguistic and cultural connections as initial steps towards the realisation 
of continental unity, the ultimate objective.2099 In other words, and for the first time, it was 
agreed that continentalisation should be progressively realised, step by step, through the 
division of Africa into different regions and state groupings.2100 These two visions were 
confronted during the Conference of Addis Ababa for the creation of the OAU in 1963. The 
proponents of immediate continentalisation constituted the so-called progressist group, led by 
Presidents Kwame N’krumah (Ghana) and Sekou Touré (Guinea/Conakry). The other group 
consisted of the so-called realist states, led by Presidents Félix Houphouët Boigny and 
Léopold Sédar Senghor (Senegal). At the end of negotiations, a compromise was found. The 
OAU Charter provided for a minimum cooperation between states at the continental level. 
States would have to consolidate their independence before embarking progressively on the 
path of Africa’s integration. They were also free to create their specific regional groupings in 
conformity with relevant criteria defined by the OAU Council of Ministers in August 
1963.2101 This minimalist approach therefore leaves minor powers to the continental level but 
tends to include regions as primary spaces from which African unity has to be built and 
realised. The coexistence between continental and regional institutions is its main 
characteristic. This logic persists with the advent of the AU. President Kwame N’krumah’s 
maximalist approach was revived by Muhammar Kadhafi, who was defending the 
establishment of the United States of Africa.2102 But, views from the majority of states such as 
Nigeria and South Africa were in favour of the minimalist position.2103 In any case, if the 
continental level is vested with more power in the framework of the AU than it was under the 
OAU, it is still a fact that RECs remain the pillars of Africa’s integration.  
The drafters of the Malabo Protocol seem to have followed the minimalist approach: the AU 
Criminal Court should coexist with courts of justice of RECs, the latter having even 
jurisdictional primacy over it. This position can be politically justified. However, the 
implication of such courts in criminal matters is likely to render justice difficult to 
administrate. First of all, the financial burden to operationalise the AU Criminal Court 
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become aggravated owing to the costs that states must pay to make other potential eight 
criminal jurisdictions attached to those recognised RECs effective. Secondly, states normally 
belong to more than a REC. For example, the DRC is a member of three RECs: SADC, 
COMESA and ECCAS. It is not excluded that it consents to their respective criminal 
jurisdictions. In such a situation, the multiple memberships to RECs reduce the state capacity 
to contribute substantially to the funding of common and duplicated criminal institutions. 
Thirdly, and more important, there are technical drawbacks. On the one hand, the AU 
Criminal Court may prove to be in fact useless due to the lack of cases to handle. This is 
because of the double complementarity principle established by the Malabo Protocol (Annex), 
requiring that the Court intervenes only when states fail to carry out investigations and 
prosecutions against the alleged perpetrators, and when the case is not or has not been 
prosecuted or tried before a regional court of justice. On the other hand, the Malabo Protocol 
(Annex) creates unnecessary competing criminal jurisdictions. In this regard, “the question is 
which of the RECs’ courts should be considered for the purposes of the complementarity 
principle where the national state of an accused person holds multiple memberships”.2104 The 
Malabo Protocol (Annex) is dramatically silent on the possible coordination of these courts 
and their mutual cooperation.       
After all, there are two additional reasons why the Malabo Protocol (Annex) should have 
opted for the maximalist approach. First, the proper dynamic of African regionalism towards 
continental unification shows that RECs are themselves in a process of rationalisation. They 
have been grouped into two main regional blocs of integration in order to avoid duplication of 
objectives, programs and institutions in view of reaching in time “the final stage of the 
political and economic integration of the continent”.2105 One of these blocs is constituted by 
SADC-COMESA-EAC-IGAD and the other by ECOWAS-ECCAS-AMU-CEN-SADC.2106 
                                                 
2104 A. Abass, ‘Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa: Rationale, Prospects and Challenges’, 24 (3) 
European Journal of International Law (2013) 933–946, at 945. 
2105 African Union Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact, Article 4 (d). 
2106 Assembly/AU/Dec.392(XVIII), Decision on African Integration (Doc: EX.CL/693(XX)), 18th Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), 29-30 January 2012, para.7; 
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Therefore, whereas there is a will to speed up the process of integration towards continental 
unification, the trend which consists of creating and increasing the number of regional 
institutions runs against this backdrop. Second, in 2012, it was envisaged to create an arbitral 
section within the AfCJHR as part of the institutional mechanism of the proposed Continental 
Free Trade Area (CFTA).2107 For the first time, one jurisdiction was foreseen to be relevant 
for the settlement of disputes on the continent without any role being left to courts of justice 
of RECs.2108 Due to all the drawbacks mentioned above, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) could 
follow the same dynamic of unification. The AU had the power to make such an institutional 
rationalisation and harmonisation. 
b) The Case for a Permanent or Non-Permanent Court    
As a reminder, the AU Assembly chose to confer criminal jurisdiction on the AfCJHPR rather 
than creating a separate criminal tribunal comparable to an ICC made in Africa. This choice 
was quite logical because, as stated above, it was already decided in 2004 to merge the AU’s 
existing courts as a matter of institutional rationalisation and for reducing financial costs. 
Creating a separate criminal jurisdiction could have been in contradiction with this policy.2109 
Nevertheless, the form of the criminal jurisdiction to create was not thoroughly considered 
during the drafting process of the Malabo Protocol.  
Like the Court itself, its International Criminal Law Section shall be permanent. This means 
that the criminal jurisdiction will be also exercised permanently. In other words, the Court is 
not designed to deal with particular situations with a limited mandate in time. But, its 
permanence is to some extent mitigated by the fact that the Court shall sit in ordinary or extra-
ordinary sessions,2110 and so judges will perform their functions on a part-time basis.2111 Only 
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the periods of its ordinary sessions. 3. Extraordinary sessions shall be convened by the President or at the request 
of the majority of the Judges’. 
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“the President and Vice President reside at the seat of the Court”.2112 However, for a 
permanent criminal jurisdiction, it is hard to imagine that sessions would permit criminal 
judges to be out of the seat of the Court during a large period of the year like their 
counterparts sitting in the General Affairs and Human Rights Sections. The reason is that 
criminal justice is a matter of daily administration, particularly if the accused persons are in 
detention. The procedure is characterised by a high degree of oral submission and publicity 
before the Court. Hence, procedural motions to be dealt with and the length of hearings must 
make these judges almost permanent at the seat of the Court like the President and Vice-
President. The OTP which shall not only support the accusation before the Court but also 
monitor situations occurring on the continent will also be necessarily permanent. The same 
observation applies to the Registry which shall be responsible for the administration of the 
Court,2113 in addition to its traditional judicial mission to record the Court’s hearings. This 
permanent character of the Court will imply enormous financial costs for African states. Yet, 
the AU has wanted to avoid these costs through the rationalisation of its institutions.   
Another judicial option was possible: the creation of a non-permanent criminal jurisdiction. 
The Malabo Protocol (Annex) could include article 19(2) of the Protocol of the Court of 
Justice of the AU of July 2003, which was deleted without justification in the Protocol on the 
Statute of the AfCJHR of July 2008. This article provided that the AU Assembly could confer 
on the Court jurisdiction over any dispute other than those referred to in its first paragraph.2114 
The term any dispute could be given a broad meaning in order to cover criminal matters. For 
example, such conferral of jurisdiction could be decided on matters in which competent states 
remain inactive or that engender an international dispute as it has been observed in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
2111 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Article 5(4). 
2112 Ibid., Article 22 (5). 
2113 Ibid., Article 22B (5).  
2114 Article 19(2) of this Protocol reads as follows: ‘1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over all disputes and 
applications referred to it in accordance with the Act and this Protocol which relate to: (a) the interpretation and 
application of the Act; (b) the interpretation, application or validity of Union treaties and all subsidiary legal 
instruments adopted within the framework of the Union; (c) any question of international law; (d) all acts, 
decisions, regulations and directives of the organs of the Union; (e) all matters specifically provided for in any 
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jurisdiction on the Court; (f) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an 
obligation owed to a State Party or to the Union; (g) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the 
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429 
Hissène Habré case. In this scenario, the AU Criminal Court could have received the function 
analogues to that of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal, intervening only in exceptional 
circumstances when a particular situation was referred to it. If the Malabo Protocol (Annex) 
could still have to provide for the applicable law in such circumstances, it was not necessary 
to institutionalise a permanent criminal jurisdiction as described above. Rather, the AU 
needed to appoint a Special Prosecutor attached to the Court, vested with the mandate to 
monitor and investigate permanently situations all over Africa. It could have been up to this 
Special Prosecutor to identify situations or cases which could deserve regional judicial action 
and to recommend to the AU Assembly or the PSC either to refer the matter to the Court or to 
choose any other option of regional criminal justice mentioned above, that is, to delegate 
jurisdiction to a third member state or to create a hybrid criminal tribunal. The involvement of 
the AU Assembly or the PSC as political bodies in this system of justice could not hamper 
justice. Firstly, this involvement could be a test of good faith on the part of the AU to fight 
impunity. Secondly, at least for crimes falling under its competence, the ICC’s eyes would be 
also permanent in a manner that when a situation or a case is not dealt with by the competent 
state or the AU, there would be no reason to complain about its intervention to deliver justice. 
In this regard, the AU Special Prosecutor could work hand in hand with the ICC Prosecutor 
and exchange judicial information, documents and evidence. Likewise, if the AU decided to 
resort to any of the three models of regional criminal jurisdiction, the ICC could support the 
proceedings in the same manner or even more and up to providing financial assistance.  
This kind of non-permanent criminal jurisdiction had several advantages as a matter of 
judicial policy. First, it gives a margin of appreciation to the AU Assembly to decide, on a 
case-by-case basis, whether to trigger the regional criminal jurisdiction or not. In this process 
of decision-making, various factors could be put into consideration, including the political 
sensibility of a situation or a case to be taken out of Africa and the availability of financial 
means. Second, it would avoid unnecessary conflicts with the ICC. This is important because 
there has been a perception that calls for the establishment of the AU Criminal Court “are 
manifestly meant to detract from the progressive development of international criminal 
justice”.2115 Third, the exercise of regional criminal jurisdiction would remain very 
exceptional. Positive cooperation would be strengthened between the ICC and the AU through 
its Special Prosecutor. The operations of this kind of regional criminal jurisdiction would be 
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less heavy to sustain than the institution established by the Malabo Protocol which poses 
questions about its viability.    
2.2. The Viability of the Criminal Court of the African Union 
The Malabo Protocol was badly drafted. This lack of technical quality has increased 
skepticisms about the viability of the AU Criminal Court in addition to initial concerns over 
the alleged will of African states to undermine the ICC justice system. Max Du Plessis has 
qualified this kind of law-making as “a case of irresponsible treaty making”.2116 There are 
several reasons to believe that the Court’s viability could be undermined if there is not 
sufficient political will to support its mandate or if the legal framework is not improved. 
These reasons relate to conditions of the Court’s operationalisation (2.2.1), the ambition of its 
jurisdiction (2.2.2), the existence of a number of factors that can hamper its work (2.2.3) and 
the need for effective cooperation with African states (2.2.4). 
2.2.1. The Conditions of Operationalisation 
There are three conditions to fulfill so that the AU Criminal Court becomes operational: the 
ratification of the Malabo Protocol (2.2.1.1), the operationalisation of the Court’s structure 
(2.2.1.2) and the completion of the definition of its applicable law (2.2.1.3).   
2.2.1.1. The Ratification of the Malabo Protocol 
A short reminder of the succession of AU courts is important to understand the issue of 
ratification of the Malabo Protocol. The AfCHPR was created by the Ouagadougou Protocol 
in June 1998. In 2000, the Constitutive Act established the AU Court of Justice, organised by 
the Protocol of July 2003. The merge of the two courts gave birth to the AfCJHR, created by 
the Protocol in July 2008. The Malabo Protocol of June 2014, by granting criminal 
jurisdiction to the latter Court, changed its name. It became the African Court of Justice and 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCJHPR).2117 In view of this complexity of the succession of 
courts, Don Deya, the former Chief Executive of PALU, wrote:  
There are two points to make with regard to the succession of Courts. The first is that the second 
and third Courts might never be practically established. There could very easily be a ‘transition’ 
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from the existing Court to the fourth Court. The second point is that future phases of the Court do 
not hinder operationalisation of the current phases of the Court. Thus, the existing African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights – based in Arusha, Tanzania – will continue to function according 
to its founding Protocol until the envisaged ‘Merged’ Court comes into being. But if the ‘Merger’ 
Protocol never comes into force, then the Human and Peoples’ Rights Court will continue to 
operate as it does now. Similarly, the ‘Merged’ Court would – once established – continue to 
function according to its founding Protocol until the eventual tri-mandate, African Court of Justice 
and Human and Peoples’ Rights comes into being. But if this fourth Court is never created, then 
the third Court would continue as is. This is a pragmatic compromise.2118 
The Malabo Protocol “shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of instruments of 
ratification by fifteen (15) Member States”.2119 However, it has to be noted that it amended 
the Protocol of July 2008 which was not yet in force, whereas the better course could have 
been to re-write the instrument and avoid a useless overlapping of protocols. To be clear, one 
must observe that the Malabo Protocol is not an independent treaty because its sole 
ratification would not suffice to allow the Court to start working without the entry into force 
of the founding Protocol of July 2008. Therefore, it is not sure if a state which ratifies the 
Protocol of July 2008 will consent to the Malabo Protocol as well. Similarly, those states 
which only ratify the Malabo Protocol may remain outside the Court’s jurisdiction if they do 
not also consent to the founding Protocol of July 2008. 
Still, there are some serious doubts whether African states will be ready to ratify the Malabo 
Protocol and to leave free hands to the AfCJHPR to exercise independently its criminal 
jurisdiction. This is because many of these states do not accept individual access to judicial 
mechanisms for human rights protection. There are various attempts to prevent a number of 
African regional courts from reviewing human rights complaints.2120 The most important 
example is the suspension of the SADC Tribunal in 2010 due to the increasing and successful 
individual petitions against member states, notably Zimbabwe, following disputes over 
arbitrary land seizure.2121 In August 2012, Heads of States gathered in Maputo (Mozambique) 
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extended this suspension and decided to expunge disputes between member states and 
individuals from the competences of the Tribunal.2122 In February 2013, the decision was 
transformed into a draft agreement which was consolidated in the new Protocol of the 
Tribunal laying down its composition, powers, functions, procedures and other related 
matters,2123 adopted in Victoria Falls (Zimbabwe) on 18 August 2014.2124 Likewise, as at 
August 2017, only 8 states out of thirty that have ratified the Ouagadougou Protocol (Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Mali, Malawi, Tanzania and Tunisia) have accepted the 
jurisdiction of the AfCHPR with respect to individual petitions.2125 Worse, Rwanda, the 
champion of contestations against the application of universal jurisdiction and the ICC, 
decided to withdraw its declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive such 
petitions on 29 February 2016.2126 The decision was taken following a claim against Rwanda 
by a leading opposition politician, Victoire Ingabire, alleging that she had been imprisoned for 
genocide denial in violation of the ACHPR and for political reasons.2127 While this 
withdrawal decision had no consequence on the Ingabire’s complaint insofar as it could not 
affect the pending case retroactively, Rwanda decided to boycott the Court’s hearings which 
were scheduled to start on 27 March 2017.2128  Thus, if most African states cannot even 
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consent to individual human rights litigation before the AfCHPR, it is likely that they will not 
a fortiori ratify the Malabo Protocol. The AU Criminal Court may become a still-born 
criminal jurisdiction or could take many years before it becomes operational. 
2.2.1.2. The Operationalisation of the Court’s Structure  
One of the biggest challenges to overcome is to make operational the whole complex structure 
of the AfCJHPR. As already stated, the Court has three sections: General Affairs Section, 
Human, and Peoples’ Rights Section and International Criminal Law Section. This tripartite 
mixture of competences is unprecedent in the world. Unlike the ICC which is an 
intergovernmental organisation, the AfCJHPR is an organ of the Union. Its International 
Criminal Law Section which shall be competent to hear all cases relating to the crimes falling 
within the Court’s jurisdiction is structured on the basis of the ICC’s model. It consists of 
three chambers: Pre-Trial Chamber, Trial Chamber and Appellate Chamber.2129 The bureau of 
the Court is constituted by a President and a Vice President elected by the judges between 
themselves for a term of two years, renewable once.2130 But, each judge is in principle elected 
by the AU Assembly for nine years.2131 The Pre-Trial Chamber has various powers.2132 It 
shall decide whether to authorise investigations into alleged crimes or not. It shall also decide 
on issues of the Court’s jurisdiction and admissibility of cases, issue arrest warrants against 
the accused persons or other judicial orders (e.g. for the protection of witnesses, victims and 
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Trial Chamber are provided for in other different Articles above.   
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arrested persons, as well as the presentation of evidence) on the request of the Prosecutor or 
the defence council. However, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) is silent on the modalities of 
challenging either the Court’s jurisdiction or the admissibility of cases, particularly on the 
crucial issue of who should have standing to submit an application in this respect: states 
parties, the accused, the REcs, etc. Maybe, these flaws could be covered by the Court’s Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence. 
In contrast, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) has made some progress by omitting the stage of 
confirmation of charges, which is one of the principal causes of very lengthy trials and 
resources consumption before the ICC.2133 This stage of procedure did not exist at the ICTY 
and ICTR. Cases will have to be brought before the Trial Chamber of the AU Criminal Court 
immediately after investigations. The Trial Chamber shall try the accused persons or receive 
and examine appeals against decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber. The Trial Chamber’s 
judgments shall be challenged before the Appeals Chamber. During the trial, a person accused 
shall have the right to represent himself or herself in person or through an agent.2134 This is a 
significant departure from the ICC’s legal framework, as amended in 2013, which allows 
representation of the accused person only if, owing to his extraordinary public duties at the 
highest national level, he gets an excuse from presence at trial.2135  
There is also the OTP, led by a Prosecutor and assisted by two Deputy Prosecutors,2136 elected 
by the AU Assembly. While the Prosecutor enjoys a non-renewable term of seven years, his 
Deputies are elected for four years terms, renewable once. The OTP shall be responsible for 
the investigation and prosecution of crimes and act independently as a separate organ of the 
Court.2137 Unlike the ICC Statute, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) also provides for a Defence 
Office, led by the Principal Defender, who is vested with equal status to that of the 
Prosecutor. He shall be appointed by the AU Assembly, but the Malabo Protocol (Annex) 
does not specify any term for his function. This implies that he could be removed ad nutum by 
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the AU Assembly. Such a potential instability of the Principal Defender’s position is likely to 
undermine his independence. The main function of the Defence Office consists of “protecting 
the rights of the defence, providing support and assistance to defence counsel and to the 
persons entitled to legal assistance, including, where appropriate, legal research, collection of 
evidence and advice, and appearing before the Chamber in respect of specific issues”.2138 
The Registry comprises a Registrar and two Assistant Registrars, who shall be appointed by 
the Court itself, respectively for a non-renewable term of seven years and four years, 
renewable once. The Registry includes two main units. The first one is the Victims and 
Witnesses Unit, the function of which consists of ensuring “protective measures and security 
arrangements, counselling and other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who appear 
before the Court and others who are at risk on account of testimony given by such 
witnesses”.2139 This Unit is one of the pillars of the protection of victim’s rights,2140  beside 
the Trust Fund which is established in order cover the costs of “legal aid and assistance and 
for the benefit of victims of crimes or human rights violations and their families”.2141 The 
second one is the Detention and Management Unit, which shall manage the conditions of 
detention of accused and convicted persons.2142   
As one may observe, the whole structure of the AU Criminal Court implies some challenges 
to overcome for the Court to become fully operational. Of course the appointment on different 
positions within the Court is not difficult. But, there is a problem with the number of judges, 
who are only 16 for the three Court’s Sections, compared to 18 judges acting for the ICC 
alone with a limited substantive jurisdiction. It has been posited that the International 
Criminal Law Section could face some difficulties to sit because of a lack of judges. The 
opinion was first developed by Max Du Plessis and then followed by Amnesty 
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International.2143 These commentators based their position on the premise that six of those 
judges were the only available human resources for the International Criminal Section. Thus, 
at the beginning of the drafting process of the Malabo Protocol, Max Du Plessis warned: 
(…) the draft protocol already stipulates the quorum for the various chambers of the ICL section: 
the pre-trial chamber shall be duly constituted by one judge; the trial chamber shall be constituted 
by three judges and the appellate chamber by five judges. It is clear that the six ICL judges will 
find themselves spread so thinly over these three chambers as to jeopardise any thought of speedy 
justice. More problematic is a question of mathematics (…) One judge would preside in the pre-
trial chamber, and she could not then preside in the other two chambers in respect of the same 
case; another three would then preside in the trial-chamber; and a further (and different) five 
would have to be available to sit in any appeal. A full criminal trial and appeal, involving each of 
the designated chambers, would accordingly require nine judges, three more than the total 
allotment of ICL judges appointed to the court’s ICL section. In short, there are not enough judges 
necessary to do anything close to the justice (…).2144    
However, this position found no audience on the part of the drafters of the Malabo Protocol, 
probably because it was unconvincing. In fact, the premise of the position makes confusion 
between the conditions for electing judges and their allocation to the Court’s sections and 
chambers. The Malabo Protocol (Annex) does provide that six of the 16 judges of the Court 
will belong to the International Criminal Law Section, but that they are elected on the list of 
candidates C, having expertise in international criminal law.2145 And five judges each shall be 
elected from amongst the candidates on lists A and B, having expertise in international law (in 
general) and international human rights as well as humanitarian law respectively.2146 The 
quorum of judges for the sections and the chambers is a different issue. The Malabo Protocol 
(Annex) clearly specifies: 
The General Affairs Section of the Court shall be duly constituted by three (3) judges. The Human 
and Peoples’ Rights Section of the Court shall be duly constituted by three (3) judges. The Pre-
Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Law Section of the Court shall be duly constituted by 
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2146 Ibid., Article 4 (1) (i)-(ii) and (3). 
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one (1) judge. The Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Law Section of the Court shall be 
duly constituted by three (3) judges. The Appellate Chamber of the International Criminal Law 
Section of the Court shall be duly constituted by five (5) judges.2147  
Mathematically, six judges will be available for the General Affairs and Human and Peoples’ 
Rights Sections, and nine out of 16 judges for the International Criminal Law Section. One 
judge will remain at the disposal of the Court. Nevertheless, these numbers presuppose that 
judges may have to deal with a lot of cases because chambers could not be multiplied due to 
staff insufficiency. It is also supposed that there would not be sick judges or otherwise 
prevented from sitting with the Court. 
Finally, the Court must have facilities for its new structure. This includes a detention house. 
All this is a matter of financial issues that are examined below. Maybe, upon agreement, the 
Court could utilise the detention houses of the hosting state before being granted its own 
facilities.  
2.2.1.3. The Completion of the Definition of the Court’s Applicable Law 
The Malabo Protocol (Annex) does not contain any provision on applicable law by the AU 
Criminal Court. This silence is similar to that of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes. But, for these 
ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the silence was understandable since they were set up 
as temporal judicial mechanisms to enforce, in particular circumstances, existing customary 
international law and general principles of law pursuant to their Statutes. In this regard, judges 
had a broad margin of discretion to the judges to identify the content of such applicable law to 
concrete cases brought before the tribunals. This was a challenging task to accomplish beyond 
any doubt, in particular because the existence of international customary law remained 
“difficult to demonstrate given the widespread impunity of grave human rights violations”2148 
over the years. In contrast, in order to ensure more compliance with the principle of legality, 
the discretion of judges in the determination of applicable law is limited before the ICC as 
provided for in article 21 of the Rome Statute.2149 Hybrid tribunals also followed a different 
                                                 
2147 Ibid., Article 10. 
2148 K. Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law – Volume I: Foundations and General Part (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), at 76. 
2149 This Article provides: ‘1. The Court shall apply: (a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence; (b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the 
principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed 
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practice. Their specific nature implies that at least the domestic legislation to apply is clearly 
specified.2150 
In order to cover the silence of the Malabo Protocol (Annex), it may be useful to resort to the 
Protocol on the Statute of the AfCJHR that it amended. Article 31 of the latter Protocol 
provides: 
1. In carrying out its functions, the Court shall have regard to: 
a) The Constitutive Act; 
b) International treaties, whether general or particular, ratified by the contesting 
States; 
c) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
d) The general principles of law recognized universally or by African States; 
e) Subject to the provisions of paragraph 1, of Article 46 of the present Statute, judicial decisions 
and writings of the most highly qualified publicists of various nations as well as the regulations, 
directives and decisions of the Union, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of 
law; 
f) Any other law relevant to the determination of the case. 
2. This Article shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the 
parties agree thereto. 
This article is however modeled on article 38 of the ICJ Statute providing for sources of law 
in general international law. While these sources are also applicable in international criminal 
law,2151 the specificity of the latter discipline must be taken into consideration: the need for 
clarity, certainty and hierarchy of sources of law as a requirement of the principle of 
                                                                                                                                                        
conflict;(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the 
world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the 
crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and 
internationally recognized norms and standards. 2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as 
interpreted in its previous decisions. 3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be 
consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on 
grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, 
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status’. 
2150 See SCSL Statute, Article 5; EAC Statute, Articles 16 and 22; Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea, with inclusion of amendments as promulgated on 27 October 2004, Articles 2 and 3; Regulation 
No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences within 
the District Court in Dili in East Timor, Section 3.  
2151 Cassese, above note 210, at 26. 
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legality.2152 This is the reason why article 21 of the ICC Statute establishes “a three-tiered 
hierarchy”2153 of sources of applicable law. In the first place, the ICC applies its Statute, 
Elements of Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. If there are lacunae, it applies 
in the second place “applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, 
including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict”. It is admitted 
that this second source of applicable law before the ICC includes all the primary sources of 
law mentioned in article 38 of the ICJ Statute, that is, treaties, customs and general principles 
of law,2154 apart from principles that can be derived from national law.2155 If there is still some 
lacuna, then the ICC is authorised to apply “general principles of law derived by the Court 
from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws 
of states that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime”. The difference between 
these two kinds of general principles of law may lead to some confusion.2156 General 
principles that are derived from national systems “require analysis and comparison of national 
law. Reversely, those which underlie the international system do not consider national law but 
are instead based on the fundamental features and the basic requirement of international 
criminal justice”.2157 
It is obvious that article 31 of the Protocol on the Statute of the AfCJHR does not specify any 
hierarchy of sources of applicable law. Its wording is also more general to meet the clarity 
requirement of international criminal law. The AU Constitutive Act is even quoted before 
other sources, and eventually before the Malabo Protocol (Annex) which must be included in 
the category of “international treaties, whether general or particular”. Yet, it is well known 
that each international criminal court should first pay regard to its Statute as applicable 
                                                 
2152 Ibid. See also M. M. deGuzman, ‘Article 21: Applicable Law’, in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos (eds), The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (3rd edn., München/Oxford/Baden Baden: 
C.H. Beck/Hart/ Nomos, 2016) 932-948, at 933 
2153 W. A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (3rd edn., Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), at 195. 
2154 Ibid., at 196. 
2155 DeGuzman, above note 2152, at 940. 
2156 D. Akande, ‘Sources of International Criminal Law’, A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to 
International Criminal Justice (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 41-53, at 51. 
2157 Ibid, at 52. See also F. O. Raimondo, General Principles of Law in the Decisions of International Criminal 
Courts and Tribunals (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), at 1. 
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law.2158 The Statute is crucial for an international tribunal because it sets out its structure and 
defines its temporal, personal and substantive jurisdiction.2159 It also provides for some 
procedures, such as the interplay between the tribunal, states (parties) and their domestic 
courts. Furthermore, article 31 (f) of the Protocol on the Statute of the AfCJHR refers to a 
more ambiguous applicable law: “any other law relevant to the determination of the case”.  
On the whole, these legal deficiencies imply that the Malabo Protocol (Annex) should include 
a specific provision on applicable law. Moreover, there is a necessity to draft and adopt not 
only the Elements of Crimes falling under its substantive jurisdiction but also its Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. The Elements of Crimes must clarify the content and understanding 
of the constituent elements of each crime. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence must regulate 
the conduct of the pre-trial phase proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, 
the procedures relating to the protection of witnesses and victims as well as any other 
appropriate matters which may not be determined by the Court’s Statute. These legal 
instruments (Statute annexed to the Malabo Protocol, Elements of Crimes and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence) shall constitute the law that the AU Criminal Court will have to 
apply in the first place. Their complete availability is the primary condition for the Court’s 
technical operationalisation.    
It is not known who can adopt the Elements of Crimes for the AU Criminal Court, whereas 
the adoption of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence apparently belongs to the Court itself.2160 
This role granted to the Court to adopt its Rules is similar to the power conferred on the 
judges of ad hoc international criminal tribunals.2161 For the ICC, these legal instruments were 
adopted by the ASP. However, there is not any similar organ within the structure of the AU 
Criminal Court. To be logical, the Elements of Crimes should also be adopted by the Court. A 
problem would arise only with respect to issues of legitimacy of a Court to legislate on behalf 
of states parties. It has to be reminded that this is the reason why the power to adopt the two 
legal instruments was given to the ASP within the ICC justice system. 
                                                 
2158 Akande, above note 2156, at 44. 
2159 Ibid. 
2160 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, Article 27. This Article reads: ‘1. 
The Court shall adopt rules for carrying out its functions and the implementation of the present Statute. In 
particular, it shall lay down its own Rules. 2. In elaborating its Rules, the Court shall bear in mind the 
complementarity it maintains with the African Commission and the African Committee of Experts’.  
2161 ICTY Statute, Article 15; ICTR Statute, Article 14. 
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2.2.2. The Ambitious Jurisdiction of he Court  
The jurisdiction of the AU Criminal Court is very ambitious compared to that of the ICC. This 
ambition can be seen in regard to the broad list of crimes within the Court’s substantive 
competence (2.2.2.1), the admission of corporate criminal liability (2.2.2.2) and the trigger 
mechanisms of the Court’s jurisdiction (2.2.2.3). 
2.2.2.1. The Broad List of Crimes Covered 
The AU Criminal Court will have jurisdiction over 14 different crimes: four ICC crimes 
(aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) and ten more crimes 
(unconstitutional change of government, piracy, terrorism, mercenarism, corruption, money 
laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in drugs, trafficking in hazardous wastes, illicit 
exploitation of natural resources). The legal criteria which were taken into account to include 
such an extensive list of crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction were not specified. However, 
Dona Deya has explained: 
(…) these crimes incorporate all the elements contained in the Rome Statute, as it represents the 
consensus of the international community. This (Amendment) Protocol gives effect to the 
requirement of the ACDEG for the speedy formulation of a new crime of ‘unconstitutional change 
of government’ in Africa. This (Amendment) Protocol provides for other serious crimes of concern 
to African States and the international community, especially those already addressed in Treaties 
and Protocols of the African Union and of the RECs (…).2162 
The statement shows that there were apparently two criteria for incorporating these crimes. 
The first criterion was the necessity to include ICC crimes in the Malabo Protocol (Annex). 
But, as already demonstrated, the Malabo Protocol has expanded the definitions of these 
crimes and so contributes to the progressive development of international criminal law. The 
second criterion consisted of taking into account crimes that were already incorporated in 
specific African treaties. The drafters of the Malabo Protocol largely copied the provisions of 
these treaties with more or less some progressive development in the case of unconstitutional 
change of government, terrorism, mercenarism, corruption, money laundering, trafficking in 
hazardous wastes and illicit exploitation of natural resources. However, the definitions of 
piracy, trafficking in persons and trafficking in drugs were drawn from other universal 
treaties. This method of copying provisions from other treaties implies two main drawbacks.  
                                                 
2162 Deya, above note 2078, at 25. 
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First, concerning specific African treaties, crimes were incorporated into the Malabo Protocol 
(Annex) whereas not all AU member states were parties to each of them or domesticated the 
definitions provided for therein.2163 This raises a problem of legitimacy of the crimes 
concerned at the continental level. It may hamper accession to the Malabo Protocol for those 
states which are not yet ready to accept such definitions. Furthermore, if the AU Criminal 
Court becomes operational, there is a potential that its substantive jurisdiction will be 
interpreted with due regard to treaties that a state party may not have yet ratified. This is a 
serious lack of logic in the process of regional law-making.  
Second, the copying approach has resulted in the duplication of modes of criminal 
responsibility. For example, article 28G (b) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) punishes any 
promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, 
threat, conspiracy, organising, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any 
act of terrorism. Likewise, article 28F (c) incriminates any act of inciting or of intentionally 
facilitating an act of piracy. Yet, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) provides for similar modes of 
criminal responsibility in article 28N as follows:  
An offence is committed by any person who, in relation to any of the crimes or offences provided 
for in this Statute: 
i. Incites, instigates, organizes, directs, facilitates, finances, counsels or participates as a 
principal, co-principal, agent or accomplice in any of the offences set forth in the present Statute; 
ii. Aids or abets the commission of any of the offences set forth in the present Statute; 
iii. Is an accessory before or after the fact or in any other manner participates in a collaboration 
or conspiracy to commit any of the offences set forth in the present Statute; 
iv. Attempts to commit any of the offences set forth in the present Statute. 
Therefore, it can be considered that article 28N contains general provisions on criminal 
responsibility while the specific articles on crimes in question constitute special rules. In 
terms of interpretation, the special rules will prevail over the general provisions in case of 
conflict.    
Nevertheless, the expanded substantive jurisdiction remains controversial. Some 
commentators have argued that the list of crimes is too broad for a Court that is already heavy 
due to its mandate and runs the risk of facing tremendous financial and human resources 
                                                 
2163 Jeßberger, above note 1878, at 77. 
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constraints.2164 But, the position is unconvincing. It can be argued that the jurisdictional 
overreach does not necessarily mean that there are too many cases to try. Since the Court is a 
continental one, with complementary jurisdiction to national tribunals, the number of cases 
brought before it would be sensibly reduced. If complementarity with the courts of justice of 
RECs becomes effective, the AU Criminal Court may even miss cases to try which have not 
been dealt with by these RECs, when domestic tribunals fail to exercise their primary 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) contains a general clause restricting 
the Court’s intervention to cases of “sufficient gravity”.2165 This gravity threshold must be 
clearly determined by the Court in order to avoid prosecutions or trials of complaisance and to 
overwhelm the judges uselessly. Concerning the crimes of corruption and illicit exploitation 
of natural resources, there is an additional restriction, requiring that the Court proceeds if only 
the punishable acts in question are “of a serious nature affecting the stability of a state, region 
or the Union”.2166 It is submitted that this criterion must be understood in the sense of the AU 
Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact which defines destabilisation as “any act that 
disrupts the peace and tranquility of any member state or which may lead to mass social and 
political disorder”.2167 
Other commentators argue that the expanded substantive jurisdiction reflects the quotidian 
problems affecting the African continent.2168 In this regard, the Kenyan NGO, Kenyans for 
Peace with Truth and Justice, has posited:   
An important rationale for placing these crimes on the same level as the so-called ‘core’ 
international crimes is that many of them are capable of destabilising a state, which in turn leads to 
the proliferation of core international crimes. For example, several of the civil wars in Africa were 
                                                 
2164 G. Kemp, ‘Taking Stock of International Criminal Justice in Africa: Three Inventories Considered’, in B. 
Van der Merwe (ed.), International Criminal Justice in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities (Nairobi: Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung, 2014)7-32, at 18-19; Bensouda, above note 968, at 34.  
2165 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Article 46H (2) (d). 
2166 Ibid., Articles 28I (1) and 28L (bis). 
2167 African Union Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact, Article 1 (i). 
2168 M. Sirleaf, ‘The African Justice Cascade and the Malabo Protocol’ Working Paper No.2017-01, Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series (January 2016), at 29; P. Naidoo and T. Murithi, ‘The African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights and the International Criminal Court: Unpacking the Political Dimensions of Concurrent 
Jurisdiction’ Policy Brief No.20, The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, (October 2016), at 6 
<http://ijr.org.za/home/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/IJR-Brief-No-20-web-ready.pdf> accessed 27 March 2017.  
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preceded by an unconstitutional change of government that threw the state into chaos in which 
core crimes were committed. Thus, it is arguably more sensible and forward-looking to address the 
crimes that may lead to serious conflict or civil war, rather than waiting for violence to happen. In 
addition, there is often a mutually causative and reinforcing relationship between these crimes and 
core international crimes.2169 
Another rationale is that where state borders are porous, the mobility of criminals is likely to 
increase across different countries.2170 The risk could be aggravated if these borders were to 
be opened to the free movement of people in accordance with the integration agenda of the 
African continent. Therefore, the issue of cross-borders criminality should involve the 
exercise of regional jurisdiction to deal with it collectively. This jurisdiction fills the gap of 
general international criminal law which does not cover the additional crimes incorporated 
into the Malabo Protocol (Annex).2171 Socio-economic crimes such as illicit exploitation of 
natural resources, corruption and money laundering are taken into account in contrast to the 
ICC substantive jurisdiction. It is a positive evolution in international criminal law, which 
may contribute to the fight against the impunity of businessmen, of which criminal activities 
can impair development in Africa. Finally, it must be reminded that it was because of the gap 
in the system of international criminal justice that the UN Secretary General proposed to the 
Security Council in 2012, the establishment of specialised courts in Somalia in order to 
prosecute acts of piracy committed in the Horn of Africa.2172 Another gap is filled by the 
Malabo Protocol (Annex) with respect to corporate criminal liability. 
2.2.2.2. The Admission of Corporate Criminal Liability 
Another innovation of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) is the admission of corporate criminal 
liability in addition to individual criminal responsibility.2173 This is a historic and milestone 
event, significantly contributing to the development of international criminal law, because it is 
                                                 
2169 Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice, ‘Seeking Justice or Shielding Suspects? An Analysis of the 
Malabo Protocol on the African Court’ (November 2016), at 13 <http://kptj.africog.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/Malabo-Report.pdf> accessed 27 March 2017.   
2170 M. Sirleaf, ‘The African Justice Cascade and the Malabo Protocol’, International Journal of Transitional 
Justice (2017) 1–21, at 5. 
2171 Ibid., at 17. 
2172  UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Specialized Anti-Piracy Courts in Somalia and 
other States in the Region’ (20 January 2012) S/2012/50, para.126. 
2173 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Articles 46B and 46C. 
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the first time that a treaty expressly provides for corporate liability under the criminal 
jurisdiction of an international court. Article 46C of the Malabo Protocol, entitled “corporate 
criminal liability”, provides:  
1. For the purpose of this Statute, the Court shall have jurisdiction over legal persons, with the 
exception of States. 
2. Corporate intention to commit an offence may be established by proof that it was the policy of 
the corporation to do the act which constituted the offence. 
3. A policy may be attributed to a corporation where it provides the most reasonable explanation of 
the conduct of that corporation. 
4. Corporate knowledge of the commission of an offence may be established by proof that the 
actual or constructive knowledge of the relevant information was possessed within the corporation. 
5. Knowledge may be possessed within a corporation even though the relevant information is 
divided between corporate personnel. 
6. The criminal responsibility of legal persons shall not exclude the criminal responsibility of 
natural persons who are perpetrators or accomplices in the same crimes. 
It has to be reminded that the ICC does not have jurisdiction over corporations. But, the draft 
Rome Statute included corporate criminal liability.2174 African states upheld the same 
proposal. But, there was no time to focus on the issue and reach a consensus.2175 This situation 
was due to the fact that “for some delegations, the notion of corporate criminal responsibility 
did not exist in their legal systems, which would raise problems of complementarity. Others 
were concerned that it could be applied to self-determination movements or against state-
owned entities”.2176 Another concern about corporate criminal liability was the danger of 
“tarnishing reputable companies that provide the legitimate investment essential to 
rehabilitating economies ravaged by war”.2177 
                                                 
2174 A. Clapham, ‘The Question of Jurisdiction under International Criminal Law over Legal Persons: Lessons 
from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court’, in M.T. Kamminga and S. Zia-Zarifi (eds), 
Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 
139-195, at 143-144.  
2175 Schabas, above note 941. 
2176 N.S. Pak and J.P. Nussbaumer, ‘Beyond Impunity: Strengthening the Accountability of Transnational 
Corporations for Human Rights Abuses’, Hertie School of Governance –Working Paper No.45 (November 
2009), at 41. 
2177 J.G. Stewart, Corporate War Crimes: Prosecuting the Pillage of Natural Resources (New York: Open 
Society Institute, 2011), at 10.  
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By incorporating corporate criminal liability, the Malabo Protocol seems to have paid 
attention to the OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa of 1977 and 
the ICGLR’s Protocol against Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources of 2006.2178 This is 
also in line with other instruments, adopted at the global level, two of which deserving to be 
mentioned. First, the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, which obliges 
states parties to establish the liability of legal persons for participation in serious crimes 
involving an organised criminal group or for the laundering of proceeds of crime, corruption 
and obstruction to justice.2179 Second, the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, which invite states to ensure that corporations respect human rights within 
their territory.2180 States should particularly ensure that those victims affected by business-
related human rights abuses have access to an effective national judicial remedy by 
eliminating all “legal barriers that can prevent legitimate cases involving business-related 
human rights abuse from being addressed”.2181 The case-law landscape has also evolved 
towards the acknowledgement of corporate criminal liability.2182 For example, the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon delivered, in January 2015, the first international judicial decisions 
supporting criminal jurisdiction over media corporations, even if its Statute does not explicitly 
confer on it such jurisdiction.2183 The Tribunal considered that its jurisdiction over 
                                                 
2178 Article 1 (2) of the OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa provides that the crime of 
mercenarism may be committed by any person, natural (individual) or legal/juridical (group or association, or 
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2179 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, Article 10. See also H. Van der Wilt, 
‘Expanding Criminal Responsibility in Transnational and International Organized Crimes’, 4 (1) Groningen 
Journal of International Law (2016) 1-9, at 6 and 8.  
2180 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (2011), at 13 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf> on 23 November 2016. 
2181 Ibid., at 28-29. 
2182 See C. Kaeb, ‘The Shifting Sands of Corporate Liability under International Criminal Law’, 49 George 
Washington International Law Review (2016) 351-403. 
2183 N. Bernaz, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability under International Law: The New TVS.A.L. and Akhbar Beirut 
S.A.L. cases at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2015) 315-316, 
at 321-322. See also New TV S.A.L. and AI Khayat, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal 
Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings (STL-14-05/PT/AP/AR126.1), Appeals Panel, 23 January 2015, para.91; 
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corporations was implicit to its power to deal with the offence against the administration of 
justice.2184  
The Malabo Protocol (Annex) is further consistent with the position of the African Coalition 
for Corporate Accountability, gathering over 20 NGOs, which promotes civil and criminal 
mechanisms to address the impunity with which corporations continue to operate on the 
African continent.2185 In the same vein, it is in line with the work undertaken by the Human 
Rights Council, which adopted resolution 26/9 of 26 June 2014 deciding to establish an open-
ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with respect to human rights. The mandate of this working group is “to elaborate 
an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the 
activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises”.2186 This work may 
include the issue of corporate criminal liability, whose reconsideration within the ICC justice 
system also continues to be recommended.2187  
In essence, the scope of article 46C of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) could raise three 
challenges to the AU Criminal Court. First of all, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) provides for 
criminal liability of corporations, whether private, state-controlled or entirely public, with the 
exception of the states as internationally recognised separate entities. This raises the problem 
as to whether the AU Criminal Court will exercise jurisdiction over state corporations and 
particularly foreign state companies in the country of commission of the crime without 
violating international law.2188 In this regard, a defence can be drawn from the theory of acts 
of state, which implies that acts of such corporations cannot be adjudicated by a foreign 
criminal tribunal because they are considered as sovereign acts. But, this defence is not 
                                                                                                                                                        
Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. and Ibrahim Mohamed Al-Amin, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal concerning Personal 
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Accountability (ACCA)’ (27 November 2013) 
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2188 J. Kyriakakis, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability at the African Criminal Court’, Briefing Paper –African Court 
Research Initiative (ACRI) Meeting (Arusha 2016), at 3 <http://www.africancourtresearch.com/wp-
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convincing insofar as it cannot be opposed to an international court. In the same vein, no 
immunity would apply to such corporations since the Malabo Protocol (Annex) grants 
personal immunity only to individuals, who are incumbent heads of state or government, and 
other senior state officials.2189 
Secondly, it will be difficult to address corporate criminal liability in light of the Court’s 
complementary jurisdiction when the state having primary competence to prosecute does not 
recognise such kind of liability. A tentative solution could be that the municipal non-
recognition of corporate criminal liability would amount to a legal inability to prosecute. In 
other words, the lack of legislation on the part of a state party would justify the Court’s 
intervention based on national inability to prosecute.2190 The pressure from the Court to 
intervene in such circumstances will push states parties to adapt their legislation to the 
standards of the Malabo Protocol (Annex). However, the reluctance of states parties to do so 
may overwhelm the Court with cases which could be efficiently dealt with at the domestic 
level. This is why there is a need for an alternative approach, which is based on the 
proportionality of sanctions applied to a corporation domestically in respect of the crime 
committed, regardless of the nature of the liability, whether civil or administrative. This 
approach is consistent with the range of sanctions applicable by the AU Criminal Court itself. 
It is obvious that corporations cannot be sentenced to imprisonment unlike natural persons. 
The AU Criminal Court will apply pecuniary fines,2191 and order, if necessary, “forfeiture of 
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International Crimes: The Potential of the Commonwealth Criminal Code’, 5 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2007)809-826, at 811-814.  In this case, which dated back in 2004, the Australian company, Anvil 
Mining Company, was suspected of having participated, through providing logistical assistance to a unit of the 
Congolese armed forces, in the commission of war crimes in the village of Kilwa (south-east of the DRC). A 
hundred of civilians were reportedly executed by the army during the military operations aiming to re-capture 
the village of Kilwa, which had been occupied by a militia group from 13 to 15 October 2004. But, in the so-
called Kilwa case, the Military Court of Katanga did not examined the criminal liability of Anvil Mining 
Company due to the lack of appropriate law. It restricted itself to (civil) responsibility for acts committed by its 
agents. It must be noted that the Military Court of Katanga failed to establish this kind of responsibility because 
the three agents of Anvil Mining Company, who were prosecuted for their own acts of complicity of war crimes 
in the Kilwa case, were finally acquitted due to a lack of evidence.  
2191 Ibid., Article 43A (2). 
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any property, proceeds or any asset acquired unlawfully or by criminal conduct, and their 
return to their rightful owner or to an appropriate Member State”.2192 Consequently, if a 
corporation is sentenced to a pecuniary fine which is proportional to the seriousness of its 
criminal conduct, the Court may not exercise jurisdiction. In contrast, concerning situations in 
those states parties which have legislation on corporate criminal liability, civil or 
administrative proceedings against corporations could not hamper criminal prosecutions 
before the AU Criminal Court.2193            
Thirdly, many corporations operating in Africa do not belong to Africans (states or 
individuals) or have their seats outside the continent. Yet, the mental element with regard to 
corporate criminal liability under the Malabo Protocol (Annex) consists of the policy of the 
corporation to commit a crime or the knowledge of such a commission. In order to establish 
this mental element threshold, the AU Criminal Court must receive information available in 
the structure of the corporation in question. This exigency will render very problematic 
prosecutions of any foreign corporation for crimes committed in Africa if cooperation is not 
provided by the state of social siege or nationality. Thus, much of what the AU Criminal 
Court will do to enforce corporate criminal liability will depend on the will of non-African 
states to cooperate in good faith.   
2.2.2.3. The Court’s Trigger Mechanisms         
The trigger mechanisms refer to the way in which the jurisdiction of the AU Criminal Court 
may be activated. These mechanisms are provided for in article 46F of the Malabo Protocol 
(Annex) on the exercise of jurisdiction as follows: 
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 28A in 
accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: - 
1. A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to 
the Prosecutor by a State Party; 
2. A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to 
the Prosecutor by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union or the 
Peace and Security Council of the African Union. 
3. The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with 
article 46G. 
                                                 
2192 Ibid., Article 43A (5). 
2193 Kyriakakis, above note 2188, at 5. 
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The mechanisms must be distinguished from the institution of proceedings that are brought 
before the Court by or in the name of the Prosecutor.2194 Any referral by a state party, the AU 
Assembly or the PSC must be made to the independent Prosecutor who shall be free to decide 
on the action to be undertaken next, that is, whether to open a preliminary examination or not, 
to request the opening of an investigation to the Pre-Trial Chamber or not. But, the Malabo 
Protocol (Annex) does not contain any procedure to challenge the Prosecutor’s decision not to 
proceed before the Pre-Trial Chamber. The reason is not specified in the travaux 
préparatoires. However, if it is not a deliberate omission to exclude judicial control over the 
Prosecutor’s discretionary decisions, the gap must be covered by the Court’s Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence so as to avoid the risk of arbitrariness. Furthermore, the trigger 
mechanisms must be distinguished from the pre-conditions for the exercise of the Court’s 
jurisdiction as provided for in article 46Ebis of the Malabo Protocol (Annex): 
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Protocol and Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of 
the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in Article 28A. 
2. The Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following, conditions apply: 
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was 
committed on board a vessel or aircraft ,the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft. 
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national. 
(c) When the victim of the crime is a national of that State. 
(d) Extraterritorial acts by non-nationals which threaten a vital interest of that State. 
3. If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under paragraph 2, 
that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise.   
These pre-conditions are the modalities under which the activation of the Court’s jurisdiction 
is allowed.2195 It has to be noted that the wording of article 46Ebis of the Malabo Protocol 
(Annex) is poor. For example, the chapeau of its paragraph 2 appears to be incomplete if not 
read in connection with paragraph 1 above because it omits to mention that the jurisdictional 
criteria listed therein involved only the state which is a party to the Malabo Protocol. 
Likewise, paragraph 3 is incomplete and not understandable if the final words “accept the 
exercise” is not linked to “the exercise of jurisdiction” referred to in the title of article 46Ebis 
                                                 
2194 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Article 34A (1). 
2195 See V. Nerlich, ‘Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction (Article 46Ebis), Exercise of Jurisdiction 
(Article 46F) and the Prosecutor (Article 46G)’, in G. Werle and M. Vormbaum (eds), The African Criminal 
Court: A Commentary on the Malabo Protocol (Berlin: Springer, 2017) 157-186, at 165-174. 
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and “with respect to crimes referred to in article 28A” as stipulated in paragraph 1. The 
comparison between the Malabo Protocol (Annex) and the ICC Statute on this point leads to 
three main observations.   
First, the jurisdictional criteria of the AU Criminal Court are broader than those applicable to 
the ICC, which can exercise its jurisdiction only on the basis of territoriality and active 
personality of states parties.2196 However, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) extends the 
jurisdictional criteria to passive personality and the principle of protection of states parties. 
Passive personality implies that the AU Criminal Court could be activated against nationals of 
states not parties, even though the crimes at issue have not been committed on the territory of 
a state party or a country which has accepted its competence. For those states not parties 
which do not recognise the principle of passive personality, the Court’s intervention could be 
subject to contestations. The critique may be even more serious if these states are not African 
countries. The position of the Court to try crimes committed outside Africa also runs against 
the object of the CADSP, which deals with threats to the African regional public order which 
only occur on the continent. The AU Criminal Court cannot be a world jurisdiction. The 
passive personality should be therefore interpreted restrictively in order to include only crimes 
committed on the territory of African states not parties against nationals of states parties. The 
same restriction should apply to the principle of protection of a state party to include only the 
specific crimes affecting its security or vital interest (as opposed to crimes against human 
security) towards which territoriality, active and passive personality may not be upheld: 
aggression, unconstitutional change of government and mercenarism. A practical example 
could be the recruitment of mercenaries in a third African country to be sent to the territory of 
a state party.        
Second, paragraph 3 of article 46Ebis is unclear on the identity of the state not party which 
may accept the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to crimes referred to in article 
28A. For the same reason related to the object of the CADSP, non-African states cannot 
accede to the Court’s jurisdiction. This understanding is confirmed by article 29(2) of the 
Protocol on the Statute of the AfCJHR, as amended by the Malabo Protocol (Annex),2197 
                                                 
2196 ICC Statute, Article 12 (a) and (b). 
2197 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Article 15. 
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stipulating that “the Court shall not be open to States, which are not members of the Union”. 
To date, all African countries are AU member states.  
Third, the trigger mechanisms of the jurisdiction of the AU Criminal Court under the 
aforementioned list of pre-conditions have some similarities with those provided for under 
article 13 of the ICC Statute.2198 In fact, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) admits state referrals 
and the power of the Prosecutor to initiate investigation proprio motu, including when a state 
not party has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 3 of article 46Ebis. 
Considering that the AU has been particularly critical against the ICC Prosecutor’s proprio 
motu powers, it is questionable why African states accept similar powers for the Prosecutor of 
the AU Criminal Court. Likewise, as the ICC jurisdiction can be activated by a political body, 
namely the Security Council, a situation can be referred to the AU Criminal Court by the AU 
Assembly or the PSC. These similarities have led a commentator to doubt whether Africa 
does understand what it actually wants or where the problem with international criminal 
justice really lies.2199 However, one may argue that the problem does not appear to be the 
attribution of these powers to political organs as such but the way in which they can be used 
or misused. Regarding the ICC, the African objection is rather about the selectivity, the 
partiality and the misuse of justice for (geo)-political agenda.  
There are two further differences between the ICC and the AU Criminal Court concerning the 
activation of their jurisdiction by political organs. On the one hand, the AU Assembly and the 
PSC do not have the power to defer investigations or prosecutions from the AU Criminal 
Court. This is consistent with the position of African states opposing a similar power in the 
hands of the Security Council towards the ICC during the negotiations of the Rome Statute. 
On the other hand, the Security Council can refer a situation to the ICC in respect of a state 
which is not a party to its Statute. But, the AU Assembly and the PSC do not have the same 
                                                 
2198 This article provides: ‘The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 
in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: (a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears 
to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14; (b) A 
situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by 
the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; or (c) The Prosecutor has 
initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with article 15’. 
2199 E. Owiye Asaala, ‘The African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights: An Opportunity for 
International Criminal Justice’, in B. Van der Merwe (ed.), International Criminal Justice in Africa: Challenges 
and Opportunities (Nairobi: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2014) 33-56, at 49. 
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authority towards African states not parties to the Malabo Protocol. The refusal to confer 
deferral authority on the PSC is easy to understand since this political organ does not have 
coercive powers vis-à-vis AU member states in order to impose criminal jurisdiction upon 
them. Such authority however exists for the AU Assembly on the basis of the Union’s right to 
intervene in a member state, only in the event of genocide, war crimes or crimes against 
humanity. The reason why the AU Assembly has not been given the power to refer situations 
of third African states to the AU Criminal Court has not been specified. One may suppose that 
the drafters of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) did not want to include a provision which could 
lead to controversies such as those affecting the ICC in its relationship with Sudan. In any 
case, if the AU Assembly wishes to impose criminal jurisdiction on a non-contracting state on 
the basis of the Union’s right to intervene in a member state, it could resort to any of the 
following judicial options at its disposal: delegation of jurisdiction to a member state and 
creation of a hybrid court or an ad hoc regional criminal tribunal. Each of these options will 
imply for the AU some specific human, institutional and financial costs, the lack of which 
could hamper justice to be done and the fight against impunity. 
2.2.3. The Factors Susceptible to Hamper the Court’s Jurisdiction 
There are four main factors which can hinder the exercise by the Court of its jurisdiction: the 
expanded immunity provisions of the Malabo Protocol (2.2.3.1), the low standards of the 
Court’s complementary jurisdiction (2.2.3.2), the potential non-cooperation by African states 
(2.2.3.3) and the lack of sufficient financial means (2.2.3.4). 
2.2.3.1. The Expanded Immunity Provisions  
The history of the provisions on immunity before the AU Criminal Court can be traced back 
in 2012. Article 46B (2) of the Court’s draft Protocol adopted by the AU Ministers of 
Justice/Attorneys General on Legal Matters in May 2012 provided: “Without prejudice to the 
immunities provided for under international law, the official position of any accused person, 
whether as Head of State or Government, Minister or as a responsible government official, 
shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment”.2200 It clearly 
appears that the exception specified in the first part of this article referred to personal 
immunity, whereas the second part excluded functional immunity as an exemption from 
criminal responsibility for acts committed in an official capacity. While functional immunity 
                                                 
2200 Executive Council of the African Union, above note 1746, at 36. 
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does not raise any particular problem at this stage, personal immunity as a procedural bar to 
the Court’s jurisdiction could have created controversy given its laconic wording and the lack 
of precision. It could have been up to the Court to determine in concrete cases who actually 
enjoyed such immunity. This margin of appreciation had the potential to revive before the AU 
Criminal Court the conflicting positions on personal immunity before international criminal 
tribunals. In particular, given the fact that there was no other specific provision precluding 
this kind immunity in respect of officials of contracting states, the Court could have had to 
decide whether the exception applied to them or only to officials of states not parties, and to 
find a tenable justification for its decision: conventional waiver of personal immunity, waiver 
of such immunity under customary international law, or the neutral doctrine of non-
requirement or non-recognition of personal immunity for state officials before international 
criminal tribunals. In short, the exception in article 46B (2) of the draft Protocol of May 2012 
was very ambiguous. This is probably the provision had to be improved in accordance with 
the will of AU member states to grant immunity to incumbent senior state officials before any 
international criminal jurisdiction. 
The improvement was incorporated in 2014. Two separate rules were drafted. On the one 
hand, article 46B (2) on functional immunity was amended as follows: “Subject to the 
provisions of Article 46Abis of this Statute, the official position of any accused person shall 
not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment”.2201 On the other 
hand, the new article 46Abis on personal immunity now provides: “No charges shall be 
commenced or continued before the Court against any serving AU Head of State or 
Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state 
officials based on their functions, during their tenure of office”.2202 The context of 
incorporation of the latter article recalls the AU extraordinary summit held in October 2013, 
where the decision was made to exclude prosecutions of any serving AU Head of State or 
Government or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity before any international 
criminal tribunal.2203 Everything was done under the influence of the Kenyan relationship 
                                                 
2201Executive Council of the African Union, ‘The Report, the Draft Legal Instruments and Recommendations of 
the Specialized Technical Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs -Draft Protocol on Amendments to the 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights: As at Thursday 15 May 2014 
(STC/Legal/Min/7(I) Rev. 1), EX.CL/846(XXV) Annex 5, Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), 20-24 June 2014, at 35. 
2202 Ibid., at 34. 
2203 Ext/Assembly/AU/DEC.1 (Oct.2013), above note 1039. 
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with the ICC, which was prosecuting President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Deputy, William 
Ruto. During this extraordinary summit, the extension of personal immunity to “other senior 
state officials” referred to in article 46Abis was not at issue. These officials were included in 
the list of beneficiaries only in May 2014. 
There were concerns about extending personal immunity to other senior state officials during 
the drafting process of the Malabo Protocol (Annex). The discussion and the consensus found 
in May 2014 have been summarised as follows:   
During the consideration of Article 46ABis of the Draft Protocol, delegations raised concerns 
regarding extension of immunities to senior state officials and its conformity with international 
law, domestic laws of Member States and jurisprudence, underlining the challenges inherent in 
widening immunities, and especially considering the lack of a precise definition of “senior state 
official”, as well as the difficulty in providing an exhaustive list of persons who should be 
included in the category of senior state officials. After exhaustive deliberations, taking into 
consideration the relevant Decisions of the Assembly of the Union, and appreciating that some 
senior state officials are entitled to functional immunities by virtue of their functions, the meeting 
resolved that Article 46ABis should include the provision “senior state officials based on their 
functions.” The meeting further resolved that interpretation of “senior state official” would be 
determined by the Court, on a case-by-case basis taking their functions into account in accordance 
with international law.2204 
Article 46Abis of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) provides for absolute personal immunity 
insofar as it permits no exception to the level of protection it confers on the beneficiaries. But, 
it is a temporary immunity, meaning that it remains relevant as long as the beneficiaries are 
still in office. Article 46B (2) does not uphold any functional immunity covering any crime 
within the Court’s jurisdiction. This is easy to understand for ICC crimes because immunity 
does not operate anymore in favour of offenders as a matter of customary international law. 
However, for the other crimes, such as corruption, illicit exploitation of natural resources and 
money laundering, there is only a conventional removal of functional immunity, which could 
have been otherwise relevantly pleaded by the accused persons. On the whole, the immunity 
provisions of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) constitute a draw game. While personal immunity 
is conferred on senior state officials during their tenure of office, functional immunity is 
excluded beyond what is actually required under customary international law. 
                                                 
2204 Executive Council of the African Union, above note 2093, paras.26-26. It has to be noted that the expression 
“functional immunities” referred to in the quotation should be read “personal immunities”, for they are the ones 
which are granted to incumbent state officials, due to the positions they hold.  
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However, there are still many criticisms against article 46Abis. This is probably due to the 
fact that the provision is perceived as a setback compared to personal immunity under article 
27(2) of the ICC Statute. Article 46B (2) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) is almost forgotten. 
Still, some commentators agree with the inclusion of article 46Abis in the Malabo Protocol 
(Annex) arguing that it is “a compromise which should help ensure better sequencing of 
justice and peace”.2205 The reason is that prosecuting the state officials listed above, 
particularly heads of state, while they are still in office, may endanger peace and security. The 
risk is even higher when the state concerned is affected by a conflict or political crisis. It is 
rather preferable to suspend any prosecution, pending the establishment of stability and peace, 
as a matter of good policy. But, other commentators disapprove this line of argument and 
suggest that the immunity provision will further impunity for African political leaders.2206 In 
this regard, the immunity provision is said to be in conflict with the ICC Statute and to 
undermine the integrity of the AU Criminal Court.2207 Another “retort of critics of the 
provision is that the temporary nature of the protection might well encourage leaders in dan-
ger of prosecution to illegally extend their stay in office, thus endangering democratic 
progress in Africa”.2208 Max Du Plessis gave the following example: 
Take the crime of unconstitutional change of government and consider situations in which the 
incumbent may commit such a crime. This could be by his refusal to ‘relinquish power to the 
winning party or candidate after free, fair and regular elections’ (Article 28E (1)(d)), or revising 
‘the Constitution or legal instruments’ (Article 28E (1)(e)) or modifying ‘the electoral laws … 
without the consent of the majority of the political actors’ (Article 28E (1)(f)). The incumbent, 
however, cannot be prosecuted because of the provisions of Article 46Abis, which secures his or 
her immunity before the court. The immunity provision has therefore rendered this crime entirely 
redundant.2209 
                                                 
2205 C.C. Jalloh, ‘International Justice, Reconciliation and Peace in Africa’, CODESRIA Policy Briefs No.1 
(March 2015), at 6 <https://www.codesria.org/IMG/.../icj_policybriefn1-02042015.pdf> accessed 26 March 
2017. 
2206 Ibid. See also Udombana, above note 1469, at 71.  
2207 M. Swart and K. Krisch, ‘Irreconcilable Differences? An Analysis of the Standoff between the African 
Union and the International Criminal Court’, 1 (1) African Journal of International Criminal Justice (2014) 38-
56, at 48. 
2208 Jalloh, above note 2205, at 6. 
2209 M. Du Plessis, ‘Shambolic, Shameful and Symbolic: Implications of the African Union’s Immunity for 
African Leaders’, Institute for Security Studies Paper No.278 (November 2014), at 8. 
457 
All these criticisms can be mitigated. First of all, the immunity provision must not be 
overestimated because, as indicated above, it only provides temporary protection, which can 
be lifted by the states concerned, or is simply irrelevant when the beneficiaries are no longer 
in office.2210 Secondly, the immunity provision is not indeed in conflict with the ICC Statute. 
As Dire Tladi has noted, “under Article 46Abis the African Court will not have the 
competence to try the persons having immunity but this will not prevent the ICC from 
exercising jurisdiction against such persons, if it has jurisdiction”.2211 Finally, rulers holding 
their power from an unconstitutional change of government should not be recognised and so 
no immunity would apply to them. The reason is that they are or become illegitimate and 
illegal rulers ab initio, that is to say from the time when the commission of the crime in 
question is completed. It is submitted that this consequence is a specificity of unconstitutional 
changes of government and does not apply to other crimes within the jurisdiction of the AU 
Criminal Court. But, while such non-recognition would open the doors of regional 
prosecutions against the suspects, it is without prejudice to diplomatic contacts and initiatives 
aiming to restore democratic order in the state concerned.2212 This means that beyond criminal 
justice, there are other means to favour democratic governance. International criminal 
tribunals should not be transformed into new regulators of political affairs within states or a 
mean which can be used to provoke regime-change. International criminal justice is not 
designed for that.  
2.2.3.2. The Low Standards of the Court’s Complementary Jurisdiction 
The primary responsibility to investigate, prosecute and try the crimes provided for by the 
Malabo Protocol (Annex) lies with states parties. The AU Criminal Court is complementary 
to domestic criminal tribunals. It will play a subsidiary role. The standards of this 
complementarity are stated in article 46H of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) as follows:   
1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be complementary to that of the National Courts, and to the 
Courts of the Regional Economic Communities where specifically provided for by the 
Communities. 
2. The Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: 
a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless 
the State is unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation or prosecution; 
                                                 
2210 Jalloh, above note 2205. 
2211 Tladi, above note 1237, at 15-16. 
2212 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, Article 25(3). 
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b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has 
decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the 
unwillingness or inability of the State to prosecute; 
c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint; 
d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court. 
3. In order to determine that a State is unwilling to investigate or prosecute in a particular case, the 
Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international 
law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable: 
a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the 
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court; 
b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice; 
c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and they 
were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an 
intent to bring the person concerned to justice. 
4. In order to determine that a State is unable to investigate or prosecute in a particular case, the 
Court shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national 
judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony 
or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings. 
As the ICC is the first international criminal jurisdiction to have experienced the principle of 
complementarity, it is clear that its Statute has inspired the drafters of the Malabo Protocol 
(Annex). The wording of article 46H generally includes the terms of article 17 of the Rome 
Statute. But, three main differences between both articles can be pointed out.  
First of all, while article 17 of the Rome Statute is based on the relationship between the states 
parties and the Court in terms of complementarity, article 46H (1) of the Malabo Protocol 
(Annex) establishes the so-called double complementary to national criminal jurisdictions and 
to courts of justice of RECs. The complementarity with the jurisdictions of RECs relates to 
the issue of one single criminal tribunal for the whole African continent as discussed above. 
The remaining article 46H of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) is solely dedicated to the binary 
relationship between the AU Criminal Court and domestic tribunals. Complementarity 
between courts of justice of RECs and the AU Criminal Court could be on the contrary 
covered by specific agreements on cooperation. 
Secondly, the word “genuinely” in article 17 (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute is lacking in 
article 46H (2) (a) and (b) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex). For the ICC, this word helps to 
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assess the state unwillingness or inability to carry out investigations or prosecutions in order 
to determine whether a case is admissible or not.2213 It implies an aggravated burden of proof 
on the part of the Prosecutor because the sole establishment of the state unwillingness or 
inability to investigate or to prosecute does not suffice to make a case admissible.2214 The 
Prosecutor must additionally prove that the state proceedings are not genuine,2215 meaning 
that these proceedings do not meet the objective criteria of quality that are specified under 
article 17 (2) and (3) of the Rome Statute.2216 In other words, the case would be inadmissible 
if the state proceedings in question have the quality of what is objectively expected in terms 
of judicial standards. In this respect, it has been argued that the omission of the word 
“genuinely” in the Malabo Protocol (Annex) might lead to the trivialisation of international 
criminal justice in Africa.2217 In particular, Ademola Abass suggests that “African states will 
easily avoid prosecuting their nationals and offload such cases on to the African Court of 
Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights, thereby unduly burdening the Court and making it a 
Court of first rather than last resort”.2218 However, this opinion can be mitigated because 
article 46H (3) and (4) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) provides for objective criteria for the 
assessment of state inability or unwillingness to investigate or to prosecute. These criteria are 
similar to those stipulated in article17 (2) and (3) of the ICC Statute. Furthermore, it has to be 
remembered that even some delegations during the drafting process of the Rome Statute were 
                                                 
2213 See M. M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law: Origin, Development 
and Practice (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), at 165-170.  
2214 H. Van der Wilt, ‘Complementarity Jurisdiction (Article 46H)’, in G. Werle and M. Vormbaum (eds), The 
African Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Malabo Protocol (Berlin: Springer, 2017) 187-202, at 193. 
2215 El Zeidy, above note 2213, at 165-170.  
2216 Article 17 (2) and (3) of the ICC Statute provides: “2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular 
case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law, 
whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable: (a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or 
the national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility 
for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5; (b) There has been an unjustified delay in 
the proceedings which in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice; (c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and they were or 
are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice. 3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due 
to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the 
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings”.  
2217 Abass, above note 2104, at 945. 
2218 Ibid. See also Wilt, above note 2214, at 195. 
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opposed to the term “genuinely” for it was a vague concept.2219 Its inclusion in the ICC 
Statute is simply an emphasis on the quality of state proceedings to be evaluated. Hence, its 
omission in the Malabo Protocol (Annex) does not imply any risk of trivialisation of 
proceedings before the AU Criminal Court.   
Thirdly, unlike the ICC Statute,2220 nothing is specified in the Malabo Protocol (Annex) about 
challenges to the jurisdiction of the AU Criminal Court or the admissibility of cases. The 
regulation of the principle of complementarity is therefore incomplete. Not only is the 
procedure missing, but also the specification of who shall have the standing to make an 
application for that purpose. Probably, the vacuum could be covered by the Court’s Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. In principle, it will suffice to adopt for the AU Criminal Court the 
standards of the ICC Statute. However, the issue is a contentious one since such law-making 
relates to state sovereignty. It raises the problem of legitimacy of the judges to adopt the Rules 
of the Court and so to legislate on the account of states, whereas for the ICC, this matter is 
governed by the Rome Statute itself and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which were 
adopted by states parties. Since the Rules of the AU Criminal Court will not be treaty rules, 
the question as to whether they could be binding on sovereign states parties is open. A 
cautious option for solving this issue could consist of including a provision in the Malabo 
Protocol (Annex) which provides that the Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence shall be 
consistent with this Protocol and binding on the contracting parties.    
Furthermore, in order to give a positive effect to the principle of complementarity, states 
parties to the Malabo Protocol will need to take two different actions. On the one hand, each 
state should adopt national implementation legislation, incorporating the relevant crimes in 
the domestic legal order and providing for the rules on cooperation with the AU Criminal 
Court. Of course the Malabo Protocol (Annex) does not explicitly oblige them to do so. 
However, it is a matter of practical requirement in order to give effect to the principle of 
complementarity. Even those states that are parties to the ICC Statute and which have 
domesticated the core crimes should amend their laws and adapt the corresponding definitions 
to those embodied in the Malabo Protocol (Annex). In the same vein, states should extend the 
non-application of statutes of limitations to the entire list of 14 crimes within the competence 
                                                 
2219 El Zeidy, above note 2213, at 164. 
2220 ICC Statute, Articles 18-19. 
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of the AU Criminal Court.2221 On the other hand, whilst states parties have the primary 
responsibility to prosecute, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) does not place any duty on them to 
do so or to rely on a specific head of jurisdiction, such as territoriality or universal 
jurisdiction, in the exercise of their jurisdiction. States parties to the Malabo Protocol should 
however exercise any kind of jurisdiction which any of the different African penal treaties 
that they have also ratified impose on them.2222 In any case, territoriality and active 
personality will remain the best jurisdictional bases for states parties in the discharge of their 
primary responsibility. 
2.2.3.3. The Potential Non-Cooperation of African States 
The question of cooperation of African states with the AU Criminal Court or between 
themselves is a central issue for effective regional criminal justice in Africa. By definition, 
cooperation in criminal matters implies “many measures including everything from law 
enforcement exchanges and co-operation, agencies and facilities such as Interpol, as well as 
                                                 
2221 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Annex), Article 28A (3): ‘The crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject to any statute of 
limitations”.  
2222 For example, Article 6 (1) and (2) of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 
provides : ‘1. Each State Party has jurisdiction over terrorist acts as defined in Article 1 when: (a) the act is 
committed in the territory of that State and the perpetrator of the act is arrested in its territory or outside it if this 
punishable by its national law; (b) the act is committed on board a vessel or a ship flying the flag of that State or 
an aircraft which is registered under the laws of that State at the time the offence is committed; or (c) the act is 
committed by a national or a group or nationals of that State. 2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction 
over any such offence when: (a) the act is committed against a national of that State; or (b) the act is committed 
against a State or government facility of that State abroad, including an embassy or other diplomatic or consular 
premises, and any other property, of that State; (c) the act is committed by a stateless person who has his or her 
habitual residence in the territory of that State; or (d) the act is committed on board an aircraft which is operated 
by any carrier of that State; and (e) the act is committed against the security of the State Party’. On its part, 
Article 13 of the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption stipulates: ‘1. Each State Party has 
jurisdiction over acts of corruption and related offences when: (a) the breach is committed wholly or partially 
inside its territory; (b) the offence is committed by one of its nationals outside its territory or by a person who 
resides in its territory; and (c) the alleged criminal is present in its territory and it does not extradite such person 
to another country. (d) when the offence, although committed outside its jurisdiction, affects, in the view of the 
State concerned, its vital interests or the deleterious or harmful consequences or effects of such offences impact 
on the State Party. 2. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised by a State Party in 
accordance with its domestic law. 3. Notwithstanding the provision of paragraph I of this Article, a person shall 
not be tried twice for the same offence’.   
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legal measures such as extradition, mutual assistance, transfer of sentenced prisoners, transfer 
of proceedings, and cooperation in the restraint and confiscation of proceeds of crime”.2223 
The risk of non-cooperation can be high if the enablers for such cooperation are missing, 
notably political will as a prerequisite for any judicial action, national culture in favour of 
justice and adequate resources capacity to cooperate (number and training of the personnel or 
financial costs).2224 However, the most important challenge that the AU Criminal Court could 
face is the deficiency of the applicable legal framework. Beyond the scope of existing 
provisions on judicial cooperation in the Malabo Protocol (Annex) (a), it is important to 
develop a comprehensive legal framework on the matter, binding on African states, between 
them, the RECs and the AU (b).   
a) The Facets of Judicial Cooperation under the Malabo Protocol   
The AU Criminal Court does not have a territory within which it could sovereignly exercise 
its jurisdiction. It has no police or other security services to protect its investigators or other 
staff members deployed on the ground, or to enforce its legal acts such as arrest warrants or 
orders concerning fines and forfeiture measures. In principle, cooperation with states is 
required by the power of fact.2225 The AU Criminal Court will rely on the states’ police, 
judicial authorities and other security services in order to discharge its mandate with efficacy. 
Cooperation is also important to avoid conflicts which may result from competing requests for 
cooperation between the Court and the states.  
The regulation of this cooperation is based on various articles of the Malabo Protocol 
(Annex). Thus, article 46L stipulates:  
1. States Parties shall co-operate with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of persons 
accused of committing the crimes defined by this Statute. 
2. States Parties shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order 
issued by the Court, including but not limited to: 
a) The identification and location of persons; 
                                                 
2223 K. Prost, ‘No Hiding Place: How Justice Need not Be Blinded by Borders’, in S. D. Brown (ed.), Combating 
International Crime: The Longer Arm of the Law (London/New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2008) 123-162, at 
125. 
2224 S. D. Brown, ‘Ready, Willing and Enable: A theory of Enablers for International Co-operation’, in S. D. 
Brown (ed.), Combating International Crime: The Longer Arm of the Law (London/New York: Routledge-
Cavendish, 2008) 29-39, at 29 and 39.  
2225 Mampuya, above note 165, at 906. 
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b) The taking of testimony and the production of evidence; 
c) The service of documents; 
d) The arrest, detention or extradition of persons; 
e) The surrender or the transfer of the accused to the Court. 
f) The identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property and assets and 
instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of eventual forfeiture, without prejudice to the rights 
of bona fide third parties.  
g) Any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by the law of the requested State, with a 
view to facilitating the investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
court. 
3. The Court shall be entitled to seek the co-operation or assistance of regional or international 
courts, non-States Parties or co-operating partners of the African Union and may conclude 
Agreements for that purpose.  
Furthermore, article 46Jbis of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) establishes the duty on states 
parties to enforce fines and forfeiture measures ordered by the Court.2226 Article 46J is about 
the cooperation of the same states in the enforcement of the Court’s sentence of 
imprisonment. Such sentence shall be served in a willing state party, pursuant to an agreement 
concluded with the Court to that effect and the criteria set out by the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.2227 
In general, article 46L is modeled on the laconic provisions of the ICTY and ICTR 
Statutes.2228 However, this was a bad approach to be followed by the drafters of the Malabo 
Protocol for several reasons. First of all, the content of article 46L is also laconic and non-
exhaustive. This is implied by the expression “including but not limited to” which is 
contained in article 46L (2). For the ICTY and ICTR, such laconism could be justified on the 
ground that these tribunals were created under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Every UN 
                                                 
2226 Article 46J reads: ‘1.A sentence of imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the Court from a 
list of States which have indicated to the Court their willingness to accept sentenced persons. 2. Such 
imprisonment shall be served as provided for in a prior agreement between the Court and a receiving State and in 
accordance with the criteria as set out in the Rules of Court’.  
2227 Article 46Jbis reads as follows: ‘1. States Parties shall give effect to fines or forfeitures ordered by the Court 
without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties, and in accordance with the procedure provided for in 
their national law. 2. If a State Party is unable to give effect to an order for forfeiture, it shall take measures to 
recover the value of the proceeds, property or assets ordered by the Court to be forfeited, without prejudice to the 
rights of bona fide third parties. 3. The Court shall determine in its Rules how real or movable property obtained 
by a State as a result of its enforcement of a judgment or order may be dealt with’. 
2228 ICTY Statute, Article 29; ICTR Statute, Article 28. 
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member state had the obligation to cooperate with them. Other relevant aspects of this 
cooperation were derived from the tribunals Statutes or included in their Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, binding on all the states.2229 This might not be the case for a treaty-based court. 
Consent to all the relevant rules on cooperation must be provided in advance as a matter of 
state sovereignty. This is why the ICC Statute contains a detailed Part 9 on “international 
cooperation and judicial assistance”.  
The deficiency of article 46L of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) is therefore obvious. In fact, the 
scope of its two first paragraphs is limited to states parties. With respect to states not parties, 
no distinction is made between those which accept the Court’s jurisdiction and other non-
contracting countries. Yet, regarding the ICC Statute, the states not parties accepting its 
jurisdiction are consequently obliged to “cooperate with the Court without any delay or 
exception in accordance with Part 9”.2230 Other states not parties can conclude agreements on 
cooperation with the Court and some others may even be obliged to cooperate upon the 
decision of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.2231 To avoid a 
legal vacuum, paragraph 3 of article 46L of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) must be applicable 
only to a state not party which conclude a specific agreement on cooperation with the AU 
Criminal Court. However, regarding a state not party that accepts the Court’s jurisdiction, it 
cannot be placed under a narrower legal regime than what is provided for in respect of states 
parties. 
Concerning the forms of cooperation, article 46L (2) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) is less 
detailed than Part 9 of the ICC Statute. The regulation on many important issues is missing for 
the AU Criminal Court. This includes the obligation for states parties to enact domestic 
legislations on cooperation, the procedure for surrendering the accused persons and possible 
judicial challenges, the competing requests for cooperation, the transportation arrangements 
and the costs of cooperation. The drafters of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) might have thought 
that these issues could be covered by the Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence. But, for 
the same reasons related to state sovereignty, such issues deserved to be death with by the 
Malabo Protocol (Annex) itself.   
                                                 
2229 D. Stroh, ‘State Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for 
Rwanda’, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2001) 249-283, at 253. 
2230 ICC Statute, Article 12 (3). 
2231 See P.D. Massi Lombat, ‘Les sources et fondements de l’obligation de coopérer avec la Cour pénale 
internationale’, 27 (1)  Revue québécoise de droit international (2014) 113-141, at 121. 
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In addition, the regulation on cooperation of states parties with the potential courts of justice 
of RECs having jurisdiction over the same crimes is not provided. Probably, the issue could 
be resolved by the RECs themselves when they establish their own criminal jurisdictions. The 
same could be said about cooperation between the RECs’ jurisdictions and the AU Criminal 
Court. It will belong to each REC to conclude an agreement of cooperation with the latter 
Court in accordance with article 46L (3) of the Malabo Protocol (Annex).  
It is worth recalling that the AU Criminal Court which is not a legal subject per se, but one of 
the AU organs. It has been nonetheless authorised to make international treaties. The question 
then arises as to who should negotiate, sign and ratify these treaties on behalf of the Court. 
The Malabo Protocol (Annex) is silent on the issue. Concerning foreign relations, the AU is 
rather represented by the Chairperson of the Commission who can negotiate and signed 
treaties on behalf of the AU, with the mandate of the AU Assembly and the Executive 
Council.2232 In this regard, the best example is the Agreement of 22 August 2012 between 
Senegal and the AU establishing the EAC. To simplify the matter, the Malabo Protocol 
(Annex) should confer the treaty-making power on the President of the Court. The reason is 
that he is the first authority in the administrative hierarchy who shall represent the Court 
before third parties. After all, in order to avoid any risk of legal vacuum, the disparity of 
African legal instruments and the potential contradictions between them, it is advisable to 
adopt a comprehensive legal framework on judicial cooperation in Africa. 
b) The Need for a Comprehensive Legal Framework on Judicial Cooperation      
The previous developments have shown that the justice system of the Malabo Protocol is 
based on a deficient legal framework on judicial cooperation. Furthermore, the Malabo 
Protocol could generate different legal instruments on cooperation involving the key actors of 
the system: states parties, states not parties, the RECs and the AU. This may give rise to a 
complex legal framework which, due to the disconnection of one state to another or of one 
REC to another and the lack of regulations on interregional cooperation between courts of 
justice of RECs, could impair the objective of cooperation for the fight against impunity. As it 
is known, “if the law is too prescriptive and the field is over-regulated, the opportunities for 
international co-operation will become paralysed in trying to comply with conflicting legal 
approaches. (…) if the legal basis is inadequate, the necessary co-operation and support for 
                                                 
2232 Statute of the Commission of the African Union (9 July 2002), Article 3 (2) (a) and (y); Rules of Procedure 
of the Executive Council of the African Union (9 July 2002), Article 5 (1) (r).  
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partners may be illegal”.2233 That is why there is a need to adopt a comprehensive legal 
framework for judicial cooperation in Africa.     
This approach is founded on two other reasons. On the one hand, given that the issue is about 
establishing a system of African regional criminal justice, it is better to strengthen the ties 
between different stakeholders rather than favoring their mutual legal de-connection or 
increasing the potential of legal fragmentation and conflicts.2234 For example, if the DRC is a 
member state of three RECs having criminal jurisdictions and fails to discharge its primary 
responsibility, it has to be known in advance which principle will apply for the exercise of 
complementary jurisdiction by one of these RECs, rather than risking a positive conflict of 
jurisdiction whereby all the courts of justice of RECs would declare themselves competent. 
Another issue is what could be the role of the AU Criminal Court if such a conflict in spite of 
everything appears? One may imagine a case of referral of the matter to the latter Court that 
could decide which RECs should exercise jurisdiction. This kind of organisation of 
cooperation and relationships between different actors within the system will not be new. It 
presupposes that RECs can access and ratify the proposed legal instrument on judicial 
cooperation. In the fields of economic integration as well as peace and security, precedents 
whereby RECs have entered into treaties of cooperation with the AU exist.2235 The experience 
will just be replicated in criminal matters.  
On the other hand, there is not any duty on states parties to cooperate between themselves for 
the purpose of investigating and prosecuting crimes against peace and security in Africa under 
the Malabo Protocol (Annex). This lack of horizontal conventional obligation on cooperation 
between states parties is also a gap in the ICC Statute.2236 The more states parties are in a 
good legal position to cooperate in criminal matters, the more they can be capable to exercise 
their primary jurisdiction with efficacy. This is particularly the case regarding the commission 
of crimes which are cross-border or transnational by nature. Countries have to build bridges in 
                                                 
2233 Brown, above note 2224, at 39. 
2234 Kahombo, above note 2121, at 345. 
2235 This is the case of the Protocol on the Relations between the Regional Economic Communities and the 
African Economic Community (1998), the Protocol on the Relations between the African Union and the 
Regional Economic Communities (2007) and Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of 
Peace and Security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating 
Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa (2008). 
2236 D. Tladi, ‘Complementarity and Cooperation in International Criminal Justice: Assessing Initiatives to Fill 
the Impunity Gap’ Institute for Security Studies Paper No.277 (November 2014), at 5. 
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order to overcome barriers of sovereignty and to enforce justice, including when the suspects 
try to escape outside the national territory of the competent country.2237 In this regard, the 
drafters of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) failed to make a progressive development in law on 
the African continent. The comprehensive legal framework should fill this gap.  
The conclusion of an African comprehensive legal framework on judicial cooperation has 
several advantages. In fact, the comprehensive legal framework may reduce the disparity of 
existing African treaties on judicial cooperation between AU member states. For instance, the 
OAU Convention for the elimination of mercenarism in Africa and the OAU Convention on 
the prevention and combating of terrorism impose on states parties the obligation to extradite 
or prosecute.2238 The AU Convention on the prevention and combating of corruption sets out a 
similar duty with respect to persons charged with or convicted of corruption or related 
offences.2239 The ACDEG not only establishes the same obligation2240 but also encourages 
states parties to conclude bilateral extradition agreements as well as to adopt legal instruments 
on extradition and mutual legal assistance in order to bring to justice perpetrators of 
unconstitutional change of government.2241 There are also non-continental treaties. The 
ICGLR’s Protocol against illegal exploitation of natural resources imposes on states parties a 
duty to extradite or prosecute.2242 However, the Conference adopted a comprehensive 
                                                 
2237 Prost, above note 2223, at 124. 
2238 Article 9 (2) of this OAU Convention for the elimination of mercenarism in Africa stipulates: ‘A request for 
extradition shall not be refused unless the requested State undertakes to exercise jurisdiction over the offender in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 8’. Article 8 (4) of the OAU Convention on the prevention and 
combating of terrorism stipulates: ‘A State Party in whose territory an alleged offender is present shall be 
obliged, whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case without undue delay to its 
component authorities for the purpose of prosecution if it does not extradite that person’. 
2239 Article 15 (6) of this Convention provides: ‘Where a State Party in whose territory any person charged with 
or convicted of offences is present and has refused to extradite that person on the basis that it has jurisdiction 
over offences, the Requested State Party shall be obliged to submit the case without undue delay to its competent 
authorities for the purpose of prosecution, unless otherwise agreed with the Requesting State Party, and shall 
report the final outcome to the Requesting State Party’. 
2240 Article 25 (9) of this Charter provides: “State Parties shall bring to justice the perpetrators of unconstitutional 
changes of government or take necessary steps to effect their extradition’. 
2241 Article 25 (10) of this Charter provides: “State Parties shall encourage conclusion of bilateral extradition 
agreements as well as the adoption of legal instruments on extradition and mutual legal assistance”.  
2242 Article 18 (5) of this Protocol provides: ‘If an alleged offender is not extradited on the ground of his or her 
nationality, or because the requested State deems itself competent in the particular case, such State shall submit 
the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, unless there are 
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Protocol on judicial cooperation. Among other issues covered by this instrument, any offence 
under the laws of each states party which is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than 
six months is made extraditable.2243 This Protocol reminds various other treaties such as the 
ECOWAS Convention on Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters (1992), the SADC Protocol 
on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (2002) and the Agreement on Judicial 
Cooperation between Member States of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central 
Africa (2004).2244 
Furthermore, the conclusion of an African comprehensive legal framework on judicial 
cooperation can solve the problem of ratification that may attach to the disparity of African 
treaties. Concerning the AU treaties, it has been demonstrated that:  
treaties that have both been signed and ratified by the greatest number of member states and 
secured high positive ratification–signature correlation are the constituent instruments establishing 
the foundational institutions and general human rights issues. Treaties on more focused and narrow 
policy areas generally seem to attract fewer signatures, and correspondingly fewer ratifications, 
arguably because these are the types of treaties that require changes to domestic legislation for 
their post-ratification implementation.2245 
This problem is recognised by the AU itself in its Report of 2012 on the Status of OAU/AU 
Treaties.2246 It is probable that the same problem affects other African treaties concluded at 
the regional or sub-regional levels. The lack of ratification simply increases legal de-
connection between states, some of which bearing the risk to become safe havens for fugitive 
offenders.2247 The problem is even worse if the relevant treaties cover some regions or sub-
regions of Africa only.2248 The comprehensive legal framework on cooperation could solve 
this problem insofar as states would have to decide to access one continental legal instrument. 
                                                                                                                                                        
provisions agreed upon with the requesting party. The requesting State shall be kept duly informed of the final 
outcome’.  
2243 ICGLR’s Protocol on Judicial Cooperation (1 December 2006), Article 3. 
2244 See also Office des Nations Unies contre la Drogue et le Crime, Recueil d’accords bilatéraux, régionaux et 
internationaux en matière d’entraide judiciaire et d’extradition –Tome 1 (Vienna : 2008), at vii-viii.  
2245 T. Maluwa, ‘Ratification of African Union Treaties by Member States: Law, Policy and Practice’, 13 
Melbourne Journal of International Law (2012)1-49, at 26. 
2246 Executive Council of the African Union, above note 1614, para.6. 
2247 B. Kahombo, ‘La coopération judiciaire pénale fondée sur les traités de la CEEAC, du COMESA et de la 
SADC’, 5 African Law Study Library (2010) 1-23, at 21.  
2248 Ibid. 
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It could also harmonise the forms of cooperation between states towards the 14 crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the AU Criminal Court. For example, the comprehensive legal framework 
on cooperation could include a duty to extradite or prosecute perpetrators of any of these 
crimes, instead of maintaining the current disparity of treaty provisions. This may be an 
outstanding improvement of the law for crimes such as the illicit exploitation of natural 
resources, which is not covered by any other treaty, with the exception of the ICGLR’s 
Protocol of 2006, or additional criminal acts that have been incorporated into the regionalised 
definitions of ICC crimes such as war crimes.    
In addition, the comprehensive legal framework on cooperation could determine the role of 
national alternative options for criminal prosecutions such as amnesties, which may impair 
cooperation with the AU Criminal Court or any other African states willing to exercise 
jurisdiction. If amnesties can be admitted regarding ICC crimes on a case-by-case basis, there 
does not seem to be any legal impediment to acknowledge their full relevance for other crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the AU Criminal Court. However, the comprehensive legal 
framework on cooperation may determine principles that states should follow in order to 
avoid the increasing of cases of blanket amnesties and so impunity. The last matter to deal 
with should be the question about the tension between the preservation of peace and the 
necessity of criminal prosecutions. The comprehensive legal framework on cooperation may 
provide for realistic options for sequencing the two values of justice and peace.  
Finally, concerning the form of this legal instrument, states may choose between amending 
the Malabo Protocol and adopting a separate treaty. The former option is more preferable as 
the latter one may create a useless duplication of existing treaties on cooperation, thereby 
perpetuating the problem of legal disparity to which a solution must be rather found.   
2.2.3.4. The Funding of the Court in Question 
Where the money to fund the AU Criminal Court will come from? This is a legitimate 
question to ask given the modest budget of the AU and its dependence on international 
donors.2249 The numbers in the years 2015, 2016 and 2017 are telling evidence. In 2015, the 
total budget of the AU was 522,121,602 USD, of which 122,793,882 USD only, representing 
                                                 
2249 Du Plessis, above note 2116, at 9-10. 
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23,51%, were assessed on its member states.2250 In 2016, the budget decreased to 416,867,326 
USD, of which 247,033,986 USD, representing 59,25%, were provided by partners.2251 In 
contrast, the budget for 2017 increased up to 782,108,049 USD, of which 576,959,511 USD, 
representing 73,76%, were secured from partners.2252 During these years, the amount of 
money allocated to the AfCHPR was 9,857,665 USD in 2015, 10,286,401 USD in 2016 and 
10,315,284 USD in 2017. This is comparable to the total budget for the trial of Hissène 
Habré, that is to say 8.570.000 Euros. Yet, unlike the EAC, the AU Criminal Court has a 
broad substantive jurisdiction, a heavy permanent structure (combined with the human rights 
and general affairs sections, increase in personnel and need of new premises), and is designed 
to perform its functions all over the continent. If, when it becomes operational, it does have a 
lot of cases to hear, then the financial needs would be equal to the budget of the current 
AfCHPR but multiplied by ten or twenty, if not more. This problem will be hard to solve 
because it is unlikely that international donors agree to increase their assistance to the AU, 
given the fact that they already contribute significantly, in order to meet the financial needs 
implied by the new AU Criminal Court. 
The financing of AU’s institutions is an old problem. The Declaration of the AU Ministerial 
Conference on Human Rights, held in Kigali (Rwanda) in 2003, recognised that the 
AfComHPR was underfunded and that there was a need to establish “a fund to be financed 
through voluntary contributions from member states, international and regional 
institutions”.2253 In July 2011, the AU Assembly recalled its concerns about “the dire financial 
situation of the AU caused by delays in Member States honouring their assessed contributions 
and complexities of accessing partner funds”.2254 In order to find a sustainable solution, it 
                                                 
2250 Assembly/AU/Dec.544 (XXIII), Decision on the Budget of the African Union for the 2015 Financial Year 
(Doc. Assembly/AU/3(XXIII)), Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), 26-27 June 2014, paras.1-2. 
2251 Assembly/AU/Dec.577(XXV), Decision on the Budget of the African Union for the 2016 Financial Year 
(Doc. Assembly/AU/3(XXV)), 25th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Johannesburg 
(South Africa), 14-15 June 2015, paras.1-2. 
2252 EX.CL/Dec.919 (XXIX), Decision on the Budget of the African Union  for the 2017 Financial Year (Doc. 
EX.CL/956(XXIX)), 29th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the African Union, Kigali (Rwanda), 13-
15 July 2016, paras.2-3. 
2253 MIN/CONF/HRA/Decl.1(I), Kigali Declaration, The First AU Ministerial Conference on Human Rights in 
Africa, Kigali (Rwanda), 8 May 2003, para.23. 
2254 Assembly/AU/Dec.364(XVII), Decision on Alternative Sources of Financing the African Union – Doc. 
EX./CL/656(XIX), 17th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), 30 
June – 1 July 2011, para.3.  
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requested the Commission to put in place a High Level Panel on Alternative Sources of 
Financing the AU to undertake consultations with member states and to submit a report to the 
Assembly.2255 In July 2012, the High Level Panel, chaired by Olusegun Obasanjo, former 
President of Nigeria, submitted the said report in which it noted: 
Presently, the Union continues to depend heavily on partners to finance its programmes. For 
instance, Member States contributed just about 7% of the Programme Budget in 2011 and 2012. 
Added to this is the problem of arrears in back payment of statutory contributions by Member 
States. By year 2009 and 2010, Member States arrears amounted to US$ 40 million and US 43 
million, respectively. Another problem is the continued dependence of the Union on five countries 
(Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa) for financing the bulk of its activities. The five 
countries each account for 13.272% of the Union Budget. That is, around 66.36% of the total 
Union budget comes from only five countries. The implication of the heavy dependence on a few 
countries is that failure to honour their commitments by any one of the countries could mean a 
serious financial trouble for the Union. The 2011 events in North Africa brought this reality to the 
fore and it provided a strong incentive and justification for spreading the financing web much 
wider.2256  
In deciding to include criminal jurisdiction within the AfCJHR, the AU Assembly was also 
aware of the financial difficulties the Court could face. The merge of the AU Court of Justice 
with the AfCHPR which gave give birth to a single court, the AfCJHR, was partly motivated 
by the necessity to reduce the financial costs of the Union. In July 2012, the AU Assembly 
requested the Commission to prepare a study on the financial and structural implications 
resulting from the expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction to try international crimes and submit 
its report for consideration by the AU policy organs.2257 This report confirmed that the cost for 
the trial of Hissène Habré was the comparative reference to assess the financial needs of the 
AU Criminal Court.2258 Moreover, it explained that some of the regional trials that would not 
                                                 
2255 Ibid., paras.8 and 10. 
2256 Assembly of the African Union,  ‘Progress Report of the High Level Panel on Alternative Sources of 
Financing the African Union Chaired by H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo, Former President of Nigeria Consultations 
with Member States’, Assembly/AU/18(XIX), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 15-16 July 2012, para.6.  
2257 Assembly/AU/Dec.427(XIX), above note 2091, para.2.  
2258 Executive Council of the African Union,  ‘Report on the Financial and Structural Implications of Extending 
the Jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights to Encompass International Crimes’, 
EX.CL/773(XXII) Annex 2 Rev., Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 21-25 January 2013, para.12. 
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involve former Heads of State or Government could be cheaper to sustain.2259 In any case, the 
financial needs will be significant.   
How to overcome this challenge? One of the solutions lies in the political will of member 
states to increase their voluntary contributions to the AU budget. This recommendation should 
apply foremost to states that will be parties to the Malabo Protocol. The opposite argument to 
this recommendation could be that the states are poor and may not have additional resources 
to support the AU Criminal Court. It can be objected that many African countries have a lot of 
resources to do what they wish, but money is not generally available for various structural 
problems, including corruption, embezzlement and monopolisation of resources and public 
revenue by the state officials for private and familial ends.2260 Another solution is to “invent 
ways of funding additional structure and not rely on donor funding”.2261 This suggestion 
relates to the issue of alternative sources of financing the AU.  It is a solution in line with the 
African self-reliance policy, which does not mean “self-isolation”,2262 but a commitment to 
base the development of the continent primarily on own resources.2263 International partners 
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2261 Owiye Asaala, above note 2199, at 55.  
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African Union, Johannesburg (South Africa), 14-15 June 2015, para.2. 
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might still have something to provide, even though subsidiarily, if they wish to support the 
AU Criminal Court.  
Thus, in January 2015, the AU Assembly underlined “the need to ensure predictable and 
sustainable funding”2264 and decided “to establish a Special Fund and convene a resource 
mobilisation conference to raise funds to initiate and sustain the activities of the African Court 
on Human and Peoples Rights’ proposed Chambers of the International Criminal Law Section 
(…)”.2265 In July 2016, it further decided “to institute and implement a 0.2 percent Levy on all 
eligible imported goods into the Continent to finance the African Union Operational, Program 
and Peace Support Operations Budgets (…)”.2266 It is worth noting that this import levy was 
discarded by the High Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Financing the AU in 2012,2267 
probably because it could entail the increase of prices of such goods which might be 
necessary for feeding the African peoples. Moreover, in the absence of an indicative list of the 
goods concerned, the reservation made by Mauritius to the decision of July 2016 could be 
understood. In the end, the AU aims to support 100% of its operational budget, 75% of its 
program budget and 25% of its peace support operations budget.2268 It only remains to be seen 
if these decisions showing good intention to ensure financial self-reliance will be 
implemented.       
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3. The Relationship with the Global System of International Criminal Justice 
The creation of the AU Criminal Court presupposes that Africa as a region claims to be an 
enforcer of international law and participates in the international struggle against impunity. It 
also implies that the ICC, although currently the most current dominant global system of 
international criminal justice, is not the end of the story of the development of international 
criminal law.2269 Further developments remain possible. The creation of the AU Criminal 
Court is a step in this direction. It entails both fragmentation and complexity in international 
criminal law.2270  
However, the establishment of an AU Criminal Court could cause fragmentation and 
complexity in international criminal law. There would be normative fragmentation (on 
substantive and procedural levels) of two kinds. On the one hand, norms and features of 
African international criminal law differ from those of global international criminal law. The 
following, for example, are unique to the Malabo Protocol (Annex): corporate criminal 
liability, an extensive list of crimes against peace and security in Africa, deletion of the 
confirmation of charges from the procedure applicable before the AU Criminal Court, and the 
possible application by the latter of extensive jurisdictional principles, including passive 
personality. Another prominent example of African regional norms that diverge from rules of 
universal international criminal law is the rules on functional and personal immunity of state 
officials from international criminal prosecutions. Furthermore, there is institutional 
fragmentation.2271 This implies a plurality of courts that could get into competition with one 
another because they will have jurisdiction to try the same international crimes. In particular, 
the AU Criminal Court stands alongside with the ICC at the regional level. It duplicates the 
mandate of the ICC with respect to the latter’s substantive jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction 
(trying alleged African offenders), and territorial jurisdiction (trying crimes committed in 
Africa).2272  
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The normative fragmentation does not pose difficult legal problems. It is well known that 
each criminal court shall apply first the norms provided for in its Statute. In the event of 
conflict with global international criminal law, regional criminal law could benefit from the 
status of prevailing special applicable law, without prejudice to the respect for the rules of jus 
cogens or peremptory norms of general international law from which no derogation is 
possible. However, the institutional fragmentation and the plurality of courts resulting from 
jurisdiction over the same international crimes may engender very complex legal problems. 
Competition between courts should be avoided because it can lead to an inefficiency of justice 
for perpetrators of international crimes.2273 That is why a careful coordination of jurisdictions 
and activities must be attained. What then is the appropriate approach to coordination between 
the AU Criminal Court and the ICC? Which principles should apply to solve their potential 
jurisdictional conflicts? What role may the UN Security Council play in the functioning of the 
AU Criminal Court when it comes to dealing with crimes affecting international peace and 
security for the maintenance of which this UN organ assume the primary responsibility 
pursuant to the UN Charter?    
This chapter discusses two different possible approaches to coordination of international 
criminal justice, namely, the hierarchical model whereby the AU Criminal Court is 
subordinated and connected to the institutions of global system of international criminal 
justice (the ICC and the UN Security Council), and the cooperative approach which privileges 
mutual accommodation and principles on the resolution of potential conflicts between equally 
coexisting international criminal courts. The chapter also proposes a third alternative 
approach to coordination, which seems to be the best prospect for international criminal law. 
This third approach is based on the regionalisation of the ICC in connection with the 
establishment and application of the principle of regional territoriality. The latter principle 
implies that crimes committed in one region should be tried by domestic courts of states 
belonging to that region or the competent regional jurisdictions before any involvement from 
another region or global mechanisms of criminal accountability. The final objective of this 
third approach is the establishment an appropriate model of integrated system of international 
criminal justice, consisting of both regional and universal fragments of international criminal 
law, standing in harmony one with another.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Regional Mechanisms and Global Implementation (Geneva: University of Geneva, Global Studies Institute, 
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2273Sirleaf, above note 2270, at 759.  
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Therefore, the arguments in favour of the regionalisation of international criminal justice that 
are developed below are divided into two main parts: first, the coordination of global system 
of international criminal justice with the AU Criminal Court (3.1), and, second, the prospect 
for the future of international criminal justice (3.2).   
3.1. The Coordination with the Criminal Court of the African Union   
The ICC and the Security Council dominate the global system of international criminal 
justice. Yet, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) is silent on the relationship between the AU 
Criminal Court and the Security Council. It does not refer to the Rome Statute in the same 
way as the latter is silent on regional criminal courts. A possible reason is that no regional 
criminal courts with jurisdiction over core crimes existed when the ICC as established. 
However, the lack of reference of the Malabo Protocol (Annex) to the ICC Statute should not 
be seen as a legal gap. It seems to be a deliberate omission by African states and the AU2274 
for two main reasons. First, the AU and some of its member states are not parties to the ICC 
Statute. Second, the omission is likely a manifestation of the African contestation of the ICC’s 
work in Africa and implies a tension of distribution of power between universalism and 
regionalism. A compromise between states and the international community in terms of 
coordination of enforcement mechanisms of international criminal law must be found in order 
to avoid conflicts that may impair the efficacy of justice. Such coordination can be envisaged 
in respect of the AU Criminal Court’s relationship with the ICC (31.1) and the role that the 
Security Council may play in its the functioning (3.1.2).    
3.1.1. The Relationship with the ICC  
The relationship between the AU Criminal Court and the ICC may be based on two possible 
approaches: the hierarchical model (3.1.1.1) and the cooperative approach between the two 
courts (3.1.1.2). 
3.1.1.1. The Hierarchical Model 
This model takes into account the experience of the relationship between the ICC and 
domestic courts based on the principle of complementarity. The hierarchical model implies 
that the ICC “would remain at the apex of international criminal law enforcement”.2275 
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According to Haren Van der Wilt, this model envisages a situation in which a judgment by the 
AU Criminal Court “might be superseded by one of the ICC if the former’s judgment be 
found not to measure up to the standards of the ICC Statute and therefore to exemplify the 
inability (or unwillingness) of the African Court to exercise jurisdiction in a particular 
case”.2276 This situation would lead to making the ICC complementary not only to domestic 
courts but also to regional criminal jurisdictions.  
In 2013, Kenya submitted to the ASP a proposal of amendment in this respect.2277 Several 
commentators also support this proposal. For example, Abdoulaye Soma suggests that the 
principle of complementarity should result in a judicial dialogue whereby the jurisdiction of 
the ICC or the AU Criminal Court will prevail, depending on existing comparative advantages 
of either court for the prosecution of relevant international crimes.2278 However, this is a 
confusing suggestion given that complementarity is not meant to promote judicial dialogue 
but rather to test whether domestic tribunals or potential regional courts exercise or have 
exercised jurisdiction over the alleged crimes pursuant to what is expected in terms of quality 
of criminal prosecutions in view of preventing the ICC from stepping in. In contrast, judicial 
dialogue is a form of communication between courts and tribunals.2279 This is pursued 
through various channels such as cross-referencing in case-law, which promotes normative 
coherence within the legal system, consultations and meetings between judicial actors from 
different courts and tribunals in order to harmonise policies and activities.2280 Furthermore, 
Abdoulaye Soma failed to indicate how his suggested principle of complementarity with 
regional courts should be operationalised in terms of admissibility of cases. There might be a 
need to amend article 17 of the Rome Statute on issues of admissibility before the ICC to 
include proceedings before regional criminal courts. However, for Chacha Bhoke Murungu, 
even though the Rome Statute does not contemplate regional criminal jurisdiction such as the 
AU Criminal Court, “a progressive interpretation of positive complementarity might, for the 
purposes of closing all impunity gaps, infer that even regional criminal courts could have 
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jurisdiction over international crimes within the ICC jurisdiction”.2281 Miles Jackson espouses 
a similar view. He posits that, while article 17 of the ICC Statute refers to states’ jurisdictions, 
prosecutions by a regional criminal court should be seen as prosecutions by a state.2282 This is 
because such regional prosecutions should be regarded as a lawful way of collective exercise 
by states of their primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute crimes within their 
jurisdiction.2283 These states have simply delegated their powers to the said regional criminal 
court.2284 In any case, when prosecutions are barred by the rules on immunities before the AU 
Criminal Court, the ICC should intervene on the basis of inability to prosecute.2285 
Even if the AU has encouraged its member states –including Kenya –that are parties to the 
Rome Statute to submit amendments to this treaty, a problem of acceptance of the hierarchical 
model based on complementarity between the ICC and the AU Criminal Court may arise after 
adoption of the Malabo Protocol in 2014. It must be recalled that such a hierarchy between 
international courts does not in principle exist under international law. In the Tadič case, the 
ICTY indicated:  
International law, because it lacks a centralized structure, does not provide for an integrated 
judicial system operating an orderly division of labour among a number of tribunals, where 
certain aspects or components of jurisdiction as a power could be centralized or vested in one of 
them but not the others. In international law, every tribunal is a self-contained system (unless 
otherwise provided).2286 
The drafters of the Malabo Protocol also seem to have rejected the hierarchical model towards 
the ICC. This is how the silence on the relationship of the AU Criminal Court and the ICC 
could be understood. However, it has been foreseen that an agreement on cooperation 
between the two equally coexisting courts might be possible. In this regard, Don Deya has 
written: 
The drafters and negotiators are acutely aware of the fact that the proposed Court will be 
complementary to national courts and will co-exist with other international courts, which will 
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have similar mandates and jurisdictions to it. For instance, part of its general affairs mandate will 
be shared with the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and also the Courts of the African RECs. 
Similarly, its human and peoples’ rights mandates will be shared with some (if not all) of the 
Courts of the RECs. Furthermore, its international criminal law mandate (at least in respect of 
the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes at the moment, and the crime of 
aggression in the future) will be shared with the ICC. This international criminal law mandate 
may eventually be shared with the Courts of the RECs as well, if some of the current discussions 
on the continent come to fruition. (….) The drafters and negotiators clearly envisage that, since 
multiple courts will share jurisdiction, these courts may opt to negotiate among themselves on 
how best to handle this shared jurisdiction so that the ends of justice are met in an effective, 
efficient, credible and fair manner. In this regard, it is left to the Courts themselves, once fully 
constituted, to negotiate how they will work together. The aim is to reduce the possibility of 
‘politics’ or ‘political considerations’ playing a part in what should essentially be a judicial task. 
This, in my view, is another positive and pragmatic position.2287 
This rejection of the hierarchical model diverges from the acceptance of the latter model 
concerning the relationship between the AU Criminal Court and the courts of justice of RECs, 
when they have criminal jurisdiction, on the basis of the principle of complementarity. This 
differentiation is understandable. The reason is that within the AU institutional system, 
hierarchy already exists between the continental, regional and national levels of exercise of 
public authority for the integration of the African continent. Against this backdrop, the 
cooperative approach to the relationship between the ICC and the AU Criminal Court may be 
preferable.  
3.1.1.2. The Cooperative Approach 
This approach can be based on two main ideas. First, the ICC will have to equally coexist 
with the AU Criminal Court. This plurality of jurisdictions implies that states parties will have 
an option to refer their situations to either court when it comes to prosecuting ICC crimes. 
Second, for the purpose of solving possible conflicts resulting from the situation of 
overlapping jurisdictions, an agreement on cooperation should be concluded between the ICC 
and the AU Criminal Court. This is because neither court may gain from lasting conflict at the 
expenses of the struggle against impunity.2288 In this regard, article 46L (3) of the Malabo 
Protocol (Annex) stipulates: “The Court shall be entitled to seek the co-operation or assistance 
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of regional or international courts, non-states parties or co-operating partners of the African 
Union and may conclude agreements for that purpose”. The question is what could be the 
content of such an agreement on cooperation between the ICC and the AU Criminal Court.   
Foremost, the simplest content could be providing for a division of work between the ICC and 
the AU Criminal Court. Haren Van der Wilt has suggested that this division of work could be 
made on the basis of one of the following options. On the one hand, “one could envisage a 
selection and division of cases on the basis of gravity”.2289 This means that “the ICC could opt 
for prosecuting the gravest crimes, while leaving others to the African Court”.2290 In the view 
of this author, this criterion would also help to distinguish between the specific incidents that 
could be addressed by the ICC and those which may be dealt with by the AU Criminal 
Court.2291 A criminal incident has to be understood here as “a historical event, defined in time 
and place, in the course of which crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court were allegedly 
committed by one or more direct perpetrators”.2292 
However, the problem with this option is that the criterion of gravity may not be clear enough 
to avoid conflict of jurisdiction. Each Court may even have its own interpretation as to 
whether the criterion is met, even if indicators of the gravest crimes are specified in the 
agreement on cooperation between the two courts.  Furthermore, this kind of division of work 
may lead to different courses of international criminal justice in the same situation and even 
with respect to the same incident within the same country. Potential contradictions of court’s 
decisions on the qualification of crimes, the circumstances of their commission, the 
qualification of perpetrators (direct or indirect), the punishment applied or the designation of 
victims are not totally inevitable.  
On the other hand, the division of work may be made on the basis of the nature of the 
crimes.2293 According to Haren Van der Wilt, this is a stronger argument to uphold. It means 
that the ICC would continue to try exclusively ICC crimes, while the AU Criminal Court 
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could focus on the rest of crimes of transnational nature.2294 One may add to this argument 
another distinction whereby the AU Criminal Court could even try part of ICC crimes when 
the acts committed are not covered by the Rome Statute but by the extensive definitions of 
crimes contained in the Malabo Protocol (Annex).  
This option keeps the ICC jurisdiction untouchable. All possible conflicts of jurisdiction with 
the AU Criminal Court would be thus avoided. But, the problem with this option is that it 
appears to be inconsistent with the very motives that have informed the creation of the AU 
Criminal Court. It must be recalled that this Court has been created for the purpose of 
realising African self-reliance and participation in dealing with crimes committed in Africa, 
before any involvement of non-African mechanisms of criminal accountability. It is also the 
result of the African contestations against part of the ICC’s judicial work in Africa and the 
perception of a certain bias in the treatment of important cases such as those involving 
(incumbent and former) African heads of states. Given the importance of these cases, instead 
of being heard exclusively by the ICC, they are the cases to which the AU Criminal Court 
should be dedicated.2295 Michelo Hansungule even recommended that such cases should fall 
within the jurisdiction of the AU Criminal Court rather than being left to African domestic 
courts when he stated: 
(…) the African Union should adopt a resolution to establish an international tribunal capable of 
prosecuting former heads of state of Africa instead of leaving prosecution in the hands of their 
national courts after the incumbents leave office. This will remove the influence and threat 
directed towards the judiciary by heads of state by eliminating the option of surrendering their 
power for fear of facing criminal responsibility under international law. This process will also 
create confidence and in time will establish the independence of the judicial authority from 
executive power in the implementation of the rule of law in Africa and respect for international 
human rights for Africans.2296 
Thus, the division of work based on the nature of crimes between the ICC and the AU 
Criminal Court is undesirable. It would render meaningless the establishment of the latter 
Court.   
That is why the proposed agreement on cooperation between the ICC and the AU Criminal 
Court would rather focus on other issues. First of all, given that each court may exercise its 
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entire jurisdiction without limitations related to the division of work, the agreement on 
cooperation should prescribe applicable procedures designed to eliminate potential conflicts 
due to parallel proceedings and the risk of contradictory judgments. The most prominent 
example of these procedures is the principle of litis alibi pendens. This principle, which 
derives from domestic laws, is widely recognised by international courts and tribunals.2297 It is 
relevant to solving conflicts of jurisdiction resulting from pending disputes between the same 
parties for the same object and cause of action brought before two or more competent 
tribunals.2298 In such circumstances, the principle implies a set of procedural rules which 
favour the jurisdiction of one court and the decline of jurisdiction by the other. For example, it 
may be that the jurisdiction that has been activated first will be the competent court, or the 
court of the first-filed application.2299 The European Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 30 October 
2007 prescribes the same rule for domestic courts.2300 Preference may also be given to the 
court which has made much progress in instance and proceedings compared to the other. This 
is particularly important because the alleged offenders should be tried and their cases 
terminated in a reasonable delay. The principle of litis alibi pendens should apply to 
investigations and prosecutions of concrete cases. In case of a motion challenging the 
jurisdiction of one Court on this basis, the proceedings should be suspended until the 
jurisdiction of the other Court has been established.  
Secondly, the proposed agreement on cooperation between the ICC and the AU Criminal 
Court could also provide for principles on mutual recognition of jurisdiction and judicial 
decisions. These principles may include the principle of double jeopardy (ne bis in idem), 
which prevents perpetrators from being prosecuted more than once the same crimes. They 
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also include the principle of the authority of res judicata, which imposes the respect by a 
court of the decision made by it or another court when it is exercising its jurisdiction in order 
to avoid contradictory judgments and jurisprudence. 
In any event, whichever procedural mechanism may be established by the said agreement on 
cooperation, there will still be a need for judicial dialogue between the two Courts. This 
dialogue may be promoted through regular meetings between their Presidents and 
consultations and exchange of information as well as evidentiary elements between their OTP. 
A conference of international prosecutors may even be established to this effect. This 
conference could be a forum whereby these offices would have to harmonise their criminal 
and prosecutorial policies or strategies and thus end mutual misunderstandings, which may 
potentially derive from their parallel activities.        
3.1.2. The Potential Role of the Security Council  
The Security Council is primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. In the past, the Security Council has resorted to the establishment of ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals when it views prosecutions as essential to achieving 
international peace and security. This is also why it has been provided a role in the 
functioning of the ICC through referral of situations to the ICC’s Prosecutor or deferral of 
investigations or prosecutions. This raises the question: can or should the Security Council 
utilise the AU Criminal Court though referral of situations or deferral of investigations or 
prosecutions for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security? Furthermore, 
the Security Council enjoys the principal authority to qualify acts of aggression. Given that 
aggression also falls within the jurisdiction of the AU Criminal Court, one may ask which 
kind of interplay may exist between this Court and the Security Council for the purpose of 
prosecuting such crime. 
The first question can be answered in application of the principle of subordination of regional 
mechanisms of collective security to the United Nations.2301 African regional criminal justice 
can be considered as an important tool with potential to contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and security in Africa. In this regard, the Malabo Protocol has explicitly 
indicated the pivotal role that the AU Criminal Court can play “in strengthening the 
commitment of the African Union to promote sustained peace, security and stability on the 
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continent and to promote justice and human and peoples’ rights (…)”.2302 Now, it is well 
known from the UN Charter that the Security Council is authorised to “investigate any dispute 
or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to 
determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security”.2303 Moreover, the Security Council may 
“where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action 
under its authority”.2304 In this context, there are not theoretically legal impediments to have a 
regime of connection of the Security Council to the AU Criminal Court which is similar to the 
one established by the Rome Statute in relation to the ICC. In terms of concrete proposal, the 
Security Council could have the power to refer situations to the Court’s Prosecutor or to defer 
investigations or prosecutions in the interests of maintaining international peace and security 
in Africa. 
Concerning the second question on the interplay between the AU Criminal Court and the 
Security Council with respect to the prosecution of the crime of aggression, there is no reason 
why the relationship should not be modelled on the Rome Statute. This is because the 
problem arises in the same terms.2305 In fact, how can the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction 
be reconciled with the power of the Security Council to proceed to the qualification of acts of 
aggression pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter? Should the Court wait for the decision 
of the Security Council on whether a state has committed aggression before any determination 
on individual criminal responsibility? Or could the Court remain free to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction rather than potentially being blocked by political considerations on acts of 
aggression within the Security Council? The whole debate is therefore about the 
independence of the Court vis-à-vis the Security Council, the balance between judicial 
process and political control.2306 
The consensus found in the framework of ICC’s proceedings is formulated in article 15bis of 
the Rome Statute. The ICC Prosecutor shall proceed with an investigation upon the Security 
Council’s determination whether the state concerned has committed an act of aggression. 
                                                 
2302 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 
Preamble, paras.5 and13. 
2303 UN Charter, Article 34. 
2304 Ibid., Article 53 (1). 
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When no such prior determination is made within six months, the ICC Prosecutor may 
proceed with an investigation, “provided that the Pre-Trial Division has authorised the 
commencement of the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression in accordance with the 
procedure contained in article 15, and the Security Council has not decided otherwise in 
accordance with article16”.2307 In any case, “a determination of an act of aggression by an 
organ outside the Court shall be without prejudice to the Court’s own findings under this 
Statute”.2308 If the AU Criminal Court does not adopt the same solution, it would practically 
enjoy more independence in the prosecution of acts of aggression than the ICC. Its judicial 
process would be completely independent from political control. The risk of contradiction 
between judicial determination and political considerations could be very high. This may 
impair judicial cooperation on the part of states parties and undermine the struggle against 
impunity. 
However, there are several concerns with all these proposals. First, there is a risk that –like 
the ICC –the AU Criminal Court will become politicised if it allows political organs to 
interfere in its operation. The second concern is the potential contestation of the Court by non-
contracting states that could be coerced to its jurisdiction through a referral of a situation by 
the Security Council. Thirdly, even African states, by adopting the Malabo Protocol, omitted 
to confer on the proper organ of the AU, namely the AU Assembly, the power to trigger the 
Court’s jurisdiction in respect of states not parties or to suspend proceedings before the Court. 
The fourth concern is about the issue of legitimacy of the Security Council to enjoy increasing 
powers in the administration of regional criminal justice without being reformed in a manner 
that all the regions of the world are provided with equitable powers and representation in its 
composition. Currently, the Security Council consists of 15 members states, of which five are 
permanent and dominate its operation with their veto right. That is to say, the veto provides 
these states the power to block any resolution in conflict with their individual interests.  
Generally speaking, the Security Council is a product of realism after the trauma of World 
War II and this situation is reflected by the veto power given to its permanent members,2309 
                                                 
2307 ICC Statute, Article 15bis (8). Article 15 of the ICC Statute refers to the initiation of investigations by the 
Prosecutor proprio motu. Its Article 16 is about the power of the Security Council to refer situation to the 
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2308 Ibid., Article 15bis (9). 
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who won the war: USA, Russia, United Kingdom, China and France. After decolonisation, 
Africa remains without permanent seat in the Security Council. True, membership in the 
Council as a whole should not be linked only to geographical balance, but also to effective 
“contributions to maintaining peace and security”.2310 But, more than seven decades after the 
creation of the UN, the underrepresentation of Africa is unjustified and arbitrary, particularly 
because the meaning of contribution to the maintenance of peace and security has become 
very flexible.2311 In this regard, the proposed reform of the Security Council is expected to 
“increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the United 
Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically”,2312 including “contributions to United 
Nations assessed budgets, participation in mandated peace operations, contributions to 
voluntary activities of the United Nations in the areas of security and development, and 
diplomatic activities in support of United Nations objectives and mandates”.2313 On its part, 
the Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the Security Council of the United 
Nations indicates that “full representation of Africa in the Security Council means: i. not less 
than two permanent seats with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership 
including the right of veto; ii. five non-permanent seats”.2314 Given the disagreements 
between UN member states on that proposed reform,2315 the concern about the legitimacy of 
the Security Council is likely to continue for a long time. 
                                                 
2310 United Nations, above note 346, para.244. 
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international peace and security since such countries contribute most to the United Nations in terms of decision-
making, military capacity and financial support. These criteria are not in favour of developing countries in order 
to get permanent seats within the UN Security Council. However, due to the expansion of the UN Security 
Council’s activities after the end of the Cold War, other criteria for gauging the contribution to the maintenance 
of international peace and security have come into consideration. For example, the bulk of the UN Security 
Council’s activity relates to peacekeeping operations in states affected by civil wars. As powerful countries do 
not have troops and policemen to deploy everywhere, the United Nations increasingly rely on the contributions 
of developing states. As such, developing states can no longer be regarded as less able to contribute to the United 
Nations so that permanent seats within the Security Council should still be considered reserved for developed 
and powerful states.       
2312 United Nations, above note 346, para.249 (a). 
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Ultimately, the proposals to reserve a role to the Security Council in the functioning of the 
AU Criminal Court require some amendments to the Malabo Protocol (Annex). In the absence 
of such amendments concerning the power to refer a situation to the Court or to suspend its 
proceedings, the Security Council could only recommend to the AU that a situation in a state 
party be referred to the Court. Regarding a state not party, the situation could be referred to 
the ICC. The suspension of proceedings will not yet be possible since the same power is not 
even given by the Malabo Protocol (Annex) to the AU Assembly. Perhaps, a better model for 
relationship between the AU Criminal Court and the ICC may be based on the regionalisation 
of the ICC in conjunction with the establishment and application of the principle of regional 
territoriality. As discussed below, this might constitute the most realistic future for 
international criminal justice. 
3.2. The Future of International Criminal Justice 
The future of international criminal justice lies in the regionalisation of international criminal 
law. Beside domestic courts, power to prosecute and try international crimes should be 
distributed between regions and universal mechanisms of criminal accountability. This 
requires some changes within the system, which currently gives a predominant role to the 
ICC, when crimes have not been dealt with domestically. These changes can occur in two 
principal and complementary directions, that is to say the regionalisation of the ICC (3.2.1) 
and the establishment and application of the principle of regional territoriality (3.2.2). 
3.2.1. The Regionalisation of the ICC  
This is one of the most controversial issues in international criminal law. It is generally 
acknowledged that “the task of reversing the culture of impunity for international crimes and 
thereby strengthening the rule of law cannot simply be devolved to the ICC”.2316 But, the idea 
to regionalise international criminal justice is not entirely accepted in respect of Africa. The 
AU Criminal Court is said to imply negative or cynical complementarity, that to say “an 
attempt to undermine the existing work of the ICC through a commitment to an alternative 
mechanism for dispensing international criminal justice but which stands no realistic chance 
of providing such justice, at least not without significant changes in the funding available to 
                                                 
2316 M. Du Plessis, ‘Complementarity and Africa: The Promises and Problems of International Criminal Justice’, 
17 (4) African Security Review (2008) 154-170, at 167; Manirakiza, above note 595, at 49. 
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the AU”.2317 States should rather strengthen their domestic justice as a key to achieve 
effective struggle against impunity in line with the principle of complementarity.  But, this 
position does not resist critique. As William Schabas has noted, the debate on the usefulness 
of regional criminal justice has been “short-circuited”.2318 This is because regional courts are 
often presented as an alternative to the ICC rater than a mechanism necessary to complement 
its operations and work.  On his part, William Burke-White opposes his vision of strong 
regionalisation based on the establishment of regional criminal courts to soft forms of regional 
enforcement of international criminal law in the framework of existing arrangements, notably 
through the creation of hybrid court with regional judges or the ICC sitting regionally, in 
place where the crime in question was committed.2319 According to him, soft forms of 
regional enforcement of international criminal law should be favoured given that the ICC has 
already gained significant support and it would be unnecessary duplication of effort to create 
regional criminal courts.2320 However, this statement might be tenable only if regional 
criminal courts enjoy the same substantive jurisdiction as the ICC or if the latter Court does 
not itself face contestations against a part of its judicial work. The regionalisation of the ICC 
is simply a way to decentralise the system of international criminal justice, to bring 
confidence in such a system, to promote ownership of justice and proximate access to judicial 
forums. Against this backdrop, the debate on the regionalisation of the ICC turns to the 
potential creation of regional chambers of the ICC (3.2.1.1) or the transformation of existing 
regional criminal courts into jurisdictions of first instance within the ICC justice system 
(3.2.1.2). 
3.2.1.1. The Creation of Regional Trial Chambers of the ICC            
The first way in which the ICC may be regionalised is through the creation of regional trial 
chambers, which may sit in the regions of the world where crimes have been committed. 
William Burke-White has indicated that “from a legal perspective then, the possibility of the 
                                                 
2317 M. Du Plessis, A. Louw and O. Maunganidze ‘African efforts to Close the Impunity Gap: Lessons for 
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ICC sitting in a regional context is both possible and easy to achieve without structural 
changes”.2321 Jérôme De Hemptinne supports this notion and argues that it could strengthen 
the legitimacy of the Court’s judicial work.2322 But, it is Stuart K. Ford who has thoroughly 
studied the creation of regional trial chambers without making amendments to the Rome 
Statute.2323 The basis of his analysis is found in articles 3, 4 and 62 of the Rome Statute. 
Article 3 (1) provides that the seat of the ICC is established at The Hague. However, article 3 
(3) indicates that “the Court may sit elsewhere, whenever it considers it desirable, as provided 
in this Statute”. Article 62 of the same Statute provides that “unless otherwise decided, the 
place of the trial shall be the seat of the Court”. This article makes The Hague the default seat 
of the Court. Article 4 gives to the Court legal capacity as an intergovernmental organisation, 
including treaty-making power in relation to the state on whose territory it may decide to sit. 
Article 4 specifies: 
1. The Court shall have international legal personality. It shall also have such legal capacity as 
may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.  
2. The Court may exercise its functions and powers, as provided in this Statute, on the territory 
of any State Party and, by special agreement, on the territory of any other State. 
Article 62 above indicates that it is rather the place of the trial which may be moved from the 
seat of the Court. This literally implies that pre-trial proceedings are out of the scope of this 
provision and should take place in The Hague. This is the case of procedures on confirmation 
of charges or challenges to the Court’s jurisdiction.2324 Furthermore, the Court may sit 
elsewhere to hold a trial in whole or in part. The possibility has been invoked before the Court 
on several occasions.2325 For example, in the Ntaganda case, the Trial Chamber IV envisaged 
to hold the opening statements of the trial in Bunia (DRC) in order to bring the judicial work 
of the Court closer to the most affected communities by the crimes allegedly committed by 
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the accused person.2326 But, creating a regional chamber goes far beyond displacing the 
Court’s hearing in a particular case. It would require “entering into a formal agreement with 
the receiving country, posting staff to the receiving country, and signing a multi-year contract 
to acquire the use of suitable facilities”.2327 According to Stuart K. Ford, if article 62 of the 
Rome Statute permits the ICC to displace the trial from The Hague, “there is nothing within 
the other provisions of the Rome Statute or its negotiating history that would prohibit the 
Court from deciding to hold all or most of the trials arising out of a particular situation away 
from the seat of the Court if that would be in the interests of justice”.2328 Article 4 (1) above 
reinforces this possibility as it implies the relevant authority of the Court to enter into 
agreements that could be necessary to establish a regional trial chamber for the exercise of the 
Court’s functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.2329  
However, the ICC Statute is silent on who could make the decision to establish such a 
regional trial chamber. It is also silent on the applicable procedure. But, one may rely on Rule 
100 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence which seems to grant that power to the 
Presidency of the Court,2330 that is to say the organ consisting of the Court’s President, First 
and Second Vice-Presidents.2331 Pursuant to this Rule, the Presidency can not only decide to 
displace the Court’s hearing in a particular case from The Hague, but also, by extension, 
create a regional trial chamber. In this regard, Rule 100 specifies: 
1. In a particular case, where the Court considers that it would be in the interests of justice, it 
may decide to sit in a State other than the host State, for such period or periods as may be 
required, to hear the case in whole or in part.  
2. The Chamber, at any time after the initiation of an investigation, may proprio motu or at the 
request of the Prosecutor or the defence, decide to make a recommendation changing the place 
where the Chamber sits. The judges of the Chamber shall attempt to achieve unanimity in their 
recommendation, failing which the recommendation shall be made by a majority of the judges. 
Such a recommendation shall take account of the views of the parties, of the victims and an 
assessment prepared by the Registry and shall be addressed to the Presidency. It shall be made in 
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writing and specify in which State the Chamber would sit. The assessment prepared by the 
Registry shall be annexed to the recommendation.  
3. The Presidency shall consult the State where the Chamber intends to sit. If that State agrees 
that the Chamber can sit in that State, then the decision to sit in a State other than the host State 
shall be taken by the Presidency in consultation with the Chamber. Thereafter, the Chamber or 
any designated Judge shall sit at the location decided upon.  
In deciding on whether the Court may sit in a state other than the host country, the Presidency 
must take into account various factors, including those which make the displacement of the 
trial desirable. Rule 100 (1) above refers to the interests of justice. In the Ntaganda case, for 
example, the appraisal of these interests of justice proved to be negative and the 
recommendation of the Trial Chamber IV to the Presidency for the purpose of sitting in Bunia 
was therefore rejected. The ICC specifically explained: 
In deciding whether it was desirable and in the interests of justice to sit in Bunia, the Presidency 
considered a number of factors. Most importantly, it considered concerns over the consequences 
of the in situ hearings on the witnesses and victims' safety and well-being, as well as the security 
of the local communities involved. Furthermore, the Presidency considered the concerns 
expressed by the victims that the accused's return would remind them of the suffering and 
trauma. The Presidency also considered the impact of the logistics required for the hearings, 
which may have resulted in the affected communities having limited access to them, given their 
length and nature. Finally, the Presidency noted the financial impact of the costs of hosting the 
opening statements in Bunia, which were estimated to be more than €600,000. The ICC 
Presidency concluded that the potential benefits of holding proceedings in Bunia are, in view of 
the Presidency, outweighed by these risks.2332  
In the end, there are two specific problems with this possibility of creating regional trial 
chambers. First of all, regional trial chambers may be established at odd times, depending on 
circumstances peculiar to each situation and each region. Secondly, creating regional trial 
chambers leaves the issue of coordination of the ICC with potential regional criminal courts 
unsolved. It would be preferable to restructure the Court by expressly establishing permanent 
regional trial chambers to act at first instance in all cases in the regions concerned. This will 
require more resource mobilisation, including increasing the Court’s staff with the majority 
involvement of judges from the region concerned, as well as amendment of the Rome Statute. 
The ICC at The Hague would retain appeal jurisdiction. These regional chambers have been 
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envisaged in the absence of the establishment of regional criminal courts. Thus, if the African 
experience with the creation of the AU Criminal Court becomes effective and is copied in 
other regions of the world, it could make sense to prefer an alternative to the creation of 
regional trial chambers, namely, the transformation of the existing regional criminal courts 
into jurisdictions of first instance within the ICC justice system.   
3.2.1.2. The Regional Criminal Courts as Jurisdictions of First Instance  
Regional criminal courts may be defined as judicial organs established within the framework 
of regional or sub-regional intergovernmental organisations such as the AU. Transforming 
these courts into jurisdictions of first instance within the system of international criminal 
justice may be the most preferable option for the regionalisation of the ICC. Given the 
protracted conflict between Africa and the ICC as well as Africa’s objections to the use of 
universal jurisdiction in Africa, regionalisation promises to deliver the benefits of greater 
regional participation and ownership in the prosecution of international crimes. The ICC at 
The Hague would become a jurisdiction of appeal.  
Even if this proposal appears to be a move back to a form of institutional hierarchy, as the 
ICC would be given the power to say the last word within the system, it is quite different from 
the hierarchical model that has been developed above, which is based on the ICC’s 
complementarity jurisdiction to the AU Criminal Court. First, the principle of 
complementarity pre-supposes the fragmentation of the system of international criminal 
justice, whilst the current proposal aims to integrate the latter. Second, it is well known that a 
court of appeal will not re-start the proceedings but base its examination on the work done by 
the regional criminal court which has heard the case at the first instance. The reasons for 
appealing against decisions of acquittal or conviction could be similar to those provided for 
under article 81 (1) of the Rome Statute, namely procedural error, error of fact or error of law. 
In case of conviction in particular, the same article provides that appeal may be based on ‘any 
other ground that affects the fairness or the reliability of the proceedings or decision’. This 
clearly means that the competence of a court of appeal could be more limited than the ICC’s 
complementary jurisdiction to the AU Criminal Court. Such a limited competence is likely to 
be beneficial to the timely termination of the case by the ICC. Therefore, the current proposal 
could reduce the risk of perception that lengthy proceedings before the ICC deliberately aim 
to sustainably remove the accused person from his homeland or the region of his origin for 
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political reasons, in favour of his opponents. This is likely to increase the legitimacy of the 
ICC’s operation.     
Two main arguments can be advanced in support of this option.First, the creation of regional 
criminal courts appears to be the next step in development in international criminal law, even 
outside the African continent. Prior to the African experience, the first regional court to enjoy 
explicit criminal jurisdiction is the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) established within the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which was created by a treaty adopted in 1973 and 
revised in 2001 in order to include the CARICOM single market and economy.2333 Being a 
community court, the CCJ also aims to consolidate the sovereignty of member states towards 
Great Britain, the former colonial power.2334 In fact, after independence, these states allow the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the British court of highest instance, to hear appeals 
against decisions of their domestic tribunals and to render final binding judgments.2335 The 
Agreement establishing the CCJ provides that “an appeal shall lie to the Court with the special 
leave of the Court from any decision of the Court of Appeal of a Contracting Party in any 
civil or criminal matter”.2336 In this respect, the CCJ shall operate as a court of last instance 
for member states. If the Agreement above does not exclude the exercise of jurisdiction over 
international crimes, it remains to be seen whether it could be utilised by CARICOM for that 
purpose.  
The replication of the African experience in some other parts of the world can also be 
envisaged outside the EU zone where the ICC currently finds the most enthusiastic state 
supporters. In Latin America, for example, there is a long history of initiatives to establish 
regional tribunals. The Central American Court of Justice could be regarded as the first 
modern regional court that was established out of the Central American Peace Conference in 
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1907.2337 This Court performed its functions for ten years in Costa Rica. It ceased to exist in 
March 1918 because member states failed to extend its life duration.2338 However, American 
countries remained receptive to the possibility of creating a regional criminal court in the 
1990s within the Organisation of American States (OAS) as part of their efforts to prosecute 
collectively the crimes of terrorism and drug trafficking.2339 But, the initiative has so far 
failed, probably because of the disinterest of some member states, including the USA, to 
promote such a court.2340 It has to be noted that the need for international prosecutions of the 
crime of drug trafficking in the Americas seems to be persistent. This is probably why 
Trinidad and Tobago and Belize submitted to the ASP an amendment to the Rome Statute in 
order to give jurisdiction to the ICC to try the said crime.2341 It was also Mexico that proposed 
the inclusion of “employing nuclear weapons” as war crime.2342 Perhaps, if these issues are 
not addressed with satisfaction within the ICC, the idea to create a regional criminal court for 
Americas could be revived. 
In Asia, the situation is quite different. International criminal justice was experienced at an 
earlier stage in different Asian countries. This is true in respect of prosecutions of war 
criminals in Tokyo (Japan) out of World War II. Other experiences include the establishment 
of hybrid special panels of judges within the District Court in Dili in East Timor in 2000 and 
the ECCC in 2004. However, it is clear that these experiences have been more promoted from 
abroad rather than from regional initiatives in Asia.2343 Up to now, there is not in this 
continent any regional organisation comparable to the AU or the OAS,2344 which may 
promote the idea of regional criminal court. From this perspective, this lack of regional 
initiatives in favour of international criminal law comes as no surprise. It follows from the 
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absence of a system of regional human rights protection for the entire Asian continent.2345 
According to Alvin Tan Poh Heng, “it is recognised from the international human rights 
debate that Asia is too diverse to claim that any homogeneous culture and uniformity of 
norms exists”.2346 Therefore, for a regional approach to international criminal law to be 
pursued, it might be “more prudent to focus attention at the sub-regional level, rather than 
argue for a pan-Asian system”.2347 In this regard, the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) created by the Bangkok Declaration of 19672348 is the most developed Asian 
intergovernmental organisation.2349 The pivotal role of ASEAN in Asian regionalism has been 
described as follows: 
ASEAN serves as the core of other important regional organizations such as ASEAN+3, the Asian 
Regional Forum, and the East Asian Summit, among others. In a region with some of the most 
dynamic economies in the world and also some of the most intractable conflicts, some see 
regionalism as an answer to the region’s development and security challenges. ASEAN, made up 
of mostly small powers and developing nations, has taken the opportunity to shape the incipient 
regionalism. In other words, due to the lack of other viable centers for regionalism ASEAN has 
taken the helm and at the same time it has institutionalized some of its norms.2350  
In the field of human rights protection, the ASEAN Charter of 20 November 2007, which 
institutionalises and confers legal personality on this organisation, provides that the 
Association aims “to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, 
and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the 
rights and responsibilities of the member states of ASEAN”.2351 It also aims “to respond 
effectively, in accordance with the principle of comprehensive security, to all forms of threats, 
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transnational crimes and transboundary challenges”.2352 To this effect, ASEAN member states 
adhere to several principles, such as “respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and 
protection of human rights, and the promotion of social justice”.2353 In 2012, the ASEAN 
Human Rights Declaration was adopted.2354 In terms of enforcement of ASEAN human rights 
law, it was foreseen to establish the ASEAN human rights body, which should operate “in 
accordance with the terms of reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
Meeting”.2355 Member states preferred to establish a commission on human rights rather than 
a court. This modest choice might be due to some hesitations to create a robust institution that 
could take decisions binding on member states, because of a conservative approach to state 
sovereignty. The ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was 
launched in 2009.2356 It is a consultative body to develop strategies for the promotion and 
protection of human rights and has no judicial competence to hear cases on matters of 
individual rights.2357  
It is hard to predict if these relatively new developments in human rights law may lead to the 
creation of a regional court vested with criminal jurisdiction under the auspices of ASEAN. 
Alvin Tan Poh Heng has demonstrated that such evolution towards a regional criminal court 
is desirable in order to deal with international and regional crimes of collective concern to 
ASEAN member states, including maritime piracy.2358 However, non-penal options and 
alternative processes could remain legitimate and valid in this region, notably recourse to 
amnesties and truth commissions.2359 For example, “after winning independence, even East 
Timorese government acknowledged the benefits of post-conflict reconciliation with 
Indonesia over legal proceedings under a criminal tribunal”.2360 While criminal prosecutions 
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might be a better approach to uphold the responsibility of high-level perpetrators of 
international and regional crimes, restorative justice and non-penal forms of regional 
accountability will constitute a viable alternative to criminal trials for masses of lower-level 
offenders in the ASEAN context.2361  
The second argument in support of transforming potential regional criminal courts into 
jurisdictions of first instance rather than creating ICC’s regional trial chambers is that regional 
criminal courts’ substantive competences are likely to be broader than the ICC jurisdiction. 
Regional criminal courts may therefore have more potential to contribute to the struggle 
against impunity than regional trial chambers since these courts could also focus on crimes 
that are specific to the regions concerned. In the end, regional criminal courts are better placed 
to give effect to the principle of regional territoriality. 
3.2.2. The Establishment and Application of the Principle of Regional Territoriality  
It is suggested that the principle of regional territoriality implies that international crimes 
should be prosecuted or tried in each region where they have been committed to the exclusion 
of external judicial interventions of foreign states to that region and the international 
community. This principle aims to create for the states of the region or the regional criminal 
courts the primary responsibility for fighting impunity of international crimes around the 
world. In the African context, the AU explicitly claims this responsibility. The Protocol on the 
PSC indicates that Africa, through the AU, should play “a central role in bringing about 
peace, security and stability on the continent”.2362 In the field of international criminal justice, 
the principle of regional territoriality implies that Africans should prosecute international 
crimes committed in Africa through mechanisms of criminal accountability existing on the 
continent. It also reflects the ideas of regional self-reliance in dealing with African matters on 
Africa. This approach has informed all the developments of African international criminal 
law, notably the creation of the AU Criminal Court. The principle of regional territoriality 
could be extended to other regions of the world in the collective effort to regionalise the 
system of international criminal justice or to take part of international jurisdictional powers 
away from the universal level to the regions and their different judicial actors. Two main rules 
should characterise the principle of regional territoriality and its application. First, a court of a 
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state in a region should not hear cases concerning crimes committed in a foreign state from 
another region of the world, except in cases involving the application of the active personality 
principle. It will be up to the courts of states belonging to the region of commission of the 
crimes in question to exercise jurisdiction if they are competent under any traditional basis of 
criminal jurisdiction, namely, territoriality, personality, protection principle, or universal 
jurisdiction. Second, global mechanisms of criminal accountability, notably the ICC, should 
not intervene in the repression of international crimes in a given region at the first instance. 
The task must be executed by the competent regional criminal court, that is to say the court 
established in the region where the alleged crimes have been committed. These main rules 
raise the question as to how the principle of regional territoriality could be reconciled with the 
principle of universal jurisdiction.  
The principle of universal jurisdiction has to be understood here as adjudicative criminal 
power which potentially stands at the disposal of any state. But, it could be limited by way of 
an international arrangement of universal character, such as a multilateral treaty, to states of 
the region of commission of the crimes in question. In effect, when a crime has to be 
prosecuted on the basis of such principle, it will be up to the state in the region concerned 
which is willing and capable to prosecute, and which is competent in law to act, to exercise 
jurisdiction. In case of conflict of jurisdictions, when several states claim to be competent, or 
if a state claiming jurisdiction is accused of not complying with the rules on jurisdictional 
powers –such as the principle of subsidiarity of universal jurisdiction or the rules on 
immunities of state officials –the matter should be referred to the independent Prosecutor of 
the competent regional criminal court. In this case, the said Prosecutor could request the latter 
court to issue an order whereby it designates the state of the region which may exercise 
jurisdiction. Alternatively, the Prosecutor may take the situation or the case away from a state 
in favour of a regional trial. In the context of the African continent, regional international 
criminal jurisdiction should be exercised through one of the aforementioned judicial options 
available to the AU, that is to say delegation of jurisdiction to a member state, hybrid tribunal 
or regional criminal court.  
There are technical and policy advantages to establish such a system of international criminal 
justice. First, it clearly eliminates the duplication of international mechanisms of criminal 
accountability, either at the state, regional or universal levels. Second, the system is based on 
the ownership of justice by states and in each region. Third, this system could promote 
equitable participation of regions in the struggle against impunity. In time, it would reveal 
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those regions which are actively defending the cause of justice and safeguarding the peace 
and security of mankind. Fourth, this system is likely to reduce the perception of 
instrumentalisation of international criminal justice by states from one region against the 
sovereignty, the nationals, or political leadership of other regions.  
However, there are also some weaknesses. In fact, for the ICC to become a court of appeal 
against decisions of regional criminal courts, it should enjoy a wide international recognition 
in order to avoid the risk of judicial vacuum when this recognition is lacking. For example, 
that may be the case when a state is a party to the treaty establishing the competent regional 
court and not to the Rome Statute. There should also be a legal basis allowing the ICC to sit 
on appeal in cases involving crimes that are specific to a region, unless such an appeal is 
lodged with a special chamber of the regional criminal court which has heard those cases at 
the first instance. This is a matter of particular arrangements within the system. Similarly, 
regional criminal courts should be established in every region and be widely accepted by the 
states concerned for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction at first instance. Given these 
weaknesses, the principle of regional territoriality may be difficult to apply. One may 
reasonably doubt that a system of international criminal justice based on this principle will be 
established in the near future. The establishment of such a system is highly dependent on 
political will of states and the international community as a whole. For its efficiency, it would 
be necessary to promote interregional judicial cooperation in criminal matters in order to 
avoid that a given region becomes the sanctuary of impunity. 
Finally, in the context of Africa, the intervention of the regional criminal court should be 
exceptional. This is because recognition of its jurisdiction by African states might remain 
limited. Furthermore, recourse to universal jurisdiction in the framework of the principle of 
regional territoriality should be prioritised. In the event of regional prosecutions or trials, 
priority should be accorded to delegation of jurisdiction to an AU member state or the 
creation of a hybrid court with participation of regional judges. When the AU Criminal Court 
exceptionally upholds its jurisdiction, it will act as a jurisdiction of first instance in the 
repression of ICC crimes. In this regard, the AU Criminal Court should benefit from the 
support of the international community as a whole. Globally, the ICC Prosecutor should work 
hand in hand with the regional prosecutors and offices, share expertise and judicial 
information. The ICC could equitably allocate part of its financial resources to regional 
criminal courts to support their proceedings. In short, all this may constitute the better system 
of international criminal justice, which is multilevel, integrated and unified. This evolutionary 
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shift towards more regionalisation of international criminal law will therefore require 
profound legal reforms. The amendments to the Rome Statute, as described in the first part of 
this study, would not be anymore sufficient. It is the entire system of international criminal 
law which should be revisited.    




Conclusion of Part II 
This part has highlighted a number of indicators of the development of African international 
criminal law. Two aspects have been distinguished. The first one relates to the necessity to 
protect and defend African regional public order. This notion of African regional public order 
is made up of legal rules of different nature and institutions which aim to protect peace, 
security, stability and human rights in Africa. Regarding legal rules, it has been demonstrated 
that African international criminal law contains two categories of norms. First of all, some 
rules emanate from global international criminal law. These norms are however regionalised 
and incorporated into African legal instruments with a relative expansion of their legal scope. 
This is the case of the definitions of ICC crimes, such as war crimes and aggression, by the 
Malabo Protocol of June 2014. Second, the notion of African regional public order is enriched 
by the codification of various norms that are specific to Africa in criminal matters. These 
norms include the definitions of another ten crimes, including economic and political offenses 
that are not dealt with as such by the ICC, notably illicit exploitation of natural resources, 
political assassination and unconstitutional changes of government. All these norms can be 
enforced on behalf of the AU as a community of African states and peoples. One of the best 
bases for this community’s action for the fight against impunity is the Union’s right to 
intervene in a member state in the event of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
Furthermore, the AU can now resort to different regional mechanisms of criminal 
accountability to protect and defend African regional public order. This has been 
demonstrated in the second aspect of the development of African international criminal law: 
the promotion of the system of African regional criminal justice. Practical information has 
shown that the AU suggests or has resorted to various types of regional exercise of 
jurisdiction over international crimes in Africa: delegation of jurisdiction to a member state 
(case of the trial of Hissène Habré) and hybrid jurisdictions, such as the Extraordinary African 
Chambers in the Senegalese Courts, the proposed hybrid court for the Darfur region (Sudan) 
in 2009 and the ad hoc legal mechanism of criminal accountability for South Sudan that was 
recommended in 2014. However, the most important innovation in this respect is the creation 
of the AU Criminal Court. This jurisdiction is actually the International Criminal Law Section 
established within the AfCJHPR. It is modeled on the ICC and the ad hoc UN criminal 
tribunals (ICTY and ICTR).  
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The features of the ICC are found in the structure of the AU Criminal Court, the mechanisms 
to trigger its jurisdiction which include political bodies (the AU assembly and PSC), and the 
procedures applicable by the Court, notably the principle of complementarity to African 
domestic criminal tribunals. However, the AU Criminal Court is also different from the ICC 
in several respects. For example, its jurisdictional clauses extend to passive personality and 
the principle of protection. The AU Criminal Court is also complementary to courts of justice 
of RECs which may have criminal jurisdiction. Procedurally speaking, it does not include the 
stage of confirmation of charges, which is one of the principal causes of very lengthy trials 
before the ICC and resources consumption. In addition, corporate criminal liability and 
personal immunities of officials of states parties are admitted before it. The regime of 
cooperation between the AU Criminal Court and its member states is (wrongly) modeled on 
the laconic provisions of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes rather than on detailed Part 9 of the 
ICC Statute concerning “international cooperation and judicial assistance”. Furthermore, apart 
from several technical shortcomings relating to the drafting of the Malabo Protocol (Annex), 
the AU Criminal Court contains numerous deficiencies. One may recall the omission of 
applicable procedures concerning challenges to the Court’s jurisdiction and the admissibility 
of cases as required by the principle of complementarity. Another missing is the procedure on 
the challenge to the Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed, before the Pre-Trial Chamber. More 
important, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) does not contain any specific provision on the law 
applicable by the Court that could be comparable to article 21 of the ICC Statute. It even 
omits to refer to the necessity to adopt the Court’s Rules of Procedures and Evidence, as well 
as the Elements of Crimes, which should be part of that applicable law.  
These deficiencies are among the challenges to overcome for the viability of the system of 
justice embodied in the AU Criminal Court. In this regard, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) 
needs a profound technical refinement. This concerns, among others, the inclusion of a 
specific provision on applicable law and the missing procedures before the Court. The Rules 
of Procedures and Evidence as well as the Elements of Crimes should also be adopted. As 
there is no such organ within the structure of the AU Criminal Court comparable to the ASP 
to the ICC Statute, it has been suggested that these two important instruments may be adopted 
by the Court itself. Finally, there is a need, in the form of a separate treaty or amendments to 
the Malabo Protocol (Annex), for a comprehensive legal framework on judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters in Africa, which could be binding on the AU, the RECs and their member 
states. This will help avoid a number of risks which can impair the fight against impunity in 
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the continent: diversification of legal instruments on judicial cooperation and potential legal 
fragmentation; legal de-connection of one state to another or of one REC to another; lack of 
regulations on interregional cooperation between courts of justice of RECs. If these 
improvements are made and the AU guarantees financial resources to support the Court’s 
operation and other mechanisms of criminal accountability, the emerging system of regional 
criminal justice may become viable and eventually efficient in the fight against impunity in 
Africa. This system can be connected to the global system of international criminal justice, 
notably through the regionalisation of the ICC. The latter may be transformed into a court of 
appeal against decisions of regional criminal tribunals, where they exist, as jurisdictions of 
first instance over ICC crimes and in accordance with the principle of regional territoriality.   





This thesis is situated in the context of the regionalisation of international criminal law. It 
deals with the development of African international criminal law under the aegis of the AU. 
The central question has asked which factors inform this development, the concept and the 
content of regional law so laid down for the African continent. The primary objective was to 
explore theoretical and practical bases for the establishment of a viable system of African 
regional criminal justice in order to deal with crimes against peace and security in Africa, 
which put in danger African regional public order. The thesis also aimed to examine the 
relationship between African regional criminal law and the global system of international 
criminal justice, currently dominated by the ICC and the UN Security Council. The systemic 
analysis of these different issues have reached three main conclusions.  
1. The Combination of Universal and Regional Factors behind the Development of 
African International Criminal Law 
The first conclusion of this study is that the development of African international criminal law 
is not simply a conjectural consequence of the crisis observed within general international 
criminal law. It is also and chiefly the result of the policy of self-reliance of the AU and its 
member states aiming to protect and defend African regional public order through the 
recourse to regional institutions of criminal accountability.  
With respect to the crisis of general international criminal law, this thesis has demonstrated 
that it manifests itself in four different ways in relation to the African continent. First of all, 
there are tensions arising from perceptions of unequal decline of sovereignty deriving from 
the distribution of criminal powers between states and the international community. Second, 
the AU and its member states disapproved the abusive exercise of universal jurisdiction by 
some European states in African situations. Third, there are a divergence of views on the ICC 
jurisdiction and contestations of its judicial work in Africa. Fourth, the crisis relates to the 
unsatisfied claim for legal reforms by AU member states.  
In fact, states no longer possess judicial discretion or monopoly to prosecute international 
crimes committed in their territory, by their nationals or by aliens who are found therein. 
Competing criminal jurisdiction acknowledged to foreign countries or the international 
community may result in external judicial interventions. Contestations then arise when such 
interventions to ensure criminal prosecutions and fight against impunity contradict the policy 
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of the competent state not to prosecute, notably through amnesties or judicial inaction, in 
order to achieve a peace process or realise national reconciliation. Contestations are also 
possible if these interventions involve prosecutions of former or incumbent senior state 
officials in violation of the rules on immunity or are viewed as potentially provocative of 
regime-change, irrespective of the democratic aspirations and self-determination of the people 
of the state concerned. Contestations are finally possible when external judicial interventions 
appear as a measure of constraint against the competent state, given the fact that its nationals 
or situations occurring within its territory are submitted to a foreign judicial authority without 
its express consent. These contestations are more perceptible in the relationship between weak 
and powerful countries. The reason is that, in practice, powerful states are more likely to 
exercise jurisdiction over criminal acts committed abroad than weak countries, owing to the 
costs of such an action, notably diplomatic frictions and financial resources. Powerful 
countries also influence the work done in the name of the international community. Of 
particular interest was the Lockerbie case in respect of the relationship between Libya, the 
United Kingdom and the USA, when the Security Council imposed the extradition of two 
Libyans to the latter countries for the purpose of prosecutions for acts of terrorism. The 
influence of powerful countries is even explicit through referrals of situations in non-
contracting states to the ICC Prosecutor or the suspension of the Court’s proceedings in 
accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Examples were those relating to the referral 
of the situation in Libya to the ICC Prosecutor and the refusal by the Security Council to defer 
the Court’s proceedings regarding the situation in Kenya. All in all, external judicial 
interventions are perceived as a manifestation of a policy of force or a means to achieve a 
(geo-) political agenda, rather than just the pursuit of the cause of justice, against nationals or 
the leadership of weak states or other countries where great powers do not have specific 
interests to protect. As a result, the decline of state sovereignty has become in practical terms 
the decline of sovereignty on the part of weak countries and the parallel increasing of 
exorbitant powers in favour of powerful states within the international legal system. This is 
paradoxical given the under-participation of great powers in the ICC. Countries such as India, 
Israel and three permanent members of the Security Council (China, Russia and USA) have 
not ratified the Rome Statute. This under-participation gives the impression that some states 
are jealously guarding their sovereignty, while others are subjected, by will, constraint or 
enticement, to the global system of international criminal justice.  
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This inequality between states reinforces perceptions of “hegemonic” use of international 
mechanisms of criminal accountability. This explains all the negative legal and political 
statements on the ICC and the principle of universal jurisdiction: tool for imperialism; 
contestations of both the application of the rules on the principle of ICC’s complementary 
jurisdiction or the state officials’ immunity; disapproval of indictments against the AU sitting 
heads of state or government before any international criminal tribunal; need to frame 
differently the exercise of powers granted by the Rome Statute to the ICC Prosecutor and the 
Security Council; diplomatic efforts within the UN General Assembly aiming to define a 
number of rules restricting or preventing the abuse of the application of universal jurisdiction. 
There is no legal or technical solution to such a crisis. The pursuit of dialogue between states 
should continue in order to advance on the path of legal reforms which would satisfy the 
interests of all the states and the regions.    
The crisis of general international criminal law has boosted the development of African 
international criminal law. However, this development is previous to it and dates back at least 
to the creation of the OAU in 1963. The policy of self-reliance of the AU and its member 
states might limit external judicial interventions in African countries. It is also designed to fill 
the gap of general international criminal law by addressing a number of crimes of specific 
concern to the African continent which are not dealt with at the universal level. It is in this 
context that the notion of African regional public order finds its application. This notion is 
made up of two different legal conceptions. On the one hand, it refers to an order of protection 
of Africa, which implies a set of rules and principles having a high legal status in Africa –
even a peremptory character as regards those universal norms that have been regionalised –
which are of fundamental importance for the protection of peace, stability and human rights in 
Africa or any other essential interests of the African community of states and peoples as a 
whole. On the other hand, the notion refers to an order of defence against regional security 
threats violating the norms so laid down. In African international criminal law, these 
violations have been identified as crimes against peace and security in Africa. The thesis has 
discussed the African codification of these crimes and classified them into two categories, 
namely the crimes against human security, i.e. that of individuals, and the crimes against the 
states and Africa. They include the four ICC crimes, with a relative regional expansion of 
their definitions, and at least some other ten crimes of specific concern to Africa.  
The substantive added value of African international criminal law lies in the definitions of 
these crimes. Suffice it to recall some innovations in respect of some ICC crimes incorporated 
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into the Malabo Protocol (Annex). For example, the crime of aggression can be committed on 
behalf of a state or a non-state actor. War crimes include 15 new offences as compared to the 
definition provided for by the Rome Statute. This is notably the case of the criminalisation of 
the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in the context of any armed 
conflict. Furthermore, the other ten crimes of specific concern to Africa and over which the 
ICC does not have jurisdiction include unconstitutional change of government, piracy, 
terrorism, mercenarism, corruption, money laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in 
drugs, trafficking in hazardous wastes and illicit exploitation of natural resources.  
African regional public order therefore offers a promising legal framework to respond 
collectively to the said crimes in the framework of the AU. The protection and the defence of 
this order is the raison d’être of the promotion of the system of African regional criminal 
justice.                       
2. The Promotion of Three Optional Approaches to African Regional Criminal Justice 
The second conclusion of this study is that the AU is promoting a system of African regional 
criminal justice based on three optional models of justice, namely the delegation of 
jurisdiction to a member state, the creation of hybrid courts with participation of regional 
judges and the establishment of a regional criminal court, mandated to try the aforementioned 
crimes against peace and security in Africa. Together with these crimes, these models of 
justice form the core of the content of African international criminal law. Delegation of 
jurisdiction to a member state was experienced in the case of the trial of the former Chadian 
president, Hissène Habré, in Senegal. Hybrid courts were suggested in Senegal and Darfur 
(Sudan). The first experience succeeded with the establishment of the EAC, whilst the second 
failed due to insufficient international support for the regional initiative and the lack of 
political will on the part of Sudan. The regional criminal court was created by the Malabo 
Protocol in June 2014. It indeed creates an International Criminal Law Section within the 
AfCJHPR which this thesis generically referred to as the AU Criminal Court. It has been 
demonstrated that for any initiation of regional prosecutions or trials of crimes committed in 
Africa, the AU may attempt to rely on any of these three models of justice, depending on the 
specificity of every situation or case and the availability of financial resources. However, the 
recourse to the AU Criminal Court, which is to be the main judicial institution in the emerging 
system of African regional criminal justice, should remain exceptional, as prosecutions and 
trials may be conducted by states themselves or in collaboration with the AU. Still, the 
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viability of the AU Criminal Court is problematic. There are numerous challenges to 
overcome, including ratifying the Malabo Protocol, complementing the definition of the 
Court’s applicable law, raising the technical legal standards of the Court’s complementary 
jurisdiction to domestic tribunals and courts of justice of RECs, promoting judicial 
cooperation of African states by adopting a comprehensive regional framework on judicial 
cooperation in Africa and finding financial resources to support the Court’s operation. 
Another challenge is the coordination of African international criminal law with the global 
system of international criminal justice.  
3. The Prospect for Three Alternative Approaches to Consistent Relationship with the 
Global System of International Criminal Justice 
The third conclusion of this study is that African international criminal law is not a 
replacement of general international criminal law on the continent. There is rather a 
coexistence of norms and institutions which commands a certain degree of coordinated 
relationships to avoid unnecessary conflicts and so inefficiency of justice. This thesis has 
discussed perspectives on three alternative approaches to consistent relationships between 
African regional criminal law and the global system of international criminal justice, namely 
the hierarchical model, the cooperative approach and the regionalisation of the ICC in 
conjunction with the principle of regional territoriality. 
The hierarchical model privileges complementarity of the ICC to the AU Criminal Court. In 
this model, the latter Court is subordinated like domestic jurisdictions to the decision of the 
ICC on the admissibility of cases. The ICC should intervene when the AU Criminal Court 
fails to exercise its jurisdiction. A strong example to recall is the incapacity to proceed due to 
immunity bars to bring cases against AU sitting heads of state or government before the 
regional criminal court. However, the thesis found that this approach was rejected by the 
drafters of the Malabo Protocol. This was evidenced by their silence on such a principle as 
regards the ICC, in contrast to the express provision on complementarity of the AU Criminal 
Court to courts of justice of RECs. Rather, the drafters of the Malabo Protocol put forward a 
cooperative approach between equally coexisting international courts. Furthermore, the 
Malabo Protocol (Annex) is silent on the relationship between the AU Criminal Court and the 
UN Security Council which has the principal responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. It has been concluded that this UN political body could only 
have the possibility to recommend to the competent AU organs (the AU Assembly or the 
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PSC) referral of a situation in a state party to the Malabo Protocol to the AU Criminal Court. 
There is no such kind of relationship between the Security Council and the AU Criminal 
Court which is comparable to that of the Security Council and the ICC. In terms of 
legitimacy, more involvement of the Security Council in the functioning of the AU Criminal 
Court would require amendments to the Malabo Protocol, the reform of the composition of 
the Council and an equitable allocation of the veto power to its member states.    
The cooperative approach privileges mutual accommodation between equally coexisting 
courts. This thesis has shown that cooperation on the basis of division of work is undesirable. 
The most important reason is that this division of work could run against the objective which 
has informed the creation of the AU Criminal Court or broadly the system of African regional 
criminal justice, which is to try any international crime committed in Africa, prior to any 
judicial intervention of external actors to the continent. At best, the relationship between the 
two courts should be based on an agreement on cooperation which provides for applicable 
procedures designed to eliminate potential conflicts due to parallel proceedings and the risk of 
contradictory judgments. This is the case of the principles of litis alibi pendens and ne bis in 
idem. These procedures should be complemented by judicial dialogue between officials of the 
two courts in order to harmonise policies, strategies and activities on the ground. The thesis 
has notably suggested the establishment of a conference of international prosecutors to this 
effect. 
Finally, regionalisation of the ICC appears to be the most realistic option for the future of the 
system of international criminal justice. Regional criminal courts, which are also envisaged as 
potentially delivering justice outside Africa, such as in the Caribbean, in Latin-America or in 
Southeast Asia, could be transformed into jurisdictions of first instance for the ICC. Doing so 
will allow these courts to efficiently apply the principle of regional territoriality, according to 
which crimes committed in one region should be tried by states of that region or the 
competent regional criminal court at first instance, before any possible external judicial 
intervention. This is a way to increase the ownership of international criminal justice in order 
to avoid perceptions of hegemonic exercise of jurisdiction by states from one region against 
nationals of other states from other regions, and so to increase confidence in the system of 
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Die vorliegende Arbeit steht im Kontext der Regionalisierung im Internationalen Strafrecht. Sie 
untersucht die Faktoren, die der entsprechenden Entwicklung des afrikanischen internationalen 
Strafrechts unter der Ägide der Afrikanischen Union (AU) zugrunde liegen und beleuchtet die Inhalte 
dieser sich entwickelnden Disziplin. Primäres Ziel der Arbeit ist es, die theoretischen und praktischen 
Grundlagen für die Entwicklung eines tragfähigen Systems afrikanischer Strafjustiz zu untersuchen, 
das in der Lage sein soll, mit Verbrechen gegen den Frieden und die Sicherheit in Afrika umzugehen, 
die die öffentliche Ordnung des Kontinents bedrohen. Im Weiteren entwickelt die Arbeit das Verhältnis 
des regionalen, afrikanischen Strafrechts zu dem globalen System des internationalen Strafrechts, in 
dessen Mittelpunkt der Internationale Strafgerichtshof (IStGH) und der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten 
Nationen stehen. Die Kombination der Analysen dieser verschiedenen Bereiche führt die Arbeit zu 
drei zentralen Schlussfolgerungen: Erstens ist die Entwicklung eines afrikanischen internationalen 
Strafrechts nicht nur eine Konsequenz der aktuellen Krise des internationalen Strafrechts. Sie ist 
ebenso und zuvorderst das Ergebnis einer Politik der Eigenständigkeit der AU und ihrer 
Mitgliedsstaaten. Diese zielt darauf ab, die regionale öffentliche Ordnung durch regionale 
Institutionen und strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit zu schützen. Die zweite Schlussfolgerung lautet, 
dass die AU ein System regional- afrikanischer Strafjustiz vorantreibt, das auf drei optionalen 
Modellen aufbaut: Der Delegation von Rechtsprechungsbefugnissen an Mitgliedsstaaten, der 
Errichtung hybrider Gerichte mit regionalen RichterInnen sowie dem Aufbau eines regionalen 
Strafgerichtshofs. Zusammen mit solchen Straftatbeständen der Verbrechen gegen den Frieden und 
die Sicherheit, die den Kontinent spezifisch betreffen, bilden diese Modelle den Kern des afrikanischen 
internationalen Strafrechts. Allerdings bleiben Tragfähigkeit und Effizienz des Systems problematisch. 
Es steht vor einer Vielzahl an Herausforderungen, etwa der Ratifikation des Malabo-Protokolls von 
2014, das einen „Strafgerichtshof der AU“ errichten soll, der Förderung justizieller Kooperation der 
Staaten oder der Sicherung einer stabilen Finanzierung des Gerichts. Die dritte Schlussfolgerung 
lautet, dass ein afrikanisches internationales Strafrecht kein Ersatz für das allgemeine internationale 
Strafrecht ist. Es geht um die Koexistenz von Normen und Institutionen und eine koordinierte 
Beziehung, um Kollisionen und Ineffizienzen zu vermeiden. Die Arbeit diskutiert drei verschiedener 
Ansätze für stabile Beziehungen zwischen dem afrikanisch-regionalen und dem internationalen 
Strafrecht: Das hierarchische Modell, den kooperativen Ansatz und die Regionalisierung des IStGH in 
Verbindung mit dem Prinzip der regionalen Territorialität.  
 
